von Bock and Voronej

[DavidFrankenberg]

Looks like he did.

I doubt whether it can be considered evidence after the words "to me the situation looks this way". Maybe Hoth would be justified otherwise.

He covered Hoth after ordering him to strike Voronej.

Halder writes, made at the request of Hoth. The diary entry is in the form of an assumption ...

He engaged the arm div whereas it was forbidden. Arm. div had to keep on going south.

not even a hint of such an order in the diary. Where text of the order?

We already discussed that. No need to repeat ad nauseam.

I have reason to doubt what Halder said. Everything is very shaky and no other source confirms its logic. At 21.35 on July 3, von Bock sent a telegram that he was moving to Voronezh. Indicated the number of forces. July 5, after the claims of Hitler, it turned out to be a mistake.

I have no reason to doubt about what Halder stated.
VB sent a telegram following Soviets ? So what ? Of course VB had to go in the direction of Voronej, but it didnt have to STRIKE it plus with ARM DIV.
That was his disobedience, his failure.

[AbollonPolweder]

Voronej was important for the soviets because of the railroads. The only interest in taking Voronej was to cut the railroad track.
The Germans did not occupy the whole city. They let the railroad trafic free for the soviets. That was like they were not in the city indeed.

Great, sir! Von Bock and Weichs agree with you completely. Let's look at Bock's diary:
" 5 July 1942 ... At Voronezh the enemy's resistance increased. Although he clearly lacks artillery, the situation may change, as reinforcements come to Voronezh from all sides. Goth is a consistent opponent of the attack on the city; we once again learned about his unwillingness to attack Voronezh from the radio message sent by the 4th tank army liaison officer from the Supreme command of the land forces. Unlike the commander of the 4th tank army, Weichs wants to make an attempt to capture Voronezh tomorrow morning-until the enemy had time to strengthen thoroughly, especially in terms of artillery. The Supreme command of the land forces was informed that, according to Weichs, it is possible to keep the bridgehead on the opposite Bank of the Don only on condition that Voronezh will be captured. Weichs also believes that the railway communications, which are replenished to the city from the West Bank of the don, can not be cut by us if the enemy takes away this bridgehead from us.
The Voronezh really was'nt fully occupied. But why? Because of Hitler's wrong decision. Right? Why Hitler made this mistake? Because of lack of real information. Von Bock also at that time had no reliable information about the intention of the Russians regarding (towards) Voronezh. He wrote 5 July that " ... the situation may change, as reinforcements come to Voronezh from all sides ... " . It was'nt reinforcements and the Russians had no plans ( intentions) to defend the city. They used it as a railway station to transport their retreating troops to Stalingrad. Of course, the Russian troops in the city repelled the attack of German units, but not to protect the city, but to protect themselves. And as a result : " 6 July 1942 ... I am informed that in several places Russians "run". Almost simultaneously, the news came that the enemy began to evacuate from Voronezh and that during the night the battalion of the 24th tank division broke through the southern part of the city to the Voronezh river. ... The city of Voronezh and another bridge across the Don were captured by us without any resistance." Any resistance, sir! The Germans could also capture the left-bank part of Voronezh, but since Hitler did not insist on it, von Bock decided not to waste time.
Some examples of " resistance":
- "6 июля Die südwestl. und westl. Woronesch vorgehenden eign. Div.en konnten die Brückenköpfe nur wenig erweitern gegen starken feindl. Widerstand in ausgebauten Stellungen westl. und süd= westl. Woronesch. Die Besatzung besteht zum großen Teil aus Arbeitermilizen. http://www.znaci.net/zb/7_2_1.pdf
" ... The crews are mostly made up of workers ' militias". They are serious defenders, aren't they?
- " ... Im Sommer 1942 an der Südfront im Einsatz, fasste Blumenthal zusammen mit fünf weiteren Kameraden im Juli den selbständigen Entschluss, die wichtige Don-Brücke bei Woronesh in Besitz zu nehmen. Die Inbesitznahme der Brücke war entscheidend für den Fortgang der Operationen der gesamten Südfront. Für seinen persönlichen Einsatz erhielt Blumenthal am 18. September 1942 das Ritterkreuz verliehen." It's about oberleutnant Blumenthal, commander of the company of the infantry regiment of the division "Grossdeutschlland". Pay attention! Not a company and not a regiment, but six soldiers only captured the bridge unharmed. http://www.ritterkreuztraeger.info/rk/b ... udwig.pdf

