von Bock and Voronej

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
DavidFrankenberg
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 11:19

jesk wrote:
12 Mar 2019 23:25
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
12 Mar 2019 22:26
It was VB's whims to use motor div in Voronej.
The delay doomed Fall Blau.
There were no prohibitions. The version of Glantz is quite logical. Halder wrote quickly and could not fully understand.
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
20 Feb 2019 00:40
David Glantz in To the gates of Stalingrad p.156-166 advances a strange view of the events :

VB understood Hitler's order "not to strike Voronej at any cost" as "take Vorronej as soon as possible" ! That's why he felt obliged to use the used motor. div. ....

But what Glantz omits to say is that Hitler forbade to use motor. div. to strike Voronej... So could it be true that Hitler said to VB to take Voronej as soon as possible and to use motor. div. ? No, sir !

For Mr Glantz VB's disobedience is only an "apparent "disobedience'" whereas it is a clear disobedience.
Glantz is not so accurate. He omits that it was VB's idea to use motor. div. that it was on the insistance of VB to use motor. div. in Voonej that delayed the whole Fall Blau.
What emerges from multiple testimonies of these days is that
1) Hitler's idea was not to use motor. div., but only infantry to take Voronej and not at any costs. 2) Hitler wanted to keep motor. div. to send them south. Voronej was not a priority in Hitler's mind. Encirclement of Soviet troops in the south was the priority and the main goal of Fall Blau.
What VB did is at best a big mistake, at worst a treason.

We often insist on the crazyness, stubbornness of Hitler, but we forget the stubbornness of his generals. If VB had not changed the plan, Hitler would have succeeded in encircling soviet troops in the south.

DavidFrankenberg
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 11:23

jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.

jesk
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 11:37

DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:19
1) Hitler's idea was not to use motor. div., but only infantry to take Voronej and not at any costs.
Hitler came to this idea on July 5, when German tanks were on the outskirts of Voronezh. And put it in von Bock's guilt. He had to understand, "any cost" means tank divisions do not move to Voronezh. Glantz drew attention to this episode, von Bock was not limited in his actions as he was later attributed.

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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 11:42

DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:23
jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.
http://modernlib.net/books/proektor_dan ... a/read_64/
{806}Позже, 18 сентября, в беседе с Кейтелем Гитлер так оценивал действия Бока: "Он теряет из-за этого (Воронежа. - Д. П.) 4-5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день для того, чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских;

Later, on September 18, in an interview with Keitel, Hitler estimated Bock's actions in the following way: “He loses 4-5 days because of this (Voronezh. - D.P.). And this is at a time when every day is dear to surround and destroy the Russians;

Boby
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by Boby » 13 Mar 2019 11:54

DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:23
jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.
Me too. Perhaps from the stenographic conferences?

Boby
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by Boby » 13 Mar 2019 11:59

jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:42
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:23
jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.
http://modernlib.net/books/proektor_dan ... a/read_64/
{806}Позже, 18 сентября, в беседе с Кейтелем Гитлер так оценивал действия Бока: "Он теряет из-за этого (Воронежа. - Д. П.) 4-5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день для того, чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских;

Later, on September 18, in an interview with Keitel, Hitler estimated Bock's actions in the following way: “He loses 4-5 days because of this (Voronezh. - D.P.). And this is at a time when every day is dear to surround and destroy the Russians;
Book? Author? Don't be lazy, jesk.

It seems is not the same book you quoted before (Isaev).

jesk
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 12:22

Boby wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:59
jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:42
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:23
jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.
http://modernlib.net/books/proektor_dan ... a/read_64/
{806}Позже, 18 сентября, в беседе с Кейтелем Гитлер так оценивал действия Бока: "Он теряет из-за этого (Воронежа. - Д. П.) 4-5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день для того, чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских;

Later, on September 18, in an interview with Keitel, Hitler estimated Bock's actions in the following way: “He loses 4-5 days because of this (Voronezh. - D.P.). And this is at a time when every day is dear to surround and destroy the Russians;
Book? Author? Don't be lazy, jesk.

It seems is not the same book you quoted before (Isaev).
Sources surely quote Hitler's conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942. The primary source is meanwhile unknown.

https://studfiles.net/preview/2365289/page:2/
В беседе с Кейтелем 18 сентября Гитлер заявил: «Решающим является прорыв на Туапсе, а затем блокирование Военно-Грузинской дороги и прорыв к Каспийскому морю».

