The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[MarkN]

7 Not correct : Germany prepared for 2 wars : a short war against the SU ,to make the UK surrender and a long war against the UK/USA ,which would happen if a successful Barbarossa did not compel Britain to surrender

Again you're making up garbage.

It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.

It takes a very speshul kind of fool to believe it is true.

:roll:

[thaddeus_c]

7 Not correct : Germany prepared for 2 wars : a short war against the SU ,to make the UK surrender and a long war against the UK/USA ,which would happen if a successful Barbarossa did not compel Britain to surrender

Again you're making up garbage.

It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.

It takes a very speshul kind of fool to believe it is true.

all three could be reasons for attacking USSR, as well the fact they had incurred a "debt" they could not easily repay with finished goods, AND the scare they received the year before when Soviets advanced further than expected into Romania.

btw nasty does not persuade others of your point, only points to your nastiness

[Max Payload]

7 Not correct : Germany prepared for 2 wars : a short war against the SU ,to make the UK surrender and a long war against the UK/USA ,which would happen if a successful Barbarossa did not compel Britain to surrender

Again you're making up garbage.

It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.

Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.

“In the event that invasion [Sealion] does not take place, our action must be directed to eliminate all factors
that let England hope for a change in the situation. To all intents and purposes, the war is won, France has stepped out of the set-up protecting British convoys. Italy is pinning down British forces.
Submarine and air warfare may bring about a final decision, but this may be one or two years off. ...
Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. IfRussia drops out of the picture America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East. ...
Russia, is the factor on which Britain is relying, the most. ...
All that Russia has to do is to hint that she does not care to have a strong Germany, and the British will take hope, like one about to go under, that the situation will undergo a radical change within six or eight months.
With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be shattered. Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans.
Decision: Russia's destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 41”
Halder Diary entry 31/7/40.

[MarkN]

7 Not correct : Germany prepared for 2 wars : a short war against the SU ,to make the UK surrender and a long war against the UK/USA ,which would happen if a successful Barbarossa did not compel Britain to surrender

Again you're making up garbage.

It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.

Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.

No perhaps about it. Hitler was indeed that psychopath. But just because he used it as an excuse, doesn't make it true, does it? Were the jews really the source of all evil? Hitler said they were, repeatedly. At some point the reader has to use their own brains to decide what is credible and what is not.

[SloveneLiberal]

Hitler's decision to attack Soviet union in June 1941 was in fact strategically the quite right one. Of course from the point of view that he started war of conquest in 1939. Germany had not enough oil and an energy crisis emerged in 1940. They were very limited in fighting long war. This was because of British blocade, Since Hitler was not able to convince the UK for peace agreement it was for him a good option to attack SU and get his hand on oil of Caucasus, destroy soviet war industry and get food resources of Ukraine.

On the other hand Germans knew very well how vonurable Romanian oil fields were for a Soviet attack. They had informations that Soviets are building their army at Pripyat marshes. Yet they thought Red army is much less strong as it really was. Soviet war industry was building their armor very quickly and in 1942 Hitler would have much less chances. On the contrary Red army would be much better prepared plus war between Britain and Germany would exhaust both, specially Germany.

[Hanny]

Since the Germans were able to continue to fight deep in Soviet territory for 3+ years, how did they overcome the logistical setbacks of 1941 and keep their forces "well-enough" supplied all the to the Volga and South Caucasus?

BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of logistics.

It didn't fail because of poor logistic planning, it didn't fail due to faulty intelligence on the logistic capacity, it didn't fail because the Red Army caused significant damage to the logistic system and it didn't fail due to unexpected logistic issues that cropped up once the unternehmen had begun. Nor did it fail due to poor industrial or economic planning beforehand.

Studying the logistics aspect of BARBAROSSA maybe an interesting subject for military logisticians during their own training. But as a focal point for understanding the outcome of the unternehmen, it is just a red herring. However, you try to tweek the logistics, the decisions about logistics, the decisions about manufacturing priorities etc etc, the result will always be the same: BARBAROSSA fail!

