What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

[T. A. Gardner]

Russia did win, with a largley ww1 field phone equipped army. He agrees with you pace/depth of offensives. SU dependent more on RR is hardly a problem with winning but only how long it takes to win.

The problem is not just one of time, but of ability to mount a massive offensive that is in depth. Anything less, and the Germans are going to be able to plug the hole and likely are going to be able to even reduce the size of the gain substancially. Again, it would look more like 1918 than 1944. That is, the Russians gain some ground, the Germans recover, repeat. The distances gained would be on the scale of tens of miles rather than hundreds.
That's essentially a stalemate.

[Hanny]

Russia did win, with a largley ww1 field phone equipped army. He agrees with you pace/depth of offensives. SU dependent more on RR is hardly a problem with winning but only how long it takes to win.

The problem is not just one of time, but of ability to mount a massive offensive that is in depth. Anything less, and the Germans are going to be able to plug the hole and likely are going to be able to even reduce the size of the gain substancially. Again, it would look more like 1918 than 1944. That is, the Russians gain some ground, the Germans recover, repeat. The distances gained would be on the scale of tens of miles rather than hundreds.
That's essentially a stalemate.

Glantz is arguing ( he breaks the war down into periods for this but ill just do a big picture) that each operational bound of the SU would be less without LL to broaden the logistical support, the SU Rifle Div had little to no LL assets for instance, so the 1200 odd miles from Moscow to Berlin took the SU from Dec41 to April of 45 is 40 months, so with LL the advanced on average 30 miles a month, without that LL he says it would take 18 months more, which is 20 miles a month.

So internal logically his argument is sound as it does not produce a stalemate, as both end up in Berlin at different points in time, unlike the WW1 "stalmate"advance of 2 years to reach Berlin by the BEF if they achieved the same rate of manoeuvre.

[Hanny]

The bottom line here is that without Lend Lease, the Soviets can't win. They won't lose. They'll stop the Germans, pretty much as they did historically. What they won't be able to do, is go on the strategic offensive and beat the Germans retaking Western Russia and defeat them by taking Berlin. Lend Lease is absolutely critical to the Soviets winning, but not to keeping them from losing.

Glantz When Titans clashed " LL did not arrive in sufficient quantity in 41/2 to make the difference between victory or defeat, that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and the iron nerve of stalin" He goes on the refer to SU running out of logistical support sans LL MTV. in 43/4 allowing less deep penetrations and more Germans escaping." Left to their own devices , Stalin and his commanders might have taken 12-18 months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht, the ultimate result would probably be the same except that the SU soldiers would have wadded in Frances Atlantic beaches".

Glantz is exceedingly wrong in this area. According to Hunger and War:




Due to the lack of Lend Lease food imports, sometime between 1942-1944 the USSR would've been forced into submission by hunger no less. Another two vital areas was LL Aviation Gasoline, Motor vehicles, and tanks.

Not yet read Hunger and War as i plan to read it side by side with The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II
By William Moskoff, which was the last book in read on this some time back.

But some thoughts i already have.

10/1/41-6/30/42 341,641 tons of food LL convert to kilo 309931502
7/1/42-30/6/43 1,117,517 tons of food Ll convert to kilo 1013794369

SU population in 1942 requiring food 140000000 horses in mil use 1000000

humans required 1.5 kilos or so of food per day horses 4.5 kilo of grain plus fodder.
140000000*38365 =76650000000 a year plus horses 1642500000 in mil usage.

Year 42 SU consumes 78292500000, of which LL comprised 0.4 % in 43 it rose to 1.3%

[ljadw]

Due to the lack of Lend Lease food imports, sometime between 1942-1944 the USSR would've been forced into submission by hunger no less.

Another two vital areas was LL Aviation Gasoline, Motor vehicles, and tanks.

1 The first statement is not true
2 The second statement is a very big exaggeration : there is no proof that the Soviet airforce was doing better against the LW after and because it received LL Aviation Gaoline .

[T. A. Gardner]

Russia did win, with a largley ww1 field phone equipped army. He agrees with you pace/depth of offensives. SU dependent more on RR is hardly a problem with winning but only how long it takes to win.

