where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

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MarkN
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 24 Mar 2019 14:01

doogal wrote:
24 Mar 2019 09:41
So "Marcks planning " at this time was of a more general nature with 18th AOK as its COS .....
When you say "marcks planning" and use the date July 4th without clarification of what he was doing it gives the impression that he is beginning drafting otto prior to the 21 st 22 nd and subsequent 29th July meetings which are the earliest primary dates we have for the Genesis of objectives for Barbarossa.
AOK.18 was assigned to move to the East at the end of June 1940. I believe the order document is dated 28 June off the top of my head. Absolutely nothing out of the ordinary in this as a wholescale regrouping and relocation of forces post-victory in France was required.

AOK.18 was given responsibility of security of borders with Lithuania, Slovakia and the Soviet Union (Russia as well as occupied Poland etc.). This responsibility entails AOK.18 doing contingency planning and preparation on how they're going to secure the borders and deal with any threat to their security. Absolutely nothing out of the ordinary in this. Irresponsible for a professional army NOT to do so.

At some point in time, the name Plan OTTO was ascribed to this planning and preparation. A name that survived in some minds (eg Halder) right through to December when Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was assigned.

There is no evidence to suggest that Plan OTTO was a plan of aggression - although many argue it was. Any credible contigency planning would consider offensive as well as defensive effort. Plain and simple common sense.

The objectives of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA are not predicated on the abstract: ideological or the political. The objectives are (simple) calculations of the depth and breadth of territory that the Heer believes they could reach with the resources at their disposal. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that Marcks' thinking which lead to his 5 August Operationsentwurf Ost was an extension of his contingency planning thoughts of the previous 4 weeks.

The wartime documentation of AOK.18 is one of the best preserved collections in respect of coverage and retention of documents. Thousands upon thousands of pages are publically available, free of charge, to read and copy. One just has to get oneself along to the German Military Archives in Freiburg. Once you're there, start with this file and work onwards: RH20-18/40.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 24 Mar 2019 15:30

MarkN wrote:
24 Mar 2019 14:01
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that Marcks' thinking which lead to his 5 August Operationsentwurf Ost was an extension of his contingency planning thoughts of the previous 4 weeks.
To call it an extension may be overstating it. Any ideas he may have had before 29 July may have influenced his subsequent thinking but unless I am missing something, there was no reason for Marcks to be considering operations south of the Pripet Marshes before 29 July. Nor should he have had any reason to be contemplating the occupation of the Baltic States, let alone planning a march on Moscow. These, and more, were proposals Hitler made on 31 July, all faithfully delivered in the subsequent Marcks report.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 24 Mar 2019 20:37

doogal,

Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940. Apparently, it was based upon 80 divisions in the front line, 20 divisions in reserve. Nine weeks to complete mission to take Baltic States, Belorusija and Ukraine (possible Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov too). Two groups: one north of the marshes, one south. Start date autumn 1940 possible. They claim this was the original Plan OTTO and thus predating Marcks' efforts. More info on this plan is in Die Zeit article of 1997.

It's almost the same info that was given to Hitler on 21 July 1940.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 24 Mar 2019 20:40

MarkN wrote:
24 Mar 2019 20:37
doogal,

Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940. Apparently, it was based upon 80 divisions in the front line, 20 divisions in reserve. Nine weeks to complete mission to take Baltic States, Belorusija and Ukraine (possible Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov too). Two groups: one north of the marshes, one south. Start date autumn 1940 possible. They claim this was the original Plan OTTO and thus predating Marcks' efforts. More info on this plan is in Die Zeit article of 1997.

It's almost the same info that was given to Hitler on 21 July 1940.
What does this prove? The strike south of the Pripyat marshes is only Hitler’s initiative. The offensive from the territory of Romania allowed to seize the Ukraine weeks earlier.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 24 Mar 2019 20:53

Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940. Apparently, it was based upon 80 divisions in the front line, 20 divisions in reserve. Nine weeks to complete mission to take Baltic States, Belorusija and Ukraine (possible Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov too). Two groups: one north of the marshes, one south. Start date autumn 1940 possible. They claim this was the original Plan OTTO and thus predating Marcks' efforts. More info on this plan is in Die Zeit article of 1997.
OK .. so I now see why you describe the plan as being authored prior to the 21/22 nd and 29th of July meetings.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 24 Mar 2019 21:25

doogal wrote:
24 Mar 2019 20:53
Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940. Apparently, it was based upon 80 divisions in the front line, 20 divisions in reserve. Nine weeks to complete mission to take Baltic States, Belorusija and Ukraine (possible Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov too). Two groups: one north of the marshes, one south. Start date autumn 1940 possible. They claim this was the original Plan OTTO and thus predating Marcks' efforts. More info on this plan is in Die Zeit article of 1997.
OK .. so I now see why you describe the plan as being authored prior to the 21/22 nd and 29th of July meetings.
I believe the planning for the attack, which later was given the name BARBAROSSA, began when Brauchitsch told Halder to get cracking on 22 July 1940.

