Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[Hanny]

About the suicide of Jeschonnek,mentioned in post 82: this was not caused by the conviction that Germany had lost the war,or by the attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, but by the order of Jeschonnek after the attack on Peenemünde to the German Flak in Berlin to shoot on a concentration of German fighters, who were thought by Jeschonnek to be allied aircraft .It was this blunder that caused Jeschonnek's suicide .

Jesconeck had argued with Goring about force stucture, LW in 1943 was losing 20% of ftr pilots a month, of bombers 14%, Jesconeck had lost the argument over building more fts, In July/August LW Ftrs lost 32% and 36% if its strength in the Reich. Goring blammed Jeschonnek from early 43 onwards as SB took its toll, and he went to AH on the 17th to defend himself, witha 10 page memo for AH to see, asking for Goring to be removed, or he would resign, AH refused to do either.

We have his own suicide note, we have his aides and others comments all supporting suicide over failure to convince goring he was wrong and being scapgoated by Goring. He had already attempted suicide earlier, and had the gun taken out his hand by his aide, who feared he would try it again.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MjR ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7fg ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e0R ... de&f=false

Jesconeck on August 18th wrote a suicide note, explaining Goring had caused the problems and was using him as a scape goat for inability to defend the Reich, and thats his death would be a beacon of hope for the LW, and shot himself. In this note he asked Goring not attend his funeral.


Now the idea that he shot himself over AA fire over Berlin comes from Van Wachstein acount, in which the 20 RAF bombers spoof raid drew in 148 fighters against them and not Peenemede and Jeschonnek directing AA fire that shot down 100 German fighters killing their pilots. Its only his opinion, not shared by anyone else.

The Allies tapped all pow conversations, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... G_0001.pdf here we learn of why he shot himself

Colonel General Jeschonnek, G.P.G. Chief of Staff, died in August 1.943, it was officially given out in Germany that he had died from natural causes at Goering/s Headquarters, It was understooe by officers in the G.A.F., however, that he had shot himself. The prisoner was told that one night Hitler had had a long and angry conversation with Jeschonn(k, in which he reproached the latter for the general leer ficiency and Ian's of enterprise of the G.A.F.; he en( the conversation with: "You know what you can do nor, with the result that Jeschonnek shot himsell s in the early hours of the following morning.


First thing wrong in the wiki acount you prefer, is thats standing orders require the AA guns to engage, there was not 200 as wikki claims but 148, and 7 planes were lost and only 3 pilots killed, if the AA could hit and destroy two thirds of bombers, then SB would have lasted a week and been given up as a bad idea.

Jeschonnek and Udet both shot themselves for fundamentally the same reasons, they failed to convince goring and AH to face reality.

[jesk]

I think i quted sources already but anyway i really want readers to grasp this:

Here you can find how Hitler told to Ribbentrop in January 1941 that the goals of Barbarossa are: the destruction of the Red army, the seizure of the most important industrial ares and the seizure of Baku. Also you can find other statements which i mentioned before like the confession of Speer that main objective of Barbarossa was oil. ( chapter about operation Barbarossa )

https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... _11993.pdf

For the order of Hitler from 21. August 1941 which is going against the memorandum of OKW from three days earlier I used also another source book Pekel 1941, written by Miloš Mikeln in 1981, which is also talking about this order in the chapter of the book about operation Barbarossa, then i used some youtube videos too.

In Halder’s diary, Hitler’s thoughts and desires are detailed. In short, the meaning is as follows. The generals wanted to attack Moscow and Kiev at the same time. Hitler insisted on carrying out successive operations. First Kiev, only then Moscow.
Generals: Kiev and Moscow. Fuhrer: 1.Kiev 2.Moscow

[SloveneLiberal]

Max Payload the destruction of Red army was not the only goal of Barbarossa. German generals followed it much more then Hitler did. In July 1941 Hitler was convinced by OKW reports that Red army is almost finished so the difference in strategies was not so important. Yet when he saw it is not so he reacted.

In August 1941 OKW wanted to strike against Moscow to like wipe out "last concentration of remaining German divisions". Hitler said NO and pointed out that it is his priority to capture food rich areas, war industry in Donets Basin and cut off supply of oil from Caucasus at the right time. So pointing to his strategy that SU should be crippled economicaly. He strenghtened army group south and weakened the centre which was made to strong by OKW quite contrary to the wishes of Hitler.

About old conventional view you should understand the background. During Cold war quite some German generals were working for the west as advisors. Like knowing much about Red army and Soviet union. You can imagine that by admiting their mistakes they would be seen as bad advisors. But history overgrew this point of view now.

