Picture of a Sherman withstanding a clean hit of a pak40 or better

[Richard Anderson]

I think you're past being butthurt. You are in need of a full on proctological exam.

Oh darling, I didn't think you cared so much.

Again, you are mixing up things that I said to CM with things I said to you. Your embarrassing histrionics could have been avoided if you simply read my latest response to you in its entirety, rather than working yourself up into an angry huff. But not to worry, I will show you exactly where you jumped the shark and got everything mixed up.


This is the first exchange, where you inserted yourself into the discussion between CM and I.

Nope.

At 26 Feb 2019, 18:04 PST I posted in reply to christianmunich's reply to critical mass:

"Anyway, all of 79 the Panther ausf A for I./Pz.Regt. 3. were delivered between 27 January and 28 February 1944, so were early 1944 quality and not late-war expedient quality...or manufactured with face-hardened armor."

You then decided to remark at 27 Feb 2019, 06:51 PST that I shouldn't "be too quick to dismiss this. We haven't adequately explored all the possible explanations."

And I responded at 27 Feb 2019, 09:29 PST that C.G. Erickson's notion, which you parroted, was "a rather extended chain of assumptions and coincidence. How much more or less reasonable is it to assume that the "characteristic flaking" identified in old photographs was incorrect?"

I then followed up with a separate question, addressed to you at 27 Feb 2019, 09:41 PST, asking if you were "agreeing with the C. Erickson that said that the Panther tested at Isigny was an Ausführung A with face-hardened glacis or the C. Erickson I remember that argued, vociferously, for years on TankNet that German quality control of their plates WAS maintained until the end of the war?

And are you arguing that the results at Isigny reflected a face-hardened glacis or the German's struggle to maintain QC?"

That simple question, clarifying which position of the "expert" you were quoting was correct, is the apparent source of your butthurt. I suggest you get over it.

[Richard Anderson]

https://tankandafvnews.com/2015/10/02/f ... ther-tank/

Seems the Brits were more preoccupied with driveability trials.

Yep. The 12-28 June 1944 drivability trials of the Kursk Panther. Done following the analysis that resulted in the 30 May 1944 protection analysis, which corrected the lame-ass initial Soviet report to the Western Allies re-published in the November 1943 U.S. Military Intelligence Service, Tactical and Technical Trends. It still is unclear to me whether the protection analysis was done using the Kursk or Anzio Panther. I do not believe in either case that the protection analysis was done by testing to destruction, but rather by measuring the armor thickness and angles, which would then match the photo you fund of the Kursk Panther.

[Richard Anderson]

Jentz claims...

Indeed, the same page I quoted from. I suspect that Jentz actually only assumed rather than knew they back-stocked hull front sections for the Ausführung D based upon finding that later that is what they did with the Ausführung G, using completed Ausführung A hull sections.

[critical mass]

But as for the questions about the protection (or lack thereof) offered by the Shermans armor, that is kindof relevant. Even a 'mere' medium tank should be able to offer some protection from enemy anti-tank guns. On paper, the M4A3 should be able to shrug off hits from a 75mm L48 gun from medium range. But we've found no evidence of them doing this in combat.

Sorry, somehow I missed this. There may actually be a very simple explanation. The tanks in question are actually the M4A3 75mm and 76mm (w) and the M4 and M4A3 105mm with 47 degree hull front of the "Ultimate Medium Tank M4 series" (the M4A2 with 47 degree hull front in the series were mostly shipped to the USSR). The thing is, they did not start appearing in the ETOUSA until mid-August and late September 1944 and in relatively small numbers, about 509 M4A3 75mm, of which 250 were actually M4A3E2...so not really the type in question. Another 589-odd M4A1 and M4A3 76mm (w) were shipped June-September 1944 and were issued to units July-October, but the M4A1 again did not have the 47 degree hull front - it was a cast hull design. Of course, further shipments arrived November-December (but always in quantities insufficient to build up a strong replacement tank reserve - a major bone of contention between the ETOUSA and the War Department).

