Question about tanks, 1943!

[Counter]

Hi, guys!

I am Counter and I have a question for you, hopefully you could help me (first, apologizes for my bad English…)

A friend of mine told me about the amazing efficiency of the Wehrmacht tank crews, and assured me that in the battle of Kursk (july 1943) the germans destroyed EIGHT Russian tanks for each german tank lost. I doubted that could be so, as I knew that the Russian tanks were also fairly good ones and, after two years of terrible war, the Red Army soldiers should have improved very much their own efficiency. Anyway... the russians won the war...

Then, my friend passed me a book about the second world war that is, according to him, the “definitive” history book on that Catastrophe: this one… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_a ... _World_War

And, it is true, I read this:

The total losses incurred by Central Front, Voronezh Front, and the reinforcements from Steppe Front were thus between 1,614 and 1,956 fighting vehicles. At all events, they far exceeded the 252 losses suffered by the German attacking forces.


Page 152, Vol VIII


In page 155, there is a Diagram showing that the total figures before the battle were 2699 german tanks against 8200 soviet tanks (and assault guns)

Then, again, about operations “Kutuzov” (Orel, July, north to Kursk) and “Rumyantsev” (Kharkov, August, south to Kursk) the figures are: 324 german tanks against 3200 russians ones and 237 against 2400. On these two battles, the Russians finally won, after losing first -Orel- 2586 (!), and then –Kharkov- 1864 .

I also read in page 154 (related to Kursk battle, in July): The German forces lost 252 tanks and assault guns, but it must be borne in mind that 817 new fighting vehicles were produced in the same month.

That I can´t understand. I sum up: 252 tanks lost in Kursk, and then 234 available to defend Orel and 237 available to defend Kharkov: 252+234+237= 723 tanks (and what about the rest of the other over 1000 german tanks still available?, I know there were finally few of them sent to Italy or anywhere else)

Before the battle they had (supposedly) 2699 PLUS 817 “produced in the same month”

They destroyed (supposedly) 1614+2586+1864= 6064 soviet tanks in July and August… and then there would have been more than 2000 another german tanks left… enough (supposedly) to destroy at least… 18000 russian tanks more…

According to these figures… The Soviet could never have won the war…

Could you help me?

Thanks

[Jan-Hendrik]

'Tanks' do not 'win' wars, it's the Infantry!

Jan-Hendrik

[Art]

The total losses incurred by Central Front, Voronezh Front, and the reinforcements from Steppe Front were thus between 1,614 and 1,956 fighting vehicles. At all events, they far exceeded the 252 losses suffered by the German attacking forces.

German AFV losses in "Citadel" were in fact higher than 252. The problem is that reporting and German reporting in particular tended to be erratic and lagged behind events. Which makes exact losses suffered during a relatively short period of time difficult to establish. The characteristic case is the Army Group "South". By 17 July it reported 191 tanks and assault guns as complete write-offs in units participating in "Citadel". However by 31 July the tally had increased to 283 (A.Tomzov 2007). Which was mostly a result of a more accurate accounting of losses suffered during "Citadel" rather than combat activity in those two weeks. As estimated by Tomzov of these 283 about 20 were lost after 20 July which leaves about 260 tank and assault guns lost in "Citadel". So about 50% more than an initial report. Losses of "Panthers" tanks in the AG S is an even more striking example. By 17.7 44 Panthers were reported as total write-offs, by the end of the month the number increased almost two-fold (80-83-84 from different sources). And all those Panthers were actually hit during the "Citadel". That demonstrates how easily you can mess up with numbers. In addition to tanks and assault guns there were also armored self-propelled guns, which were for some reason ignored by Frieser and Zetterling. According to a COSAVE study by 18.7.43 AG South lost 17 Marder SP guns and also 4 captured T-34, not counted in the tally quoted above. Which brings total losses to about 280.
In addition the Army Group Center lost 88 tanks and assault guns in "Citadel" according to Zetterling&Frankson. Which is again is subject to some corrections probably. Anyway about 370 tanks/SP guns is the minimal number of irrevocable losses.

