where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 26 Mar 2019 22:25

MarkN wrote:
26 Mar 2019 20:17
The evidence, even without considering what Dirks and Janssen offer, points to Unternehmen BARBAROSSA being created by the Heer according to what they considered to be their capabilities.
Problems began later. How much did Marcks's plan differ from the final version of Barbarossa? In this vein should seek the intervention of Hitler. The idea to advance on the line of aviation of Hitler or the generals?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 27 Mar 2019 00:10

MarkN wrote:
26 Mar 2019 20:17
There is no evidence that Hitler set the objectives.
Just a remarkable correspondence between the objectives Hitler identified on 31 July and the objectives in Marcks’ report five days later.
MarkN wrote:
26 Mar 2019 20:17
Weisung 21 is Hitler agreeing to the Heer's plan - not the other way round.
The ‘Heer plan’ as presented to Hitler in mid-December included Moscow as a primary objective. Hitler did not agree to this aspect of the Heer plan and changed it.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 27 Mar 2019 10:02

Max Payload wrote:
27 Mar 2019 00:10
MarkN wrote:
26 Mar 2019 20:17
There is no evidence that Hitler set the objectives.
Just a remarkable correspondence between the objectives Hitler identified on 31 July and the objectives in Marcks’ report five days later.
The objectives for an attack on Russia that Hitler opines on 31 July 1940 bear no relation to the objectives laid out in either Marcks' Operationsentwurf Ost or Weisung 21's Unternehmen BARBAROSSA. Both explicitly exclude Hitler's desired objectives.

Your repeated denial of Hitler's objectives as stated on 31 July, and the misrepresentation of his namechecking of intermediate checkpoints as the objectives, is tedious and a perversion of serious historical discussion.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 27 Mar 2019 12:12

MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 10:02
The objectives for an attack on Russia that Hitler opines on 31 July 1940 bear no relation to the objectives laid out in ... Marcks' Operationsentwurf Ost
I guess we’ll just have to disagree on that.
MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 10:02
Your repeated denial of Hitler's objectives as stated on 31 July, and the misrepresentation of his namechecking of intermediate checkpoints as the objectives, is tedious
I don’t recall claiming that they were the objectives in the sense that they were the sole objectives but they were part of the process to have Russia smashed/crushed/shattered to its roots, and to see the destruction of its manpower, by which some explicit operational objectives were identified to achieve ultimately “Ukraine, White Russia, Baltic States to us”.
MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 10:02
... the objectives laid out in ... Marcks' Operationsentwurf Ost ... explicitly exclude Hitler's desired objectives.
How so? Because they don’t include Russia smashed/crushed/shattered to its roots?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 27 Mar 2019 17:48

jesk wrote:
26 Mar 2019 16:16
...
Where Marcks's plan? He wrote it in a week, on 26 pages of text.
MarkN wrote: How do you know they are scant? Marcks' Operationsentwurf Ost is 18 pages long.
I believe that the plan of the operation, written by General Marcks, consists of 23 pages. Jesk counted along with Kienzel's summaries and MarkN did not include in the plan an annex on the training of troops and their organization. And this application was thought out and written by Marcks, for which it took time too. If we take a look at page 7 of the document,
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/6
we will see there a mention of the need to resolve issues of training and organization. And this is already strange, because such special questions are considered separately. Moreover on page 17
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/6
it is written about the need to improve the roads. And there is a specific example with the AOK 18. It would seem that the scale of the plan of attack on the USSR and the repairing of the roads in the one army's strip are incompatible. But let's not forget that Marcks had two tasks. 1 - development of a defense-attack plan for AOK 18 and a 2 - general plan of attack on the USSR. The problems facing the AOK -18, being transferred to the East, could have been typical for the other armies, which were to be transferred in the future. Therefore, Marcks left in the general plan of the attack of SU the specific problems of his army.
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 27 Mar 2019 21:28