Anyway, what that means is that distribution of the new tanks in the late summer and fall of 1944 was very diffuse, spread between numerous units. Except for one case, the 9th AD. For some reason, which I have never been able to track down, it was issued a complete set of new M4A1 and M4A3 76mm (w), just in time for one of its battalions to go into action with CCR against 2. Panzer and Lehr in the Ardennes, where the Panthers had little problem defeating the new hull front. Otherwise, most of the improved tanks simply don't appear in significant numbers, especially in the photographic record, until very late in 1944 and then in 1945.

Hmmm,
Avalancheon is actually asking a good question here. Based upon the official penetration curves against RHA at 45° obliquity for the 75mm Pzgr. 39 APCBC-HE as of 1943 mass production as reproduced in Lilienthalbericht 166 (1943), the 2.5inches thick RHA and 47° sloped, M4A3 glacis represents a target, which is somewhat beyond the reliable penetration realm of the 75mm KWK40 even from close range without considering an additional target angle. F.e. at 750m/s terminal velocity (that´s point blanc <50m, for the KWK40), the 45° penetration really is only in order of 63-65mm, and should be less than that at the refence 47° slope angle. Probability to penetrate would be nil, when factoring in even slight target angles. And it cannot be stated that all M4A3 glacis penetrations are caused by KWK42 or 88mm...

In response to this, I may offer an explenation. The report 166 graphs are for mod.1943 Pzgr39 production, and that was before the projectile proof obliquity was raised from 30° to 45°. For what´s worth, the Pzgr39 graph at 45° in this report is for broken up projectiles, though they do anticipate 45° intact penetration as a future requirement in the report (hence, my default position is that the graph is NOT for intact projectiles at this obliquity and date). Further, the graph shows an already smoothed interpretation line through non-existent-anymore datapoints, which originally would have exposed some noticable zags every time the hardness of the target plate abruptly changes.

The 60mm german target RHA plate at 45° is noted in the graphs at 110 kg/mm^2 ± 5 kg/mm^2 tensile strength, that translates to a medium hardness of BHN 330 ± 15. Compared to the relatively soft 240-270BHN US RHA hardness practice, this consititutes for a significant difference in target properties. While one might argue, whether or not the BHN offers more resistence beeing so hard against approx. 0.8 T/D ratio impacts, the key difference here is that the harder material will damage a projectile more completely than softer target material would, particularly at these moderately high obliquities, which homogenious armor works very effectively by base slapping and damaging the projectile as it rotates first away and then into the plate as it digs in deep enough that the back side of the plate starts to experience failure by either plastic deformation or plugging.
Photographs of tests at 45° show the onset of deformation originating in the base of the pzgr39, generally.

Now, lack of damage to the penetrating projectile, caused by softer target materials could very abruptly alter the involved penetration mechanics. If the projectile stays intact, it can penetrate by plastic deformation, or plugging with intact penetrators, both are lower energy penetrations than plugging/ discing with a broken penetrator would be.

The only relevant evidence in this question for US RHA are the 45° post war USPAG data, which give a complete, intact penetration of 75mm Pzgr39 through 5 3/16 (131.8mm) US RHA plate. Apparently, these trials confirm the aforementioned presumption in regard to projectile damage. Under this condition, the 75mm Pzgr39 generally stayed intact, whether or not it penetrated (3155fps and up) or was rejected by plate (3099fps and down). This corresponds to a De Marre K = 2565 for 3155fps / plate thickness and projectile combination. If the thickness is allowed to be reduced to 65mm, this K translates -everything else beeing equal- to a velocity = 586.4m/s, or, approx. 160m/s less than what report 166 graphs suggested. I stress that the use of discrete data here just demonstrates a variance between graphs for broken penetration and intact penetration, and by no intents, do I want people to misunderstand them as useful proxy for downrange penetration probabilities (At 1.0km the velocity is 637m/s and at 1.5km the velocity drops to 585m/s, but these values cannot be used as a relevant reference here because we don´t know the likelyhood of penetration). De Marre K is a rough tool, and variances are to be realistically reckoned with.
Even though one has to be careful from jumping to conclusions from limited samples, this seems to somewhat contribute to resolve the conflict between legend penetration and observed evidence.