Then, the number of write-offs was just a technical quantity. What mattered in a short perspective was the number of operational vehicles. This number decreased very sharply and dramatically:

[FORBIN Yves]

In page 155, there is a Diagram showing that the total figures before the battle were 2699 german tanks against 8200 soviet tanks (and assault guns)

Then, again, about operations “Kutuzov” (Orel, July, north to Kursk) and “Rumyantsev” (Kharkov, August, south to Kursk) the figures are: 324 german tanks against 3200 russians ones and 237 against 2400. On these two battles, the Russians finally won, after losing first -Orel- 2586 (!), and then –Kharkov- 1864 .

Welcome but for this battle Germans don't have only 237 tanks, Panzers in the 4 Pz Divisions but also present an independent Panther Bn with 130 machines in more 5 Pz Divisions whose 4 arrive very fast in Rft with 700 Panzer and Stugs !

During Kursk 10 Pz Brigade have 10 - 160 Pz V ops in general about 40 a 1/2 Bn early model delicate but they have destroyed IIRC 250 russian tanks with excellent crews, very long gun and Germans had the best optic systems.

[Art]

In page 155, there is a Diagram showing that the total figures before the battle were 2699 german tanks against 8200 soviet tanks (and assault guns)

I can tell to you where the number of 8200 is from. If was first published in the Soviet "Military History Journal" in 1968 and calculated the following way:
- 3500 tanks and SP guns in the Voronezh and Central Front at the start of "Citadel"
- 1500 additionally committed with the Steppe Front until 23 July
- 3200 committed in the offensive operations with the Bryansk Front, elements of the West Front and reserves of Stavka
So 8200 stands for the numbers employed until the end of the BoK (not counting replacements sent to units). Not the number available at the start.
From the German side Frieser seems to count only units available for "Citadel" and also habitually forgets about SP guns like Marders. Everybody forgets those little guys despite the fact that Heer had about a thousand of them in the summer of 1943.

In general my impression of Frieser is that he is pretty lame and lazy author who has an unfortunate tendency to mess up with figures on a regular basis. I would be cautious with any of his stats.

[Richard Anderson]

German AFV losses in "Citadel" were in fact higher than 252. The problem is that reporting and German reporting in particular tended to be erratic and lagged behind events. Which makes exact losses suffered during a relatively short period of time difficult to establish.

There is also the eternal question of what exactly constitutes a tank "loss". Was a tank evacuated by rail to Germany a tank loss? Were the Panthers evacuated to the 4. Panzerarmee ordnance depot at Kharkov for repair, due to lack of spare parts and ordnance personnel with 10. Panzerbrigade, Panzerregiment 39., and Panzer Abteilung 51. and 52. losses or merely damaged? Were tanks kept in long-term repair for months on end lost or just damaged? The same holds for all armies.

The characteristic case is the Army Group "South". By 17 July it reported 191 tanks and assault guns as complete write-offs in units participating in "Citadel". However by 31 July the tally had increased to 283 (A.Tomzov 2007). Which was mostly a result of a more accurate accounting of losses suffered during "Citadel" rather than combat activity in those two weeks. As estimated by Tomzov of these 283 about 20 were lost after 20 July which leaves about 260 tank and assault guns lost in "Citadel". So about 50% more than an initial report.

Possibly, but again, we accounted for both destroyed and damaged tanks and other AFV in the KDB, so if they were later written off, but destroyed 4-18 July, they should be accounted for as damaged and then at some time be deducted from them. I do not recall that occurring and such a large change would be noticeable. In this case, I suspect Tomzov is actually estimating the damaged tanks that likely never were repaired and were eventually lost in the retreats of late summer when repair depots were overrun before they could be evacuated.

Losses of "Panthers" tanks in the AG S is an even more striking example. By 17.7 44 Panthers were reported as total write-offs, by the end of the month the number increased almost two-fold (80-83-84 from different sources). And all those Panthers were actually hit during the "Citadel". That demonstrates how easily you can mess up with numbers.