[DavidFrankenberg]

Voronej was important for the soviets because of the railroads. The only interest in taking Voronej was to cut the railroad track.
The Germans did not occupy the whole city. They let the railroad trafic free for the soviets. That was like they were not in the city indeed.

Great, sir! Von Bock and Weichs agree with you completely. Let's look at Bock's diary:
" 5 July 1942 ... At Voronezh the enemy's resistance increased. Although he clearly lacks artillery, the situation may change, as reinforcements come to Voronezh from all sides. Goth is a consistent opponent of the attack on the city; we once again learned about his unwillingness to attack Voronezh from the radio message sent by the 4th tank army liaison officer from the Supreme command of the land forces. Unlike the commander of the 4th tank army, Weichs wants to make an attempt to capture Voronezh tomorrow morning-until the enemy had time to strengthen thoroughly, especially in terms of artillery. The Supreme command of the land forces was informed that, according to Weichs, it is possible to keep the bridgehead on the opposite Bank of the Don only on condition that Voronezh will be captured. Weichs also believes that the railway communications, which are replenished to the city from the West Bank of the don, can not be cut by us if the enemy takes away this bridgehead from us.
The Voronezh really was'nt fully occupied. But why? Because of Hitler's wrong decision. Right? Why Hitler made this mistake? Because of lack of real information. Von Bock also at that time had no reliable information about the intention of the Russians regarding (towards) Voronezh. He wrote 5 July that " ... the situation may change, as reinforcements come to Voronezh from all sides ... " . It was'nt reinforcements and the Russians had no plans ( intentions) to defend the city. They used it as a railway station to transport their retreating troops to Stalingrad. Of course, the Russian troops in the city repelled the attack of German units, but not to protect the city, but to protect themselves. And as a result : " 6 July 1942 ... I am informed that in several places Russians "run". Almost simultaneously, the news came that the enemy began to evacuate from Voronezh and that during the night the battalion of the 24th tank division broke through the southern part of the city to the Voronezh river. ... The city of Voronezh and another bridge across the Don were captured by us without any resistance." Any resistance, sir! The Germans could also capture the left-bank part of Voronezh, but since Hitler did not insist on it, von Bock decided not to waste time.
Some examples of " resistance":
- "6 июля Die südwestl. und westl. Woronesch vorgehenden eign. Div.en konnten die Brückenköpfe nur wenig erweitern gegen starken feindl. Widerstand in ausgebauten Stellungen westl. und süd= westl. Woronesch. Die Besatzung besteht zum großen Teil aus Arbeitermilizen. http://www.znaci.net/zb/7_2_1.pdf
" ... The crews are mostly made up of workers ' militias". They are serious defenders, aren't they?
- " ... Im Sommer 1942 an der Südfront im Einsatz, fasste Blumenthal zusammen mit fünf weiteren Kameraden im Juli den selbständigen Entschluss, die wichtige Don-Brücke bei Woronesh in Besitz zu nehmen. Die Inbesitznahme der Brücke war entscheidend für den Fortgang der Operationen der gesamten Südfront. Für seinen persönlichen Einsatz erhielt Blumenthal am 18. September 1942 das Ritterkreuz verliehen." It's about oberleutnant Blumenthal, commander of the company of the infantry regiment of the division "Grossdeutschlland". Pay attention! Not a company and not a regiment, but six soldiers only captured the bridge unharmed. http://www.ritterkreuztraeger.info/rk/b ... udwig.pdf

You forget that VB had not to strike Voronej with arm. div. and that taking Voronej was not obligatory.
VB decided to strike it whereas it was useless.
Vb lost time and forces.
The goal of 1942 was Stalingrad and caucasian oil.
Germans had to control the right bank of the Volga, not the left bank.