[Christianmunich]

I believe they attempted to convert German hardness to US hardness in regards to the test plates and tried to "calculate" supposed penetration based on their conversion. Going from Ballistics and Gunnery WW2

It goes without saying that the absence of evidence is no clear evidence on its own but I believe that to this day only 2 photos surfaced in contention for the "fabled" Sherman front protection one of which has clear evidence of additional armour still on the front the other being from a fight where photographic and video evidence shows very many vehicles covered in additional "armour".

I may sound like a broken record but people thought it was interesting enough to record Jumbos ( or pseudo jumbos ) which withstood frontal impact somebody would have done the same for one of the so many Shermans. In my opinion, as stated in the OP, the lack of empiric evidence tells me it is likely either the Sherman plate did not perform as well as calculated or the German guns better than calculated in this specific case.

If 750m frontal impacts should be withstood there must have been a considerable amount of hits that fulfil the criteria, especially if we consider the range being reduced by adding vertical angles but nobody recorded such instance?

What is the ballpark for increased penetration in this scenario? Could it be significant enough to explain the lack of empiric evidence?

[Yoozername]

Jentz claims...

Indeed, the same page I quoted from. I suspect that Jentz actually only assumed rather than knew they back-stocked hull front sections for the Ausführung D based upon finding that later that is what they did with the Ausführung G, using completed Ausführung A hull sections.

Not really sure what you are saying. I just wanted to quote Jentz.

The initial order for D versions of the Panther was 1000 units. So, assembly of the hull/superstructure piece would have naturally progressed to fill the order, and the various teething issues and delayed final production, and rework(s), would develop a backlog. This picture shows the overhead gantry moving a Panther hull/superstructure. Unlike a Panzer IV, which received hulls and superstructures as separate pieces, these Panther components were a major cost.



Early A models used the same hull with 'mailbox' bow MG slot. One could theorize that only 850 some D were made, and FH glacis armor bled over to early A models. If there are any D or early A models left in the world, it might be nice to test the glacis armor with a field instrument.

Basically, the G Model is the hull. Building a G turret, unless it has a chin mantlet, would be a A. Cast Mantlets with dual hole sight were used in models using monocular sights by just plugging and welding the extra aperture. E The Germans can be anal retentive, but they are frugal also...

[Yoozername]

A British report Summary 147 (10/11/1944) claims that " A model D examined in Russia had flame hardened armour on the superstructure sides, hull sides, and lower nose plate. All the main plates of the models D, A and G tanks examined in this country were, however, were machineable quality (RHA)"

From panther -Green

[critical mass]

The claim is almost certainly in error. 45 to 60mm plates are too thick for flame hardening. IF they would be surface hardened then they were induction hardened, a completely different process. In my opinion its more likely that they mistook 340—380BHN levels of homogenious hard plates for the thinner section thickness as evidence for the presence of surface hardening.
I remain convinced that the british assessment of MQ plates was a more accurate representation of the state of things, instead.

I happily stand corrected in light of updated, primary source evidence,

[Richard Anderson]

Not really sure what you are saying. I just wanted to quote Jentz.

Not really sure what you are missing. I quoted the exact same passage from Jentz and then you repeated it. Maybe you were having a Santayana moment.

(snip agreement)

What I was recalling from memory rather than going and looking - never a good idea - was Jentz' remark in the photo caption on page 112, "The armor suppliers contracts specified delivery of hulls three months in advance of the assembly firms scheduled delivery of a finished tank". While he was specifically referring there to the Ausführung F, I wondered if he supposed the same held true for the D, A, and G? With only 22 D completed by the end of February 1943, the concerns about rebuilding, and all, I wonder how many - if any - were ever actually completed with a face-hardened upper hull plate? As CM has noted, the notion that they would actually use face-hardened plates of that thickness there is odd anyway. Yet again, the old story about the face-hardened Panther seems to be a fantasy.

