The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Konig_pilsner
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#136

Post by Konig_pilsner » 21 Feb 2019, 17:13

I asked you a question, not the views of some random person on the net, please show where he expresses a bias.
While it may be one review, I am clearly not alone in my interpretation. You can choose to ignore it if you choose, but I am not going to search through boxes to prove it to you. If you view that as conceding then that is fine with me.

The reason why I posted about the preface was to show you the wisdom in the statement, even though after 20 years I got the authors religion and exact quote incorrect. Without adequate information and objectivity, it is difficult to properly access past events.

It is you that clearly has an agenda. Not only to remind all who will listen of the crimes committed (as if we all forgot), but to paint the Nazi's as bumbling buffoons undone by their racism. By making them incompetent, you diminish the strength and sacrifice of the countless men and woman who fought against them. You do them a disservice.

gracie4241
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#137

Post by gracie4241 » 21 Feb 2019, 17:34

Many here as usual blame Hitler for everything, including a belief in a short decisive victory.Since Halder's diary for june 15. 1941 has him planning for a rapid demobilization of the German Army(60+ divisions) in MID SEPTEMBER 1941 AFTER victory in Russia, and planning forays into the mid east from the Caucasus, it seems he wasn't too worried about Logistics either. It was universally accepted by Hitler's "GENERALS" that the military conflict would be decided on or at the Dneiper/Dvina line.Why these "generals" keep getting a (undeserved) pass is beyond me


Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#138

Post by Hanny » 21 Feb 2019, 17:56

Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 17:13

While it may be one review, I am clearly not alone in my interpretation. You can choose to ignore it if you choose, but I am not going to search through boxes to prove it to you. If you view that as conceding then that is fine with me.
I asked you a question, you failed to answer.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 17:13
The reason why I posted about the preface was to show you the wisdom in the statement, even though after 20 years I got the authors religion and exact quote incorrect. Without adequate information and objectivity, it is difficult to properly access past events.
No you did not understand what he wrote, you got his religion wrong, and that only appears on far right websites on the net, and you misrepresented what he did write, because you dont comprehend the written word very well.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 17:13
It is you that clearly has an agenda. Not only to remind all who will listen of the crimes committed (as if we all forgot), but to paint the Nazi's as bumbling buffoons undone by their racism. By making them incompetent, you diminish the strength and sacrifice of the countless men and woman who fought against them. You do them a disservice.
Your the one who claimed they were not as described, but doing other stuff. I did not paint them as bumbling buffoons undone by their racism, see you cant read and comprehend. Nor did i paint them as incompetent, again your comprehension skill is miserable, so dumb.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#139

Post by MarkN » 21 Feb 2019, 20:28

gracie4241 wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 17:34
Many here as usual blame Hitler for everything, including a belief in a short decisive victory.Since Halder's diary for june 15. 1941 has him planning for a rapid demobilization of the German Army(60+ divisions) in MID SEPTEMBER 1941 AFTER victory in Russia, and planning forays into the mid east from the Caucasus, it seems he wasn't too worried about Logistics either. It was universally accepted by Hitler's "GENERALS" that the military conflict would be decided on or at the Dneiper/Dvina line.Why these "generals" keep getting a (undeserved) pass is beyond me
There is indeed a determination by some, and obsession it seems, to portray the Wehrmacht as quite invincible on the battlefield and every reverse, every loss and every failure was down to the meddling of the strategic corporal. This goes hand in hand by a similar clique who are convinced the SS were super-soldiers especially when equipped with wunderwaffe.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#140

Post by ljadw » 21 Feb 2019, 21:04

Shirer was an American journalist who traveled ( not lived !) through a number of European countries,without having any serious contact with their populations,but still was writing about these countries for an American public that knew nothing about them,and had the pretention to write history .Today,more than 80 years later, the situation has not changed : American journalists continue to write rubbish about ''Europe '' for a public that mostly does not believe any word from what they are writing . European journalists (also incompetent, unreliable and biased ) are doing the same .
Shirer was writing about a German national character, not knowing that there was no German nation/state before the 19th century and that even in 1866 the German states were fighting against each other,and that there was ,and is still today, a lot of hostility between Bavarians and other Germans, and between Austrians and Germans .
He believed in the exceptionalism of the US and said, after the war !,that Germany was also exceptional,and translated this in a not existing German Sonderweg ,ignoring (he ignored a lot of things ) the liberal German revolution of 1848 .

