Barbarossa Planning

[ljadw]

And, how long took it the Pz of Kleist to go to Rostov-0n-Don?

5 months. What does it matter?

How is Dunkirk relevant when actual units, involved in the actual Barbarossa fighting completed the actual task of moving 2500 km?

There is also the fact that to defend the Wolga,the Germans needed boots on the ground,and not tanks.

First the infantry would go to the Wolga, by train, than , small numbers of tanks and artillery would also go to the Wolga, also by train

No quarrel here.


[/quote]

1) Germany had not 5 months to go to the Wolga
2) The focus on Guderian's tanks is wrong : the aim was for the three AGs to go to the Wolga and to occupy a line from Archangelsk to Astrachan,and this had to be done before the winter of 1941 .The distance AA is more than 2000 km ,thus the presence of the tanks of Guderian was irrelevant as they could occupy only a few % of this distance .
The plans were that after the Soviet defeat west of the DD line, some 50 divisions ( including the Pz and mobile units ) would return to Germany, 50 other units would be disbanded and 50 would be used for occupation duties . It was never the intention to go to the Wolga with the mobile divisions .If these divisions were going east of the DD line, how would they return to Germany ?

[MarkN]

The plans were that after the Soviet defeat west of the DD line, some 50 divisions ( including the Pz and mobile units ) would return to Germany, 50 other units would be disbanded and 50 would be used for occupation duties . It was never the intention to go to the Wolga with the mobile divisions .If these divisions were going east of the DD line, how would they return to Germany ?

No it wasn't. You're making up garbage as usual.

[MarkN]

That is not correct : the Panzerwaffe could not chase the RKKA remnants to the Wolga, because tanks are too slow, they would not make it, they would need supplies transportede by trucks, who could not make it , and they did not operate independently ,but always in collaboration with the infantry and artillery . Only infantry could go to the Wolga. By train .

You have a bizarre understanding of history and the world.

[BDV]

1) Germany had not 5 months to go to the Wolga

D-Day was June 1944, so Germany had not 5 months, but 35 months to "get to the Wolga."

2) The focus on Guderian's tanks is wrong : the aim was for the three AGs to go to the Wolga and to occupy a line from Archangelsk to Astrachan,and this had to be done before the winter of 1941 .The distance AA is more than 2000 km ,thus the presence of the tanks of Guderian was irrelevant as they could occupy only a few % of this distance.

There are not many major crossings of Wolga from Nizhny Novgorod onward (large enough to support operations of adequate forces on West bank of Wolga, from East bank of Wolga bases; 12 armored Corps should be enough to guard the Wolga line until infantry units march up to the line. Infantry have have until December to get to the Wolga line, when Wolga freezes and crossing becomes easier.

The plans were that after the Soviet defeat west of the DD line, some 50 divisions ( including the Pz and mobile units ) would return to Germany, 50 other units would be disbanded and 50 would be used for occupation duties . It was never the intention to go to the Wolga with the mobile divisions. If these divisions were going east of the DD line, how would they return to Germany ?

As you said it, it would be by Rail. Which means that Barbarossa Plan has to boost rail engineering, so that objectives acquired by blood are not squandered by a lack of sweat.

[ljadw]

The plans were that after the Soviet defeat west of the DD line, some 50 divisions ( including the Pz and mobile units ) would return to Germany, 50 other units would be disbanded and 50 would be used for occupation duties . It was never the intention to go to the Wolga with the mobile divisions .If these divisions were going east of the DD line, how would they return to Germany ?

No it wasn't. You're making up garbage as usual.

Yes : it was

[ljadw]

Weisung 32 mentions explicitly
a An occupation army of 60 divisions ( other sources are giving 50 divisions )
b a decrease of the personal strength of the army
c a continuation of the war against Britain (if needed ) with mobile divisions .
This means that at least 90 divisions would leave the East and that this included the mobile divisions, as they would be committed in the war against Britain and thus would not be present in the East .
The war production would be concentrated on the LW and the KM .
The future operations against Britain would start immediately after the collaps of the SU ,thus in the summer/autumn of 1941 ,and thus the Germans would not wast time to send the mobile divisions to the AA line (for which there was also no reason ) and than to send them back to Germany .

[MarkN]

Weisung 32 mentions explicitly
a An occupation army of 60 divisions ( other sources are giving 50 divisions )
b a decrease of the personal strength of the army
c a continuation of the war against Britain (if needed ) with mobile divisions .
This means that at least 90 divisions would leave the East and that this included the mobile divisions, as they would be committed in the war against Britain and thus would not be present in the East .
The war production would be concentrated on the LW and the KM .
The future operations against Britain would start immediately after the collaps of the SU ,thus in the summer/autumn of 1941 ,and thus the Germans would not wast time to send the mobile divisions to the AA line (for which there was also no reason ) and than to send them back to Germany .

That is quite different to the garbage you posted.

