What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#106

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 11:50

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:40
Appreciate the offer, of the pdf but i prefer to read it all. But a couple of observations untill i do.

It wont matter if the LL ( because its dry and canned goods are usfull for sending to the front) goes only to the military, SU population is the whole national, population, they all have to be fed, wherever they are,so LL contribution is compared to total food consumption, it matters not if it all went to the military. Agricultural output, was lowest in 42/3 rising dramticly thereafter in any event allowing SU to maintain 5.3 million Red army force levels in 42, rising to 6.4 in 43 rising again to 6.5 in 44.

Army rations in calories were 2,854 calories combat rations - 3.450 in 42, before rising to 3350 to 3750 calories in 44, by 45, 450,000 civialns were in reciept of military rations. Hunger and War does not use the actual calorofic content by year of SU Military rations as set down in the manuals used at the time, it prefers 4000. Humans in a military context have always required 3/4000 calories.


page 334 discusses methodology,table 5.3 List all LL sent to SU in calories.
22,874,650,250,000 caleries of LL sent over time, which supplies the Red Army for 509 days, Red Army dasilly requirement was 44,940,000,000 Red Army was at war for 1428 days, LL was in operation for 1339 days. Note it excludes feeding any animals used by the military, whose grain requirementy which is 1750 calories a day for a million horses, 1750000000 a day.

Calories required per day for 130,000,0000 at 2200 per civilian is 286,000,000,000
44,940,000,000 Military per day
286,000,000,000 Civilian per day
1750000000 horse per day

Total 332,690,000,000 per day

LL delivered per day (22,874,650,250,000/1339) 17083383308

LL calories as a % of daily requiremnt over the period of LL, 5%.

So instead of 509 for the Red Army, its 19 days for the SU.
Again, this misses the point Hunger and War makes. Lend Lease fed the RKKA, removing that burden from the Soviet state and thus allowing them to focus domestic food production on the civilian populace. Removing Lend Lease would, in our hypothetical, restore that burden to the Soviet state at a time it was completely incapable of meeting both requirements:

The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15588
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#107

Post by ljadw » 18 Feb 2019, 11:52

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:03

The fact that most LL food arrived 2 years after the start of the war,means that during these 2 years, the Soviet civilians survived without LL food . They survived als without the official rations .
It was not two years; the Germans invaded in June of 1941 and Lend Lease food in large quantities began to arrive in July of 1942 onwards, so about one year. As for why the Soviets were able to survive for that first year, it's quite simple: the Germans overrun their food areas over the course of 1941 and early 1942, not all at once. 1942 and 1943 actually represented the dearth of Soviet agricultural production.
Your source P 325 : most LL food arrived after July 1943 .


History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#108

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 11:58

ljadw wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:47
Moskoff P 237 : the rationing system was in many ways a farce .
P 238 : people were fed, not because of the system ,but in spite of the system .


In a lot of cases, the official rations were not available . This means that if they were decreased, it was notthat important .
People were feeding themselves .The Soviet state was unable to do this .
It was the same in Belgium : you could survive without the official rations, but not without the black market, not if you did not produce food yourself : on all balkons in the cities, food was cultivated ,people were holding pigs and poultry in their flats .People had relatives in the country,etc
You've either misunderstood the citation or misrepresented it, and indeed the entirety of the place it is stated refutes the rest of your post here:

Image

This is not saying there was no ration system in place, in fact far from it; Moskoff is questioning the effectiveness of it because of the shortage of resources it could provide. Earlier on Page 138 he specifically notes essentially all Soviet citizens were on the ration system:

Image

History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#109

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 12:02

ljadw wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:52
Your source P 325 : most LL food arrived after July 1943 .
Yes, most overall did but that ignores from July of 1942 onwards Lend Lease food was already constituting 30% of rations.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#110

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 12:23

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:50
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:40
Appreciate the offer, of the pdf but i prefer to read it all. But a couple of observations untill i do.

It wont matter if the LL ( because its dry and canned goods are usfull for sending to the front) goes only to the military, SU population is the whole national, population, they all have to be fed, wherever they are,so LL contribution is compared to total food consumption, it matters not if it all went to the military. Agricultural output, was lowest in 42/3 rising dramticly thereafter in any event allowing SU to maintain 5.3 million Red army force levels in 42, rising to 6.4 in 43 rising again to 6.5 in 44.

