Was Germany’s situation THAT bad in the summer of 1942?

[Max Payload]

Historians are today seeing and searching for the roots of German defeat in the east in the time before the start of operation Typhoon. ...
The root is in fact operation Typhoon itself. The case that generals persuaded Hitler that he did not go after the blocade of Caucasus and go after capturing Soviet war industry as he ordered in August 1941 ...

Wrong.
See posts 139 and 147 on page 10.
This thread is just going round in circles.
Starting from mid-August nothing would or could have been different before the end of September even if Hitler had stuck to his new-found fixation on economic targets. By that time (beginning of October) the frontline ran from Genechest at the eastern end of the Sivash, north to the bend of the Dnepr, east of Poltava and west of Lokhvitsa. Starting from there perhaps you could explain how, in the final three months of 1941 and given the German logistical difficulties east of the Dnepr the Wehrmacht would have been able to ‘blockade the Caucasus and go after the Soviet war industry’ in a manner that would have avoided ‘defeat in the east’.
Note that of the 1,500 industrial enterprises that were evacuated to the east more than two-thirds had been evacuated before October (viewtopic.php?t=22442), and AGS secured the Donbas anyway without the southern axis being the autumn’s strategic priority.

[jesk]

Starting from there perhaps you could explain how, in the final three months of 1941 and given the German logistical difficulties east of the Dnepr the Wehrmacht would have been able to ‘blockade the Caucasus and go after the Soviet war industry’ in a manner that would have avoided ‘defeat in the east’.

Need to take into account the force of impact. If 11 army attacked Rostov instead of the Crimea, maybe the Germans would be able to break through to the Caucasus. In addition to economic motives, it is necessary to take into account the military component.

[SloveneLiberal]

Max Payload well it is true that Soviet evacuation of industry was going fast. Germans being surprised how fast in fact. Yet you forgot that this problem was not only from the middle of August. In one month from Hitler's order Soviets lost their bread basket. Then of course already in the middle of September AGC was reinforced again because of Typhoon. The wish of Hitler to go after Soviet war industry and after oil was from before the start of Barbarossa. Yet as it was explained at the beggining he and OKW were sharing an illusion of quick victory. OKW made AGC in fact to strong before the operation Barbarossa started. Quite contrary to wishes of Hitler who wanted Soviet war industry to be captured before being moved beyond Ural. And from July already the debate started with OKW pushing Hitler with offensive against Moscow.

Jesk i agree that ports of Crimea were much less important than Caucasus.

[ljadw]

Max Payload well it is true that Soviet evacuation of industry was going fast. Germans being surprised how fast in fact. Yet you forgot that this problem was not only from the middle of August. In one month from Hitler's order Soviets lost their bread basket. Then of course already in the middle of September AGC was reinforced again because of Typhoon. The wish of Hitler to go after Soviet war industry and after oil was from before the start of Barbarossa. Yet as it was explained at the beggining he and OKW were sharing an illusion of quick victory. OKW made AGC in fact to strong before the operation Barbarossa started. Quite contrary to wishes of Hitler who wanted Soviet war industry to be captured before being moved beyond Ural. And from July already the debate started with OKW pushing Hitler with offensive against Moscow.

Jesk i agree that ports of Crimea were much less important than Caucasus.

Ukraine was not the Soviet bread basket : the SU could do and did without the grain of Ukraine .Hitler wanted the Soviet oil and war industry AFTER the defeat of the Red Army .Thus, it was never Moscow or the oil .

[SloveneLiberal]

Well orders of Hitler show different picture. Specially from August. Soviet union in fact was able to do without Ukraine yet food rations were much lowered after it was captured.

[Max Payload]

The wish of Hitler to go after Soviet war industry and after oil was from before the start of Barbarossa.

Yet, to repeat, that was not the operational priority of the Barbarossa planning. You have been asked to provide evidence that ‘before the start of Barbarossa’ economic targets had been specified as the priority objectives and you have failed to do so.

OKW made AGC in fact to strong before the operation Barbarossa started. Quite contrary to wishes of Hitler who wanted Soviet war industry to be captured before being moved beyond Ural.

And you now seem to be claiming that, against Hitler’s wishes, AGC was strengthened in preference to AGS ‘before the operation Barbarossa started’. What is the source for this claim?

Hitler wanted the Soviet oil and war industry AFTER the defeat of the Red Army .Thus, it was never Moscow or the oil .

Well orders of Hitler show different picture.

I’m sure you would acknowledge that Hitler gave different orders at different times. Yet you seem to have chosen to select his orders emanating from Directive 33a as his unwavering position throughout. What is your evidence for this?

