Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[ljadw]

Warlimot? What do you mean? High command trial?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Warlimont

Inside Hitler's headquarters

https://b-ok.cc/book/2059431/6b3bd5

Warlimont was the deputy of Jodl and belonged to the OKW (WFS) which had no business in Barbarossa .

[ljadw]

Yes strategy of the battle i agree but not strategy how to win the war at first. And you also forgot that OKW agreed that also on that way they will be able to cross throught Ukraine very quickly.

Barbarossa was not the business of OKW .

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw this is debate about actual history.

[SloveneLiberal]

Something else. About Hitler changing his mind in late September 1941 after Kiew was captured. Seeing that things are not going well he ordered in August 1941 that army group south should be reinforced ( it should be stronger in the first place already before according to the strategy of Hitler which was mismanaged by OKW ). But after the fall of Kiew it seems von Bock persuaded Hitler that Red army is falling apart and that now is the time to concentrate on Moscow. Halder praised also this wrong decison as we can see from his diary for September 1941.

[ljadw]

About the suicide of Jeschonnek,mentioned in post 82: this was not caused by the conviction that Germany had lost the war,or by the attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, but by the order of Jeschonnek after the attack on Peenemünde to the German Flak in Berlin to shoot on a concentration of German fighters, who were thought by Jeschonnek to be allied aircraft .It was this blunder that caused Jeschonnek's suicide .

[ljadw]

Something else. About Hitler changing his mind in late September 1941 after Kiew was captured. Seeing that things are not going well he ordered in August 1941 that army group south should be reinforced ( it should be stronger in the first place already before according to the strategy of Hitler which was mismanaged by OKW ). But after the fall of Kiew it seems von Bock persuaded Hitler that Red army is falling apart and that now is the time to concentrate on Moscow. Halder praised also this wrong decison as we can see from his diary for September 1941.

The Taifun decision was not wrong, because no Taifun meant no victory in the East in 1941 . The chances for Taifun to succeed were minimal, but it was worth to try it .
That ''things were not going well in August '' is the euphemism of the decennium : it was obvious in August 1941 that Barbarossa had failed and the question was now : what now ? The answer of the OKH was to repeat the tactics which had failed, and Hitler agreed because there was no alternative.As Taifun was only possible at the end of September, Hitler took the correct decision to use the free time for an offensive in the South to capture the industrial and agriculture assets of the Ukraine , and to make Taifun possible : without the Kesselschlachten in the South, Taifun was not possible .It is thus not correct to say that Hitler changed his mind in late September :the Kiew battle ended on September 26,while Taifun started 4 days later,on September 30, because it took til September 30 to prepare Taifun .

[Cult Icon]

What destroyed the Axis in Typhoon phase 2 and Stalingrad/Caucasus in 42' were the regenerative abilities of the Red Army. In both cases they vastly underestimated their capabilities to not only rebuild, but improve and expand their capabilities in such a short amount of time (a few months).

In both cases the RKKA bided their time until the Axis reached culmination point/critical weakness and then struck with a coordinated series of counteroffensives. The tactical superiority of fresh panzer and infantry divisions didn't matter much when the vast majority of German formations on the front were bled white and had lost most of their combat power.

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw but you are writting like there was an agreement between Hitler and his generals about the strategy which is not correct. Hitler was just persuaded in September 1941 by von Bock who was speaking for OKW that after the fall of Kiew they should go after Moscow. Also it is not correct that they were thinking at that time that they are losing but rather they were all thinking that they will most surelly win the war. That was the mistake of all of them, yet strategy of Hitler was in general much more correct in that stage that the one of his generals.

[SloveneLiberal]

Cult iron you are surelly right in general terms but Red army was able to regenerate in winter 1941/42 because Caucasus and Donets Basin were not captured in 1941 at least not in the right time with the last. So Soviets had enough oil and they moved their war industry throgh Ural.

However this outcome was not at all sure until October 1941. There were to main mistakes mostly done by OKW. At the start of Barbarossa generals concentrated armor and planes in centre contrary to the strategy of Hitler who prefered taking food, war industry and oil from Soviet Union. In August Hitler corrected this with sending reinforcements to south. Then again in September OKW in fact von Bock on its behalf persuaded Hitler that after the fall of Kiew they should go after Moscow. In November when progress at Moscow stopped Hitler desperatly ordered new offensive in the south, now of course being really to late for the success.

With phrase being persuaded by his generals i mean that Hitler was in his strategy not seeing Moscow as priority. But the illusion which they all shared about how they are winning and the fact that foe around two months were lost with army group south underfed together with fact that now winter was coming in influenced Hitler that he was open to OKW plans for Moscow.

