Rescue of Leningrad
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Btw, Hitler called for ending the offensive, but Leeb appeared at FHQ on 26.10 and asked to continue it.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
It is just your imagination. Thoughts from a ceiling. The Russian source skeptically estimated fighting capacity of 54 army in October. Only the fact that on the Volkhov direction attacked only 2 German divisions: 11 and 21, saved army from defeat. An exit to the Volkhov River in headwaters blocked any deliveries. Unlike the cut railroad.Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑12 Mar 2019, 17:25I like the advance to Tikhvin.
Leeb's direct attack towards Volkhov suffered heavy casualties and was called off. By flanking the 54th army at Tikhvin you cut off the last rail line from Moscow to Leningrad, and put the 54th army in bad spot. Much better then smashing your head against a wall.
Problems were numerous. Operationally they were too ambitious with a PD and MD heading south to link up with AGC, which was called off after 2 weeks. By the time they were redirected to Tikhvin it was too late for the encirclement. (The 8th MD had forced a gap between the 4th and 54th that could have been exploited.) The roads sucked and the Russians resistance was sufficient to halt the German advance, but it was a close one.
http://lib.ru/PRIKL/SYAKOW/volhov_v_ogne.txt
At the beginning of November, 1941 during retreat our troops of the continuous front of defense of Volkhov were not. Separated, deprived of uniform command and not united by a common goal the Soviet parts exsanguinated in fights everyone on the site created the centers of resistance to the impudent enemy and tried to stop by insignificant forces his advance.
scheme of normal plans, without Hitler
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
In 1942 the 18th army was the second after the 6th largest on east front. Hitler's creativity was held down from active operations. A lot of defense at lack of an initiative in their actions.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
This is taken out of context. The Fuhrer could offer to search the roads through the swamps ...
http://militera.lib.ru/db/leeb_vr/03.html
Sunday October 26, 1941
Leeb's personal notes in the notebook:
At the Fuhrer. It is allowed at its discretion to conduct an operation in the direction of Tikhvin. Prohibited offensive actions in the Kronstadt region (Oranienbaum bridgehead. - Yu. L.).
Note from the compiler Georg Meier with reference to Baron von Griesenbeck:
Today at 07.00 the commander flew to the Fuhrer headquarters.
Monday, October 27, 1941
Assessment of the situation by the commander of Army Group "North":
During yesterday's visit to the Army High Command, I had a conversation with the commander-in-chief (Brauchitsch. - Yu. L.) and the Führer. The Führer considers it impossible to reach Tikhvin, since too large enemy forces and very bad roads do not allow this to be done ... The Führer laid the decision on this question on the commander of Army Group North.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
What context?
"the fuhrer considers it impossible"
"laid the decission on this question"
The offensive continued or not?
"the fuhrer considers it impossible"
"laid the decission on this question"
The offensive continued or not?
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
This is the context. Stop the offensive. What then? Hitler exaggerated the enemy forces in the Volkhov area. Tikhvin or nothing. Such choice was offered by Hitler.
Wednesday, October 29, 1941
Evaluation of the enemy commander of Army Group "North":
Judging by the content of the Fuhrer’s report of October 26, he exaggerates the forces of the enemy in front of Army Group North, especially those in the Volkhov area. The Fuhrer believes that their forces are equal to 12–15 divisions, not only in quantity but also in combat capability. This does not correspond to the intelligence of Army Group North. The interception of the reports of the 305th Infantry Division of the Russians from 28.10 testifies to the real strength of the enemy, in particular ...
Wednesday, October 29, 1941
Evaluation of the enemy commander of Army Group "North":
Judging by the content of the Fuhrer’s report of October 26, he exaggerates the forces of the enemy in front of Army Group North, especially those in the Volkhov area. The Fuhrer believes that their forces are equal to 12–15 divisions, not only in quantity but also in combat capability. This does not correspond to the intelligence of Army Group North. The interception of the reports of the 305th Infantry Division of the Russians from 28.10 testifies to the real strength of the enemy, in particular ...