However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence the army had the capacity to attack only by stripping 2 AG to bring one up to 855 of TOE in the south, Logistic failures include, failure to predict oil consumption, 6 fold consumption put 1800 Panzers out of action when engines seized up from lack of oil.Having a a forward lift capacity of half the food ration and full pol and munitions for only a third of the formations tasked with the mission. Zero allocation left for replacements ( Hitler declared the war won after 4 weeks and no more AFV replacements to be sent or spares changed industrial production from AFV and munitionsn to that of LW and KM, meaning 42 in the east woud not have what it needed) and winter equipment, so when preparing to go to Moscow, and sending POL and munitions, was chosen, it was at the expense of not being able to send forward winter equipment. Plan called for the number of Divison required and 5 months to win, based on SU raising 100 replacement Divisons total, this was so far off it stagers the mind. Industry was tasked to supply the TOE for that number of formations and AH was told we cant do it, so equipment from all over Europe was used, one MOT div had 111 different makes of trucks, There were over 2000 different weapons systems with over a million different spare parts for them, a logistical nightmare. Plan called for single track RR conversion but quickly showed this was insufficient requiring double track laying that slowed the process by more than double the time planned for, such a fuck up the whole process was taken away from the Army,and given to TODT to do. Army general went top thje concentration camsps for their RR supply fiasco. When two thirds of the Trucks at Div level were gone, 1 third of the grosstruppen gone, the logistical ability to move supplies from the rail head to the end user became insurmountable, not least because the end user was twice as far from the rail head as the -plan called for. Maps issued for the invasion were wrong, roads and towns on them did not exist, it was over a year before accurate maps were issued.

Barbarossa failed because it was logistically impractical for the army to defeat and destroy the SU inside its operational capabilty of 300 miles, over half the SU esacped back to fight again, and was joined by mobilised formations that Germany did not plan to exist. By 42 as a consequence of the failure of barbarossa, the Germany army was reduced to 58 Divison being combat ready for offensive actions.

[Hanny]

A couple of questions about how the logistics were handled/mishandled by the Germans during Operation Barbarossa:


6. Is it known what military resources were used to support German Einsatzgruppen and other occupation forces that should/could have been used elsewhere?

One Germany division was unable to be deployed as the munitions it had and required,were used to execute on an industrial scale, you can try Hitlers willing executioners.

[Hanny]

7 Not correct : Germany prepared for 2 wars : a short war against the SU ,to make the UK surrender and a long war against the UK/USA ,which would happen if a successful Barbarossa did not compel Britain to surrender

Again you're making up garbage.

It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.

Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.

No perhaps about it. Hitler was indeed that psychopath. But just because he used it as an excuse, doesn't make it true, does it? Were the jews really the source of all evil? Hitler said they were, repeatedly. At some point the reader has to use their own brains to decide what is credible and what is not.

Ignores that AH was setting industrial and military policy based on his political conceptions of reality. indeed how is credible you dont know that?.

[MarkN]

However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence ...

... Barbarossa failed because it was logistically impractical for the army to defeat and destroy the SU inside its operational capabilty of 300 miles, over half the SU esacped back to fight again, and was joined by mobilised formations that Germany did not plan to exist. By 42 as a consequence of the failure of barbarossa, the Germany army was reduced to 58 Divison being combat ready for offensive actions.

The objective of Op BARBAROSSA was a land grab up to the Urals. Although not actually stated in the policy & planning documents, we can deduce that that objective was to be achieved before the winter of 1941/42 set in.

The Wehrmacht logistics branch, during the initial fleshing out of the plan, stated that logistically that objective was not achievable. I have not seen anywhere what they consider to be the maximum distance or time that logistical support was practical. There must have been a tipping point somewhere. But where?

The historical evidence suggest BARBAROSSA had failed before the logistics had reached that tipping point.

BARBAROSSA failed because the objective was far, FAR too ambitious for the capabilities of the German military machine. Not the logistics branch, but the entire machine to sustain the fight.

What happened logistically or otherwise in 1942 is irrelevant. BARBAROSSA had already failed.

[MarkN]

Logistic failures include, failure to predict oil consumption, 6 fold consumption put 1800 Panzers out of action when engines seized up from lack of oil.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Having a a forward lift capacity of half the food ration and full pol and munitions for only a third of the formations tasked with the mission.

Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.

Zero allocation left for replacements ( Hitler declared the war won after 4 weeks and no more AFV replacements to be sent or spares changed industrial production from AFV and munitionsn to that of LW and KM, meaning 42 in the east woud not have what it needed) and winter equipment, so when preparing to go to Moscow, and sending POL and munitions, was chosen, it was at the expense of not being able to send forward winter equipment.

Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.