Nice to see somebody bothering to read the evidence itself, analyse what it says and understand the implications - rather than just trying to deny or manipulate any evidence that doesn't fit a preconceived opinion.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Mar 2019 17:48
It would seem that the scale of the plan of attack on the USSR and the repairing of the roads in the one army's strip are incompatible. But let's not forget that Marcks had two tasks. 1 - development of a defense-attack plan for AOK 18 and a 2 - general plan of attack on the USSR. The problems facing the AOK -18, being transferred to the East, could have been typical for the other armies, which were to be transferred in the future. Therefore, Marcks left in the general plan of the attack of SU the specific problems of his army.
Indeed.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was well beyond the capabilities of the Wehrmacht - the Heer in particular - to deliver. They didn't get anywhere close to success. Of the four 'steps' identified by Marcks in Operationsentwurf Ost, they got through step 2 geographically, but failed to deliver the militarily requirements of step 2.

Many people love to chant Hitler's quote about kicking down the door and the whole house will collapse. What they fail to mention is that the Heer's military strategy - from Operationsentwurf Ost onwards - was kick down the door and hope the whole house collapses!

A careful read and analysis of Operationsentwurf Ost shows just how overconfident/deluded senior OKH and Heer generals were. And remember, by the time it got to Weisung 21, they'd expanded it even further!!!

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by BDV » 27 Mar 2019 22:52

MarkN wrote: With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was well beyond the capabilities of the Wehrmacht - the Heer in particular - to deliver. They didn't get anywhere close to success. Of the four 'steps' identified by Marcks in Operationsentwurf Ost, they got through step 2 geographically, but failed to deliver the militarily requirements of step 2.

Many people love to chant Hitler's quote about kicking down the door and the whole house will collapse. What they fail to mention is that the Heer's military strategy - from Operationsentwurf Ost onwards - was kick down the door and hope the whole house collapses!

A careful read and analysis of Operationsentwurf Ost shows just how overconfident/deluded senior OKH and Heer generals were. And remember, by the time it got to Weisung 21, they'd expanded it even further!!!

Well, as LJADW likes to point out, the Barbarossa attack HAD to work, or else. Whether the German generals were deluded, or not, it matters not; is a moot point.
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Mar 2019 02:19

MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 21:28
Nice to see somebody bothering to read the evidence itself, analyse what it says and understand the implications - rather than just trying to deny or manipulate any evidence that doesn't fit a preconceived opinion.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Mar 2019 17:48
It would seem that the scale of the plan of attack on the USSR and the repairing of the roads in the one army's strip are incompatible. But let's not forget that Marcks had two tasks. 1 - development of a defense-attack plan for AOK 18 and a 2 - general plan of attack on the USSR. The problems facing the AOK -18, being transferred to the East, could have been typical for the other armies, which were to be transferred in the future. Therefore, Marcks left in the general plan of the attack of SU the specific problems of his army.
Indeed.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was well beyond the capabilities of the Wehrmacht - the Heer in particular - to deliver. They didn't get anywhere close to success. Of the four 'steps' identified by Marcks in Operationsentwurf Ost, they got through step 2 geographically, but failed to deliver the militarily requirements of step 2.

Many people love to chant Hitler's quote about kicking down the door and the whole house will collapse. What they fail to mention is that the Heer's military strategy - from Operationsentwurf Ost onwards - was kick down the door and hope the whole house collapses!

A careful read and analysis of Operationsentwurf Ost shows just how overconfident/deluded senior OKH and Heer generals were. And remember, by the time it got to Weisung 21, they'd expanded it even further!!!
This is exactly your inattention. Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. Caucasus, too, if not attacking the Crimea. Hitler intervened in the fighting and this was a relative cause of failure. The main rejection of the new "Barbarossa" in 1942. At a much better starting position.
A lot of mistakes of Hitler.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by aurelien wolff » 28 Mar 2019 05:30

jesk wrote:
28 Mar 2019 02:19
MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 21:28
Nice to see somebody bothering to read the evidence itself, analyse what it says and understand the implications - rather than just trying to deny or manipulate any evidence that doesn't fit a preconceived opinion.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Mar 2019 17:48
It would seem that the scale of the plan of attack on the USSR and the repairing of the roads in the one army's strip are incompatible. But let's not forget that Marcks had two tasks. 1 - development of a defense-attack plan for AOK 18 and a 2 - general plan of attack on the USSR. The problems facing the AOK -18, being transferred to the East, could have been typical for the other armies, which were to be transferred in the future. Therefore, Marcks left in the general plan of the attack of SU the specific problems of his army.
Indeed.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was well beyond the capabilities of the Wehrmacht - the Heer in particular - to deliver. They didn't get anywhere close to success. Of the four 'steps' identified by Marcks in Operationsentwurf Ost, they got through step 2 geographically, but failed to deliver the militarily requirements of step 2.