The problem is not just one of time, but of ability to mount a massive offensive that is in depth. Anything less, and the Germans are going to be able to plug the hole and likely are going to be able to even reduce the size of the gain substancially. Again, it would look more like 1918 than 1944. That is, the Russians gain some ground, the Germans recover, repeat. The distances gained would be on the scale of tens of miles rather than hundreds.
That's essentially a stalemate.

Glantz is arguing ( he breaks the war down into periods for this but ill just do a big picture) that each operational bound of the SU would be less without LL to broaden the logistical support, the SU Rifle Div had little to no LL assets for instance, so the 1200 odd miles from Moscow to Berlin took the SU from Dec41 to April of 45 is 40 months, so with LL the advanced on average 30 miles a month, without that LL he says it would take 18 months more, which is 20 miles a month.

So internal logically his argument is sound as it does not produce a stalemate, as both end up in Berlin at different points in time, unlike the WW1 "stalmate"advance of 2 years to reach Berlin by the BEF if they achieved the same rate of manoeuvre.

I'd wager it'd be less than 10 miles a month mainly because many of the advances would be countered and the ground lost requiring a "replay" of the offensive. The reason for that is the gains would be smaller making them more manageable for counterattacks and other actions by the German defenses. The larger gains allowed the Soviets to make up some of their losses by impressing / drafting people in newly retaken territory, along with capturing more German troops unable to avoid the Soviet advances. Here, the advances are much smaller giving exponentially less return.

First, you have to consider that there'd be fewer tank brigades and tank corps. But, the big hurt would be the loss of roughly half the mechanized corps the Soviets formed. They wouldn't have the trucks and other motor vehicles to build these. These units are vital to a deep penetration as they are the mobile infantry formations that hold the ground gained. Without them, you can only advance as far and fast as the infantry can walk. That in turn means far less encirclements of large pockets of German troops, far less wastage on the German side in long and deep retreats.

My guess is that it would lead to a stalemate with both sides bled white.

[Hanny]

Russia did win, with a largley ww1 field phone equipped army. He agrees with you pace/depth of offensives. SU dependent more on RR is hardly a problem with winning but only how long it takes to win.

The problem is not just one of time, but of ability to mount a massive offensive that is in depth. Anything less, and the Germans are going to be able to plug the hole and likely are going to be able to even reduce the size of the gain substancially. Again, it would look more like 1918 than 1944. That is, the Russians gain some ground, the Germans recover, repeat. The distances gained would be on the scale of tens of miles rather than hundreds.
That's essentially a stalemate.

Glantz is arguing ( he breaks the war down into periods for this but ill just do a big picture) that each operational bound of the SU would be less without LL to broaden the logistical support, the SU Rifle Div had little to no LL assets for instance, so the 1200 odd miles from Moscow to Berlin took the SU from Dec41 to April of 45 is 40 months, so with LL the advanced on average 30 miles a month, without that LL he says it would take 18 months more, which is 20 miles a month.

So internal logically his argument is sound as it does not produce a stalemate, as both end up in Berlin at different points in time, unlike the WW1 "stalmate"advance of 2 years to reach Berlin by the BEF if they achieved the same rate of manoeuvre.

I'd wager it'd be less than 10 miles a month mainly because many of the advances would be countered and the ground lost requiring a "replay" of the offensive. The reason for that is the gains would be smaller making them more manageable for counterattacks and other actions by the German defenses. The larger gains allowed the Soviets to make up some of their losses by impressing / drafting people in newly retaken territory, along with capturing more German troops unable to avoid the Soviet advances. Here, the advances are much smaller giving exponentially less return.

First, you have to consider that there'd be fewer tank brigades and tank corps. But, the big hurt would be the loss of roughly half the mechanized corps the Soviets formed. They wouldn't have the trucks and other motor vehicles to build these. These units are vital to a deep penetration as they are the mobile infantry formations that hold the ground gained. Without them, you can only advance as far and fast as the infantry can walk. That in turn means far less encirclements of large pockets of German troops, far less wastage on the German side in long and deep retreats.

My guess is that it would lead to a stalemate with both sides bled white.

Could be 10, we can never know as its a counter factual, so a judgement call at best. My understanding of his argument is that a 20% LL increase in LL MTV gave it 30 miles a month, if its not present the rate of monthly advance drops to 66% of 30 which is 20. You prefer 33% or that LL is twice as important as he judges. Of course i dont know, but he may have looked deeper at LL, discarded the LL arriving after Dec 45 as having no influence, which drops the LL% of MTV park to 14%.