Plan called for the number of Divison required and 5 months to win, based on SU raising 100 replacement Divisons total, this was so far off it stagers the mind.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Industry was tasked to supply the TOE for that number of formations and AH was told we cant do it, so equipment from all over Europe was used, one MOT div had 111 different makes of trucks, There were over 2000 different weapons systems with over a million different spare parts for them, a logistical nightmare.

A logistical nightmare is not a failure of logistics.

Plan called for single track RR conversion but quickly showed this was insufficient requiring double track laying that slowed the process by more than double the time planned for, such a fuck up the whole process was taken away from the Army,and given to TODT to do.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Army general went top thje concentration camsps for their RR supply fiasco.

That's not a failure of logistics.

When two thirds of the Trucks at Div level were gone, 1 third of the grosstruppen gone, the logistical ability to move supplies from the rail head to the end user became insurmountable, not least because the end user was twice as far from the rail head as the -plan called for.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Maps issued for the invasion were wrong, roads and towns on them did not exist, it was over a year before accurate maps were issued.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Blaming the logistics system for failure is easy, isn't it? The logistics system being at fault is something quite different.

[Hanny]

However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence ...

... Barbarossa failed because it was logistically impractical for the army to defeat and destroy the SU inside its operational capabilty of 300 miles, over half the SU esacped back to fight again, and was joined by mobilised formations that Germany did not plan to exist. By 42 as a consequence of the failure of barbarossa, the Germany army was reduced to 58 Divison being combat ready for offensive actions.

The objective of Op BARBAROSSA was a land grab up to the Urals. Although not actually stated in the policy & planning documents, we can deduce that that objective was to be achieved before the winter of 1941/42 set in.

The Wehrmacht logistics branch, during the initial fleshing out of the plan, stated that logistically that objective was not achievable. I have not seen anywhere what they consider to be the maximum distance or time that logistical support was practical. There must have been a tipping point somewhere. But where?

The historical evidence suggest BARBAROSSA had failed before the logistics had reached that tipping point.

BARBAROSSA failed because the objective was far, FAR too ambitious for the capabilities of the German military machine. Not the logistics branch, but the entire machine to sustain the fight.

What happened logistically or otherwise in 1942 is irrelevant. BARBAROSSA had already failed.

Or we can look at what primary objective was, "The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented."

Operational bound for Panzer force was determined by the fuel it was allotted, 300 miles.

How and where was that to be effected?, the plan tells us.The Conduct of the Operations:
The southern of these two army groups - in the center of the whole front - will have the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then cooperate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states. Only after the accomplishment of these offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are further offensive operations to be initiates with the objective of occupying the important center of communications and of armament production, Moscow.

The army group south of the Pripet Marshes will make its point of main effort from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, with the object of driving into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces with strong armored formations and of then rolling up the enemy along the Dnieper. The German-Romanian group on the right flank will have the task of protecting Romanian territory and thus of covering the southern flank of the whole operation; in coordination with the attack by the northern of Army Group south of tying up the enemy forces on its sector of the front; then, as the situation develops, of launching a second thrust and thus, in conjunction with the air force, of preventing an orderly enemy withdrawal beyond the Dniester.

Once the battle south or north of the Pripet Marshes have been fought, the pursuit is to be undertaken with the following objectives:

In the south the rapid occupation of the economically important Donetz Basin, in the north the speedy capture of Moscow.

Destruction of the Red Army within the 300 operation ability of the Panzers failed, because the logistics did not exist to maintain it and the leg bound mass of the army, as pointed out pre invasion by the planners.

What happened logistically or otherwise in 1942 is irrelevant. BARBAROSSA had already failed.

Nonsense. Barborossa ended on 5 December 1941. The consequences of that failure, for the future prosecution ( by further operations)and the survival of the Reich of the war were profound.

In Jan 42 only 15% of the LW 100,000 MTV were in operation.By March 42 33% of the Heer in the East had been lost, that started the Invasion, not counting those on the sick list, AFV losses ran to 100% of start numbers with 873 replacement. March 30th 140 combat ready AFV was all there was. A report by OKH states that of 162 divisions in the East 8 were suitable for offensive operations,3 could be brought up to full offensive capacity after a rest,47 could perform limited offensive operationms.The rest suitable only for defensive operations. AGN and AGC lost practicly all its transport, which went to AGS, thus 2 AG were limited to defensive operations only due to logistical contraints. This re organization, including paraticaly all replacemnts going to AGS, gave AGS 80% of its TOE at the expense of the other AGs.

[MarkN]

Or we can look at what primary objective was,..

We can....

"The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented."

