Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Sept. 29th. Halder says supply is satisfactory.
He does, but what does it mean. He also wrote "In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four Panzer, three motorised infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"
It means since on 30th July OKH orders AGC to stop advancing and rest and refit, as it had outrun the logistical base and was now 500 to 720klm from base of supply. Pre war plan allowed for 2 weeks to resupply. Logistics order were now coming in for winter equipment placing a higher burden of supply. Now read his August 11 remark. Pzr Group, now an Panzer Army is sent to Kiev while AGC fights of counter attacks that consume the munitions they are trying to build up for the next offensive. set for 2nd October, ie it took 63 days to acquire the logistics for Typhon. 61 days to prepare for an offensive logistically is an indication of how bad the system was in 41, and then SU had its own ideas about letting them just sit there unmolested.
Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Nov. 3rd. Halder's first real mention of supply issues.
Only if we ignore all the ones before then.
Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.
Halder calculated that by the end of the month (July) only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the original total of 3350, which was 55/60%.Supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rhythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.
Already at the end of July the quartermaster’s war diary for Kleist’s panzer group noted that, even in their current positions, the general supply situation, and especially the running of the trains, was ‘unsatisfactory’ Panzer Group 1 categorised the supply situation on 20 August as ‘critical’. Why?, because the nearest supply pointy was 350 klm away.
Instead of half way through typhoon going into defensive posture and receiving the winter equipment ordered, AH chose to send more POL/munitions and continue.
Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Nov. 4th. Halder talks about continued operations regarding rail.
On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, ( who had advised AH pre invasion that it was only possible to supply the invasion for 20 days with both POL/Food/munitions before a stop was forced to resupply) reported that “We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter.”
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.