Army rations in calories were 2,854 calories combat rations - 3.450 in 42, before rising to 3350 to 3750 calories in 44, by 45, 450,000 civialns were in reciept of military rations. Hunger and War does not use the actual calorofic content by year of SU Military rations as set down in the manuals used at the time, it prefers 4000. Humans in a military context have always required 3/4000 calories.


page 334 discusses methodology,table 5.3 List all LL sent to SU in calories.
22,874,650,250,000 caleries of LL sent over time, which supplies the Red Army for 509 days, Red Army dasilly requirement was 44,940,000,000 Red Army was at war for 1428 days, LL was in operation for 1339 days. Note it excludes feeding any animals used by the military, whose grain requirementy which is 1750 calories a day for a million horses, 1750000000 a day.

Calories required per day for 130,000,0000 at 2200 per civilian is 286,000,000,000
44,940,000,000 Military per day
286,000,000,000 Civilian per day
1750000000 horse per day

Total 332,690,000,000 per day

LL delivered per day (22,874,650,250,000/1339) 17083383308

LL calories as a % of daily requiremnt over the period of LL, 5%.

So instead of 509 for the Red Army, its 19 days for the SU.
Again, this misses the point Hunger and War makes. Lend Lease fed the RKKA, removing that burden from the Soviet state and thus allowing them to focus domestic food production on the civilian populace. Removing Lend Lease would, in our hypothetical, restore that burden to the Soviet state at a time it was completely incapable of meeting both requirements:

The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."
Its not a very usfull point, it matters not where they are, only that they require x calories as a civilian and y in the military, LL was a insignificant national calorie requirement. As i showed their own methodology at national level is that it ran the war for 19 days.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#111

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 12:27

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:58
ljadw wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 11:47
Moskoff P 237 : the rationing system was in many ways a farce .
P 238 : people were fed, not because of the system ,but in spite of the system .


In a lot of cases, the official rations were not available . This means that if they were decreased, it was notthat important .
People were feeding themselves .The Soviet state was unable to do this .
It was the same in Belgium : you could survive without the official rations, but not without the black market, not if you did not produce food yourself : on all balkons in the cities, food was cultivated ,people were holding pigs and poultry in their flats .People had relatives in the country,etc
You've either misunderstood the citation or misrepresented it, and indeed the entirety of the place it is stated refutes the rest of your post here:

Image

This is not saying there was no ration system in place, in fact far from it; Moskoff is questioning the effectiveness of it because of the shortage of resources it could provide. Earlier on Page 138 he specifically notes essentially all Soviet citizens were on the ration system:

Image
Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-45

Period Amount(tons)
Food Machinery Chemicals& Motor vehicles
explosives & parts
10/1/41-6/30/42 341,641 33,255 62,728 239,864
7/1/42-30/6/43 1,117,517 188,684 203,130 502,307
7/1/43-30/6/44 1,953,057 546,001 501,927 831,417
7/1/44-5/12/45 1,296,258 532,722 447,268 No data
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#112

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 12:41

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:23
Its not a very usfull point, it matters not where they are, only that they require x calories as a civilian and y in the military, LL was a insignificant national calorie requirement. As i showed their own methodology at national level is that it ran the war for 19 days.
It very much needs to be said we're talking about a benchmark here in terms of what the Soviets would optimally need, not what they were actually able to provide; indeed, Hunger and War goes into great detail about the extent of hunger and starvation-induced deaths in the USSR during the war, which was quite large. With that said, utilizing your benchmark of the Soviet state needing 286 million calories a day to feed civilians, adding the 45 million calories used by the RKKA would've meant increasing the burden on the rationing system by 15%. This is critical, as in the late 1942-early 1944 period, particularly in 1943, there was no slack in the system to accommodate such an extra burden given that civilian rations had been cut to their lowest possible point without engendering general starvation. Finally, as the authors noted in terms of Moskoff's assessment, attempting to average out the calories over the course of the whole war is an error in of itself, given that Lend Lease food aid reached its peak from 1943 to 1944, which was also the time of greatest dearth of food in the USSR:

Image
Image
Last edited by History Learner on 18 Feb 2019, 12:44, edited 1 time in total.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#113