Many people love to chant Hitler's quote about kicking down the door and the whole house will collapse. What they fail to mention is that the Heer's military strategy - from Operationsentwurf Ost onwards - was kick down the door and hope the whole house collapses!

A careful read and analysis of Operationsentwurf Ost shows just how overconfident/deluded senior OKH and Heer generals were. And remember, by the time it got to Weisung 21, they'd expanded it even further!!!
This is exactly your inattention. Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. Caucasus, too, if not attacking the Crimea. Hitler intervened in the fighting and this was a relative cause of failure. The main rejection of the new "Barbarossa" in 1942. At a much better starting position.
A lot of mistakes of Hitler.
and what about the one made by general?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Mar 2019 07:32

aurelien wolff wrote:
28 Mar 2019 05:30
jesk wrote:
28 Mar 2019 02:19
MarkN wrote:
27 Mar 2019 21:28
Nice to see somebody bothering to read the evidence itself, analyse what it says and understand the implications - rather than just trying to deny or manipulate any evidence that doesn't fit a preconceived opinion.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Mar 2019 17:48
It would seem that the scale of the plan of attack on the USSR and the repairing of the roads in the one army's strip are incompatible. But let's not forget that Marcks had two tasks. 1 - development of a defense-attack plan for AOK 18 and a 2 - general plan of attack on the USSR. The problems facing the AOK -18, being transferred to the East, could have been typical for the other armies, which were to be transferred in the future. Therefore, Marcks left in the general plan of the attack of SU the specific problems of his army.
Indeed.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was well beyond the capabilities of the Wehrmacht - the Heer in particular - to deliver. They didn't get anywhere close to success. Of the four 'steps' identified by Marcks in Operationsentwurf Ost, they got through step 2 geographically, but failed to deliver the militarily requirements of step 2.

Many people love to chant Hitler's quote about kicking down the door and the whole house will collapse. What they fail to mention is that the Heer's military strategy - from Operationsentwurf Ost onwards - was kick down the door and hope the whole house collapses!

A careful read and analysis of Operationsentwurf Ost shows just how overconfident/deluded senior OKH and Heer generals were. And remember, by the time it got to Weisung 21, they'd expanded it even further!!!
This is exactly your inattention. Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad. Caucasus, too, if not attacking the Crimea. Hitler intervened in the fighting and this was a relative cause of failure. The main rejection of the new "Barbarossa" in 1942. At a much better starting position.
A lot of mistakes of Hitler.
and what about the one made by general?
From another topic quote. Rundstedt wanted to improve the starting position before hitting Ukraine. Hitler cited alleged political reasons. Hungary could place on its territory 17 army. Also Romania. The Dniester was not such a serious obstacle.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/02.html

The situation in the south, however, continued to be a vexing problem. Since the end of 1940 an increasing amount of intelligence information had been filtering out of the Soviet Union that indicated beyond a doubt that a major shift in the deployment of the Red Army was taking place{49}. The new area of concentration was the Ukraine, with the buildup there placing Army Group South decisively in a numerically inferior position. Geographically, too, squeezed as it was between the Pripet Marshes on its left flank [88] and the four hundred-kilometer-long barrier of the Carpathian Mountains on its right. Army Group South could not hope to score well in the early battles along the frontier. In March 1941, von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group South, proposed forming a "Carpathian Group" drawn from the Seventeenth Army that would use Hungarian territory as its base for the attack against Russia. This strategy would avoid clashing head-on with the three Soviet armies in the Galician-Podolian bottleneck between the Pripet swamps and the eastern Carpathians. Hitler refused, however, citing the political reservations of the Hungarian government. Thus, after the German forces in Rumania had been weakened by the Balkan campaign, and contrary to the original plan. Army Group South was to have only one wing of encirclement and the Seventeenth Army would have to advance straight into the enemy's front{50}. The growing feeling of uneasiness about the situation in the Ukraine was manifested in a conference held at the Berghof on February 3, 1941, shortly after the issuance of the Barbarossa deployment directive.