Yes, the Panthers are a good example. Very few of those damaged could be repaired by the units, so were evacuated to the ordnance depot at Kharkov where technicians (and more importantly a supply of spare parts flown in from the factory) were available. Repairs were busily underway, but then rudely interrupted by the Soviets liberating the city and overrunning the depot before the Panthers were evacuated in late August. The "increased losses" again are likely a reflection of unit evacuations rather than "losses".

In addition to tanks and assault guns there were also armored self-propelled guns, which were for some reason ignored by Frieser and Zetterling. According to a COSAVE study by 18.7.43 AG South lost 17 Marder SP guns and also 4 captured T-34, not counted in the tally quoted above. Which brings total losses to about 280.

Yes, the COSAVE study is a good source, especially given it was based on the KDB.

In addition the Army Group Center lost 88 tanks and assault guns in "Citadel" according to Zetterling&Frankson. Which is again is subject to some corrections probably. Anyway about 370 tanks/SP guns is the minimal number of irrevocable losses.

The idea that ZITADELLE was only fought and "lost" by HG-S and the battles of the SS-Panzerkorps does seem to have taken hold.

Then, the number of write-offs was just a technical quantity. What mattered in a short perspective was the number of operational vehicles. This number decreased very sharply and dramatically:

Exactly.

[Counter]

Thank you very much for the help. I understand that sources are not very sure about this issue...

For example, dear friend Art gave us a Diagram (no source, by the way) showing that few tanks were useful, although not directly "written off" (in september 1943, only 600 operational but 1900 available). But anyway, I dont know of something similar happened on the russian side...

Herr Frieser also wrote (pag 156):

In the second half of 1943 the German armament industry produced a monthly average of 908 tanks and
assault guns (some of which were, of course, intended for other fronts), so that the number of fighting vehicles on the eastern front in December was higher than at the beginning of July.

According to generally accepted figures, that year germans produced 17000 tanks and russians 27000 (from "A war to win"). If ratio destruction was not 1/8... but even just 1/4, anyway, german Panzers would have destroyed all russian tanks. So, something wrong is on the statistics.

I'd rather believe the claim of dear friend Jan-Hendrik about not counting tanks, but counting infantry (and artillery?), because these data on AFV do not make sense...

Thank you very much

[Richard Anderson]

Thank you very much for the help. I understand that sources are not very sure about this issue...

For example, dear friend Art gave us a Diagram (no source, by the way) showing that few tanks were useful, although not directly "written off" (in september 1943, only 600 operational but 1900 available). But anyway, I dont know of something similar happened on the russian side...

Actually that is the 12 October 1943 figure, not "in september". It is also just for Panzer...605 operational, 1,348 non-operational, and 317 replacements "allocated" (but not arrived...and some never arrived). However, it does not count 508 StuG operational, 468 non-operational, and 245 allocated. It was the perpetual problem for the Germans, they could manufacture tanks, but insufficient spares and ordnance personnel meant that operational readiness rates were always low.

Herr Frieser also wrote (pag 156):

In the second half of 1943 the German armament industry produced a monthly average of 908 tanks and
assault guns (some of which were, of course, intended for other fronts), so that the number of fighting vehicles on the eastern front in December was higher than at the beginning of July.

580.67 Panzer and 318.67 StuG actually, so the two are mixing different things really.

According to generally accepted figures, that year germans produced 17000 tanks and russians 27000 (from "A war to win"). If ratio destruction was not 1/8... but even just 1/4, anyway, german Panzers would have destroyed all russian tanks. So, something wrong is on the statistics.

5,897 Panzer and 3,312 StuG in 1943, so I'm not sure what those "generally accepted figures" are talking about? 17,000 (8,432 Panzer and 9,291 StuG) is the figure for 1944, not 1943. BTW, "StuG" includes StuG, StuH, StuPa, and JgPz.

I'd rather believe the claim of dear friend Jan-Hendrik about not counting tanks, but counting infantry (and artillery?), because these data on AFV do not make sense...

Thank you very much

They do make sense, but yes, Jan-Hendrik has a definite point.