... and that's NOT what it was.

Of course, if you are using the word "primary" in the sense of initial, you are correct. However, being initial is just a intermediate task on the way to the objective.

If you are using "primary" to mean main or principle, then you are wrong.

[Hanny]

That's not a failure of logistics.

http://www.enlistment.us/field-manuals/ ... ions.shtml
Yes it is.

Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.

It was a logistical constraint, when the planners explained the limits of what was logistiocaly possible.that was what logistiocal possible.

That's not a failure of logistics.

yes it is, logistical the size of the invasion force was determined by the size of the opposition and prepared accordingly to defeat that force level. Logisticaly it faced a force level far greater than it was prepared for.

Blumentritt
"On the Moscow route, the principal line of advance, they repeatedly held on long enough to be encircled, The badness of the roads became our worst handicap, Faulty inte1igence had underestimated Soviet strength, The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond theRussian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious problem, complicated by local conditions.

A logistical nightmare is not a failure of logistics.

Its a product of failure of Germany industry to be able to logistical supply the army with what it required, and task that expands the number of parts involved makes the logistics of that task mopre complex, the 4000 french trucks used to equip a MOT Div when needing spare parts, when in russia only then found out the french worklers who made them where now in gernmany making something else instead of the parts the army needed and was asking for. Failure of loguistics no matter what you think.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Its not?, single RR line was insuffiecent to supply the requirement as consumption was higher than planned, requiring twice the RR track to meet this unexpected level of demand is not a logistics failure?, how odd. What is it called when you plan for x and x turns out to be 2x.


Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Correct its a consequence of a logistical failure.

That's not a failure of logistics.

its both logiostical failure and a conconsequnce of a logistical failure.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Its not?, following maps to a road that does exist and so consumming 2/3 times fuel to get to where you want by cross country is not a logistical failure from failure to have the right maps, how odd.

Blaming the logistics system for failure is easy, isn't it? The logistics system being at fault is something quite different.

Blaming you for not knowing what logistics is so much an easier explanation.


Military logistics is the discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with: Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

[Hanny]

Or we can look at what primary objective was,..

We can....

"The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented."

... and that's NOT what it was.

Of course, if you are using the word "primary" in the sense of initial, you are correct. However, being initial is just a intermediate task on the way to the objective.

If you are using "primary" to mean main or principle, then you are wrong.

Very first thing on AH to do list, its odd you know more about what AH ment than he did himself.

I. General Purpose:The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

[Hanny]

That's not a failure of logistics.

http://www.enlistment.us/field-manuals/ ... ions.shtml
Yes it is.

Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.

It was a logistical constraint, when the planners explained the limits of what was logistically possible.That was what logistical possible to provide.

That's not a failure of logistics.

yes it is, logistical the size of the invasion force was determined by the size of the opposition and prepared accordingly to defeat that force level. Logisticaly it faced a force level far greater than it was prepared for. planners pointed out to fully supply the Mech formations at 300 miles from base would consume all avilable grosstruppen leaving nothing for any other formations.

A logistical nightmare is not a failure of logistics.

Its a product of failure of Germany industry to be able to logistical supply the army with what it required, and task that expands the number of parts involved makes the logistics of that task more complex, the 4000 french trucks used to equip a MOT Div when needing spare parts, when in russia only then found out the french worklers who made them where now in Germany making something else instead of the parts the army needed and was asking for. Failure of logistics no matter what you think.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Its not?, single RR line was insuffiecent to supply the requirement as consumption was higher than planned, requiring twice the RR track to meet this unexpected level of demand is not a logistics failure?, how odd. What is it called when you plan for x and x turns out to be 2x. Planners pointed out that a pause would result around reaching smolensk to resupply, that turned out to be a month not the 2 weeks planned for because, suprise, demand was double what was expected.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Correct its a consequence of a logistical failure.

That's not a failure of logistics.

its both logistical failure and a consequence of a logistical failure.

That's not a failure of logistics.

Its not?, following maps to a road that does exist and so consuming 2/3 times fuel to get to where you want by cross country is not a logistical failure from failure to have the right maps, how odd.

Blaming the logistics system for failure is easy, isn't it? The logistics system being at fault is something quite different.

Blaming you for not knowing what logistics is so much an easier explanation.


Military logistics is the discipline of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of military forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects or military operations that deal with: Design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

I have not seen anywhere what they consider to be the maximum distance or time that logistical support was practical

Thats a failure to read the required reading literature.