Barbarossa Planning

[jesk]

Halder on 28.7.

"von Bock's forces too weak for further advance to the east, since he needed large forces on his right wing"

So jesk?

First, figure out what the circumstances, than to tear quotes from the context.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

28/7/41
В который уже раз обсуждал с Гальдером вопросы проведения новых операций. В частности, те трудности, которые возникают у меня в связи с отводом войск с правого крыла моей группы армий, где сосредоточены части, предназначенные для наступления на Москву. Гальдер уже знает об отказе Гудериана наступать к востоку от Сожи по причине ужасных дорог и сложного рельефа местности. Но если Гудериан пойдет на юг, а не на юго-восток, как это ранее планировалось, южному флангу восточной группы это большого облегчения не принесет. Гальдер считает, что при сложившихся обстоятельствах значительного продвижения на московском направлении ослабленных войск, оставленных группе армий для наступления на восток, ожидать не приходится. Гальдер все еще надеется, что ему удастся уговорить фюрера изменить свое мнение.

Which has already discussed with Halder issues of conducting new operations. In particular, the difficulties that I have in connection with the withdrawal of troops from the right wing of my army group, where the units intended for the attack on Moscow are concentrated. Halder already knows about the refusal of Guderian to advance east of Sozhi due to the terrible roads and difficult terrain. But if Guderian goes to the south, and not to the southeast, as was previously planned, this will not bring much relief to the southern flank of the eastern group. Halder believes that under the circumstances, significant progress in the Moscow area of ​​the weakened troops left for the army group to advance to the east cannot be expected. Halder still hopes that he will be able to persuade the Fuhrer to change his mind.

[jesk]

When i first started it was what and how to cope South of the Pripet region that was the hardest thing to sort out.

Another tactic, breakdown to Regimental level, a MOT formation, use these sub units,to move onto routed formations that regroup well to the rear after a heavy defeat, as that takes them out of the game but only risks a reg as your going into space the SU will have enough formations to cut you off and or counter attack you.

Jesk neither knows what logistics is or what its for, so would be wasted on him.

Happy to talk more in the proper forum, movies/games if you want.

Very short distances to Moscow in order to seriously consider logistics. 300 km is 2-3 days on tanks and Moscow fell. One, two, three days and it's over.
Vladivostok agrees far. Logistics may intervene. To argue on Moscow in the context of logistics simply ridiculously. Wagner wrote tanks to Moscow, infantry to Smolensk. But this is mathematics. 10x+10x+10x= Smolensk. 5x+5x+20x = Smolensk +10 divisions in Moscow. Taking into account defeat of Russians 20 motorized and 10 infantry divisions lasted out for any operations in the Moscow region.

[BDV]

The attack on the Great Luki was a mistake. Von Bock insisted on changing the angle of attack in the direction of Smolensk.
Your logic, remind, does not correspond to the Wehrmacht’s promotion schemes.

Big mistake, but not of 3rd Panzer Gruppe; big mistake of 4th Panzer Gruppe, in particular of Erich "120 armbanduhren" Manstein 56th Panzer Corps (took Opochka, at great cost in lives for Totenkopf, but 56 Panzer Korps did not pursue continuing SE to join 19th and block retreating Sovjet units). This would bag all the troops in the AGN AGC seam. "Lost Victory," indeed.

This would allow 4th Panzer to join for a strike towards Moscow from Novossokolniki rooms.

16,19,20 army destroyed. 3 other armies will be able to stop? Not.

One rifleman battalion can stop a truck column. Ask again "120 Armbanduhren" about his Stoltsy experience.

Absolutely unpromising scheme for Russians.

only if Leningrad pipe-dream is abandoned.

[jesk]

16,19,20 army destroyed. 3 other armies will be able to stop? Not.

One rifleman battalion can stop a truck column. Ask again "120 Armbanduhren" about his Stoltsy experience.

Absolutely unpromising scheme for Russians.

only if Leningrad pipe-dream is abandoned.

