The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#211

Post by jesk » 14 Apr 2019, 11:34

Stolfi does not see problems with progress to Moscow in the summer of 1941.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/11.html
In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.
That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.
By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#212

Post by jesk » 14 Apr 2019, 11:39

This is important by the way. Tanks Hoth and Guderian jumped to Smolensk, when main forces of the field armies were shackled by the encircled Soviet armies near Bialystok.
Stolfi offers a strategy of jumping to Moscow and the Germans were capable of that.


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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#213

Post by jesk » 14 Apr 2019, 11:50

Funny, this source is cited and author of the polar opinion. Who is right? Stolfi and jesk. We agree with that. :) Jump to Moscow. Wagner points us to this.
Hanny wrote:
16 Feb 2019, 22:44
Volyn wrote:
16 Feb 2019, 21:20
Thanks for the links!
Hanny wrote:
16 Feb 2019, 20:44
When the logistics heads explained the limitations of Barbarossa, AH overruled those limitations/objections, as the campaign would be over before logistics curtailed operations.
This is very interesting, because someone would have given him some sort of report on the situation - how did the logisticians produce a report like that?

If they used 3.5 million soldiers to invade USSR, then how did they come up with this number? Did they choose 3.5M and then determine the necessary amount of supplies for the expected duration of the campaign, or were they limited by the domestic supply situation and so they could only adequately muster and equip 3.5M in June 1941?

An Operation of this complexity would have required enormous planning and attention to these kinds of details, which the Germans were famous for - except it seems, for the logistical/supply needs for 3 separate Army Groups beyond November of 1941.

Did the Allies have a delivery schedule for their munitions?
Your welcome :D http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/11.html usefull but wrong at the same time. :lol: We had a chat on this recently so a quick copy past for you.

Indeed how many Divs could be supplied and for how long is in the link i posted. Its all based on FM x amount required per type of Div per day in normal/combat conditions, which could be a number of forms of expenditure based on posture.

Pre war planning ( wargames) gave how many Divs they needed to create.https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a279709.pdf
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945
viewtopic.php?f=79&t=235629&start=15

Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after gettingb there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.

The logistics branch of the OKH was blunt in its prediction for anothwer advance from smolensk to moscow: ( supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock) 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.


The 1941 munition supplies reaching the front by month.Source:Germany and WWII Tome
June :23077 tons
July :101594
August:118855
September: 107870
October:90563
November:68035

Which yields per Div per day.
June 5
July 22
Aug 26
Sept 23
Oct 20
Nov 15

German Munitions production by year.
1940 865000
1941 540000
1942 1270000
1943 2258000

We might get a ball park value from backtracking deliveries at the front by month, i have those figures but you can do ty from the gross numbers i just gave you, 150 ish Div over the time period received on average x amount from rail head, rail head advanced at roughly 20 miles a day by track conversion and 300klm per new depot would give you how much was supplied per day at the front and how much is locked up in the supply chain back to the Reich, so you wont need to actually work/research out lead times as you can aduce it from what was delivered over time compared to required over time.

Depends when you talking about, Normandy is well documented, so are several of the NWE campaigns, like Arnhem for example.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#214

Post by BDV » 16 Apr 2019, 14:20

jesk wrote:
14 Apr 2019, 11:39
This is important by the way. Tanks Hoth and Guderian jumped to Smolensk, when main forces of the field armies were shackled by the encircled Soviet armies near Bialystok.
Stolfi offers a strategy of jumping to Moscow and the Germans were capable of that.
Because of the struktur of the Sojet railsystem west of Wolga => there is a major railhub 50-150 km distance from ANY path Nazi attacker chooses.

As proven during the disastrous 10 Juli 1941 - 24 Juli 1941 period, by the debacle at Soltsy, and the troubles on Emajogi, on Luga, at Velikiye Luki, in Northern Ukraine, in Southern Belarus, and in Bessarabia, Stavka had the will and the power to ensure that the underprepared Wehrmacht is not able to advance with unprotected flanks.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#215

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 19:35

BDV wrote:
16 Apr 2019, 14:20
jesk wrote:
14 Apr 2019, 11:39
This is important by the way. Tanks Hoth and Guderian jumped to Smolensk, when main forces of the field armies were shackled by the encircled Soviet armies near Bialystok.
Stolfi offers a strategy of jumping to Moscow and the Germans were capable of that.
Because of the struktur of the Sojet railsystem west of Wolga => there is a major railhub 50-150 km distance from ANY path Nazi attacker chooses.
The Germans rebuilt the railway on a narrow gauge at a speed of 20 km a day. Problems arose due to poor organization of the trains.
I once read about problems of the Soviet Union in the 80s. There could not unload the goods for weeks. Traffic chaos and collapse.
As proven during the disastrous 10 Juli 1941 - 24 Juli 1941 period, by the debacle at Soltsy, and the troubles on Emajogi, on Luga, at Velikiye Luki, in Northern Ukraine, in Southern Belarus, and in Bessarabia, Stavka had the will and the power to ensure that the underprepared Wehrmacht is not able to advance with unprotected flanks.
There was no defeat in Soltsy. A technical problem arose due to the deviation of 41 tank corps in the direction of Leningrad. Soviet forces were freed up on the left flank for a counterstrike.
Estonia could be blocked with the islands. Hitler ordered to attack. A lot of mistakes Hitler happened.
Last edited by jesk on 16 Apr 2019, 22:04, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#216

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 19:55

Problems approximately of such plan arose at Germans in the summer of 1941.