In a conversation with Keitel on September 18 Hitler said: "The break to Tuapse, and then blocking of the Georgian Military Road and break to the Caspian Sea is decisive".

Boby
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by Boby » 13 Mar 2019 12:32

No, Isaev source.

DavidFrankenberg
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 12:45

jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:22
Sources surely quote Hitler's conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942. The primary source is meanwhile unknown.

https://studfiles.net/preview/2365289/page:2/
В беседе с Кейтелем 18 сентября Гитлер заявил: «Решающим является прорыв на Туапсе, а затем блокирование Военно-Грузинской дороги и прорыв к Каспийскому морю».

In a conversation with Keitel on September 18 Hitler said: "The break to Tuapse, and then blocking of the Georgian Military Road and break to the Caspian Sea is decisive".
So, Hitler is supposed to have said that to Keitel ?

Who reported these words ? Keitel ? Isaev does not quote any book.

DavidFrankenberg
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 12:50

Boby wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:54
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 11:23
jesk wrote:
11 Mar 2019 20:35

http://militera.lib.ru/h/isaev_av6/01.html

Такое суровое наказание Гитлер позднее объяснял так:
«Он теряет из-за этого [Воронежа. — А.И.] 4—5 дней. И это в то время, когда дорог каждый день, для того чтобы окружить и уничтожить русских; он продолжает сидеть там, наверху, с четырьмя лучшими дивизиями, в первую очередь с 24-й танковой дивизией и дивизией «Великая Германия», цепляясь за Воронеж. Я еще сказал — не нажимайте, если встретите где-либо сопротивление, идите южнее к Дону. Решающее — продвинуться как можно быстрее на юг, чтобы мы могли действительно захватить противника в клещи. Так нет, этот человек делает совершенно обратное. Затем пришла эта беда — несколько дней плохой погоды, в результате чего русские неожиданно выиграли 8—9 дней, в течение которых они смогли выбраться из петли»

Hitler later explained this harsh punishment as follows:
“He loses because of this [Voronezh. - AI] 4-5 days. And this is at a time when roads are every day in order to surround and destroy the Russians; he continues to sit there, upstairs, with the four best divisions, primarily with the 24th Panzer Division and the “Great Germany” Division, clinging to Voronezh. I also said - do not press, if you meet anywhere resistance, go south to the Don. The crucial thing is to move south as quickly as possible so that we can really capture the enemy in ticks. So no, this person does the exact opposite. Then this trouble came - a few days of bad weather, as a result of which the Russians unexpectedly won 8–9 days, during which they were able to get out of the loop ”
I wonder what is the source of the author for that Hitler's quote.
Me too. Perhaps from the stenographic conferences?
Has it ever been published ?

jesk
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 12:56

DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:45
jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:22
Sources surely quote Hitler's conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942. The primary source is meanwhile unknown.

https://studfiles.net/preview/2365289/page:2/
В беседе с Кейтелем 18 сентября Гитлер заявил: «Решающим является прорыв на Туапсе, а затем блокирование Военно-Грузинской дороги и прорыв к Каспийскому морю».

In a conversation with Keitel on September 18 Hitler said: "The break to Tuapse, and then blocking of the Georgian Military Road and break to the Caspian Sea is decisive".
So, Hitler is supposed to have said that to Keitel ?

Who reported these words ? Keitel ? Isaev does not quote any book.
Isaev refers to the 1972 book. That does not refer to anyone. Other sources also confidently quote the conversation on September 18, without calling the primary source.

http://militera.lib.ru/research/proektor/05.html

Проэктор Д.М. Агрессия и Катастрофа. Высшее военное руководство фашистской Германии во второй мировой войне. Издание 2-е, переработанное и дополненное. Издательство "Наука". Москва 1972.

