There are 4 divisions in the corps. 2 divisions on the scale of Leningrad is half the offensive. Regrouping, replacing with other parts took a lot of time. Leeb chose to move to Tikhvin.Boby wrote: ↑13 Mar 2019, 22:27No, because the deep penetration was only 2 divisions...
Are you saying it was not possible to pull back 2 divisions?
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... IX1141.jpg
Btw, it was the 12. Pz., not the 18. wrongly appearing in the map.
Rescue of Leningrad
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
No, this is your POV. We don't know Leeb's POV. Prove it.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
On October 26, the Germans were 40 km from Tikhvin. And Leeb did not want to change plans. Probably it was difficult to abandon the goal, 2/3 of the way to which passed. Retreat? Not!
Removal of 8,12,20 divisions of 100 km from Leningrad is Hitler's crime. a, b, c, d, e buried the Führer.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Tikhvin was captured 8 november. That's 2 weeks. Offensive started 16 October.
If Tikhvin was a pure waste, why to continue?
If Tikhvin was a pure waste, why to continue?
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
For 10 days passed 80 km. And it is Hitler forced. In the next 2 weeks, another 40 km. Why after passing 80 km in 10 days, Leeb had to refuse to cover the remaining 40? I do not see logic against Tikhvin at the end of October, 1941.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Because, if he thinks the entire operation was not possible (few forces), with only the capture of Tikhvin, but not the destruction of 54 army (next step), as clearly shown in his diary of early october, then after receiving a free hand by Hitler, why to continue? Not that Tikhvin can't be captured (it was) but his strategical importance.
You are saying: the entire operation was illogical, a waste. But Leeb thought otherwise, he didn't stop when he received a free hand.
Care to explain?
You are saying: the entire operation was illogical, a waste. But Leeb thought otherwise, he didn't stop when he received a free hand.
Care to explain?
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
What does Leeb think? In his diary, he showed a period of 14 days for the regrouping of forces. In scales of the events of Army Group "North" is a little 2 weeks .. Cancel the offensive at the end of October again a long regrouping. And he wrote about 2-3 divisions. These forces he received. Your statement about his words about lack of strength is not confirmed by the diary.Boby wrote: ↑14 Mar 2019, 00:48Because, if he thinks the entire operation was not possible (few forces), with only the capture of Tikhvin, but not the destruction of 54 army (next step), as clearly shown in his diary of early october, then after receiving a free hand by Hitler, why to continue? Not that Tikhvin can't be captured (it was) but his strategical importance.
You are saying: the entire operation was illogical, a waste. But Leeb thought otherwise, he didn't stop when he received a free hand.
Care to explain?
1. Thursday, October 2, 1941
Leeb's personal notes in the notebook:
The Fuhrer initiates an operation in the direction of Tikhvin - Volkhovstroy to the rear of the enemy by the forces of the 39th Army Corps. Unfortunately, the strength for this is not enough.
2. Friday, October 3, 1941
In recent days, the initiative of the Fuhrer received its development.
Army Group North asked: to check whether it is possible to force the 39th Army Corps to force the Volkhov River in the Chudovo area, then move in the direction of Tikhvin, entering the enemy’s rear, located between Volkhov and Lake Ladoga. There, the enemy to destroy. Unfortunately, for now there is not enough power. By calculations it would be required at least two — three divisions.
Monday, October 6, 1941
Leeb's personal notes in the notebook:
The Fuhrer decided to launch an offensive in the direction of Volkhovstroi not by the 39th Army Corps, but by infantry divisions. As a result, the next 14 days will go to regroup the forces ...
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October 8, Hitler did not say anything about the 54 army. It was about the operation in cooperation with the Hoth group. Plans changed, reminded already about it.
Wednesday, October 8, 1941
Note by George Mayer:
From the log of military operations of Army Group North on October 8, at 12.45: “General Marshal Keitel had a telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff of the Army Group: after listening to the situation report, the Führer urged the 39th corps to be removed from its positions as quickly as possible. The Fuhrer wants to transfer him to the area of the Chudovo-Lyuban highway in order to continue with it to begin a larger operation in cooperation with the Hoth group, which will launch an offensive in the north.
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In the area of Tikhvin there was a railway and after passing 80 km to the goal, when 40 km remained, Leeb decided not to stop. Highways passed through Tikhvin, the enemy delivered troops and cargo. The city could be a serious threat to the rear.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
In the north are swamps. Even the rejection of the attack on Tikhvin forced to approach the city at a distance of 20 km from it. In such situation, not to capture Tikhvin, center of roads, is simply impractical.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Map of 1941. Pull back and turn north? There are swamps. At the end of October, it was too late to change plans. Capture Tikhvin with the subsequent movement to the north-west along the railway. There was no alternative.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
??????
First you said the offensive was illogical, a sabotage, now you are saying Tikhvin was a serious threat to the rear.
And you haven't demostrated it was not possible to stop the offensive by turning back 2 divisions. Nonsensical.
First you said the offensive was illogical, a sabotage, now you are saying Tikhvin was a serious threat to the rear.
And you haven't demostrated it was not possible to stop the offensive by turning back 2 divisions. Nonsensical.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
After the Germans advanced 80 km and 40 were left to Tikhvin. The threat from Tikhvin in such conditions is logical.
October 27 the Germans were in Sitoml. Turn 2 divisions back and then where? There are solid swamps, the terrain for tanks is impassable. Turning back and going to Volkhov meant the way through the swamps. In late October, it became impractical to turn the tanks back.And you haven't demostrated it was not possible to stop the offensive by turning back 2 divisions. Nonsensical.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Boby, in your posts I have noted dozens of mistakes. And after you write again, these are my conclusions are meaningless. For example, here:
Just you want to show that jesk on the forum does not know the story better than others. But it really is. Now you are attached to the logic Hitler allowed to stop the attack on Tikhvin on October 26. Leeb continued. But there is simple.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
More and more nonsensical logic. From where did 12. Pz.Div. and the Masse of 18. Inf.Div. (mot.) advance? Swamps or roads?
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
Frontal attacks on narrow areas between swamps. Therefore, slowly. At 120 km, Leeb spent 23 days. In such areas, attack sites are easily miscalculated.
Narrow wedge on the map.
This is only psychology Boby and any history. In other topics you did not agree with each of my conclusions. I do not understand anything ... It often happens. When someone appears in the collective, states he understands and knows better. Old-timers do not like it. We all know on the forum ... This is obviously not true.
Re: Rescue of Leningrad
No, I never said I know better, or that you are always wrong.
Sorry, but claiming 2 or 3 divisions can't retreat from the same roads/terrain they used to advance since 16 october is nonsensical.
If Leeb didn't stop the attack, then he considered Tikhvin was important, not your POV that he has no choice but advance (with zero proof).
Sorry, but claiming 2 or 3 divisions can't retreat from the same roads/terrain they used to advance since 16 october is nonsensical.
If Leeb didn't stop the attack, then he considered Tikhvin was important, not your POV that he has no choice but advance (with zero proof).