[AbollonPolweder]

You forget that VB had not to strike Voronej with arm. div. and that taking Voronej was not obligatory.
VB decided to strike it whereas it was useless.
Vb lost time and forces.
The goal of 1942 was Stalingrad and caucasian oil.
Germans had to control the right bank of the Volga, not the left bank.

Hitler probably also forgot that he gave the order not to use armored units when storming Voronezh. Right? Ordered and forgot! It happens to people. But it is unlikely that this could happen to the Supreme commander of the German armed forces.
Let's look von Bock's diary:

4.9.41 field Marshal Keitel called me twice during the day. He said that the Fuhrer was disappointed that the Guderian tank corps, having forced [the Desna, moved so far to the East, instead of concentrating its efforts on the southern direction. In this regard, the Fuhrer wishes to receive a full report on the situation of each corps of the tank group, as well as to find out the intentions of the command of the group regarding their use. If the army group or the Commander-in-chief does not consider it necessary to issue the relevant orders, he, the Fuhrer, will do it personally.

9.10.41 In the night from 9 to 10 October at 03.00 came direct order of the Fuhrer in the shortest possible time to send at Guderian's disposal 19th Panzer division and infantry regiment "Great Germany" to not allow surrounded the South of Bryansk the enemy to make a breakthrough in the Eastern direction!

You see? Hitler threatens that he will personally give orders to the troops. In 1941, at important moments, Hitler did not forget about his orders. As didn't Keitel! And Brauchitsch:

16.8.41 Late last night, I received a written order to immediately relocate northward parts of the tank and motorized divisions, regardless of their combat readiness. In the morning, Brauchitsch called me so as not to deny himself the pleasure of personally hearing my report regarding the dispatch of the divisions.

Weren't there a lot of supervisors and observers in 1941? And where did they disappear to in 1942 when von Bock was waiting for a specific order? Look:

8.7.42 At noon, I sent a telex to Galder, in which I indicated that the enemy was, without a doubt, retreating in front of the 6th army on the entire front, as well as in the southern direction, and that the bilateral coverage planned by the Supreme command of the land forces would most likely not catch the enemy in the same place. In my opinion, under the circumstances, the "Blau 2" plan can be "buried"; currently, the high command of the land forces needs to decide where and for what purpose to use the tank parts of my left wing. … ... Faced with all these facts, The high command of the land forces, although the time is already at night, has not yet issued any orders to continue the operation.

9.7.42 ... So as to 19.30 no orders concerning the continuation of the operation was followed, I called to the Supreme command of the army and proposed to consider the next object of attack of my armored divisions on flat terrain in the area N. Astakhov.

10.7. 42 ... during the night, a telegram came from the high command of the land forces confirming yesterday's oral Directive.

As you see the order came a week after the meeting in Poltava, according to von Bock.

[DavidFrankenberg]

You forget that VB had not to strike Voronej with arm. div. and that taking Voronej was not obligatory.
VB decided to strike it whereas it was useless.
Vb lost time and forces.
The goal of 1942 was Stalingrad and caucasian oil.
Germans had to control the right bank of the Volga, not the left bank.

Hitler probably also forgot that he gave the order not to use armored units when storming Voronezh. Right? Ordered and forgot! It happens to people. But it is unlikely that this could happen to the Supreme commander of the German armed forces.
Let's look von Bock's diary:

4.9.41 field Marshal Keitel called me twice during the day. He said that the Fuhrer was disappointed that the Guderian tank corps, having forced [the Desna, moved so far to the East, instead of concentrating its efforts on the southern direction. In this regard, the Fuhrer wishes to receive a full report on the situation of each corps of the tank group, as well as to find out the intentions of the command of the group regarding their use. If the army group or the Commander-in-chief does not consider it necessary to issue the relevant orders, he, the Fuhrer, will do it personally.