However, conversations had, and advice given, prior to that date were not plucked from thin air but based upon prior thinking and contingency planning. At that exact moment, Marcks at AOK.18 was the man with the hat. What I have just posted presents information on thought and contingency planning prior to Marcks being brought into the loop at the beginning of July. I cannot speak for its veracity as I have not read the actual documents. But, nobody seems to have questionned the documents themselves only Dirks and Janssen's subsequent conclusions and theories. I thought you would be interested in another line of research in addition to following up Marcks' effort.

Here is an excerpt from the OKH order detailing the reorganisation and relocation of formations OKH Gen St d H OpAbt (Ia) Nr.375/40 g.kdos dated 26 June 1940:
Image

Kuechler and Marcks had a face-2-face interview with Halder on, I think, 3 or 4 July to flesh out the Sonderanweisung.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 24 Mar 2019 21:27

jesk wrote:
24 Mar 2019 20:40
...
What does this prove? The strike south of the Pripyat marshes is only Hitler’s initiative. The offensive from the territory of Romania allowed to seize the Ukraine weeks earlier.
Do you think that Marcks included Hitler’s ideas of July 31, 1940 in his plan? But look at the number of divisions. It is different in Hitler's and Marcks's plans. How could Marcks contradict the Führer himself in such a question? Who knew better how many divisions are needed to defeat the USSR? :milwink:
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 25 Mar 2019 05:57

AbollonPolweder wrote:
24 Mar 2019 21:27
jesk wrote:
24 Mar 2019 20:40
...
What does this prove? The strike south of the Pripyat marshes is only Hitler’s initiative. The offensive from the territory of Romania allowed to seize the Ukraine weeks earlier.
Do you think that Marcks included Hitler’s ideas of July 31, 1940 in his plan? But look at the number of divisions. It is different in Hitler's and Marcks's plans. How could Marcks contradict the Führer himself in such a question? Who knew better how many divisions are needed to defeat the USSR? :milwink:
In a subject people were fond of search of mythical documents. Ignoring obvious military advantages or shortcomings of plans. In particular, to strike the main blow from the territory of Romania is much more practical, than the movement on the North of Ukraine. In March, 1941 Hitler complicated a task, having rearranged even more forces to the north.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 25 Mar 2019 14:51

MarkN wrote:
24 Mar 2019 21:25
Here is an excerpt from the OKH order detailing the reorganisation and relocation of formations OKH Gen St d H OpAbt (Ia) Nr.375/40 g.kdos dated 26 June 1940:
Image

Kuechler and Marcks had a face-2-face interview with Halder on, I think, 3 or 4 July to flesh out the Sonderanweisung.
The meeting with Halder was on the morning of 4 July.
This from the Feldgrau website re. Eighteenth Army - “It was then involved in the occupation of southern France from 26 June 1940 through 20 July 1940. From 21 July 1940 through 21 June 1941 it was serving in the east along the northern Germany-Russian Frontier.”
So although the order for the transfer (above), the purpose of which was identified as being to secure ‘the German eastern border vis-à-vis Russia and Lithuania’, may have been issued on 26 June, it doesn’t seem to have been executed until the fourth week of July (though Marcks appears to have been established in Bromberg on 9 July).


MarkN wrote:
24 Mar 2019 20:37
Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940. Apparently, it was based upon 80 divisions in the front line, 20 divisions in reserve. Nine weeks to complete mission to take Baltic States, Belorusija and Ukraine (possible Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov too). Two groups: one north of the marshes, one south. Start date autumn 1940 possible. They claim this was the original Plan OTTO and thus predating Marcks' efforts. More info on this plan is in Die Zeit article of 1997.