17 march 1941, Halder's Diary, words of Hitler

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by gracie4241 » 28 Mar 2019 15:21

The problem with the German Generals "speaking" as a source for WW2 history is that in many cases what they claimed AFTER the war was diametrically opposite from what they said and did DURING the war, and written proof to the contrary exists but lazy("corrupt"?) historians never bothered to compare. Halder's diary from 1939-42. Von Bock's diary 1939-45,and actual transcripts(surviving) of Hitler's military conferences Dec 1942-April 1945, among other documents conclusively prove these "generals" were to a considerable extent peddling -shall I say it-"fake news".As to the source of the "over-optimism" re Barborossa lets look at Halder(who btw INITIATED planning against Russia in june 1940 WITHOUT Hitler's knowledge or approval-see "Mueller, Enemy in the East"). In march 1941 we have Halder complaining to his diary" that he was unnecessarily summoned to the Chancellery" to allay the Fuehrer's unjustified "fretting over the reported numbers of Russian tanks and planes" and he had to calm this fruitless nervousness".Or in mid-June 1941!!!! Halder initiating staff planning to draw down by at least 60 divisions the size of the german army STARTING in mid-Septemver 1941 AFTER victory in Russia!!!HUH???? No mention of these postwar at all.What is striking, and this covers a lot, in the above diaries and conferences is ANY reference to economic/industrial concerns or interest in the world's largest industrially based war .None. Hitler, often lampooned (incorrectly) for saying his generals "knew nothing" about economics was in fact 100% right.His generals were totally focused on the next battle(operational tactics) to the exclusion of long term thought, as Citino pointed out in the "german way of war" where he concluded they knew how to win battles, but not wars

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Mar 2019 16:39

gracie4241 wrote:
28 Mar 2019 15:21
Or in mid-June 1941!!!! Halder initiating staff planning to draw down by at least 60 divisions the size of the german army STARTING in mid-Septemver 1941 AFTER victory in Russia!!!HUH???? No mention of these postwar at all.
This is the directive of Hitler on June 11, 1941. You are all confused !!!

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Führer_Directive_32

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces

OKW/WFSt./Abt.L(I Op.) Nr. 44886/41 gK Chefsache II. Ang.

SECRET
The Fuehrer's Headquarters
11 June 41

(only through officer)
13 copies

Directive Nr. 32
Preparations for the Time After Barbarossa
A. After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Germany and Italy will be military masters of the European Continent—with the temporary exception of the Iberian Peninsula. No serious threat to Europe by land will then remain. The defence of this area, and foreseeable future offensive action, will require considerably smaller military forces than have been needed hitherto.

The main efforts of the armaments industry can be diverted to the Navy and Air Force.

Closer co-operation between Germany and France should and will tie down additional English forces, will eliminate the threat from the rear in the North African theatre of war, will further restrict the movements of the British Fleet in the Western Mediterranean and will protect the south-western flank of the

European theatre, including the Atlantic seaboard of North and West Africa, from Anglo-Saxon attack.

In the near future Spain will have to face the question whether she is prepared to co-operate in driving the British from Gibraltar or not.

The possibility of exerting strong pressure on Turkey and Iran improves the prospect of making direct or indirect use of these countries in the struggle against England.

B. This situation, which will be created by the victorious conclusion of the campaign in the East, can confront the Armed Forces with the following strategic tasks for the late autumn of 1941 and the winter of 1941-42:

1. The newly conquered territories in the East must be organized, made secure and, in full co-operation with the Armed Forces, exploited economically.