Группа армий "Б" докладывала 13 июля: "Противник перед 4-й танковой армией и перед северным флангом группы армий "А" прорвался дальше на восток и юго-восток и снова сильными частями двинулся к югу"{804}. Фельдмаршал Бок требовал направить 4-ю танковую армию через Морозовский к Дону выше устья Донца. Он послал донесение Гальдеру: "Я думаю, что уничтожение значительных сил противника больше не может быть достигнуто в одной операции, когда в центре — крупные силы, а на флангах — слабые"{805}. Это донесение Бока стало предметом бурного обсуждения на совещании 13 июля в ставке. Гитлер, взбешенный, как он теперь был уверен, критикой его действий и угрозой провала замысла операции, поставил Боку в вину прежде всего еще задержку вывода подвижных войск 4-й танковой армии из Воронежа и неожиданно для всех отстранил его от командования. Вечером фон Бок получил телеграфное уведомление от Кейтеля и немедленно отправился в Берлин{806}.

Proctor D.M. Aggression and Catastrophe. The highest military leadership of fascist Germany in the Second World War. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. Publisher "Science". Moscow 1972.

Army Group "B" reported on July 13: "The enemy in front of the 4th Tank Army and in front of the northern flank of Army Group" A "broke further east and southeast, and again with strong units moved south" {804}. Field Marshal Bock demanded that the 4th Tank Army be directed through the Morozovsky to the Don above the mouth of the Donets. He sent a report to Halder: "I think that the destruction of significant enemy forces can no longer be achieved in a single operation, with large forces in the center and weak forces on the flanks" {805}. This Bock report was the subject of intense discussion at the July 13 meeting at headquarters. Hitler, enraged, as he was now sure, by criticism of his actions and by the threat of failure of the plan of the operation, put Bock at first to blame for the delay in the withdrawal of the mobile forces of the 4th Tank Army from Voronezh and unexpectedly for all removed him from command. In the evening, von Bock received a telegraph notification from Keitel and immediately went to Berlin {806}.

DavidFrankenberg
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 13:35

jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:56
DavidFrankenberg wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:45
jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 12:22
Sources surely quote Hitler's conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942. The primary source is meanwhile unknown.

https://studfiles.net/preview/2365289/page:2/
В беседе с Кейтелем 18 сентября Гитлер заявил: «Решающим является прорыв на Туапсе, а затем блокирование Военно-Грузинской дороги и прорыв к Каспийскому морю».

In a conversation with Keitel on September 18 Hitler said: "The break to Tuapse, and then blocking of the Georgian Military Road and break to the Caspian Sea is decisive".
So, Hitler is supposed to have said that to Keitel ?

Who reported these words ? Keitel ? Isaev does not quote any book.
Isaev refers to the 1972 book. That does not refer to anyone. Other sources also confidently quote the conversation on September 18, without calling the primary source.

http://militera.lib.ru/research/proektor/05.html

Проэктор Д.М. Агрессия и Катастрофа. Высшее военное руководство фашистской Германии во второй мировой войне. Издание 2-е, переработанное и дополненное. Издательство "Наука". Москва 1972.

Группа армий "Б" докладывала 13 июля: "Противник перед 4-й танковой армией и перед северным флангом группы армий "А" прорвался дальше на восток и юго-восток и снова сильными частями двинулся к югу"{804}. Фельдмаршал Бок требовал направить 4-ю танковую армию через Морозовский к Дону выше устья Донца. Он послал донесение Гальдеру: "Я думаю, что уничтожение значительных сил противника больше не может быть достигнуто в одной операции, когда в центре — крупные силы, а на флангах — слабые"{805}. Это донесение Бока стало предметом бурного обсуждения на совещании 13 июля в ставке. Гитлер, взбешенный, как он теперь был уверен, критикой его действий и угрозой провала замысла операции, поставил Боку в вину прежде всего еще задержку вывода подвижных войск 4-й танковой армии из Воронежа и неожиданно для всех отстранил его от командования. Вечером фон Бок получил телеграфное уведомление от Кейтеля и немедленно отправился в Берлин{806}.

Proctor D.M. Aggression and Catastrophe. The highest military leadership of fascist Germany in the Second World War. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. Publisher "Science". Moscow 1972.