Konig_pilsner
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#141

Post by Konig_pilsner » 21 Feb 2019, 21:06

Sept. 29th. Halder says supply is satisfactory.
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Nov. 3rd. Halder's first real mention of supply issues.
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Nov. 4th. Halder talks about continued operations regarding rail.
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Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#142

Post by Hanny » 22 Feb 2019, 12:22

viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004, 21:09
FDR was a jew. he was the only one in america that wanted to go to war.

viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004, 21:09
My first girlfriend was a skinhead and she brought me into her circle of friends. Since my parents are German, they all loved me and I got to know them well. Amongst them they had 2 copies of MK, and no one had read the whole thing.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#143

Post by Hanny » 22 Feb 2019, 12:26

Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Sept. 29th. Halder says supply is satisfactory.
He does, but what does it mean. He also wrote "In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four Panzer, three motorised infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"


It means since on 30th July OKH orders AGC to stop advancing and rest and refit, as it had outrun the logistical base and was now 500 to 720klm from base of supply. Pre war plan allowed for 2 weeks to resupply. Logistics order were now coming in for winter equipment placing a higher burden of supply. Now read his August 11 remark. Pzr Group, now an Panzer Army is sent to Kiev while AGC fights of counter attacks that consume the munitions they are trying to build up for the next offensive. set for 2nd October, ie it took 63 days to acquire the logistics for Typhon. 61 days to prepare for an offensive logistically is an indication of how bad the system was in 41, and then SU had its own ideas about letting them just sit there unmolested.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Nov. 3rd. Halder's first real mention of supply issues.
Only if we ignore all the ones before then.

Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.


Halder calculated that by the end of the month (July) only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the original total of 3350, which was 55/60%.Supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rhythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.


Already at the end of July the quartermaster’s war diary for Kleist’s panzer group noted that, even in their current positions, the general supply situation, and especially the running of the trains, was ‘unsatisfactory’ Panzer Group 1 categorised the supply situation on 20 August as ‘critical’. Why?, because the nearest supply pointy was 350 klm away.

Instead of half way through typhoon going into defensive posture and receiving the winter equipment ordered, AH chose to send more POL/munitions and continue.

Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Nov. 4th. Halder talks about continued operations regarding rail.
On 27 November 1941, Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, ( who had advised AH pre invasion that it was only possible to supply the invasion for 20 days with both POL/Food/munitions before a stop was forced to resupply) reported that “We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter.”
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#144

Post by MarkN » 22 Feb 2019, 14:28

Complaints about, and problems with, logistics are not the same as failures of logistics.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 12:26
Konig_pilsner wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 21:06
Sept. 29th. Halder says supply is satisfactory.
He does, but what does it mean. He also wrote "In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four Panzer, three motorised infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"
Indeed, what does it mean?

It means that the logistic system is holding up according to expectations. Being able to deliver 6,300 tones daily to that point, at that stage of the advance is inline (as in based upon actual conditions rather conditions predicted months earlier) with the advice presented before they crossed the start line.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 12:26
It means since on 30th July OKH orders AGC to stop advancing and rest and refit, as it had outrun the logistical base and was now 500 to 720klm from base of supply. Pre war plan allowed for 2 weeks to resupply. Logistics order were now coming in for winter equipment placing a higher burden of supply. Now read his August 11 remark. Pzr Group, now an Panzer Army is sent to Kiev while AGC fights of counter attacks that consume the munitions they are trying to build up for the next offensive. set for 2nd October, ie it took 63 days to acquire the logistics for Typhon. 61 days to prepare for an offensive logistically is an indication of how bad the system was in 41, and then SU had its own ideas about letting them just sit there unmolested.
...
Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.
It's not a logistics failure if Halder buries he head in the sand about the realities of his, and his senior commanders decisions. He was advised before crossing the start line, that at some point he would need to pause. That at some point, the logistic system would only be able to support a reduced effort in the advance. He was advised that he should not expect all his troops to get everything they demand.