9.10.41 In the night from 9 to 10 October at 03.00 came direct order of the Fuhrer in the shortest possible time to send at Guderian's disposal 19th Panzer division and infantry regiment "Great Germany" to not allow surrounded the South of Bryansk the enemy to make a breakthrough in the Eastern direction!

You see? Hitler threatens that he will personally give orders to the troops. In 1941, at important moments, Hitler did not forget about his orders. As didn't Keitel! And Brauchitsch:

16.8.41 Late last night, I received a written order to immediately relocate northward parts of the tank and motorized divisions, regardless of their combat readiness. In the morning, Brauchitsch called me so as not to deny himself the pleasure of personally hearing my report regarding the dispatch of the divisions.

What you are quoting does not refer to summer 1942.

Weren't there a lot of supervisors and observers in 1941? And where did they disappear to in 1942 when von Bock was waiting for a specific order? Look:

8.7.42 At noon, I sent a telex to Galder, in which I indicated that the enemy was, without a doubt, retreating in front of the 6th army on the entire front, as well as in the southern direction, and that the bilateral coverage planned by the Supreme command of the land forces would most likely not catch the enemy in the same place. In my opinion, under the circumstances, the "Blau 2" plan can be "buried"; currently, the high command of the land forces needs to decide where and for what purpose to use the tank parts of my left wing. … ... Faced with all these facts, The high command of the land forces, although the time is already at night, has not yet issued any orders to continue the operation.

9.7.42 ... So as to 19.30 no orders concerning the continuation of the operation was followed, I called to the Supreme command of the army and proposed to consider the next object of attack of my armored divisions on flat terrain in the area N. Astakhov.

10.7. 42 ... during the night, a telegram came from the high command of the land forces confirming yesterday's oral Directive.

As you see the order came a week after the meeting in Poltava, according to von Bock.

In Poltava, the 3rd july, Hitler said it was not obligatory to strike Voronej, that they could go south of Voronej, and that no arm. div. should be used to take Voronej in case it was empty.

[AbollonPolweder]

What you are quoting does not refer to summer 1942.

I assume you're joking, sir? Or do you really not understand why I gave examples from 1941? Why did Hitler, Keitel and Brauchitsch give orders and control their execution in 1941? And in 1942, when the fate of Germany was decided ( As you say), Hitler and Ko did not check how their orders were carried out. Why?

n Poltava, the 3rd july, Hitler said it was not obligatory to strike Voronej, that they could go south of Voronej, and that no arm. div. should be used to take Voronej in case it was empty.

Do you really believe that german arm.div. have taken the city? Tanks on the streets of Voronezh? Have you confused Voronezh with Berlin?

[DavidFrankenberg]

What you are quoting does not refer to summer 1942.

I assume you're joking, sir? Or do you really not understand why I gave examples from 1941? Why did Hitler, Keitel and Brauchitsch give orders and control their execution in 1941? And in 1942, when the fate of Germany was decided ( As you say), Hitler and Ko did not check how their orders were carried out. Why ?

There are many possible explanations. Fist would be that Hitler clearly stated orders the 3rd july in person to VB. He thought VB wd not disobeyed. He trusted VB too much. Second, the reports were falsified on the request of VB in order to support VB's orders.

n Poltava, the 3rd july, Hitler said it was not obligatory to strike Voronej, that they could go south of Voronej, and that no arm. div. should be used to take Voronej in case it was empty.

Do you really believe that german arm.div. have taken the city? Tanks on the streets of Voronezh? Have you confused Voronezh with Berlin?