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 12:43

Hanny wrote:
17 Feb 2019, 22:56
T. A. Gardner wrote:
17 Feb 2019, 21:04
Hanny wrote:
17 Feb 2019, 12:27
T. A. Gardner wrote:
17 Feb 2019, 04:35
Hanny wrote:
16 Feb 2019, 23:26

Russia did win, with a largley ww1 field phone equipped army. He agrees with you pace/depth of offensives. SU dependent more on RR is hardly a problem with winning but only how long it takes to win.
The problem is not just one of time, but of ability to mount a massive offensive that is in depth. Anything less, and the Germans are going to be able to plug the hole and likely are going to be able to even reduce the size of the gain substancially. Again, it would look more like 1918 than 1944. That is, the Russians gain some ground, the Germans recover, repeat. The distances gained would be on the scale of tens of miles rather than hundreds.
That's essentially a stalemate.
Glantz is arguing ( he breaks the war down into periods for this but ill just do a big picture) that each operational bound of the SU would be less without LL to broaden the logistical support, the SU Rifle Div had little to no LL assets for instance, so the 1200 odd miles from Moscow to Berlin took the SU from Dec41 to April of 45 is 40 months, so with LL the advanced on average 30 miles a month, without that LL he says it would take 18 months more, which is 20 miles a month.

So internal logically his argument is sound as it does not produce a stalemate, as both end up in Berlin at different points in time, unlike the WW1 "stalmate"advance of 2 years to reach Berlin by the BEF if they achieved the same rate of manoeuvre.
I'd wager it'd be less than 10 miles a month mainly because many of the advances would be countered and the ground lost requiring a "replay" of the offensive. The reason for that is the gains would be smaller making them more manageable for counterattacks and other actions by the German defenses. The larger gains allowed the Soviets to make up some of their losses by impressing / drafting people in newly retaken territory, along with capturing more German troops unable to avoid the Soviet advances. Here, the advances are much smaller giving exponentially less return.

First, you have to consider that there'd be fewer tank brigades and tank corps. But, the big hurt would be the loss of roughly half the mechanized corps the Soviets formed. They wouldn't have the trucks and other motor vehicles to build these. These units are vital to a deep penetration as they are the mobile infantry formations that hold the ground gained. Without them, you can only advance as far and fast as the infantry can walk. That in turn means far less encirclements of large pockets of German troops, far less wastage on the German side in long and deep retreats.

My guess is that it would lead to a stalemate with both sides bled white.
Could be 10, we can never know as its a counter factual, so a judgement call at best. My understanding of his argument is that a 20% LL increase in LL MTV gave it 30 miles a month, if its not present the rate of monthly advance drops to 66% of 30 which is 20. You prefer 33% or that LL is twice as important as he judges. Of course i dont know, but he may have looked deeper at LL, discarded the LL arriving after Dec 45 as having no influence, which drops the LL% of MTV park to 14%.
In 43 the LL MTV was 5% of the SU park, if they can achieve the historical rates of 43 with with that, then there is good reason to acept Glantz assumption.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#114

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 12:50

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:41
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:23
Its not a very usfull point, it matters not where they are, only that they require x calories as a civilian and y in the military, LL was a insignificant national calorie requirement. As i showed their own methodology at national level is that it ran the war for 19 days.
It very much needs to be said we're talking about a benchmark here in terms of what the Soviets would optimally need, not what they were actually able to provide; indeed, Hunger and War goes into great detail about the extent of hunger and starvation-induced deaths in the USSR during the war, which was quite large. With that said, utilizing your benchmark of the Soviet state needing 286 million calories a day to feed civilians, adding the 45 million calories used by the RKKA would've meant increasing the burden on the rationing system by 15%. This is critical, as in the late 1942-early 1944 period, particularly in 1943, there was no slack in the system to accommodate such an extra burden given that civilian rations had been cut to their lowest possible point without engendering starvation. Finally, as the authors noted in terms of Moskoff's assessment, attempting to average out the calories over the course of the whole war is an error in of itself, given that Lend Lease food aid reached its peak from 1943 to 1944, which was also the time of greatest dearth of food in the USSR:

Image
Image
Economic output was highest when they were starving then. How odd :P . Rations only applied to under half the population. If they needed further calories, they could slaughter more horses than they did ( 26 million horses goes along way in calories), to get it without having to tinker with rations. Yes you will note i broke it down by time period when i started, i believe thats far better indicator.