[SloveneLiberal]

Max Payload i did give the evidence about Hitler's main goals for Barbarossa. He told in January 1941 to Ribbentrop that the goals are: destruction of Red army, to capture soviet war industry and to seize oil of Caucasus. Of course this means capture the war industry in the right time before it will be moved in Asia. In summer 1941 Hitler stressed in his orders again about the importance of those goals, specially economic goals, seeing that they are not met yet and that it can be maybe to late.

https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... _11993.pdf

( on page 489 )

That army group center was made to strong at the start of Barbarossa by German generals quite contrary to the wishes of Hitler you can found for example also in this lecture of mr. John Suprin:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Z4aQTZC4H4

12:45 - 14:30 about the strenght of army groups, majority of armor and planes in the center, mr. Surpin says this is interesting because OKW is interested in Moscow but Hitler is not.

You can also watch this whole video because it is much about the differences between Hitler and gerenarls on the field of strategy in the case of Barbarossa:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVo5I0xNRhg

[ljadw]

He told in January 1941 to Ribbentrop that the goals are: destruction of Red army, to capture soviet war industry and to seize oil of Caucasus. Of course this means capture the war industry in the right time before it will be moved in Asia. In summer 1941 Hitler stressed in his orders again about the importance

This (the" of course '' sentence)is not correct .The destruction of the Red Army west of the DD line in a few weeks would result in the collaps of the Soviet state and the capture of the Soviet''war'' economy ( there was no such thing on June 22 ) and there would be no transfer to the Urals ( not to Asia ) .
You continue to put the priorities wrong : it was not
1 capture the war industry
2 defeat the SU
BUT
1 defeat the SU
2 capture the war industry
The foundation of the campaign was the December 1940 Barbarossa Weisung that clearly stated that the SU had to be defeated in a short campaign ,west of the DD line , and the war industry was not mentioned as aim . The aim (there was only one ) was to defeat the Red Army .All the rest would result from this defeat .

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw OKW underestimated Soviet strenght. So at the very beggining yes they and Hitler shared the view Soviet collapse will be very quick and they will then of course get on the table also oil, food, war industry. But when seeing this is not going according to OKW plans Hitler soon stressed the goals more specific. It should be understand also that Caucasus is in the south and they all knew Soviets will defend it with their last forces. So making army group center so strong was contrary to wishes of Hitler from whatever point you look.

[ljadw]

NO : the only way to capture the oilfields was Typhoon = to go direction Moscow with a strong AGC ,to defeat the last Soviet reserves defeat which would result in the collaps of the SU .
Germany could defeat the SU only by defeating its armed forces and it could defeat its armed forces only if it could lure them to a certain direction ,which was Moscow ;the oil fields could be defended by small forces .The Soviets did not defend the Caucasus with their last forces, not in 1941,not in 1942 . It was the same for Stalingrad : Uranus was only one of the several Soviet offensives in the winter of 1942/1943 .
Besides, it was impossible to capture the oil fields in 1941 and there was no need to do it .
You will find no source poroving that Hitler wanted to capture the oil fields in 1941 .Blau was scheduled for 1942 , and the reason for Blau was not the importance of the oil fields for the SU (they were not important for Germany ) ,but that Typhoon had failed and that there was no possibility to repeat Typhoon in 1942, as Germany was weaker and the SU was stronger .
What you are talking about happened in 1942, it was not planned/ordered,even considered in 1941 .

[Max Payload]

OKW ... at the very beggining ... they and Hitler shared the view Soviet collapse will be very quick and they will then of course get on the table also oil, food, war industry.

Which is why the Barbarossa planning was based on the rapid and comprehensive defeat of the Red Army west of the Dvina/Dnepr rendering the SU incapable of offering further meaningful resistance.

But when seeing this is not going according to OKW plans Hitler soon stressed the goals more specific.

The goals had been quite specific enough in June/July. They just turned out to be unachievable. By the end of July it was obvious that AGC could not advance east of Elnia, but a number of things came together
- it had become necessary to clear AG Centre’s southern flank
- Soviet resistance on AG Centre’s southern flank was easier to overcome than resistance to the east
- an advance to the south by AGC would compromise Soviet defences on the middle Dnepr and could encircle SW Front
- there were economic resources to the south the loss of which could potentially cripple the Soviet war effort

... making army group center so strong was contrary to wishes of Hitler

I’m not familiar with the extent to which Hitler was personally involved in the operational planning in the months immediately prior to Barbarossa, but I consider it highly unlikely that the force composition of AGC would have been made in contravention of Hitler’s clearly declared wishes. Suprin implies that this was the case but this is a claim that I had not heard before and I would be interested to know its source.

[SloveneLiberal]

Ljadw even the diary of Halder talks about Soviet last defense positions at Moscow and Caucasus.
And of course you have orders and plans about Caucasus oil mentioned also in the debate here.

[ljadw]

Ljadw even the diary of Halder talks about Soviet last defense positions at Moscow and Caucasus.
And of course you have orders and plans about Caucasus oil mentioned also in the debate here.

Orders and plans for and in 1942, not 1941.In 1941 it was impossible and unnecessary to go after the oil fields . It was the same in 1942, but the Germans still were going for Baku ,because there was nothing else they could do .