[Max Payload]

Capture of the oil fields or cutting the oil from the Caucassus was impossible in 1941

it is necessary to prove, otherwise it is just words

In order for AGS to advance beyond the Don against organised resistance in 1941 it would have needed not only the necessary men, guns and tanks, it would have needed the ability to supply those forces with the means to advance - food, fuel and ammunition. And that was the problem. During the autumn of 1941 Rundstedt was struggling to keep his relatively meagre forces (compared with what would have been required for an offensive to the Terek) adequately supplied. The advance from the Mius to the Don (Rostov) required a six-day pause in the middle of the offensive, primarily because of supply problems. Admittedly more effort could have been put into road and rail infrastructure upgrading in the south during October and November at the expense of AGC’s already dire logistical problems on the central axis but, and this is my opinion, it would have been entirely beyond the capacity of the Wehrmacht’s supply services to keep two armies and four or five panzer corps supplied east of the Don in November/December 1941.

This is logic without reference to the military component. 11 Army could turn the tide in favor of the Wehrmacht.

Order of battle (3 Sep 1941) ...

What does the order of battle of 11 Army have to do with the logistical supply situation of AGS in the final quarter of 1941? And what does the order of battle of 11 Army on 3 September have to do with anything being discussed?

Max Payload the destruction of Red army was not the only goal of Barbarossa.

No, but it was the primary goal of the Barbarossa planning - from which the other objectives would follow. Initially the only geographical objectives were Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev, none of which were targeted for their economic value to the SU.

[jesk]

Capture of the oil fields or cutting the oil from the Caucassus was impossible in 1941

it is necessary to prove, otherwise it is just words

In order for AGS to advance beyond the Don against organised resistance in 1941 it would have needed not only the necessary men, guns and tanks, it would have needed the ability to supply those forces with the means to advance - food, fuel and ammunition. And that was the problem. During the autumn of 1941 Rundstedt was struggling to keep his relatively meagre forces (compared with what would have been required for an offensive to the Terek) adequately supplied. The advance from the Mius to the Don (Rostov) required a six-day pause in the middle of the offensive, primarily because of supply problems. Admittedly more effort could have been put into road and rail infrastructure upgrading in the south during October and November at the expense of AGC’s already dire logistical problems on the central axis but, and this is my opinion, it would have been entirely beyond the capacity of the Wehrmacht’s supply services to keep two armies and four or five panzer corps supplied east of the Don in November/December 1941.

This is logic without reference to the military component. 11 Army could turn the tide in favor of the Wehrmacht.

Order of battle (3 Sep 1941) ...

What does the order of battle of 11 Army have to do with the logistical supply situation of AGS in the final quarter of 1941? And what does the order of battle of 11 Army on 3 September have to do with anything being discussed?

The supply is excellent. The number of divisions was not enough to break into the Caucasus.

[jesk]

In August 1941 OKW wanted to strike against Moscow to like wipe out "last concentration of remaining German divisions". Hitler said NO and pointed out that it is his priority to capture food rich areas, war industry in Donets Basin and cut off supply of oil from Caucasus at the right time. So pointing to his strategy that SU should be crippled economicaly. He strenghtened army group south and weakened the centre which was made to strong by OKW quite contrary to the wishes of Hitler.

At first Hitler said he needed a Hoth tank group near Leningrad, in response to Halder’s proposal to attack Moscow with 3rd tank group. That is what Halder wrote about. Fuhrer Moscow is not interested, only Leningrad. Then Hitler ordered to wait and Hoth for the end of the operation near Kiev.

all he cares about is Leningrad
23 july

[jesk]

6-7 divisions attacked in the Rostov direction. This is clearly not enough to achieve decisive success. With the 11th Army, the collapse of the Soviet defense; breakthrough on Baku.

[SloveneLiberal]

Ok Jesk. You should understand also that Leningrad was important because Hitler wanted Germans to connect with Finns. Plus from Halder's note you can see his desires were for Moscow. Hitler was not interested much even the majority of armor and planes were concentrated in center.

[jesk]

Ok Jesk. You should understand also that Leningrad was important because Hitler wanted Germans to connect with Finns. Plus from Halder's note you can see his desires were for Moscow. Hitler was not interested much even the majority of armor and planes were concentrated in center.

July 10, the Germans took Smolensk. Stood there until September 30. This is probably the main thing. No movement of the Wehrmacht in depth. Responsible for such a disgrace Hitler. 80 days pause.

[SloveneLiberal]

Max Payload Hitler was thinking a lot about oil even studing how it is produced and so on. This was very important question for him. If his goal was to capture Soviet war industry that would mean capturing it before it being moved to Asia.

[SloveneLiberal]

Jesk but also in the battle with the Red army at the beggining of August Germans captured more then 300.000 soldiers and destroyed more than 3000 tanks. Hitler already in July sent quite some troops from center to north and south. For him center was made to strong by generals. That is quite right strategy.

[jesk]

Jesk but also in the battle with the Red army at the beggining of August Germans captured more then 300.000 soldiers and destroyed more then 3000 tanks. Hitler already in July sent quite some troops from center to north and south. For him center was made to strong by generals. That is quite right strategy.

The Germans still have to move forward. Moscow is a weak reference point for them. Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk clearly corresponded to the ideas of defeated Russia.

Black line where the Germans stopped in July. Circle around Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk. It is noticeable how little the Germans dived into the territory of the enemy.