Untill i read it all in context i may be missing stiff, but dont like the methodology.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#115

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 12:52

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:43
In 43 the LL MTV was 5% of the SU park, if they can achieve the historical rates of 43 with with that, then there is good reason to acept Glantz assumption.
Image

Source here. Basically, Lend Lease imports were much more than 5% of the total fleet and without those imports, the Soviet motorpool, assuming historical losses, would've been degrading all the way into 1944 when domestic production finally exceeded losses. This means not only is the Soviet logistical network in constant decline of capabilities, but the mechanization of the RKKA itself is impossible.

Another point to make is that until 1944, the Soviet combat losses of tanks exceeded their production and even in 1944 they barely scrapped by with just 75 more tanks produced than lost. Without Lend Lease shipments of AFVs, the Soviets will be unable to maintain their armored divisions, nevermind expand them.

History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#116

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 12:58

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:50
Economic output was highest when they were starving then. How odd :P . Rations only applied to under half the population. If they needed further calories, they could slaughter more horses than they did ( 26 million horses goes along way in calories), to get it without having to tinker with rations. Yes you will note i broke it down by time period when i started, i believe thats far better indicator.

Untill i read it all in context i may be missing stiff, but dont like the methodology.
Soviet production increased over the course of the war, although in very select categories and Adam Tooze notes in Wages of Destruction the Soviet system was showing severe strain by 1944 even despite the improving food situation. As for the Rations, it applied to the overwhelming majority of the population as both Moskoff and the various authors of Hunger and War note. For those it didn't (i.e. just the peasants), their stock of food production saw dramatic and sustained declines in output overall and very much so in variety, particularly with regards to Meats. Mass slaughtering of Horses, like the Soviets did with other livestock, does not also present a solution; not only does it remove valuable transportation, it also removes an essential means of further food production given the roll horses played in plowing and other farm uses. Perhaps more importantly, it only represents a temporary fix, not an ongoing solution.
Last edited by History Learner on 18 Feb 2019, 14:44, edited 1 time in total.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#117

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 13:20

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:52
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:43
In 43 the LL MTV was 5% of the SU park, if they can achieve the historical rates of 43 with with that, then there is good reason to acept Glantz assumption.
Image

Source here. Basically, Lend Lease imports were much more than 5% of the total fleet and without those imports, the Soviet motorpool, assuming historical losses, would've been degrading all the way into 1944 when domestic production finally exceeded losses. This means not only is the Soviet logistical network in constant decline of capabilities, but the mechanization of the RKKA itself is impossible.

Another point to make is that until 1944, the Soviet combat losses of tanks exceeded their production and even in 1944 they barely scrapped by with just 75 more tanks produced than lost. Without Lend Lease shipments of AFVs, the Soviets will be unable to maintain their armored divisions, nevermind expand them.
Primary source from which
"Journal of Slavic Military Studies" Vol. 10, June 1997, "Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through Lend-Lease" by V.F. Vorsin.

Its been used on AHF from https://www.hgwdavie.com/data-appendix

My point is trucks when used in the military had an impact of rates of avance, LL influence on that rate of adance would be that 5% in 43 indicates what 5% LL has on it.

SU produced AFV and lost AFV most of what they produced each year, in order to win the war in the East.Its all realtive to what the cost was to germany, SU acepted high loss of production to inflict losses ata rate they coulod mainatin while Germany could not. Ending the war outnumbering Getrmany 4:1 after being dropped to 2:1 after barbarossa.
From Steve Zaloga's "Red Army Handbook" pg. 181:

Tanks in Inventory (1/Jan of each year)
Year - Soviet - German

1941 - 22,600 - 5,261
1942 - 7,700 - 4,896
1943 - 20,600 - 5,648
1944 - 21,100 - 5,266
1945 - 25,400 - 6,248



Production
Year - Soviet - German

1941 - 6,274 - 3,256
1942 - 24,639 - 4,276
1943 - 19,959 - 5,966
1944 - 16,975 - 9,161
1945 - 4,384 - 1,098

Losses
Year - Soviet - German - Exchange Ratio

1941 - 20,500 - 2,758 - 7:1
1942 - 15,000 - 2,648 - 6:1
1943 - 22,400 - 6,362 - 4:1
1944 - 16,900 - 6,434 - 1.4:1
1945 - 8,700 - 7,382 - 1.2:1

Which means SU losses by year of stock and production

1941 71%
1942 46%
1943 57%
1944 44%
1945 29%




From after-action report of the corps Tatsinskaya operation (TsAMO RF f.232, op.590, d.26, l.22)
Total tanks on strength in three tank brigades before operation - 96 T-34, 61 T-70 ( Authorised TOE 121 T-34 and 79 T-70)

Operational on 30.12.42 - 28 T-34, 15 T-70 Tatsinskaya raid.