[Yoozername]

Not really sure what you are missing. I quoted the exact same passage from Jentz and then you repeated it. Maybe you were having a Santayana moment.

I don't read everything you write, was the point.

[Richard Anderson]

Hmmm,
Avalancheon is actually asking a good question here.

Indeed, but yet again, there may be a very simple reason why there is no photographic evidence of such. In August 1948, 3,542 M4A3 76mm (w), 1,246 with VVS and 2,296 with HVS were in inventory in CONUS, out of 1,925 VVS and 2,617 HVS manufactured (complicating that is some of the M4A3 75mm (w) were cannibalized postwar to keep the inventory up). More - at least 100 - were stored at American bases on Okinawa, which were sent there in preparation for OLYMPIC. Most of the M4A3 76mm (w) HVS that arrived in Europe were manufactured in January 1945 and arrived the end of March...and apparently few were issued. Only 441 medium tanks with 76mm were recorded as lost from 6 January 1945 to the end of the war by the ETOUSA. That would include M4A3 VVS and HVS with 76mm as well as M4A1 VVS with 76mm. There were of course more M4A3 75mm (w) 3,271 of them. Many of those were issued to late-arriving armored divisions, especially the 8th and 14th in the fall of 1944, but by fall of 1944 the desire for 76mm-armed tanks meant that many others simply remained in depot in CONUS.

So the search is for a photo of a late-production tank, only seen in quantity in the ETOUSA and Italy very late in the war, one type of which had relatively few losses and those in a period when the greater threat became the Panzerfaust and mines instead of a Pak 40 or Panzer IV's Kwk 40. It may simple be a search for a rara avis so rare as to not exist.

[Richard Anderson]

Not really sure what you are missing. I quoted the exact same passage from Jentz and then you repeated it. Maybe you were having a Santayana moment.

I don't read everything you write, was the point.

Oh good, so glad my habits are rubbing off.

[Yoozername]

So the search is for a photo of a late-production tank, only seen in quantity in the ETOUSA and Italy very late in the war, one type of which had relatively few losses and those in a period when the greater threat became the Panzerfaust and mines instead of a Pak 40 or Panzer IV's Kwk 40. It may simple be a search for a rara avis so rare as to not exist.

Let me help you there... 7,5 cm PzGr 39 had a few other sources ...

Pak 40
StuK 40 StuG III & IV
KWK 40
Pak 39 (Hetzer and early Jagdpanzer IV)

[Yoozername]

A tidbit of info regarding Panzer IV.... I wonder if became the normal armoring on the Panzer IV...

Excerpt from the memorandum on the topics covered in the Panzersitzung of 2.5.1944, which deals with current issues concerning the different tanks. In this case reference is made to the temporary suppression of the surface hardening of the Panzer IV shield plates produced by Krupp.

VII. Surface hardening in Krupp

Due to the losses suffered in Krupp caused by enemy action, the WaPrüf6 has agreed that during the next three months the armor plates for the Panzer IV will be delivered without surface hardening. The WaPrüf6 will notify the corresponding acceptance center.

[Richard Anderson]

So the search is for a photo of a late-production tank, only seen in quantity in the ETOUSA and Italy very late in the war, one type of which had relatively few losses and those in a period when the greater threat became the Panzerfaust and mines instead of a Pak 40 or Panzer IV's Kwk 40. It may simple be a search for a rara avis so rare as to not exist.

Let me help you there... 7,5 cm PzGr 39 had a few other sources ...

Pak 40
StuK 40 StuG III & IV
KWK 40
Pak 39 (Hetzer and early Jagdpanzer IV)

Or, to put it another way, perhaps 1,200 firing 7,5 cm PzGr 39 operational in all of Ob.West in early February 1945, facing about 8,000 British and American medium tanks, of which perhaps one-in-four are the type we are searching for.