The plans were that after the Soviet defeat west of the DD line, some 50 divisions ( including the Pz and mobile units ) would return to Germany, 50 other units would be disbanded and 50 would be used for occupation duties . It was never the intention to go to the Wolga with the mobile divisions .If these divisions were going east of the DD line, how would they return to Germany ?

You made it up that 100 divisions would be disbanded or returned to Germany after the DD line. You made it up what formations would continue onwards.

[ljadw]

Barbarossa would be a success west of the DD line, only west of the DD line . Thus there was no need to go with the mobile divisions east of Moscow, besides , it would be impossible and meanwhile,they would be needed elsewhere .

[MarkN]

Barbarossa would be a success west of the DD line, only west of the DD line .

Your opinion and your conclusion. Not historical fact. You made it up.

It's also garbage, because "success" is measured against the objective not some intermediate task.

Thus there was no need to go with the mobile divisions east of Moscow, besides , it would be impossible and meanwhile,they would be needed elsewhere .

Your opinion and your conclusion. Not historical fact. You made it all up.

It's also garbage.

[ljadw]

The German opinion was that if there was still big fighting in August and east of the DD line, Barbarossa was a failure . That was why Hitler ordered to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces to the east . He ordered this in the Barbarossa Weisung .Something you know, but something you refuse to accept .
On August 23 1941, Halder admitted in a letter to his wife that Barbarossa had failed. On that day,there was still big fighting east of the DD line .
Probably you will reply that Halder was writing garbage or that he made it all up .
But that's your problem .

[BDV]

On August 23 1941, Halder admitted in a letter to his wife that Barbarossa had failed. On that day,there was still big fighting east of the DD line .

Halder said "barbarossa has failed." So what? It does not follow that the War in the East has been lost.

Failure of smash-and-grab 1 did not preclude the Wehrmacht from trying smash-and-grab 2 (Taifun) and smash-and-grab 3 (Blau).

[ljadw]

On August 23 1941, Halder admitted in a letter to his wife that Barbarossa had failed. On that day,there was still big fighting east of the DD line .

Halder said "barbarossa has failed." So what? It does not follow that the War in the East has been lost.

Failure of smash-and-grab 1 did not preclude the Wehrmacht from trying smash-and-grab 2 (Taifun) and smash-and-grab 3 (Blau).

And Taifun and Blau also failed : there was no chance they could succeed .
Only Barbarossa could succeed , with a Deus ex Machina .
The Germans first were looking after what would not succeed = a long war . and than decided that a short campaign would succeed, because there was no alternative . We know ,with hindsight,that a short campaign also would fail,excepted for a miuracle .
The truth was that the SU was invincible and that Germany had lost the war against Britain and the US before the start of the war against the USSR .

[BDV]

The Germans first were looking after what would not succeed = a long war. and than decided that a short campaign would succeed, because there was no alternative . We know, with hindsight, that a short campaign also would fail, excepted for a miracle .
The truth was that the SU was invincible and that Germany had lost the war against Britain and the US before the start of the war against the USSR .

That is also incorrect, because USofA did not have the strength to invade an undefended point of 3rd Reich sphere of influence until November 1942.

Thus, if Germany decides to do "ground-and-pound THEN smash and grab", a 2-year campaign was also a possibility. Given the forward defense strategy of RKKA this is a disastrous proposition for the Bolshevik State.

[MarkN]

The German opinion was that if there was still big fighting in August and east of the DD line, Barbarossa was a failure . That was why Hitler ordered to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces to the east . He ordered this in the Barbarossa Weisung .Something you know, but something you refuse to accept .

Hitler provided political directives through his Weissung. They were not 'orders' per se.

Hitler and the Generals wanted the Red Army to be completely defeated west of the DD Line. That is NOT in dispute.

What is in dispute is whether that was the objective of BARBAROSSA or whether it was an intermediate task on the way to the objective.

On August 23 1941, Halder admitted in a letter to his wife that Barbarossa had failed. On that day,there was still big fighting east of the DD line .
Probably you will reply that Halder was writing garbage or that he made it all up .
But that's your problem .

Nope, I don't dispute what is historical fact. I dispute the things you make up and claim are historical facts.

Halder was smart enough to recognise at a pretty early stage of BARBAROSSA that it was not going as hoped and failure was a likely outcome. He wasn't smart enough to recognise that it was likely to be a failure before they became committed.

[jesk]

So Pz.Gr. 2 attacked with the 10., 17., 18. Pz.Div, 10. and 29. Inf.Div. (mot.)
Pz.Gr. 3 with 7., 19., 20. Pz.Div. and 14., 18. and 20. Inf.Div. (mot.)

Much back, three infantry divisions are following the advance.

How strong were the Western and Central fronts at this time, jesk?

The Germans moved forward. The attack on the Great Luki was a mistake. Von Bock insisted on changing the angle of attack in the direction of Smolensk.
Your logic, remind, does not correspond to the Wehrmacht’s promotion schemes. 16,19,20 army destroyed. 3 other armies will be able to stop? Not.

Absolutely unpromising scheme for Russians.