Combat Losses:17 T-34, 9 T-70
Non combat losses 42 T-34, 35 T-70
undergo repair 9 T-34, 4 T-70



Operation conducted with 2 units of fuel (5 days of supply and no resupply.
Lost to enemy action:17% T34 15% T-70
Lost in non combat:44% T34 57% T-70
Reduction in operational tanks: T34 71% reduction, T70 76%

SU inquiry into loss rates.
In 42 ‘Our armored forces and their units frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical problems".
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

History Learner
Member
Posts: 433
Joined: 19 Jan 2019, 10:39
Location: United States

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#118

Post by History Learner » 18 Feb 2019, 14:34

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 13:20
Primary source from which
"Journal of Slavic Military Studies" Vol. 10, June 1997, "Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through Lend-Lease" by V.F. Vorsin.

Its been used on AHF from https://www.hgwdavie.com/data-appendix

My point is trucks when used in the military had an impact of rates of avance, LL influence on that rate of adance would be that 5% in 43 indicates what 5% LL has on it.
I'm afraid I don't follow; for one, even using just using 1943 import figures, Lend Lease vehicles in this category constituted around 15% of the motor pool. This also ignores that removing the 1941-1943 imports means a much steeper decline in the overall size of the motor pool to begin with. Logistics are also not linear, at least in this category.
SU produced AFV and lost AFV most of what they produced each year, in order to win the war in the East.Its all realtive to what the cost was to germany, SU acepted high loss of production to inflict losses ata rate they coulod mainatin while Germany could not. Ending the war outnumbering Getrmany 4:1 after being dropped to 2:1 after barbarossa.
From Steve Zaloga's "Red Army Handbook" pg. 181:
Case in point is 1942, during which the Anglo-Americans shipped in 5,510 tanks when the Russian stock for the year was 7,000 (including about 1,000 Allied tanks shipped in during 1941). The inescapable conclusion is the Soviets run out of tanks sometime in 1943 at the latest.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008, 21:40

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#119

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019, 15:07

History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 14:34

I'm afraid I don't follow; for one, even using just using 1943 import figures, Lend Lease vehicles in this category constituted around 15% of the motor pool. This also ignores that removing the 1941-1943 imports means a much steeper decline in the overall size of the motor pool to begin with. Logistics are also not linear, at least in this category.
LL in 43 was 5.4% of the MTV park not 15% my point was that it pushed forward in 43 with 5% LL c400 miles along half the total length of the front, in 5 months. If it can do that we can use those numbers to help understand the 15% of Ll presence in 44 for the pace of advance, and from that get a better idea of what no Ll might look like. If they for whole year can achive 400 miles, 30 a month with 5% LL, is Glantz more right than wrong or not. Ive never seen Glantz explain his reasoning on this anywhere. But if the SU can do it with 5% LL in 43, why cant they be in Berlin by 46 without any?
History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 14:34
Case in point is 1942, during which the Anglo-Americans shipped in 5,510 tanks when the Russian stock for the year was 7,000 (including about 1,000 Allied tanks shipped in during 1941). The inescapable conclusion is the Soviets run out of tanks sometime in 1943 at the latest.
Except they did not run out, indeed they won big, with back to pre war numbers of AFV in 43. it all depends on how you use the maths to explain what was going on, viewtopic.php?t=145031
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

User avatar
T. A. Gardner
Member
Posts: 3546
Joined: 02 Feb 2006, 01:23
Location: Arizona

Re: What if......no Lend-Lease to the Soviets?