It's almost the same info that was given to Hitler on 21 July 1940.
It would be interesting to read the TsAMO find. However I hope it is more substantial than the Die Zeit article, the key point of which is that Brauchitsch was able to present to Hitler at the Berghof conference on 21 July a pre-prepared plan for an attack on the SU involving a total of 100 divisions, and that this was only possible because Halder had been preparing such a plan for weeks.
The article suggests that towards the end of May 1940 (when he should have been fully occupied with the battles in Belgium and France) Halder began colluding with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to secretly prepare plans for an attack on the Soviet Union later that summer with 80 divisions and a 400,000 man reserve. (Odd because Weizsäcker was a diplomat and former naval officer, not an army officer, and was part of a pre-war anti-war faction in the German government.)
Halder was doing this without Hitler’s knowledge, he omitted most of the detail from his diary, and he even managed to keep his activities secret from post-war historians until the plot was unearthed in 1983 by Ernst Klink. There is little evidence presented to justify this claim of planning in May, most resting on an interpretation of subsequent events in June and July. On 16 June Halder arranged for 15 divisions to be transferred to their home districts in eastern areas of Germany once the fighting in the west was over and nine days later he persuaded Brauchitsch to issue the 26 June order (above) for the transfer of 15 divisions from the west to East Prussia and Poland to operate under the command of 18 Army as replacements for the eastern militia Landesschützen divisions that were to be disbanded. In all, the article states, 600,000 men were transferred to the east in a July without Hitler’s knowledge. Yet these actions don’t necessarily have sinister connotations. It was inevitable that once the fighting in France was over there would be a surplus of military personnel in the west. Disbanding the militia divisions guarding the eastern frontier once they could be replaced by regular divisions was sensible, as was the transfer of surplus divisions back to their home districts. As further evidence of Halder’s early offensive planning the article cites -
an order to pioneer troops on the border to undertake their construction works in such a way that the completed works could double as bridgeheads for offensive action, and
an assertion made in 1939 (and discovered in an archive of Moscow by Halder biographer, Hartmann, and his Russian colleague Sergei Slutsch) that, in essence attack is the best form of defence.
The article refers to Halder's meeting with Greiffenberg on 3 July, and cites it as an instruction to examine a ‘military strike against Russia' in order to demonstrate Germany's dominant role in Europe. It is not clear where this interpretation comes from because Halder in his diary only refers to a ‘military intervention’ that will compel Russia to recognize Germany's dominant position in Europe. The article suggests that key to Halder’s plan was a formation of two panzer corps under Guderian but subordinated to Eighteenth Army that would advance from a staging area west of Warsaw either to Bialystok or Lvov and, according to plans prepared by Guderian, to Kiev and Odessa. Oddly Guderian, not known for modesty, fails to mention any of this planning in his memoirs.

It is worth noting that on the evening before the 31 July Berghof conference Halder met with Brauchitsch and wrote in his diary - “The question whether, if a decision cannot be forced against Britain, we should in the face of a threatening British-Russian alliance and the resulting two-front war turn first against Russia, must be answered to the effect that we should keep on friendly terms with Russia. A visit to Stalin would be desirable. Russia's aspirations to the Straits and in direction of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On the Balkans, which falls within our economic sphere of interest, we could keep out of each other’s way. Italy and Russia will not hurt each other in the Mediterranean. This being so, we could deliver the British a decisive blow in the Mediterranean, should deter them away from Asia, help the Italians in building their Mediterranean Empire, and, with the aid of Russia, consolidate the Reich which we have created in Western and Northern Europe. That much accomplished, we could confidently face war with Britain for years.”
That does not sound like a man itching for war with the SU and who has spent weeks devising a cunning plan.

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Denying everything and anything to maintain the narrative...

Post by MarkN » 25 Mar 2019 18:39

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 26 Mar 2019 14:58

It would be interesting to read the TsAMO find. However I hope it is more substantial than the Die Zeit article, the key point of which is that Brauchitsch was able to present to Hitler at the Berghof conference on 21 July a pre-prepared plan for an attack on the SU involving a total of 100 divisions, and that this was only possible because Halder had been preparing such a plan for weeks. when he should have been fully occupied with the battles in Belgium and France) Halder began colluding with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to secretly prepare plans for an attack on the Soviet Union later that summer with 80 divisions and a 400,000 man reserve. (Odd because Weizsäcker was a diplomat and former naval officer, not an army officer, and was part of a pre-war anti-war faction in the German government.)
Halder was doing this without Hitler’s knowledge, he omitted most of the detail from his diary, and he even managed to keep his activities secret from post-war historians until the plot was unearthed in 1983 by Ernst Klink. There is little evidence presented to justify this claim of planning in May, most resting on an interpretation of subsequent events in June and July. On
So then if there is scant primary sourcing for May to June concerning Halders activities how do we resolve this ?????

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 26 Mar 2019 16:00

doogal wrote:
26 Mar 2019 14:58
So then if there is scant primary sourcing for May to June concerning Halders activities how do we resolve this ?????
Perhaps in the absence of firm evidence to the contrary we must assume, as MarkN stated in Post #126, ‘the planning for the attack, which later was given the name BARBAROSSA, began when Brauchitsch told Halder to get cracking on 22 July 1940.’