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
http://www.maparchive.ru/ArmyGroup/Nord ... _part7.pdf
Page 189
On 26.10 Hitler said to Leeb if it was not better to stop the offensive, then Leeb replied Tikhvin was necessary to cut off the supply link to Leningrad and south of Ladoga Lake. Then Hitler gives Leeb a free hand.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Leeb definitely wanted to take Tikhvin. Maybe he needed him as a crossroads center. Then the Germans turned north-west between two swamps. They are now preserved.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
amazing things happened near Leningrad along the whole length of the front
http://militera.lib.ru/db/leeb_vr/04.html
Saturday, November 15, 1941
Assessment of the situation by the commander of Army Group "North":
The offensive in the north-eastern sector of the 1st Army Corps in the area of responsibility of the 254th and 223rd infantry divisions is developing slowly ...
To date, the enemy has withdrawn the large forces of the 8th Army from the Kronstadt region and engaged them in the areas of its offensive. Thus, an amazing situation is created when the enemy freely withdraws his forces, which then also freely enter into battle in the direction of his main attack. At the same time, the 18th Army is forced to look at it with the rifle at its foot. The withdrawal of another division from the Kronstadt region is at present inexpedient, since otherwise there will be a big breach into which the enemy can penetrate ...
http://militera.lib.ru/db/leeb_vr/04.html
Saturday, November 15, 1941
Assessment of the situation by the commander of Army Group "North":
The offensive in the north-eastern sector of the 1st Army Corps in the area of responsibility of the 254th and 223rd infantry divisions is developing slowly ...
To date, the enemy has withdrawn the large forces of the 8th Army from the Kronstadt region and engaged them in the areas of its offensive. Thus, an amazing situation is created when the enemy freely withdraws his forces, which then also freely enter into battle in the direction of his main attack. At the same time, the 18th Army is forced to look at it with the rifle at its foot. The withdrawal of another division from the Kronstadt region is at present inexpedient, since otherwise there will be a big breach into which the enemy can penetrate ...
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
The Soviets spent a lot of resources for no gain until early 1943 to get to the shiny lure of Leningrad. These resources are used elsewhere if Leningrad becomes a bridge too far.jesk wrote: In 1942 the 18th army was the second after the 6th largest on east front. Hitler's creativity was held down from active operations. A lot of defense at lack of an initiative in their actions.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Nooo. Demyansk and Leningrad too much for the mighty Wehrmacht. 16 and 18 armies in 1942 did not attack. Distinguishing from the set, this is the main thing. Earlier you wrote about the inability of the OKW on Olenino. It is too.BDV wrote: ↑12 Mar 2019, 23:07The Soviets spent a lot of resources for no gain until early 1943 to get to the shiny lure of Leningrad. These resources are used elsewhere if Leningrad becomes a bridge too far.jesk wrote: In 1942 the 18th army was the second after the 6th largest on east front. Hitler's creativity was held down from active operations. A lot of defense at lack of an initiative in their actions.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
At the end of October late was to refuse plans of operations, the new regrouping would take a lot of time. The direction of blow along the lake is initially more preferable. By attacking there, Germans received natural protection of their positions in the form of two huge marsh massifs. It was difficult not to destroy the Leningrad front, Hitler managed to keep it.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
What ridiculous? a, b, c, d, e. Any of 5 tasks was not executed. Hitler for Tikhvin took away 8,12,20 tank divisions from the district of Leningrad. With these three divisions the German chances much more increased. Besides, Leeb 2 months in October and November reminded Hitler of importance of elimination of the Oranienbaum bridgehead. Every time Hitler rejected a request for carrying out operation.
a, b, c, d, e generals did not understand the power of the enemy? they crazy such plans to make? or they do not understand anything in military affairs or Boby ...
http://militera.lib.ru/db/leeb_vr/02.html
Sunday September 28, 1941
Note by George Mayer:
September 28, at 10.30 pm, the following was recorded in the combat log of Army Group North: “An order was issued for Group 1 for further operations. An army group by repelling enemy attacks creates prerequisites for a new offensive after reinforcements arrive. The purpose of the attacks is to perform previously assigned tasks:
a) dense surroundings of Leningrad;
b) the destruction of the 8th Red Army west of Peterhof;
c) blocking the Kronstadt bay in cooperation with the Navy;
d) forcing the Neva, entourage of Leningrad from the east and connecting with the Finns west of Lake Ladoga;
e) the destruction of the enemy south of Lake Ladoga, the exit to Volkhov and the further advance towards Lodeynoy Pole in order to connect with the Finns east of Lake Ladoga.
Attacks and their sequence will be determined depending on the situation. "