[Art]

For example, dear friend Art gave us a Diagram (no source, by the way)

The chart is from Vol.II of "Panzertruppen" by T.Jentz

[Counter]

5,897 Panzer and 3,312 StuG in 1943, so I'm not sure what those "generally accepted figures" are talking about? 17,000 (8,432 Panzer and 9,291 StuG) is the figure for 1944, not 1943. BTW, "StuG" includes StuG, StuH, StuPa, and JgPz.

I already wrote that I got the data from the book "A war to win" (Murray and Millet). There is a chart at the end of the book: 1943: 17300 germans AFV production. The figure for 1944 is 22100. Surprised that those data are so wrong.

Anyway, yet to explain how was possible for the germans to destroy so many russian tanks and the russians growing advantage every month. I suspect german crews were efficient but not as much as many authors wrote. If the germans had problems with repairing tanks, did not soviets also have them?

[FORBIN Yves]

5,897 Panzer and 3,312 StuG in 1943, so I'm not sure what those "generally accepted figures" are talking about? 17,000 (8,432 Panzer and 9,291 StuG) is the figure for 1944, not 1943. BTW, "StuG" includes StuG, StuH, StuPa, and JgPz.

I already wrote that I got the data from the book "A war to win" (Murray and Millet). There is a chart at the end of the book: 1943: 17300 germans AFV production. The figure for 1944 is 22100. Surprised that those data are so wrong.

Anyway, yet to explain how was possible for the germans to destroy so many russian tanks and the russians growing advantage every month. I suspect german crews were efficient but not as much as many authors wrote. If the germans had problems with repairing tanks, did not soviets also have them?

For maintenance efficiency German units in Pz Rgt or Bn are more efficient especialy for Pz III/IV and clearly than Soviets up to 1943 Soviets do good job from this year really very good after spring 1944.
During first offensives end 1942 a Soviet Tank Corps even with few fighting was losing on maybe 200 kms, severals day 50 % of his tanks broken down with bad maintenance.

Also despite T-34 is a good rustic tank he have up to 1943 a delicate engine BTW why the M4 was prefered by Soviets for it he have a clearly more reliable engine but first variants with a 75 mm was less capable vs tanks still a good round vs infantry

BTW advantage have Tiger I the 88 mm round more efficient vs infantry than Panther's 75 mm with a much more big explosive qty and better protected on the side and rear over Panther. In addition Tiger I have the best steel for armor in quality.

M4 have a other advantage he have a electric motor for turret which turn more fast about 2 time more fast than Panther IIRC.

[Richard Anderson]

I already wrote that I got the data from the book "A war to win" (Murray and Millet). There is a chart at the end of the book: 1943: 17300 germans AFV production. The figure for 1944 is 22100. Surprised that those data are so wrong.

Sad to say, but that is not the only embarrassment in a War to be Won. If you look again at the chart on pager 535 you will notice something peculiar...there is no 1941 in it! Instead, it skips from 1940 to 1942, which bollixes the German data.

Anyway, yet to explain how was possible for the germans to destroy so many russian tanks and the russians growing advantage every month. I suspect german crews were efficient but not as much as many authors wrote. If the germans had problems with repairing tanks, did not soviets also have them?

ZITADELLE occupied something like 75% of the German armor strength on the Ostfront and resulted in losses that significantly reduced the overall operational readiness rate. Worse, while the German tanks attacking inflicted about an 8-to-1 exchange ratio that was just on the southern front...on the Orel Front the massive Soviet superiority meant the few German armored vehicles present were overwhelmed, as was their infantry, and forced to retreat. That led inevitably to an even greater Soviet preponderance of strength when they began the offensive to retake Kharkov, which then led to a massive loss of tanks under repair in the depots there. That meant that most of the 80-odd Panthers damaged in ZITADELLE were lost, along with most of the spares flown in at great cost to repair them.

The Soviets won not because they had an overwhelming superiority, but because they had a sufficient superiority that allowed them to mass forces against German weaknesses, while keeping sufficient forces available to hem in German strengths.