Army Group "B" reported on July 13: "The enemy in front of the 4th Tank Army and in front of the northern flank of Army Group" A "broke further east and southeast, and again with strong units moved south" {804}. Field Marshal Bock demanded that the 4th Tank Army be directed through the Morozovsky to the Don above the mouth of the Donets. He sent a report to Halder: "I think that the destruction of significant enemy forces can no longer be achieved in a single operation, with large forces in the center and weak forces on the flanks" {805}. This Bock report was the subject of intense discussion at the July 13 meeting at headquarters. Hitler, enraged, as he was now sure, by criticism of his actions and by the threat of failure of the plan of the operation, put Bock at first to blame for the delay in the withdrawal of the mobile forces of the 4th Tank Army from Voronezh and unexpectedly for all removed him from command. In the evening, von Bock received a telegraph notification from Keitel and immediately went to Berlin {806}.
So there is no real source for this quote, despite it summarizes very well the situation in my opinion.

jesk
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 14:09

Western historians have recently discovered this 85-minute monologue of Hitler. The Soviet have used it for a long time.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/articl ... vered.html

It is the transcript of an 85-minute conversation between the Fuhrer and his submissive Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the German high command for most of the war.

Behind his back Keitel was derided by all as 'Lackeitel' - lackey - because of his inability to ever stand up for any of his officers.

This is plain from the transcript of the Hitler monologue which was seized by the Red Army after conquering Berlin in 1945.

'It reads as a template for Hitler actor Bruno Ganz in the feature film The Downfall,' said Spiegel, which publishes extracts from it in its latest issue.

The conversation with Keitel - hanged at Nuremberg in 1946 for war crimes - took place on September 18, 1942 in Vinnitsa, Ukraine, site of one of Hitler's front headquarters for the war against Russia.

jesk
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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by jesk » 13 Mar 2019 14:14

Do need it? In the diary von Bock detail proceedings for Voronezh. There is boring to read.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/21.html

But let's talk about Voronezh (!) - Keitel continued. - At the beginning of the operation, Halder and I had doubts about whether the operation to seize this city would be connected by our mobile forces to such an extent that it would prevent us from advancing in the direction of the Don. After rereading the directive issued by the Army High Command, I asked the Führer, who was then about to fly into the army group, to inform you that the seizure of Voronezh was not mandatory for you. However, after discussing this issue in Poltava on July 3, I got the impression that this idea was not expressed enough [494] clearly and was not fully communicated to the command of the army group. ”

I stated:
"Nothing like this. My conversation with the Führer about Voronezh ended with the fact that I told him: “As I understand it, I must take Voronezh, if this is not difficult to do, but I don’t have to get involved in heavy and long battles”. The Fuhrer confirmed this with a nod. But then complications began. The liaison officer at the 4th Tank Army radioed the Supreme Command of the land forces that Voronezh could probably be taken only after heavy fighting. Weichs held the opposite opinion, and I agreed with him. While there were discussions on this issue with the High Command of the Ground Forces, on July 6, the tank battalion of the 24th Panzer Division passed through Voronezh almost without a fight, after which we told the High Command of the Ground Forces that it would not be difficult to capture the city ... ”
Keitel said:
"The Fuhrer then said for a long time:" We lost 48 hours near Voronezh. " Apparently, he saw this as a serious waste of time. "
I replied:
“But one should not forget that the whole operation took less time than planned. Several times, including during the meeting with the Führer on July 3, I reminded of the danger of the Russians retreating. Obviously, under the circumstances, I did everything possible to make a turn to the south as quickly as possible. When Halder called General Sodenshtern on July 5 and told him that the Führer was impatient and wondered why the bridgeheads on Silent Pine were not yet captured, I could answer him that these bridgeheads had already been captured. ”
I did not go into further details, which could illustrate how the army group developed an offensive in a southerly direction, overcoming the resistance of the enemy. I, moreover, did not begin to say that [495] it was an army group, and not the Supreme Command of the ground forces at all came to the idea of ​​the greater expediency of an attack by the forces of the right wing of the 4th army, as well as managing the entire operation from a single center from the start.
Toward the end, Keitel remarked that the Führer had expressed doubts as to whether he would allow my health to bring the current operation to the end (!), But this statement of the Führer cannot, of course, be taken seriously.
When the conversation ended, Keitel said:
“I'm not sure that I will be able to find an opportunity to tell the Führer in detail all of the above. This is easier to do in a semi-official setting, but the Fuhrer always meets with me in the presence of two stenographers, in whom I cannot discuss such delicate issues! ”

