Again you're making up garbage.
It takes a special kind of psychopath to excuse his ideological madness in attacking Russia as a plan to encourage Britain to give up.
It takes a very speshul kind of fool to believe it is true.
:roll:
Again you're making up garbage.
all three could be reasons for attacking USSR, as well the fact they had incurred a "debt" they could not easily repay with finished goods, AND the scare they received the year before when Soviets advanced further than expected into Romania.
Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.
No perhaps about it. Hitler was indeed that psychopath. But just because he used it as an excuse, doesn't make it true, does it? Were the jews really the source of all evil? Hitler said they were, repeatedly. At some point the reader has to use their own brains to decide what is credible and what is not.Max Payload wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 01:39Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.
However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence the army had the capacity to attack only by stripping 2 AG to bring one up to 855 of TOE in the south, Logistic failures include, failure to predict oil consumption, 6 fold consumption put 1800 Panzers out of action when engines seized up from lack of oil.Having a a forward lift capacity of half the food ration and full pol and munitions for only a third of the formations tasked with the mission. Zero allocation left for replacements ( Hitler declared the war won after 4 weeks and no more AFV replacements to be sent or spares changed industrial production from AFV and munitionsn to that of LW and KM, meaning 42 in the east woud not have what it needed) and winter equipment, so when preparing to go to Moscow, and sending POL and munitions, was chosen, it was at the expense of not being able to send forward winter equipment. Plan called for the number of Divison required and 5 months to win, based on SU raising 100 replacement Divisons total, this was so far off it stagers the mind. Industry was tasked to supply the TOE for that number of formations and AH was told we cant do it, so equipment from all over Europe was used, one MOT div had 111 different makes of trucks, There were over 2000 different weapons systems with over a million different spare parts for them, a logistical nightmare. Plan called for single track RR conversion but quickly showed this was insufficient requiring double track laying that slowed the process by more than double the time planned for, such a fuck up the whole process was taken away from the Army,and given to TODT to do. Army general went top thje concentration camsps for their RR supply fiasco. When two thirds of the Trucks at Div level were gone, 1 third of the grosstruppen gone, the logistical ability to move supplies from the rail head to the end user became insurmountable, not least because the end user was twice as far from the rail head as the -plan called for. Maps issued for the invasion were wrong, roads and towns on them did not exist, it was over a year before accurate maps were issued.MarkN wrote: ↑17 Feb 2019, 16:54BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of logistics.
It didn't fail because of poor logistic planning, it didn't fail due to faulty intelligence on the logistic capacity, it didn't fail because the Red Army caused significant damage to the logistic system and it didn't fail due to unexpected logistic issues that cropped up once the unternehmen had begun. Nor did it fail due to poor industrial or economic planning beforehand.
Studying the logistics aspect of BARBAROSSA maybe an interesting subject for military logisticians during their own training. But as a focal point for understanding the outcome of the unternehmen, it is just a red herring. However, you try to tweek the logistics, the decisions about logistics, the decisions about manufacturing priorities etc etc, the result will always be the same: BARBAROSSA fail!
One Germany division was unable to be deployed as the munitions it had and required,were used to execute on an industrial scale, you can try Hitlers willing executioners.Volyn wrote: ↑16 Feb 2019, 19:20A couple of questions about how the logistics were handled/mishandled by the Germans during Operation Barbarossa:
6. Is it known what military resources were used to support German Einsatzgruppen and other occupation forces that should/could have been used elsewhere?
Ignores that AH was setting industrial and military policy based on his political conceptions of reality. indeed how is credible you dont know that?.MarkN wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 09:48No perhaps about it. Hitler was indeed that psychopath. But just because he used it as an excuse, doesn't make it true, does it? Were the jews really the source of all evil? Hitler said they were, repeatedly. At some point the reader has to use their own brains to decide what is credible and what is not.Max Payload wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 01:39Perhaps Hitler was that ‘special kind of psychopath’ because that is the explanation he gave to his senior military staff at the Berghof on 31/7/40 for his decision to attack the SU. Unless Jodl, Halder et al were the ones ‘making up garbage’.
The objective of Op BARBAROSSA was a land grab up to the Urals. Although not actually stated in the policy & planning documents, we can deduce that that objective was to be achieved before the winter of 1941/42 set in.Hanny wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 12:18However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence ...
... Barbarossa failed because it was logistically impractical for the army to defeat and destroy the SU inside its operational capabilty of 300 miles, over half the SU esacped back to fight again, and was joined by mobilised formations that Germany did not plan to exist. By 42 as a consequence of the failure of barbarossa, the Germany army was reduced to 58 Divison being combat ready for offensive actions.
That's not a failure of logistics.
Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.
Why did they only have those quantities? The answer to that question determines whether it was a logistics failure or whether it was failure of something/somebody else.Hanny wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 12:18Zero allocation left for replacements ( Hitler declared the war won after 4 weeks and no more AFV replacements to be sent or spares changed industrial production from AFV and munitionsn to that of LW and KM, meaning 42 in the east woud not have what it needed) and winter equipment, so when preparing to go to Moscow, and sending POL and munitions, was chosen, it was at the expense of not being able to send forward winter equipment.
That's not a failure of logistics.
