Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[ljadw]

To summarize: Barbarossa was successful in the first three months. Soviet strenght was reducing both army and economical strenght. But operation Typhoon already had seeds of German defeat within it. They should go on after war industry and oil.

No :
Barbarossa failed in the summer although the Germans started from their supply depots ,the summer did not cause the failure .
Typhoon failed in the autumn,because the Germans started 1500 km from Berlin/ 877 km from Warsaw, the autumn did not cause the failure of Typhoon .
The Soviet winteroffensive failed, but not because of the winter .
2 times the Germans failed because the Soviets were too strong and they were too weak .
The Soviets failed because their offensive capacity was weaker than the German defensive capacity .
If the Soviets were not in Warsaw in February 1942, why would the Germans be in Moscow in August 1941 ? Or the opposite ?
Blaming Hitler,the weather,etc is only the usual attempt from the losers to deny the winners the fruits of victory .And this applies not only to the Germans, but also to the Western Allies and to the Soviets : the Soviet generals blamed Stalin for the initial defeats and claimed the victories for themselves. After the death of Stalin of course .

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw to analize what caused some defeat or victory it is not so important what somebody says or what a visible result was after the battle but for example to analize war diaries ( also on the lower level - of divisons ), orders, resources, strenhgt and general strategy. That is how history is doing its job on that field.

[SloveneLiberal]

Offizier1916 thx! I watched the whole video! Some things which i want to point out: Mr House explains more in detail how during winter 1941/42 Soviet strenght grew. That is because they were capable to transport their war industry beyond Ural. The main ''culprit'' for this is OKW and German generals in eastern front - my comment. Of course Soviets had to do some other things to. Reorganize Red army to make it more efficient and so on.

In 1942 Germans had to rely already on their allies having not enough soldiers contrary to Soviets. But allies like Romanians, Italians, Hungarians were higly underequipped. To capture Caucasus in 1941 or block and then bomb it would be much more easy than to try to capture it in 1942 - my comment.


So as it was very much well shown in the debate here without big mistates from Stavka Germans in 1942 were not able to win in the south at Caucasus and Stalingrad. We should have in mind Soviets still had big reserves. And even if Germans would take Caucasus Soviet union would not be kicked out of the war. And yes in Stalingrad Luftwaffe failed because Soviet air forces were already to strong plus because of situation in Africa and operation Torch Luftwaffe was very buissy also there. Encircled German troops were lacking food, supplies and it was a catastrophy. On the other hand Stalin allowed to Eremenko to make good preparations for the offensive on Romanians contrary to his orders before in which he on many times demanded just offensive operations without preparations, leading to quite some defeats and problems. I like criticism of Mainstein memories and claims from mr. House to.

[offizier1916]

Jonathan House pointed it out: the red Army lost in 1941 4.5 Million men. Thats 150 % of the german forces who were at the eastern front. But the red army had 14 Million reserve soldiers, while Germany already had everything in uniform what they had. In 1942 ca 320.000 new recruits were trained for the Wehrmacht (i guess age group of 1923), but thats all. Why did Germany not have a big reserve? Because of the Versaille-treaty. All the ages groupes who were not drafted because of the Versaille treaty were called "White age Group". As Hitler came to the OKW tried to give all those "White age groups" a basic training of 8 Weeks. But first of all this basic Training was too short (in comparison to the normal time span of 2 years of draft service), then the members of the "White age Groups" could not be equipped (not enough weapons, ammunition) and were needed in the civil Industry; were already over 30 and had family etc.

[Cult Icon]

The successes of Blau I/II (which were far below what the Axis needed but also something that they never achieved again on the Eastern Front) were made possible in part of the multiple successes in the Spring (Crimea Campaign, 2nd Kharkov, the encirclement of 2nd Shock Army, end of the Soviet-wintercounteroffensive, etc. ) that put the Soviet reserve/force position at its lowest (and temporary) point in the summer of 42'.

[SloveneLiberal]

Offizier1916 numerical superiorty of Red army was not so important just by itself. This is confirmed today. Yet it is true OKW heavely underestimated Red army and generals lived in an illusion about this which led them to quite some wrong decisions. Soviets had to keep army in far east because of Japan and in battles they were normaly losing much more men than Germans. Germans were in fact quite good in their mobilization efforts at home. Plus they had allies willing to help and Red army had first to recover from Barbarossa success. It was the overall superiorty of the Soviets which was decisive. Having more men, more tanks, more planes, more artillery etc. The only way to stop this trend was to capture their war industry and their oil in summer and autumn 1941.

[ljadw]

Baku in 19041 was impossible : when at Rostov, the Germans were still 1000 km away from Baku ,besides, they had first to defeat the Red Army,and when the Red Army was defeated and the war in the east was over, why to go to Baku ?

[jesk]

Jonathan House pointed it out: the red Army lost in 1941 4.5 Million men. Thats 150 % of the german forces who were at the eastern front. But the red army had 14 Million reserve soldiers, while Germany already had everything in uniform what they had. In 1942 ca 320.000 new recruits were trained for the Wehrmacht (i guess age group of 1923), but thats all. Why did Germany not have a big reserve? Because of the Versaille-treaty. All the ages groupes who were not drafted because of the Versaille treaty were called "White age Group". As Hitler came to the OKW tried to give all those "White age groups" a basic training of 8 Weeks. But first of all this basic Training was too short (in comparison to the normal time span of 2 years of draft service), then the members of the "White age Groups" could not be equipped (not enough weapons, ammunition) and were needed in the civil Industry; were already over 30 and had family etc.