[SloveneLiberal]

Max Payload here you can read more in detail about the planning of Barbarossa. Hitler was of course very involved in the planing. Economic survey was made already in November 1940. In it it was stressed how important it is to occupy in the first months of campaign the European Russia together with Caucasus. It was estimated 75% of Soviet war industry can be captured. ( page 20/21 )

Directive 21 from Decembar 1940 is also interesting. On page 24 you can find how Hitler pointed that Donets Basin of war industry should be captured without delay. It is not strange that in July/August he pointed out again on this important target together with Caucasus oil in orders and debate with OKW mentioned before, stressing it is more of a priority than Moscow. Also Moscow is othervise mentioned in the directive 21 as an important target, yet offensive against it should be done only after Leningrad is captured. But also Volga should be reached and Soviet war industry in Asia destroyed by German airforce. Note that Volga is quite far away and this meant army group south should be made very strong. Also here mentioned Soviet war industry in Asia is quite far beyond Stalingrad.

I do not think OKW was directly breaking some orders of Hitler but rather going more against Moscow by making army group center to strong at the start of Barbarossa and trying to persuade Hitler in July/August to go against Moscow thus going quite contrary to his wishes and general strategy.


https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf

[Alexandra W]

About the suicide of Jeschonnek,mentioned in post 82: this was not caused by the conviction that Germany had lost the war,or by the attacks on Schweinfurt and Regensburg, but by the order of Jeschonnek after the attack on Peenemünde to the German Flak in Berlin to shoot on a concentration of German fighters, who were thought by Jeschonnek to be allied aircraft .It was this blunder that caused Jeschonnek's suicide .

Jesconeck had argued with Goring about force stucture, LW in 1943 was losing 20% of ftr pilots a month, of bombers 14%, Jesconeck had lost the argument over building more fts, In July/August LW Ftrs lost 32% and 36% if its strength in the Reich. Goring blammed Jeschonnek from early 43 onwards as SB took its toll, and he went to AH on the 17th to defend himself, witha 10 page memo for AH to see, asking for Goring to be removed, or he would resign, AH refused to do either.

We have his own suicide note, we have his aides and others comments all supporting suicide over failure to convince goring he was wrong and being scapgoated by Goring. He had already attempted suicide earlier, and had the gun taken out his hand by his aide, who feared he would try it again.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MjR ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7fg ... de&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e0R ... de&f=false

Jesconeck on August 18th wrote a suicide note, explaining Goring had caused the problems and was using him as a scape goat for inability to defend the Reich, and thats his death would be a beacon of hope for the LW, and shot himself. In this note he asked Goring not attend his funeral.


Now the idea that he shot himself over AA fire over Berlin comes from Van Wachstein acount, in which the 20 RAF bombers spoof raid drew in 148 fighters against them and not Peenemede and Jeschonnek directing AA fire that shot down 100 German fighters killing their pilots. Its only his opinion, not shared by anyone else.

The Allies tapped all pow conversations, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... G_0001.pdf here we learn of why he shot himself

Colonel General Jeschonnek, G.P.G. Chief of Staff, died in August 1.943, it was officially given out in Germany that he had died from natural causes at Goering/s Headquarters, It was understooe by officers in the G.A.F., however, that he had shot himself. The prisoner was told that one night Hitler had had a long and angry conversation with Jeschonn(k, in which he reproached the latter for the general leer ficiency and Ian's of enterprise of the G.A.F.; he en( the conversation with: "You know what you can do nor, with the result that Jeschonnek shot himsell s in the early hours of the following morning.


First thing wrong in the wiki acount you prefer, is thats standing orders require the AA guns to engage, there was not 200 as wikki claims but 148, and 7 planes were lost and only 3 pilots killed, if the AA could hit and destroy two thirds of bombers, then SB would have lasted a week and been given up as a bad idea.

Jeschonnek and Udet both shot themselves for fundamentally the same reasons, they failed to convince goring and AH to face reality.

I am not convinced by what Below told ,because
a More fighters and thus LESS bombers is not proved to be correct
b The most important function of the second man is to catch the blames destined for the number one : for political reasons,Goering was to be spared and Jeschonnek knew it .
c He was not obliged to kill himself,as he could ask and obtain another function,or declare himself sick
d As he was already de facto LW commander, he could not blame Goering for what was going wrong .
e Udet killed himself because there were big problems in his sector, for which he was not responsible and which later were solved ,but as commander he was held responsible ,justifiedly . In the winter of 1939-1940 Becker,head of the army armament ,also killed himself ,because there were also big problems in his sector .
Even if Udet and Jeschonnel were able to force Goering and Hitler to face reality ,the problems would not disappear. THus this argument is not correct .

Well for a normal guy perhaps yes but remember Jeschonnek was mentally unstable from the start. He suffered from a major depression outbreak since the bombing of Hamburg. He already knew that Germany would lost the war in 1942 and by the time of his suicide he had lost faith in Hitler. Meanwhile he lost his father, a brother, a brother-in-law and a nephew in that year. His only full-brother was very ill and his best friend betrayed him. I’d say Peenemede was just this poor man’s last straw.