The Germans were also not just fighting the Soviets. From 1 December 1943 to 30 November 1944 they lost 13,886 Panzer and StuG on all fronts, so 1,157 per month. They manufactured 1,614 per month. So they could, in theory, grow the force by 457 per month...gee, enough to build a Panzer division or two every month! Except, on 3 December 1943, there were only 2,866 of them operational and 2,053 in repair. On 30 November 1944, there were 4,065 operational and 1,432 in repair. Part of the problem is it took time for replacements to reach the front...on 3 December 1943 the backlog of assigned new Panzers and StuG was 1,284. On 30 November 1944, it was 1,706. So at any one time, two to three months of production was tied up in transit.

[critical mass]

I agree that the discrepancy, of panther losses -at large- is from blowing up remaining AFV in the vehicle repair depot, when the facility was about to be overrun. But I would caution that not all Panther losses were actually hit during citadel. The first two total write offs are from unloading the tanks when two of the caught fire and burned out. Judging by the mechanical teething troubles reported in this period one might presume that the ratio of mechanical to combat casualties may have made up for a significant proportion of the total number of unservicable panthers present in the repair shop in question, too.

[Richard Anderson]

I agree that the discrepancy, of panther losses -at large- is from blowing up remaining AFV in the vehicle repair depot, when the facility was about to be overrun. But I would caution that not all Panther losses were actually hit during citadel. The first two total write offs are from unloading the tanks when two of the caught fire and burned out. Judging by the mechanical teething troubles reported in this period one might presume that the ratio of mechanical to combat casualties may have made up for a significant proportion of the total number of unservicable panthers present in the repair shop in question, too.

Indeed, we did look quite a bit into that. Another problem, IIRC was that one of the early mechanical losses was one of the two Bergepanther that had arrived? I think Chris covered them extensively in his Kursk book.

[Stiltzkin]

According to these figures… The Soviet could never have won the war…

The lesson of ignorance we face today: Tanks won world war 2.
Also, production stands in relation to losses, higher losses mean higher production.

If we include all losses (that is all categories from environmental to combat causes, temporary/short-term, accidents, mechanical, burnt out, stuck etc.) we land at an exchange ratio of merely 1 : 1.6 for Zitadelle, the byproduct is of course a squander of operational readiness. If we include the AFVs and material that was lost due to actual unit interaction (tank and anti tank warfare in particular), "cleaning" the losses for mine damage, temporary damage and merely observing irrecoverable losses as a consequence of enemy fire, we land at a considerable exchange ratio in favour of the Wehrmacht, which correlates with personnel losses.
This is quite understandable, as the Wehrmacht was attacking a well entrenched enemy that was twice as strong.
The faction that controls the battlefield, can salvage the vehicles effectively, when this is not possible, losses will rise accordingly.
To get an overview of the vehicles irretrievably lost to each belligerents armed forces for this year, it is probably best to compare the term "evacuated" to "Totalausfälle", which for 1943 yields 32,539 AFVs vs 8,992 (this includes all fighting and command vehicles without APCs and half tracks).

The Germans were also not just fighting the Soviets. From 1 December 1943 to 30 November 1944 they lost 13,886 Panzer and StuG on all fronts, so 1,157 per month. They manufactured 1,614 per month. So they could, in theory, grow the force by 457 per month...gee, enough to build a Panzer division or two every month! Except, on 3 December 1943, there were only 2,866 of them operational and 2,053 in repair. On 30 November 1944, there were 4,065 operational and 1,432 in repair. Part of the problem is it took time for replacements to reach the front...on 3 December 1943 the backlog of assigned new Panzers and StuG was 1,284. On 30 November 1944, it was 1,706. So at any one time, two to three months of production was tied up in transit.

The increase in mechanization of forces requires a diversion of units to other sectors and a greater upkeep, which is not necessarily more powerful, in fact you might weaken the Army and not strengthen it. As General v.Mellenthin and Balck argued after the war (lessons learned, NATO interview), maximizing the firepower of a Panzer Division was preferred at the cost of less tanks.