Looking at the maps Dunnigan done by time periods in his Russian front i get the following:

1942 350/12=30 ( Grozney to past Rostov, 220/12=18 more like an average on Vor/SW/stalingrad fronts)
1943 400/12 =33 ( more direct Moscow to Berlin line)
1944 475/12 =40
1945 325/4=80

https://www.hgwdavie.com/s/Wartime-Nati ... ebsite.xls
43 LL O%
43 LL 6%
44 LL 19%
45 LL 31%

So the distance achieved between 42 and 43 is a 10% increse due to LL,in 43/4 is a difference of around 20% increase in distance from three times the amount of LL. Difference in 44/45 is around a 60% increase from quadrouple increase in LL. So SU with no LL is a best case SU at 30 miles a month but more likly to achieve 18. So glantz 18 months more with No Ll is off by 2 miles a month on the above figures.

[History Learner]

Not yet read Hunger and War as i plan to read it side by side with The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II
By William Moskoff, which was the last book in read on this some time back.

But some thoughts i already have.

10/1/41-6/30/42 341,641 tons of food LL convert to kilo 309931502
7/1/42-30/6/43 1,117,517 tons of food Ll convert to kilo 1013794369

SU population in 1942 requiring food 140000000 horses in mil use 1000000

humans required 1.5 kilos or so of food per day horses 4.5 kilo of grain plus fodder.
140000000*38365 =76650000000 a year plus horses 1642500000 in mil usage.

Year 42 SU consumes 78292500000, of which LL comprised 0.4 % in 43 it rose to 1.3%

Moskoff is good, although his work is more dated and lacked access to a lot of the Soviet sources Hunger and War got. If you don't have a JSTOR account by the way, I can PM you the chapters as PDFs if you want. As for the issue of calories, Hunger and War's research shows LL food was not going to the general population; instead it was, as near as can be discerned, going exclusively to the RKKA and at it peak constituted 50% of their food ration. Given rations in the USSR on the whole were pushed to their lowest level in late 1943 and were at critical levels from late 1942 to early/mid-1944, their overall conclusion is that it would've been impossible to sustain the Red Army without general starvation and a breakdown in production levels occurring in the attempt.

[History Learner]

1 The first statement is not true

2 The second statement is a very big exaggeration : there is no proof that the Soviet airforce was doing better against the LW after and because it received LL Aviation Gaoline .

A HIGH-OCTANE WEAPON FOR VICTORY:

In 1940, a total of 29,414 million tons of oil was processed at domestic refineries, producing only 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline, 3.477 million tons of automotive gasoline, 5.6 million tons of kerosene, 1.274 million tons of ligroin, 1.459 million tons of diesel fuel, 413,000 tons of naval oil, 9.8 million tons of fuel oil, and 1.469 million tons of various lubricants. Of the 883,600 tons of aviation gasoline produced domestically in 1940, an overwhelming proportion was avgas with low octane numbers of 70 to 74. This was almost good enough for obsolete domestically-produced aircraft, but only 4% of the demand for B-78 aviation gasoline, the best of those produced in the Soviet Union and the one needed by the new generation of warplanes, was satisfied across the country.

The protocol on supplying the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease program (later referred to as the First Moscow Protocol) was signed by representatives of the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain at a conference held in Moscow on September 29 - October 1, 1941.

Monthly deliveries of 20,000 tons of petroleum products for the Soviet air forces (high-octane aviation gasoline, octane-boosting avgas additives, and lubricants and motor oils) were especially stipulated in the First Protocol. Even this, however, was not enough in the first few trying years of the war. Despite the heroic efforts of Soviet oil workers, the extreme conditions of the war led to a drop in Soviet oil production, from 31 million tons in 1940 to 19.3 million tons in 1945, i.e., a reduction of 37.7%. They also aggravated the difficult situation in the oil industry's refining sector, which turned out to be incapable of fully satisfying the growing demand for high-octane aviation gasolines.

If 1.269 million tons of aviation gasoline had been produced in the Soviet Union in 1941, only 912,000 tons were produced in 1942. It should also be noted that Soviet refineries were producing avgas with low octane numbers. In 1941, an overwhelming amount (75%) of the aviation gasoline produced had octane numbers from 70 to 74, the ones needed by obsolete types of domestically-produced aircraft.