#120

Post by T. A. Gardner » 18 Feb 2019, 19:38

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 13:20
History Learner wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:52
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019, 12:43
In 43 the LL MTV was 5% of the SU park, if they can achieve the historical rates of 43 with with that, then there is good reason to acept Glantz assumption.
Image

Source here. Basically, Lend Lease imports were much more than 5% of the total fleet and without those imports, the Soviet motorpool, assuming historical losses, would've been degrading all the way into 1944 when domestic production finally exceeded losses. This means not only is the Soviet logistical network in constant decline of capabilities, but the mechanization of the RKKA itself is impossible.

Another point to make is that until 1944, the Soviet combat losses of tanks exceeded their production and even in 1944 they barely scrapped by with just 75 more tanks produced than lost. Without Lend Lease shipments of AFVs, the Soviets will be unable to maintain their armored divisions, nevermind expand them.
Primary source from which
"Journal of Slavic Military Studies" Vol. 10, June 1997, "Motor Vehicle Transport Deliveries through Lend-Lease" by V.F. Vorsin.

Its been used on AHF from https://www.hgwdavie.com/data-appendix

My point is trucks when used in the military had an impact of rates of avance, LL influence on that rate of adance would be that 5% in 43 indicates what 5% LL has on it.

SU produced AFV and lost AFV most of what they produced each year, in order to win the war in the East.Its all realtive to what the cost was to germany, SU acepted high loss of production to inflict losses ata rate they coulod mainatin while Germany could not. Ending the war outnumbering Getrmany 4:1 after being dropped to 2:1 after barbarossa.
From Steve Zaloga's "Red Army Handbook" pg. 181:

Tanks in Inventory (1/Jan of each year)
Year - Soviet - German

1941 - 22,600 - 5,261
1942 - 7,700 - 4,896
1943 - 20,600 - 5,648
1944 - 21,100 - 5,266
1945 - 25,400 - 6,248



Production
Year - Soviet - German

1941 - 6,274 - 3,256
1942 - 24,639 - 4,276
1943 - 19,959 - 5,966
1944 - 16,975 - 9,161
1945 - 4,384 - 1,098

Losses
Year - Soviet - German - Exchange Ratio

1941 - 20,500 - 2,758 - 7:1
1942 - 15,000 - 2,648 - 6:1
1943 - 22,400 - 6,362 - 4:1
1944 - 16,900 - 6,434 - 1.4:1
1945 - 8,700 - 7,382 - 1.2:1

Which means SU losses by year of stock and production

1941 71%
1942 46%
1943 57%
1944 44%
1945 29%




From after-action report of the corps Tatsinskaya operation (TsAMO RF f.232, op.590, d.26, l.22)
Total tanks on strength in three tank brigades before operation - 96 T-34, 61 T-70 ( Authorised TOE 121 T-34 and 79 T-70)

Operational on 30.12.42 - 28 T-34, 15 T-70 Tatsinskaya raid.

Combat Losses:17 T-34, 9 T-70
Non combat losses 42 T-34, 35 T-70
undergo repair 9 T-34, 4 T-70



Operation conducted with 2 units of fuel (5 days of supply and no resupply.
Lost to enemy action:17% T34 15% T-70
Lost in non combat:44% T34 57% T-70
Reduction in operational tanks: T34 71% reduction, T70 76%

SU inquiry into loss rates.
In 42 ‘Our armored forces and their units frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical problems".
On motor vehicles, the numbers above don't add up.

Studebaker alone shipped, mostly via the Persian corridor 152,000 US6 2 1/2 ton 6 x 6 or 5 ton 4 x 6 trucks to the Soviet Union during the war. That's roughly 70% of Studebaker's production. The vehicle was so ubquitious that "Studebaker" became synomnous with "Truck" in Russia for quite a while during the late war and afterwards.

Image

The Studebaker US6 far exceeds the numbers Glantz gives alone. Since it is only one of many US vehicles shipped (although probably the most common) out of 427,284 total, it is clear that without Lend Lease vehicles, the Soviets would have been seriously hit. Their vehicle park would be reduced by as much as half, and most of the remaining vehicles would be inferior in capacity to those shipped via Lend Lease. The British shipped about another 5,000 motor vehicles on top of that.

US Lend Lease also provided 1977 locomotives (as compared to Soviet production from 1942 to 45 of just 92), and 11,225 rail cars. I'm not sure what the early wartime Soviet rail losses were in locomotives and rail cars, but this is likely a significant production boost on it's own.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”