VB had delayed the advance of arm. div. to the south in order to cover the attack on Voronej. Whereas he should not attack Voronej but just keep on going south.
Without this delay the Wehrmacht wd have captured a lot of soviet troops.

The reason of the disobedience of VB is that VB was sure that the soviets had already fled the pocket. That's why he kept the arm. div. to cover the Voronej's attack.

[AbollonPolweder]

VB had delayed the advance of arm. div. to the south in order to cover the attack on Voronej. Whereas he should not attack Voronej but just keep on going south.

Theoretically, you may be right, but the probability of this possibility is minimal. So vaguely "...going south..." orders are not given. Look at an example of the order of OKH of July 12, 1942

During the night came the Directive from the high command of the land forces on the continuation of the operation:
"Group of armies" B " (Bock) should move in the General direction to the mouth of the Donets, sending all available at its disposal mobile forces to Kamensk to join the battle with the enemy troops in the North of the Don and destroy them, attacking from the rear. The remaining forces of the army group should cover this maneuver from the threat from the East and contribute to the creation of conditions for an offensive in the direction of Stalingrad."

For such a definite order from OKH waited von Bock and he got it ... July 10. End of thriller "Disobedience of VB"!

[DavidFrankenberg]

VB had delayed the advance of arm. div. to the south in order to cover the attack on Voronej. Whereas he should not attack Voronej but just keep on going south.

Theoretically, you may be right, but the probability of this possibility is minimal. So vaguely "...going south..." orders are not given. Look at an example of the order of OKH of July 12, 1942

During the night came the Directive from the high command of the land forces on the continuation of the operation:
"Group of armies" B " (Bock) should move in the General direction to the mouth of the Donets, sending all available at its disposal mobile forces to Kamensk to join the battle with the enemy troops in the North of the Don and destroy them, attacking from the rear. The remaining forces of the army group should cover this maneuver from the threat from the East and contribute to the creation of conditions for an offensive in the direction of Stalingrad."

For such a definite order from OKH waited von Bock and he got it ... July 10. End of thriller "Disobedience of VB"!

The orders about Voronej were given the 3rd in Poltava during a meeting between OKW, OKH and VB.

[AbollonPolweder]

The orders about Voronej were given the 3rd in Poltava during a meeting between OKW, OKH and VB.

Are you saying that there were several orders? In this case, show at least one, please and I recognize your rightness.

[DavidFrankenberg]

The orders about Voronej were given the 3rd in Poltava during a meeting between OKW, OKH and VB.

Are you saying that there were several orders? In this case, show at least one, please and I recognize your rightness.

You can read my very first post of this thread

[AbollonPolweder]

You can read my very first post of this thread

I have read it. And? Where is the order? The order or command ( germ. Anweisung, Befehl) looks something like this:
The beginning of the document. It is visible that the document is made by operational Department of the General staff of OKH, on September 3, 1942, concerning group of armies "Don". It was marked top secret.
The document was signed by Halder. Show me something like that. The document, sir. Not Halder's stories about the Fuhrer's ideas.

[DavidFrankenberg]

You can read my very first post of this thread

I have read it. And? Where is the order? The order or command ( germ. Anweisung, Befehl) looks something like this:
The beginning of the document. It is visible that the document is made by operational Department of the General staff of OKH, on September 3, 1942, concerning group of armies "Don". It was marked top secret.
The document was signed by Halder. Show me something like that. The document, sir. Not Halder's stories about the Fuhrer's ideas.

Some people also deny the Final Solution since they have not read the order signed Adolf Hitler who stated "Kill all jews".
Are you that kind ?

[AbollonPolweder]

Some people also deny the Final Solution since they have not read the order signed Adolf Hitler who stated "Kill all jews".
Are you that kind ?

Cool move, sir! Congratulations!

[DavidFrankenberg]

Some people also deny the Final Solution since they have not read the order signed Adolf Hitler who stated "Kill all jews".
Are you that kind ?

Cool move, sir! Congratulations!

You dont answer.