The strength of the security forces required in Russia can only be forecast with certainty at a later date. In all probability, however, about sixty divisions and one Air Fleet will be sufficient, with allied and friendly forces, for our further duties in the East.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 28 Mar 2019 16:45

lets look at Halder(who btw INITIATED planning against Russia in june 1940 WITHOUT Hitler's knowledge or approval-see "Mueller, Enemy in the East"
]

As I have no copy.of this handy which primary source does Mueller cite as showing that Halder initiated planning in June. .....

So far we have .....

Dirks and Janssen, based upon captured documents found in the TsAMO, say that Halder asked for a study (contingency planning) of an attack on Russia in late May 1940. His staff produced a paper for him dated 19 June 1940.

who btw INITIATED planning against Russia in june without Hitlers knowledge or approval
There is nothing out of the ordinary with this if a senior military figure intuitively or instinctually derives the motives and direction of his C in C ... I see it as being hard to show that even if Halder did initiate planning he wasn't doing so with an understanding of the direction Hitler was thinking towards Which is also hard to evidence ....

However, conversations had, and advice given, prior to that date were not plucked from thin air but based upon prior thinking and contingency planning. At that exact moment, Marcks at AOK.18 was the man with the hat. What I have just posted presents information on thought and contingency planning prior to Marcks being brought into the loop at the beginning of July. I cannot speak for its veracity as I have not read the actual documents. But, nobody seems to have questionned the documents themselves only Dirks and Janssen's subsequent conclusions and theories. I thought you would be interested in another line of research in addition to following up Marcks' effort.

Here is an excerpt from the OKH order detailing the reorganisation and relocation of formations OKH Gen St d H OpAbt (Ia) Nr.375/40 g.kdos dated 26 June 1940:
Image

Kuechler and Marcks had a face-2-face interview with Halder on, I think, 3 or 4 July to flesh out the Sonderanweisung.
I still don't think anyone has shown a definitive answer on the genesis of otto or Barbarossa ....

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Genesis

Post by MarkN » 28 Mar 2019 17:59

doogal wrote:
28 Mar 2019 16:45
I still don't think anyone has shown a definitive answer on the genesis of otto or Barbarossa ....
Genesis of the attack on Russia
Mein Kampf books 1 and 2 are your best bet to understand where Hitler drew inspiration for that madness.

Genesis of Plan OTTO
Contingency planning is a normal function of a professional military. Why look further?
However, if you want specifics of precisely why certain aggressive postures were looked into, I suggest a thorough examination of what the Auswaertiges Amt was thinking regarding Russian moves into the Baltics, Bukovina, Bessarabia etc. Analyse carefully the conversations between Halder and Weisaeker and others around this period. The idea of Halder wanting to get ahead of the game and look good in front of Hitler when he demands action are not unreasonable.
Consider this:
Hitler bangs fist on table: Nasty Russian schwein dogs have marched into Riga. What can we do?
Halder: Well dear leader, I've got three plans worked out as possible options for you to consider and approve. Grovel, grovel.
or
Hitler bangs fist on table: Nasty Russian schwein dogs have marched into Riga. What can we do?
Halder: Well dear leader, I have no idea. I've been far too busy running your invasion of France to bother with that. What do you suggest dear leader?
Genesis of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA
In the absense of any other evidence, the meeting on 21 July 1940 seems to be the accepted date that specific agressive military planning was authorized towards a foreign policy. To know whether it was Hitler who asked the first question: I'd like to attack Russia, how can we do it or whether it was Brauchitsch who got the ball rolling: would you like us to invade Russia next, you will need to get hold of the transcript of the meeting.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Mar 2019 18:49

doogal wrote:
28 Mar 2019 16:45
...
I still don't think anyone has shown a definitive answer on the genesis of otto or Barbarossa ....
You are right about the absence of "a definitive answer on the genesis of otto or Barbarossa". We have, at least two ways, to try to get closer to resolving this issue:
- search for documents on the topic of planning barbarossa
- analyze the content of already known projects and studies.
For example, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that Marcks could not make his plan in 1-2 weeks. He did not fight in the East in the WWI, did not know the details of the future theater of operations. It took him time to learn a lot of information and develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. The working during the month (from July 4 to August 5) is a very realistic period of time for developing such a plan.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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