In June 1942, on the eastern front, 2.85 million Germans. A year later, 3.15. An increase of 300 thousand, and this is after the loss of 200 thousand in Stalingrad. Also compensated for losses in Tunisia. Exactly an additional million people, Germany sent to the front in the first months of 1943.
The matter is rather in the absence of a desire to send new soldiers to the front than in the possibility of training them.

[jesk]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VP_QaNU5Uys

interesting lecture.

summary: german army was in a devasted situation already before Fall Blau. During Fall Blau the Situation was even more catastrophic. No reserve, to weak forces, fronts overstretched, axis allies not prepared for a mechanical warfare. General Paulus lived from hand to mouth because of lack of troops and ammunition and fuel. After DIeppe 42 Hitler was alarmed and scared and started to Transport troops from the east to the west/from the Ersatzheer to the west

At Paulus, the tanks fell into disrepair when they were idle for months. In Stalingrad such debris, only the infantry and could fight.

[jesk]

The only way to stop this trend was to capture their war industry and their oil in summer and autumn 1941.

Industry and oil everywhere. Yaroslavl, Gorkij. In Nizhny Tagil 27,000 tanks produced.

[SloveneLiberal]

80% of Soviet oil production was in Caucasus. They themself were extremly worried in 1941 of losing it. War industry in western parts of Soviet union was evacuated in Asia and production was going on there. However without this war industry east would in fact be enough to supply the demands of frontline of course if they would have enough oil to. Also they should first recover from effects of Barbarossa and that would not be possible during winter 1941/42 without war industry from west. Caucasus being cut off and bombed in 1941 would quite likely fell in to German hands soon. And last Soviets were losing quite more armor also in 1942 than Germans did.

Such a scenario is not possible any more with the operation Typhoon taking place, even if it was being so favoured by OKW and German generals in eastern front.

[ljadw]

80% of Soviet oil production was in Caucasus.

This is comparing apples to oranges and it is a meaningless clincher .
Correct would be to write : BEFORE the war 80 % of the Soviet oil production was in the Caucasus . But it was not so during the war , besides the Soviets needed less oil during the war than before the war .In 1945 they produced only 62 % of the oil they produced in 1940.
In 1938 Germany had 6.9 million ton of oil of which almost 70 % was imported from outside Europe = 4,7 million ton .
In September 1939 the import of oil from outside Europe stopped. Did this mean that Germany lost 70 % of its oil ? NO .In 1940 it had again 6,7 million ton of oil ,and 1940 was the year of its biggest successes .
It was the same for the SU :
the SU had 32,2 million ton of oil in 1940,of which 26,6 million from Baku/Grozny/Maikop ( some 80 % ).In 1945 it was only 19,4 million ton of which only 13,1 million from Baku/Grozny/Maikop ( some 61 % ) and still the Soviets were in Berlin .
It is totally wrong to use peace time oil production figures in a discussion about the importance of oil in wartime, because peace and war economy are totally different ,and ,for the SU, because in a Marxist economy, production and consumption / needs are not related .If Standard Oil could sell 10 million ton of oil only , it would not produce 12 million ton of oil.In the SU this was not so: before and during the war ,the SU produced more oil than it could use .
The loss of the Caucasus would not result in the loss of 80 % of the Soviet oil production during the war , and if it still was so, this would not mean the collaps of the SU .And if the SU would still collaps, it would not happen in 1941 or even in 1942 .
The whole thing was only wishful-thinking from Hitler, because he saw in 1942 no other possibility to finish the war in the East .

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw Soviet ''treasure'' of oil was in Caucasus and they knew this very well. Yet they were getting later oil also from Iran because already in summer 1941 joint Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran happened with the goal to provide enough oil.

[SloveneLiberal]

Historians are today seeing and searching for the roots of German defeat in the east in the time before the start of operation Typhoon. Which is correct. In the past it was thought by many that roots were there when Typhoon failed. That was
thought in big part because of memories of German generals in the east which still after the war advocated their old strategical mistake that Typhoon should happen earlier.

The root is in fact operation Typhoon itself. The case that generals persuaded Hitler that he did not go after the blocade of Caucasus and go after capturing Soviet war industry as he ordered in August 1941 when declining quite fruitless offensive against Moscow proposed by OKW.

[jesk]

Historians are today seeing and searching for the roots of German defeat in the east in the time before the start of operation Typhoon. Which is correct. In the past it was thought by many that roots were there when Typhoon failed. That was
thought in big part because of memories of German generals in the east which still after the war advocated their old strategical mistake that Typhoon should happen earlier.

The root is in fact operation Typhoon itself. The case that generals persuaded Hitler that he did not go after the blocade of Caucasus and go after capturing Soviet war industry as he ordered in August 1941 when declining quite fruitless offensive against Moscow proposed by OKW.

It reasonings at a short distance. In 1942 only Army Group "South" was advancing. And this rather original decision of Hitler. 2/3 are not capable to come. At Russians in 1945 all troops performed offensive operations. Americans too. And only Germans were not capable to pass for all 1942 80 km to Moscow. And they could not take Leningrad!