On 15 July, Wagner promises Halder 6,300 per day but delivers 6,500!

You wrote,
Hanny wrote:
21 Feb 2019, 11:15
MarkN wrote:
20 Feb 2019, 00:06
Logistic problems are NOT the same as logistic failures.

Failure to grasp that simple, commonsense reality by some is hindering sensible debate here.
Your failure is not understanding what the plans were, and what logistics is. Your the kind of person who plans pans to build a house for 20,000 and it ends up costing 80,000 and does not blame planner. There may have been some sensible debate here, but you have not contributed to it.
Reasonable analogy - but pointed in the wrong direction.

Halder and Co were the sort of people who want to build a houses that will cost 80,000, are told they only have 20,000 to spend, but carry on regardless assuming they have limitless funds!

That approach causes supply/logistic problems. It is not a supply/logistic failure where the impossible is not achieved. BARBAROSSA didn't fail because logistics failed, it failed because the Heer decisionmakers failed to grasp, understand and to stuck to their own limitations.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#145

Post by MarkN » 22 Feb 2019, 14:53

Here is an example of a logistics screw up (US Army translation) - Wagner to Halder 3 August 1941:
Ammunition situation: In North, ammunition arrivals have suddenly stopped. On 2 Aug., of nineteen supply trains only three were ammunition. On an average there should be seven or eight. It has been definitely established that on 1 August a call was sent to Railroad Operations for 10 ammunition trains, including four trains of Artillery ammunition. The Supply Area offered eighteen ammunition trains, including eight of Artillery. These eighteen trains would have amply covered all requirements. But the requisitioned 10 amunition trains just got lost in the Marshaling Area, and no one can locate them now. Today four trains have been found in the Marshaling Area ( Warsaw - Frankfurt/Oder). Ifow nine trains are on their way across the frontier. Together with the trains received today North will have twelve trains by tomorrow morning. Twenty-five more ammunition trains in the ZI are ready to be dispatched. They will be run with highest priority under supervision directly to Minsk-Molodeczno; 25 more trains are being assembled.
Nobody is denying logistic problems existed.
Nobody is denying logistic screw ups occured.
Nobody is denying frontline units often had less than they expected.

The point is, was logistics a component of BARBAROSSA failure? Or, did BARBAROSSA fail because of logistics? The answer is no.

BARBAROSSA failed because it was beyond the capability of the Heer to be successful. The Heer had set themselves an objective that was beyond their capability to deliver. They even failed in their first intermediate task - which some, such as you - have convinced themselves was the objective of BARBAROSSA. And that failure occured long before logistic issues began to bite.

The outcome of BARBAROSSA can not be changed from spectacular failure to success by tweaking logistics. Many have tried. None have succeeded. One attempt on this forum involved transferring non-existent GTR from Africa to BARBAROSSA. Converting murder squads into POW reception teams is one of the more barking out there!

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#146

Post by Hanny » 22 Feb 2019, 15:07

MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28

It means that the logistic system is holding up according to expectations. Being able to deliver 6,300 tones daily to that point, at that stage of the advance is inline (as in based upon actual conditions rather conditions predicted months earlier) with the advice presented before they crossed the start line.
I disagree, it means only half what is required is arriving, and that is all that can be guaranteed, more may or may not arrive.

Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.

MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28
It's not a logistics failure if Halder buries he head in the sand about the realities of his, and his senior commanders decisions. He was advised before crossing the start line, that at some point he would need to pause. That at some point, the logistic system would only be able to support a reduced effort in the advance. He was advised that he should not expect all his troops to get everything they demand.
Its a logistics failure because rail conversion was to reduce the gauge from wide Russian to narrow European narrow, and get the locos there on the narrow, but they forgot the distance between water/coal/wood stops was still as for Russian locos who being wider carried more, requiring less stops, so the Germans had to build the rail infrastructure from scratch to get the locos to where they wanted to go. Its a logistics failure when because you dont assign enough oil for your trucks in the region they are operating, and 25% are gone in a week, when your industry replaces them at 1000 per month. These contingencies were not accounted for in the paln.
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28
Reasonable analogy - but pointed in the wrong direction.

Halder and Co were the sort of people who want to build a houses that will cost 80,000, are told they only have 20,000 to spend, but carry on regardless assuming they have limitless funds!
Right direction, the house is planned for completion at 20k cost, but ends up costing 80, does not change the planed cost to finish is 20k. Your analogy does not work, firstly they planed for a 20k house as the plan for a 80k house was rejected, and stuck to the 20k plan as the 60k they wanted was withheld by the bank of Hitler, and only a series bridging loans by the bank were given to try and finish the house before winter stopped construction.

second, If they had limitless funds the house would have been built at the point in time the 20k house was due to complete but would have cost more.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#147

Post by MarkN » 22 Feb 2019, 15:28

Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:07
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28
It means that the logistic system is holding up according to expectations. Being able to deliver 6,300 tones daily to that point, at that stage of the advance is inline (as in based upon actual conditions rather conditions predicted months earlier) with the advice presented before they crossed the start line.
I disagree, it means only half what is required is arriving, and that is all that can be guaranteed, more may or may not arrive.

Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.
You've posted that already. Wagner deilvered more that he promised. No logistics failure. Halder wanted all his divisions to have everything they wanted even though he'd been warned it was never feasible. Delusional failure.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:07
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28
It's not a logistics failure if Halder buries he head in the sand about the realities of his, and his senior commanders decisions. He was advised before crossing the start line, that at some point he would need to pause. That at some point, the logistic system would only be able to support a reduced effort in the advance. He was advised that he should not expect all his troops to get everything they demand.
Its a logistics failure because rail conversion was to reduce the gauge from wide Russian to narrow European narrow, and get the locos there on the narrow, but they forgot the distance between water/coal/wood stops was still as for Russian locos who being wider carried more, requiring less stops, so the Germans had to build the rail infrastructure from scratch to get the locos to where they wanted to go. Its a logistics failure when because you dont assign enough oil for your trucks in the region they are operating, and 25% are gone in a week, when your industry replaces them at 1000 per month. These contingencies were not accounted for in the paln.

In addition to what you write, there were a number of other issues regarding railway capacity. But logistics plans assume problems along the way. Sometime they factor in sufficiant error, sometimes they don't. In this case, the logistics plan, despite all those problems, offered 6,300 and delivered 6,500. Logistics didn't fail.

The delusion that perfection is achievable is clouding this discussion.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:07
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 14:28
Reasonable analogy - but pointed in the wrong direction.

Halder and Co were the sort of people who want to build a houses that will cost 80,000, are told they only have 20,000 to spend, but carry on regardless assuming they have limitless funds!
Right direction, the house is planned for completion at 20k cost, but ends up costing 80, does not change the planed cost to finish is 20k. Your analogy does not work, ...
Your argument is completely flawed. The house was always planned as an 80,000 build when only 20,000 funds were available.