In response to a request from the Soviet government, the Allies increased deliveries of high-octane aviation gasolines and lubricants. According to the official data for the years of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, 2,159,336 short tons of petroleum products were delivered from the United States alone under Lend-Lease and commercial contracts. The amount of high-octane aviation gasoline, converted into the metric system, was 1,197,587 tons, including 558,428 tons with octane numbers above 99. One other important item: in the nomenclature of American oil deliveries, the Soviet Union also received 267,088 tons of automotive gasoline; 16,870 tons of kerosene; 287,262 tons of fuel oil; 111,676 tons of lubricants; 5,769 tons of paraffin; 4,788 tons of chemical additives; and 999 tons of other products.

It should be emphasized that in addition to petroleum products, the oil component of Lend-Lease included deliveries to the Soviet Union from the United States of equipment for four refinery complexes, along with drilling rigs and other oil industry equipment, pipe casings and compressor/pump piping, portable collapsible pipelines, instruments, tankers, tank trucks, railroad tanker cars, filling station pumps, and much else.

Not only did Anglo-American AV gas allow for a modern VVS, it was also was key in even allowing a VVS to function at all, given the inability of the domestic Soviet industry to meet demands for modern octane fuels.

[ljadw]

About the LL food deliveries : these were for the Red Army,and NOT for the civilians, and their impact on the Red Army was meaningless, thus for the civilians it would be less than meaningless :
William Moskoff in The Bread of Affliction P 122 : each Soviet soldier received 221 pounds of LL food per year, or 10 ounces a day ( which is for Europeans : 280 gr ) .
As the average strength of the Red Army was only some 7 % of the Soviet population, this means that the Soviet citizen would receive 20 gr of food a day ,which is less than meaningless .
You can't feed a population of 180 million people by importing food from abroad . The Soviet population survived, not because of the measures from the Kremlin, but by its own initiative, as did all populations of occupied countries .
You can't use official rations to calculate how much food the Soviet population had .

[ljadw]

There is no proof that using avgas with high octane result in less losses and more losses for the enemy .

[History Learner]

About the LL food deliveries : these were for the Red Army,and NOT for the civilians, and their impact on the Red Army was meaningless, thus for the civilians it would be less than meaningless :
William Moskoff in The Bread of Affliction P 122 : each Soviet soldier received 221 pounds of LL food per year, or 10 ounces a day ( which is for Europeans : 280 gr ) .
As the average strength of the Red Army was only some 7 % of the Soviet population, this means that the Soviet citizen would receive 20 gr of food a day ,which is less than meaningless .

With regards to Moskoff:




Next, that Lend Lease food was not going to civilians is entirely the point; it was going, as far as can be discerned, almost entirely to feed the Red Army itself. Given that civilian rations were pushed to their lowest possible point in the 1942-1944 period, the additional burden of feeding the RKKA without Lend Lease assistance would've been impossible, as the authors of Hunger and War stipulate.

There is no proof that using avgas with high octane result in less losses and more losses for the enemy .

There very much is, given that with high octane fuel there would not have been a modern VVS in the first place without it.

[ljadw]

Modern VVS is a subjective notion .
And I disagree with the authors of Hunger and War, because they use wrong figures to prove their claims .As I already said : you can't use official rations to calculate the amoiunt of food for the civilians : that the rations were decreased does not mean that the civilians had less food .Most of the food of the civilians was produced by the civilians,and did not come from the state .
The fact that most LL food arrived 2 years after the start of the war,means that during these 2 years, the Soviet civilians survived without LL food . They survived als without the official rations .
It would have been possible to feed the RKKA without LL assistance .

[History Learner]

Modern VVS is a subjective notion

It's not, it quite literally means that the VVS equipment of WWII that used high octane fuels would've been unable to be utilized in the absence of Lend Lease aid.

And I disagree with the authors of Hunger and War, because they use wrong figures to prove their claims .As I already said : you can't use official rations to calculate the amoiunt of food for the civilians : that the rations were decreased does not mean that the civilians had less food .Most of the food of the civilians was produced by the civilians,and did not come from the state .