[SloveneLiberal]

OKW presented to Hitler in early July a very problematical report in which generals claimed that more then half of Red army divisions were already destroyed. Halder was boasting at that time how Red army is lost.

But when on the 18. of August OKW proposed a strong strike toward Moscow Hitler was against it and clearly ordered that before winter German army does not need to reach Moscow but it should on the other hand capture Crimea, Ukraine, Donets Basin and cut the Soviet supply of oil from Caucasus. On the north German army should encircle Leningrad and meet with Finnish troops.

So Hitler was going after his strategy which he set up before the start of Barbarossa that the main key to success is to cripple Soviet economy.

[Cult Icon]

The Red Army regenerated earlier, they were creating new units throughout the summer/fall of 1941- the defeat of the Soviet Union required more than taking Moscow with Army Group Center's sub-optimally supplied last battalions.

[jesk]

OKW presented to Hitler in early July a very problematical report in which generals claimed that more then half of Red army divisions were already destroyed. Halder was boasting at that time how Red army is lost.

But when on the 18. of August OKW proposed a strong strike toward Moscow Hitler was against it and clearly ordered that before winter German army does not need to reach Moscow but it should on the other hand capture Crimea, Ukraine, Donets Basin and cut the Soviet supply of oil from Caucasus. On the north German army should encircle Leningrad and meet with Finnish troops.

So Hitler was going after his strategy which he set up before the start of Barbarossa that the main key to success is to cripple Soviet economy.

Halder drew up a plan for an offensive in Ukraine. But on August 4, Hitler arranged a meeting in Borisov, where he conducted a survey of generals about future plans. They said we want to take Moscow. And then Hitler refused from Ukraine after the Kiev operation. He also ordered to take the Crimea, thus refusing to seize the Caucasus.
It's boring to repeat all this, then maybe about Hitler's tricks on the part of sabotage.

[SloveneLiberal]

Khm do not forget we are talking about history. ☺

[SloveneLiberal]

Cult Icon the capture of Moscow was not so important at all. In the report of OKW from 18. August 1941 generals were claiming that Soviet side concentrated their last important divisions on the Moscow front. Thus striking on them would mean fatal blow for the Red army. Yet Soviet side in fact knew Moscow is not so important. So Hitler's decision not to listen to OKW was a very right one. From the point view of Nazi Germany of course. He underlined in his order to go south from 21. August that his wishes are against OKW plan.

Red army could not really recover from the affects of Barbarossa without very important war industry being moved through Ural and without oil of Caucasus. Already after the fall of Ukraine which came in fact to late food rations of people and soldiers went much lower.

[ljadw]

Ljadw but you are writting like there was an agreement between Hitler and his generals about the strategy which is not correct. Hitler was just persuaded in September 1941 by von Bock who was speaking for OKW that after the fall of Kiew they should go after Moscow. Also it is not correct that they were thinking at that time that they are losing but rather they were all thinking that they will most surelly win the war. That was the mistake of all of them, yet strategy of Hitler was in general much more correct in that stage that the one of his generals.

There was an agreement :
Weisung 34 (July 30 ) : AG Center must remain defensive ( it was already defensive, because it could no longer advance ). AG South had as mission to destroy the Soviet forces who were still west of the Dnjepr and were thus preventing and advance to Moscow. AG North had as mission to encircle Leningrad .
Weisung 34 A (August 12 ) : AGC must secure its flanks and than attack direction Moscow .AGS must farther advance east of Moscow and prevent the enemy to organize a new front east of the Dnjepr .
Weisung 35 ( September 6 ) : AGC must prepare its attack (Taifun ) so that it can start at the end of September ,after the destruction of the forces of Timochenko AGC must continue its advance in the direction of Moscow .
Already in August, Hitler was thinking on Taifun .He had not forgotten Moscow .
As Taifun could only start at the end of September ,and as a condition for Taifun was the destruction of the Soviet forces in the south,the orders to AG SZ were logic .
That Taifun could not start before the day it started has been widely discussed on this forum : the losses of AGC were that great that it was forced to remain idle .Stahel has given the number of operational tanks and infantry for AGC in the summer ,proving that an advance in July was out of the question . The only one who claimed the opposite was of course Guderian, who proved that he was only an idiot .Without the ID of Kluge, an advance to Moscow was out of the question . This was accepted by Bock and the OKH 9= Halder, because Brauchitz was out ) .And even if an advance was possible earlier than it happened,it would have been suicidal,as the Soviet forces south of AG C were not destroyed .