Soltsy and in general Leningrad is a specific area. The topic was discussed and the terrain there is worse than Smolensk. Like for example in the Ardennes in 1944, where German tanks were ineffective. It is not worthwhile to extrapolate the Soltsy bog experience to the Moscow area. Von Bock and Halder considered it possible to attack Moscow in the summer. Hitler did not allow.

https://reibert.info/threads/kontrudar- ... mi.594359/



Район лесной и болотистый. Дороги в лесу или недалеко от леса и вдоль рек. Явно не танкоприменимая местность. Танки и БРТ могут идти только по дорогам (в лесу или рядом с лесом).

The area is forested and swampy. Roads in the forest or near the forest and along the rivers. Clearly not tank-applicable terrain. Tanks and BRT can only go on the roads (in the forest or near the forest).

[AbollonPolweder]

Very short distances to Moscow in order to seriously consider logistics. 300 km is 2-3 days on tanks and Moscow fell. One, two, three days and it's over.
Vladivostok agrees far. Logistics may intervene. To argue on Moscow in the context of logistics simply ridiculously. Wagner wrote tanks to Moscow, infantry to Smolensk. But this is mathematics. 10x+10x+10x= Smolensk. 5x+5x+20x = Smolensk +10 divisions in Moscow. Taking into account defeat of Russians 20 motorized and 10 infantry divisions lasted out for any operations in the Moscow region.

It's not easy with logistics, jesk! Logistics, or rather supply or, as the Germans would say, Nachschub is always important. Another question: when is more supply needed? When the troops attack or when they are in defense? Halder wrote 21 Sept. 1941:

Defense* Lt. Fd. How. 2 -2 1/2
Med. Fd. How. 2 1/2 - 2 3/4
10 cm Guns 1 3/4- 2 3/4
Hv. How. 2-5

Attack Lt. Fd. How. 2.2
Med. Fd. How. 2.1
10 cm Guns 2,26
Hv. How. 1.9

The expenditure of shells is more In the defense. Food consumption, I think, is not very different in defense and in the offensive.
And only fuel consumption, of course,is more in the offensive. But the chances of capturing trophy fuel are also greater in the offensive.
So, to single out logistics as an unsolvable problem when attacking Moscow isn't right. I agree with you.

[jesk]

Until Moscow, lived a few million people. Food for soldiers, horses, too could be solved at the expense of local residents. For example, in January 1945, the 2 Belorussian Front in Germany refused food supplies from the USSR and switched to self-supply.

[BDV]

Until Moscow, lived a few million people. Food for soldiers, horses, too could be solved at the expense of local residents.

Any soldier employed to foraging is not employed to fighting. The German attacking force is pretty thin to begin with. Flanks need protection (see Soltsy, others).

For example, in January 1945, the 2 Belorussian Front in Germany refused food supplies from the USSR and switched to self-supply.

Exaggeration. sourcing, please.

[jesk]

Any soldier employed to foraging is not employed to fighting. The German attacking force is pretty thin to begin with. Flanks need protection (see Soltsy, others).

combat composition is barely a third of the army. there were enough people for supply searches. and soldiers themselves.

For example, in January 1945, the 2 Belorussian Front in Germany refused food supplies from the USSR and switched to self-supply.

Exaggeration. sourcing, please.

http://urokiistorii.ru/article/251

The commander of our 2nd Belorussian front during the offensive in Prussia and Pomerania was Marshal Rokossovsky.
Obviously, understanding the cost for the workers of the rear to get the supply of the army, Rokossovsky, after the front units had entered the territory of Germany, refused food and clothing allowance (supply). At the same time, he obviously expected to receive the necessary uniforms and food from the captured warehouses and transports of the enemy.
So it happened, but not quite. The organized supply of food and clothing did not work out.

So every Red Army man was supplied with food and clothing, as he could. The residents of villages and towns were mostly taken away food. And since there was almost no population in the cities captured by us, they cracked locks in apartments and took everything they needed. However, it should be noted that soldiers, except for watches and gold rings, usually did not take any valuables. There were heavy battles, it was not up to values. Food was taken, but not much. Soldier duffel and so was heavy from spare disks to the machine.
By this time, many Red Army men threw away their tattered uniforms (except, of course, overcoats and caps) and put on "civilized" clothing under the overcoat. In one of the occupied villages, I also took an excellent woolen suit — a jacket and trousers — and put on tattered shirts and riding breeches instead. I looked very strange, but so many were dressed in our company, and indeed in the whole battalion.
Each soldier ate on his own, the kitchen did not have time to bring lunch to the front line.