You have presented evidence that the logistics experts advised, before BARBAROSSA kicked off, that they could only support max effort for first 300 miles. Then, all they could support was a much reduced effort. And they needed a pause in the advance to even allow that to happen. The advice was that only 20,000 was available for the project. Halder ignored the advance and set his heart on the 80,000 build. It was Halder (and others) failure in approving the 80,000 build.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:07
... firstly they planed for a 20k house as the plan for a 80k house was rejected, and stuck to the 20k plan as the 60k they wanted was withheld by the bank of Hitler, and only a series bridging loans by the bank were given to try and finish the house before winter stopped construction.
That's not how it happened. Marcks offered a 80,000 project from the very beginning (Urals in 4 months). Halder never gave up on the idea of getting his 80,000 house. 20,000 was all that was ever available.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:07
second, If they had limitless funds the house would have been built at the point in time the 20k house was due to complete but would have cost more.
If they had limitless funds, the Heer would have been at the Urals by the end of November.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#148

Post by Hanny » 22 Feb 2019, 16:08

MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:28

You've posted that already. Wagner deilvered more that he promised. No logistics failure. Halder wanted all his divisions to have everything they wanted even though he'd been warned it was never feasible. Delusional failure.
Wagner delivered half what was planned. I repeated it as it escaped your notice several times.
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:28
Sometime they factor in sufficiant error, sometimes they don't. In this case, the logistics plan, despite all those problems, offered 6,300 and delivered 6,500. Logistics didn't fail.
Wrong the plan was 1300 .
MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 15:28
Your argument is completely flawed. The house was always planned as an 80,000 build when only 20,000 funds were available.
Nope argument and analogy are sound, problems your end.


Logistics, is the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied, hence no army has ever had unlimited logistics as that is an impossibility, its the science of logistics that makes the art ( strategy/tactics) of warfare either practical and possible or impractical.

Barbarossa failed due its logistical restrictions, forced on it by the demands of its conceptual originator in pursuit of his ideological dreams, an assumption of collapse of will to resist once the Red Army was annihilated on the border, and time span he wanted.

Those logistical limitations prevented Grand strategic success but did allow tactical success and some strategic success.

A sound logistical plan generates combat power, extends operational reach, and sustains the force, an unsound one reduces all the above in relation/ratio to the deficiency in the plan.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#149

Post by MarkN » 22 Feb 2019, 16:28

Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
Logistics, is the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied, hence no army has ever had unlimited logistics as that is an impossibility, its the science of logistics that makes the art ( strategy/tactics) of warfare either practical and possible or impractical.
It's one of the components NOT the only one. Success and failure, doable or not doable can (and normally is) determined by other factors.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
Brabaroosa failed due its logistical restrictions, forced on it by the demands of its conceptual originator in pursuit of his ideological dreams, an assumption of collapse of will to resist once the Red Army was annihilated on the border, and time span he wanted.
That is a your opinion. Fair dos. But it is an opinion which is not supported by historical evidence and only seems to exist as an attempt to deny the abject failures of the Heer but shifting blame.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
Those logistical limitations prevented Gand strategic success but did allow tactical success and some strategic success.
No. Logistic limitation did not prevent grand strategic success.

Logistic limitation provided one, but only one of many, limitations on what was realistically achievable. What is possible logistically, is one of the factirs which guides planners as to what is a credible objective. Strategy is the process of matching ends, means and ways. Failure was at the point where an end was stipulated for which the means were not available. The failure was starting BARBAROSSA under those conditions. The failure was not in the means not being sufficient.

It was the Heer who sets the (unachievable) objective, the end. It was the Heer who ignored their own internal experts that warned them that they did not have the means. Halder was not the only one. It was an institutional failure. But Halder has the first seat in the front row. Hitler was just the dog thrown a tasty bone which he refused to let go of. The bone being the Marcks offer of the Urals in 4 months.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
A sound logistical plan generates combat power, extends operational reach, and sustains the force, an unsound one reduces all the above in relation/ratio to the deficiency in the plan.
A wise commander plans and acts within the limitations of a sound logistical plan. An unwise commander ignores the limitations. A daft commander whines about the limitations after his plan fails.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#150

Post by MarkN » 22 Feb 2019, 16:30

Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
Nope argument and analogy are sound, problems your end.
I disagree. Problems your end.
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019, 16:08
Wrong the plan was 1300 .
Which plan?

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