[ljadw]

Max Payload the destruction of Red army was not the only goal of Barbarossa. German generals followed it much more then Hitler did. In July 1941 Hitler was convinced by OKW reports that Red army is almost finished so the difference in strategies was not so important. Yet when he saw it is not so he reacted.

In August 1941 OKW wanted to strike against Moscow to like wipe out "last concentration of remaining German divisions". Hitler said NO and pointed out that it is his priority to capture food rich areas, war industry in Donets Basin and cut off supply of oil from Caucasus at the right time. So pointing to his strategy that SU should be crippled economicaly. He strenghtened army group south and weakened the centre which was made to strong by OKW quite contrary to the wishes of Hitler.

About old conventional view you should understand the background. During Cold war quite some German generals were working for the west as advisors. Like knowing much about Red army and Soviet union. You can imagine that by admiting their mistakes they would be seen as bad advisors. But history overgrew this point of view now.

In September Hitler agreed to and ordered to attack the Soviet forces defending Moscow .
That this attack did not happen before the end of September,had nothing to do with Hitler ordering an attack in the South ( NOT the Caucasus ) ,but with the fact that it was logistically impossiblke to start Taifun before end September,whatever may claim Guderian,whose claims which he repeated after the war,only proved that he was inept as army commander .
Other point : it was not the last concentration of German divisions, but of Soviet divisions .

[ljadw]

About the suicide of Jeschonnek,mentioned in post 82: this was not caused by the conviction that Germany had lost the war,or by the attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, but by the order of Jeschonnek after the attack on Peenemünde to the German Flak in Berlin to shoot on a concentration of German fighters, who were thought by Jeschonnek to be allied aircraft .It was this blunder that caused Jeschonnek's suicide .

Jesconeck had argued with Goring about force stucture, LW in 1943 was losing 20% of ftr pilots a month, of bombers 14%, Jesconeck had lost the argument over building more fts, In July/August LW Ftrs lost 32% and 36% if its strength in the Reich. Goring blammed Jeschonnek from early 43 onwards as SB took its toll, and he went to AH on the 17th to defend himself, witha 10 page memo for AH to see, asking for Goring to be removed, or he would resign, AH refused to do either.

We have his own suicide note, we have his aides and others comments all supporting suicide over failure to convince goring he was wrong and being scapgoated by Goring. He had already attempted suicide earlier, and had the gun taken out his hand by his aide, who feared he would try it again.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MjR ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7fg ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e0R ... de&f=false

Jesconeck on August 18th wrote a suicide note, explaining Goring had caused the problems and was using him as a scape goat for inability to defend the Reich, and thats his death would be a beacon of hope for the LW, and shot himself. In this note he asked Goring not attend his funeral.


Now the idea that he shot himself over AA fire over Berlin comes from Van Wachstein acount, in which the 20 RAF bombers spoof raid drew in 148 fighters against them and not Peenemede and Jeschonnek directing AA fire that shot down 100 German fighters killing their pilots. Its only his opinion, not shared by anyone else.

The Allies tapped all pow conversations, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... G_0001.pdf here we learn of why he shot himself

Colonel General Jeschonnek, G.P.G. Chief of Staff, died in August 1.943, it was officially given out in Germany that he had died from natural causes at Goering/s Headquarters, It was understooe by officers in the G.A.F., however, that he had shot himself. The prisoner was told that one night Hitler had had a long and angry conversation with Jeschonn(k, in which he reproached the latter for the general leer ficiency and Ian's of enterprise of the G.A.F.; he en( the conversation with: "You know what you can do nor, with the result that Jeschonnek shot himsell s in the early hours of the following morning.


First thing wrong in the wiki acount you prefer, is thats standing orders require the AA guns to engage, there was not 200 as wikki claims but 148, and 7 planes were lost and only 3 pilots killed, if the AA could hit and destroy two thirds of bombers, then SB would have lasted a week and been given up as a bad idea.

Jeschonnek and Udet both shot themselves for fundamentally the same reasons, they failed to convince goring and AH to face reality.

I am not convinced by what Below told ,because
a More fighters and thus LESS bombers is not proved to be correct
b The most important function of the second man is to catch the blames destined for the number one : for political reasons,Goering was to be spared and Jeschonnek knew it .
c He was not obliged to kill himself,as he could ask and obtain another function,or declare himself sick
d As he was already de facto LW commander, he could not blame Goering for what was going wrong .
e Udet killed himself because there were big problems in his sector, for which he was not responsible and which later were solved ,but as commander he was held responsible ,justifiedly . In the winter of 1939-1940 Becker,head of the army armament ,also killed himself ,because there were also big problems in his sector .
Even if Udet and Jeschonnel were able to force Goering and Hitler to face reality ,the problems would not disappear. THus this argument is not correct .

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw yes it was like last concentration of Soviet divisions. . And yes during September army group center was again reinforced for offensive against Moscow. Halder and von Bock being very happy that they persuaded Hitler. Halder even thinking that after Moscow enemy is in fact finished as we can see from his diary. So OKW illusion about last concentration of Soviet divisons around Moscow continued. ( note for 10 October-3. November )