[BDV]

So every Red Army man was supplied with food and clothing, as he could. The residents of villages and towns were mostly taken away food. And since there was almost no population in the cities captured by us, they cracked locks in apartments and took everything they needed. However, it should be noted that soldiers, except for watches and gold rings, usually did not take any valuables. There were heavy battles, it was not up to values. Food was taken, but not much. Soldier duffel and so was heavy from spare disks to the machine.
By this time, many Red Army men threw away their tattered uniforms (except, of course, overcoats and caps) and put on "civilized" clothing under the overcoat. In one of the occupied villages, I also took an excellent woolen suit — a jacket and trousers — and put on tattered shirts and riding breeches instead. I looked very strange, but so many were dressed in our company, and indeed in the whole battalion.
Each soldier ate on his own, the kitchen did not have time to bring lunch to the front line.

The plural of anecdote is not data.

[jesk]

The plural of anecdote is not data.

Memoirs came across to me that from the field kitchen in Germany nobody ate. A lot of trophies and soldiers for the first time for war well ate.

[BDV]

Memoirs came across to me that from the field kitchen in Germany nobody ate. A lot of trophies and soldiers for the first time for war well ate.

Anecdote applicable only during the advance in West Prussia and only for front-line troops.

It does not follow in any form that this was feasible for the entire of the 2nd Belarus Front; and it REALLY does not follow it would be feasible for the attacking German troops in Summer 1941. Scorched Earth was also used by Sovjets in late 1941 (Zoia Kosmodemianskaya was executed for such actions). The konzeptum that entire Armees could subsist from the land is a pipe-dream.

[jesk]

Anecdote applicable only during the advance in West Prussia and only for front-line troops.

It does not follow in any form that this was feasible for the entire of the 2nd Belarus Front; and it REALLY does not follow it would be feasible for the attacking German troops in Summer 1941. Scorched Earth was also used by Sovjets in late 1941 (Zoia Kosmodemianskaya was executed for such actions). The konzeptum that entire Armees could subsist from the land is a pipe-dream.

In Belorussia did not manage to burn anything. Near Moscow only in November began. In the summer of local loot. 70 million Soviet people appeared under occupation and they what that ate. Sometimes it was necessary to share with the German soldiers.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
It does not follow in any form that this was feasible for the entire of the 2nd Belarus Front; and it REALLY does not follow it would be feasible for the attacking German troops in Summer 1941. Scorched Earth was also used by Sovjets in late 1941 (Zoia Kosmodemianskaya was executed for such actions). The konzeptum that entire Armees could subsist from the land is a pipe-dream.

It's ppipe-dream for you but not for real communists! Look at these theoretical foundations:

In our Soviet conditions, this task is even more important, because we have much more opportunities in the form of expanding the socialist basis of war. After all, every territory we occupy is after the occupation of an already Soviet territory, where the power of the workers and peasants will be exercised. We are thus expanding our territory and at the same time expanding not only our basis of war, but also the socialist basis in general. From the work of Marshal Tukhachevsky M.A. "Expansion of the basis of war" 1923

http://militera.lib.ru/science/tuhachevsky/16.html

[AbollonPolweder]

...
Anecdote applicable only during the advance in West Prussia and only for front-line troops.

And read this military planning, excuse me, anecdote.

Thus, the kitchen and other food machines in the breakthrough can not be taken. In order to economically use concentrates, I consider it necessary to raise the question of the command using local resources to the fullest extent, fully assuming that war is like war: meat can be taken locally, bread must be found locally... General D.G.Pavlov's report at a meeting of higher commanders in Moscow, December 1940

http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/sov-new-1940/64.html

[BDV]

So how did it work in practice? How much logistics was saved, how much food was supplied by local pillaging?

What were the RKKA regs in place in Summer 1944-Summer 1945 saying on the matter.