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 26 Mar 2019 16:16

MarkN wrote:
17 Mar 2019 16:03
ljadw wrote:
09 Mar 2019 20:51
The generals agreed with Barbarossa, ...
No they didn't. Unternehman BARBAROSSA was the Heer's plan.
doogal wrote:
16 Mar 2019 22:06
The generals agreed with Barbarossa
They had little choice. I do not see how they were in a position to disagree or halt its implementation in 1941. They had no collective power to not agree with.
The Austrian corporal asked the Wehrmacht to look at an invasion of Russia. The Heer generals came up with Unternehmen BARBAROSSA. The Heer didn't agree to it, they created it. The Heer set the objective that they believed was achievable. They wrote the plan on how to achieve that objective. A bit of a an argument occured between Heer generals as to what intermediary objectives should be prioritised. The Austrian corporal then gave his blessing to the plan presented to him. In otherwords, it was Hitler who agreed to the Heer's Unternehmen BARBAROSSA.
Where Marcks's plan? He wrote it in a week, on 26 pages of text.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 26 Mar 2019 16:32

Interests the following question. Generals rejected Marcks's plan or the Fuhrer expressed concern?

http://mirznanii.com/a/335845/plany-git ... rotiv-sssr

On August 1, 1940 Erich Marcks presented the first version of the plan of war against the USSR. The idea of rapid, lightning war as a result of which the exit of the German troops to the Rostov line - Bitter - Arkhangelsk was outlined, and further - to the Urals was the basis for this option. The crucial importance was allocated for capture of Moscow. Erich Marx recognized that Moscow - "heart of the Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to the termination of the Soviet resistance".

According to this plan it was provided drawing two blows - to the north of and to the south of Polesia. The northern blow was outlined as main. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltics and Belarus in the direction on Moscow. The southern blow was planned to be made from a southeast part of Poland in the direction to Kiev. Except these blows, "private operation on mastering the district of Baku" was outlined. On implementation of the plan from 9 to 17 weeks were allotted.

Erich Marcks's plan was played in the headquarters of the supreme commander under the leadership of the general Paulyus. This check revealed a serious lack of the presented option: he ignored a possibility of strong flank counterstrokes of the Soviet troops from the North, and the South capable to break advance of the main group to Moscow. The headquarters of the High Command decided to revise the plan.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 26 Mar 2019 20:17

doogal wrote:
26 Mar 2019 14:58
It would be interesting to read the TsAMO find. However I hope it is more substantial than the Die Zeit article, the key point of which is that Brauchitsch was able to present to Hitler at the Berghof conference on 21 July a pre-prepared plan for an attack on the SU involving a total of 100 divisions, and that this was only possible because Halder had been preparing such a plan for weeks. when he should have been fully occupied with the battles in Belgium and France) Halder began colluding with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to secretly prepare plans for an attack on the Soviet Union later that summer with 80 divisions and a 400,000 man reserve. (Odd because Weizsäcker was a diplomat and former naval officer, not an army officer, and was part of a pre-war anti-war faction in the German government.)
Halder was doing this without Hitler’s knowledge, he omitted most of the detail from his diary, and he even managed to keep his activities secret from post-war historians until the plot was unearthed in 1983 by Ernst Klink. There is little evidence presented to justify this claim of planning in May, most resting on an interpretation of subsequent events in June and July. On
So then if there is scant primary sourcing for May to June concerning Halders activities how do we resolve this ?????
Scant? I haven't seen the documents found/used by Dirks and Janssen so have no idea whether they are "scant" or not. How do you know they are scant? Marcks' Operationsentwurf Ost is 18 pages long. Do you consider that "scant" or not?

Ernst Klink's words are taken from what is effectively the German Official History using primary documentation. In their book, Dirks and Janssen use (allegedly) primary documentation too.

Dirks and Janssen's 'evidence' shows that the OKH had actively pursued contigency planning of an attack on the Soviet Union prior to 21 July 1940. Nothing sinister in that in my opinion, but they spin it otherwise. They argue that it was Brauchitsch who brought up the idea on 21 July, not Hitler, and he was just told the plan already conceived. They then argue that Hitler only decided to go ahead with the attack on 29 July and announced it openly on 31 July. I think Dirks and Janssen's conclusions and theory are a few steps off the track, but evidence is evidence.

The evidence, even without considering what Dirks and Janssen offer, points to Unternehmen BARBAROSSA being created by the Heer according to what they considered to be their capabilities. There is no evidence that Hitler set the objectives. There is no evidence that Hitler was planning on converting his ideology into foreign policy prior to 21 July. Weisung 21 is Hitler agreeing to the Heer's plan - not the other way round. Of course, it was Hitler who gave the green light. It was Hitler's decision to attack Russia, it was the Heer' plan that was implemented and to the objectives the Heer set themselves and believed doable. If the evidence used by Dirks and Janssen is valid, it's just further confirmation of this.

How do you resolve it? First read the books as they're easier to get hold of and then, if you're really into the historical reality, go get the original evidence to assess yourself.

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