You've yet to prove they used wrong figures. Nor have you provided any evidence for your assertion that most Civilians survived off unofficial food sources, nor have you cited anything to substantiate the claim that a ration cut somehow doesn't equal a food cut, given said ration cut took the form of reduced calorie allotments.

The fact that most LL food arrived 2 years after the start of the war,means that during these 2 years, the Soviet civilians survived without LL food . They survived als without the official rations .

It was not two years; the Germans invaded in June of 1941 and Lend Lease food in large quantities began to arrive in July of 1942 onwards, so about one year. As for why the Soviets were able to survive for that first year, it's quite simple: the Germans overrun their food areas over the course of 1941 and early 1942, not all at once. 1942 and 1943 actually represented the dearth of Soviet agricultural production.

[Hanny]

Not yet read Hunger and War as i plan to read it side by side with The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II
By William Moskoff, which was the last book in read on this some time back.

But some thoughts i already have.

10/1/41-6/30/42 341,641 tons of food LL convert to kilo 309931502
7/1/42-30/6/43 1,117,517 tons of food Ll convert to kilo 1013794369

SU population in 1942 requiring food 140000000 horses in mil use 1000000

humans required 1.5 kilos or so of food per day horses 4.5 kilo of grain plus fodder.
140000000*38365 =76650000000 a year plus horses 1642500000 in mil usage.

Year 42 SU consumes 78292500000, of which LL comprised 0.4 % in 43 it rose to 1.3%

Moskoff is good, although his work is more dated and lacked access to a lot of the Soviet sources Hunger and War got. If you don't have a JSTOR account by the way, I can PM you the chapters as PDFs if you want. As for the issue of calories, Hunger and War's research shows LL food was not going to the general population; instead it was, as near as can be discerned, going exclusively to the RKKA and at it peak constituted 50% of their food ration. Given rations in the USSR on the whole were pushed to their lowest level in late 1943 and were at critical levels from late 1942 to early/mid-1944, their overall conclusion is that it would've been impossible to sustain the Red Army without general starvation and a breakdown in production levels occurring in the attempt.

Appreciate the offer, of the pdf but i prefer to read it all. But a couple of observations untill i do.

It wont matter if the LL ( because its dry and canned goods are usfull for sending to the front) goes only to the military, SU population is the whole national, population, they all have to be fed, wherever they are,so LL contribution is compared to total food consumption, it matters not if it all went to the military. Agricultural output, was lowest in 42/3 rising dramticly thereafter in any event allowing SU to maintain 5.3 million Red army force levels in 42, rising to 6.4 in 43 rising again to 6.5 in 44.

Army rations in calories were 2,854 calories combat rations - 3.450 in 42, before rising to 3350 to 3750 calories in 44, by 45, 450,000 civialns were in reciept of military rations. Hunger and War does not use the actual calorofic content by year of SU Military rations as set down in the manuals used at the time, it prefers 4000. Humans in a military context have always required 3/4000 calories.


page 334 discusses methodology,table 5.3 List all LL sent to SU in calories.
22,874,650,250,000 caleries of LL sent over time, which supplies the Red Army for 509 days, Red Army dasilly requirement was 44,940,000,000 Red Army was at war for 1428 days, LL was in operation for 1339 days. Note it excludes feeding any animals used by the military, whose grain requirementy which is 1750 calories a day for a million horses, 1750000000 a day.

Calories required per day for 130,000,0000 at 2200 per civilian is 286,000,000,000
44,940,000,000 Military per day
286,000,000,000 Civilian per day
1750000000 horse per day

Total 332690000000 per day

LL delivered per day (22,874,650,250,000/1339) 17083383308

LL calories as a % of daily requiremnt over the period of LL, 5%.

So instead of 509 for the Red Army, its 19 days for the SU.

[ljadw]

Moskoff P 237 : the rationing system was in many ways a farce .
P 238 : people were fed, not because of the system ,but in spite of the system .


In a lot of cases, the official rations were not available . This means that if they were decreased, it was notthat important .
People were feeding themselves .The Soviet state was unable to do this .
It was the same in Belgium : you could survive without the official rations, but not without the black market, not if you did not produce food yourself : on all balkons in the cities, food was cultivated ,people were holding pigs and poultry in their flats .People had relatives in the country,etc