A logistical nightmare is not a failure of logistics.Hanny wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 12:18Industry was tasked to supply the TOE for that number of formations and AH was told we cant do it, so equipment from all over Europe was used, one MOT div had 111 different makes of trucks, There were over 2000 different weapons systems with over a million different spare parts for them, a logistical nightmare.
That's not a failure of logistics.
That's not a failure of logistics.
That's not a failure of logistics.Hanny wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 12:18When two thirds of the Trucks at Div level were gone, 1 third of the grosstruppen gone, the logistical ability to move supplies from the rail head to the end user became insurmountable, not least because the end user was twice as far from the rail head as the -plan called for.
That's not a failure of logistics.
Or we can look at what primary objective was, "The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented."MarkN wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 13:22The objective of Op BARBAROSSA was a land grab up to the Urals. Although not actually stated in the policy & planning documents, we can deduce that that objective was to be achieved before the winter of 1941/42 set in.Hanny wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 12:18However was initiated against the advice of the logistics branch. Hitler when told it was logisticaly unsound, he went ahead anyway, based on his intuition that the system would collapse and logistical problems would not have time to come into effect. He was wrong they did, so that for 42 as a consequence ...
... Barbarossa failed because it was logistically impractical for the army to defeat and destroy the SU inside its operational capabilty of 300 miles, over half the SU esacped back to fight again, and was joined by mobilised formations that Germany did not plan to exist. By 42 as a consequence of the failure of barbarossa, the Germany army was reduced to 58 Divison being combat ready for offensive actions.
The Wehrmacht logistics branch, during the initial fleshing out of the plan, stated that logistically that objective was not achievable. I have not seen anywhere what they consider to be the maximum distance or time that logistical support was practical. There must have been a tipping point somewhere. But where?
The historical evidence suggest BARBAROSSA had failed before the logistics had reached that tipping point.
BARBAROSSA failed because the objective was far, FAR too ambitious for the capabilities of the German military machine. Not the logistics branch, but the entire machine to sustain the fight.
What happened logistically or otherwise in 1942 is irrelevant. BARBAROSSA had already failed.
Nonsense. Barborossa ended on 5 December 1941. The consequences of that failure, for the future prosecution ( by further operations)and the survival of the Reich of the war were profound.
We can....
... and that's NOT what it was.
http://www.enlistment.us/field-manuals/ ... ions.shtml
It was a logistical constraint, when the planners explained the limits of what was logistiocaly possible.that was what logistiocal possible.
yes it is, logistical the size of the invasion force was determined by the size of the opposition and prepared accordingly to defeat that force level. Logisticaly it faced a force level far greater than it was prepared for.
Its a product of failure of Germany industry to be able to logistical supply the army with what it required, and task that expands the number of parts involved makes the logistics of that task mopre complex, the 4000 french trucks used to equip a MOT Div when needing spare parts, when in russia only then found out the french worklers who made them where now in gernmany making something else instead of the parts the army needed and was asking for. Failure of loguistics no matter what you think.
Its not?, single RR line was insuffiecent to supply the requirement as consumption was higher than planned, requiring twice the RR track to meet this unexpected level of demand is not a logistics failure?, how odd. What is it called when you plan for x and x turns out to be 2x.
Correct its a consequence of a logistical failure.
its both logiostical failure and a conconsequnce of a logistical failure.
Its not?, following maps to a road that does exist and so consumming 2/3 times fuel to get to where you want by cross country is not a logistical failure from failure to have the right maps, how odd.
Blaming you for not knowing what logistics is so much an easier explanation.
Very first thing on AH to do list, its odd you know more about what AH ment than he did himself.MarkN wrote: ↑18 Feb 2019, 13:57We can....
... and that's NOT what it was.
Of course, if you are using the word "primary" in the sense of initial, you are correct. However, being initial is just a intermediate task on the way to the objective.
If you are using "primary" to mean main or principle, then you are wrong.
http://www.enlistment.us/field-manuals/ ... ions.shtml
It was a logistical constraint, when the planners explained the limits of what was logistically possible.That was what logistical possible to provide.
yes it is, logistical the size of the invasion force was determined by the size of the opposition and prepared accordingly to defeat that force level. Logisticaly it faced a force level far greater than it was prepared for. planners pointed out to fully supply the Mech formations at 300 miles from base would consume all avilable grosstruppen leaving nothing for any other formations.
Its a product of failure of Germany industry to be able to logistical supply the army with what it required, and task that expands the number of parts involved makes the logistics of that task more complex, the 4000 french trucks used to equip a MOT Div when needing spare parts, when in russia only then found out the french worklers who made them where now in Germany making something else instead of the parts the army needed and was asking for. Failure of logistics no matter what you think.
Its not?, single RR line was insuffiecent to supply the requirement as consumption was higher than planned, requiring twice the RR track to meet this unexpected level of demand is not a logistics failure?, how odd. What is it called when you plan for x and x turns out to be 2x. Planners pointed out that a pause would result around reaching smolensk to resupply, that turned out to be a month not the 2 weeks planned for because, suprise, demand was double what was expected.
Correct its a consequence of a logistical failure.
its both logistical failure and a consequence of a logistical failure.
Its not?, following maps to a road that does exist and so consuming 2/3 times fuel to get to where you want by cross country is not a logistical failure from failure to have the right maps, how odd.
Blaming you for not knowing what logistics is so much an easier explanation.
Thats a failure to read the required reading literature.