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Re: von Bock and Voronej

Post by DavidFrankenberg » 13 Mar 2019 15:21

jesk wrote:
13 Mar 2019 14:14
Do need it? In the diary von Bock detail proceedings for Voronezh. There is boring to read.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/21.html

But let's talk about Voronezh (!) - Keitel continued. - At the beginning of the operation, Halder and I had doubts about whether the operation to seize this city would be connected by our mobile forces to such an extent that it would prevent us from advancing in the direction of the Don. After rereading the directive issued by the Army High Command, I asked the Führer, who was then about to fly into the army group, to inform you that the seizure of Voronezh was not mandatory for you. However, after discussing this issue in Poltava on July 3, I got the impression that this idea was not expressed enough [494] clearly and was not fully communicated to the command of the army group. ”

I stated:
"Nothing like this. My conversation with the Führer about Voronezh ended with the fact that I told him: “As I understand it, I must take Voronezh, if this is not difficult to do, but I don’t have to get involved in heavy and long battles”. The Fuhrer confirmed this with a nod. But then complications began. The liaison officer at the 4th Tank Army radioed the Supreme Command of the land forces that Voronezh could probably be taken only after heavy fighting. Weichs held the opposite opinion, and I agreed with him. While there were discussions on this issue with the High Command of the Ground Forces, on July 6, the tank battalion of the 24th Panzer Division passed through Voronezh almost without a fight, after which we told the High Command of the Ground Forces that it would not be difficult to capture the city ... ”
Keitel said:
"The Fuhrer then said for a long time:" We lost 48 hours near Voronezh. " Apparently, he saw this as a serious waste of time. "
I replied:
“But one should not forget that the whole operation took less time than planned. Several times, including during the meeting with the Führer on July 3, I reminded of the danger of the Russians retreating. Obviously, under the circumstances, I did everything possible to make a turn to the south as quickly as possible. When Halder called General Sodenshtern on July 5 and told him that the Führer was impatient and wondered why the bridgeheads on Silent Pine were not yet captured, I could answer him that these bridgeheads had already been captured. ”
I did not go into further details, which could illustrate how the army group developed an offensive in a southerly direction, overcoming the resistance of the enemy. I, moreover, did not begin to say that [495] it was an army group, and not the Supreme Command of the ground forces at all came to the idea of ​​the greater expediency of an attack by the forces of the right wing of the 4th army, as well as managing the entire operation from a single center from the start.
Toward the end, Keitel remarked that the Führer had expressed doubts as to whether he would allow my health to bring the current operation to the end (!), But this statement of the Führer cannot, of course, be taken seriously.
When the conversation ended, Keitel said:
“I'm not sure that I will be able to find an opportunity to tell the Führer in detail all of the above. This is easier to do in a semi-official setting, but the Fuhrer always meets with me in the presence of two stenographers, in whom I cannot discuss such delicate issues! ”
The source is Von Bock writing the 22 march 1943, almost one year after the events. He talks about Voronej events and remembers a talking with Keitel.

What does VB say ?
VB confirms that Halder said to VB the 2nd july 1942 : the take of Voronej is not obligatory.
The 3d july in Poltava Halder notes that VB has not informed his officers about the non obligation to take Voronej.
VB himself says that the 3rd july in Poltava, Hitler ordered him not to insist in taking Voronej if it is too long and too difficult.
VB himself says that just after the meeting with Hitler in Poltava, he received Hoth's comments about the strike on Voronej. Hoth was fearing that an assault on Voronej would be expensive for his 4th A.
What does VB after that warning ? He decides to go on and attack Voronej with arm. div. against the adivse of Hoth and in agreement with Weichs.

VB then tries to justify himself saying that "the 6th july the 24th Pz crossed Voronej with no serious fights"...
But he just omits to talk about what happened the 4th and the 5th !
Indeed VB does not defend himself very well... indeed he gives credit to Hitler's words when Hitler says : "we have lost 48 precious hours in Voronej".

And this loss of time is due to the stubbornness of VB who wanted absolutely to use 4th and 24th Pz in Voronej.

As i read VB, i remember Halder saying that VB faked reports. It is possible that what Hoth said to VB "after" Poltava's meeting happened indeed BEFORE Poltava's meeting. VB volunteerly hid messages going against his will in order to convince Hitler more easily.

Indeed it confirms Halder' suspicions.

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