https://kolybanov.livejournal.com/15301565.html

Yuri Kosenkov "Fight for power"

“Hundreds of thousands of cars remained unloaded, just one car a day cost 60 rubles, and there were thousands of them. Taking into account the losses from the breakdown of deliveries, HARVEST products in the cars and their downtime, losses amounted to more than 8.5 billion rubles per year

“The strategy of tension. The discontent of the people has been warming up for a long time. Back in Brezhnev times. Social injustice, the creation of the untouchable caste by the party farm and nomenclature, double morality, and bribery flourished in full color in the mid-seventies. The low quality of the goods and their shortage caused at once a bunch of vices in people: division, fraud, forgery, fraud, body kits, theft, etc. Everyone wanted to live better, so the weakest choked in their conscience and morality, going to unseemly deeds. Gradually, the people eroded the qualities that cement the people and create the basis for turning it into a nation. But the Achilles' heel of the USSR became the railways. Back in Brezhnev times, the railways began to work with large interruptions, and paralysis had come to the arrival of Gorbachev. The disruption of the work of the railways led to a breakdown in the delivery of raw materials, components and goods to tens of thousands of enterprises within the country. The increase in production of railway cars did not solve the problem, as the fifth column struck at the most vulnerable link in the transport - unloading of cars. Paralyzing the unloading of cars, paralyzed and the work of the railway, as this led to the accumulation of cars that blocked the spare ways of many railway junctions connecting various regions of the country ...

In just two years, the situation with the overstocking of cargo in ports and railway stations has become critical. Hundreds of thousands of wagons with cargoes remained unloaded. In each USSR Ministry, special headquarters were created, which organized the unloading of cars arriving at subordinate enterprises and reported daily to the Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee. For example, at the meeting of the MPS collegium on October 19, 1989, it was stated that over 2.200.000 tons of imported cargo had accumulated in the seaports, besides, 9.180 wagons are expected to be overloaded at border stations and 12.990 wagons are approaching the border ... to export 9,000,000 tons of grain, 500,000 tons of sugar, 950,000 tons of metals, as well as 2,500,000 tons of other imports from the ports as soon as possible ...

With all this it must be borne in mind that the daily allowance for a single car only in our country cost 60 rubles. That is, in terms of a year, only idle times of wagons caused losses of 2.5-3.0 billion rubles, and taking into account all the losses from the breakdown of the delivery time of products, before the spoilage of products in the standing wagons and their downtime, the losses amounted to more than 8.5 billion rubles per year. The newspaper Pravda on October 20, 1989, publishes photographs from railway freight stations in Moscow, which are packed with wagons filled with medicines, condensed milk, sugar, coffee, and other products. O.Voytov, deputy head of the container transportation service of the Moscow Railway, told Pravda correspondent that 5.792 medium-sized and large-sized containers and about 1,000 wagons had accumulated at the sites of Moscow freight stations.
So at the station Bekasovo-1 there were cars with imported furniture, tea, shoes, perfumery, wallpaper, knitwear. At Machihino station, furniture, coffee, clothing, fabrics, toilet paper, wallpaper, wheelchairs, and picture tubes are a dead weight. At the Kiev Freight Station are juices, coffee, tea, tobacco,
Bulgarian cucumbers, mixed vegetables and apples from Hungary, wine, carpets, linen, green peas, tomatoes and for almost two months these goods cannot be found on the shelves. And the shops of Moscow at this time are empty and the people are boiling with outrage and hatred for the Gorbachev impotent power ...

Ordinary people outraged by sabotage and the general mess sent hundreds of thousands of letters to the Central Committee of the CPSU to Gorbachev and to the Government, its prime minister Ryzhkov. So S. Mashkov, a machinist of the locomotive depot at Kuntsevo-P, the largest Moscow freight station, wrote with indignation: “... stores do not break with goods, and cargo from the station is taken only during the day because at night and at weekends, the recipients' warehouses do not work ... In other Moscow freight stations, the situation is the same. Every day I go to work past Fili station and see a cluster of dozens of refrigerated wagons with meat and butter poultry ... They have been idle for weeks without moving. ”

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#217

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 22:02

Glantz may unknowingly falsify history. July 15 has already funded the base on the Dnieper. There moved supplies from Molodechno. 5-6 instead of 11 lazy distortion. Too lazy to dig in the archives and so it will do.

Image

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#218

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 22:40

Yes, Glantz fabricates history. He refers to information dated July 13 in support of "no further than Smolensk." But on July 15, Wagner called it possible to supply 17 divisions to Moscow. Glantz did not see contradictions, and in vain.

Image
The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#219

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 23:04

Glantz is wrong too. Despite, authority. Wagner spoke about 14 echelons for the offensive on Moscow. Glantz wants 22. Then he writes about 5-6... Glantz just this theme is not interesting. Described it quickly, in rough strokes.

Image
In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#220

Post by jesk » 16 Apr 2019, 23:11

Glantz as a source with good reason I reject. No longer need to refer to him as a logistics expert. His work is replete with mistakes and contradictions.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#221

Post by Max Payload » 17 Apr 2019, 00:14

jesk wrote:
16 Apr 2019, 23:11
Glantz as a source with good reason I reject. No longer need to refer to him as a logistics expert. His work is replete with mistakes and contradictions.

jesk may have a point because some of the figures used here don’t add up.
This from Hanny (Post #6)
“The 1941 munition supplies reaching the front by month. Source: Germany and WWII Tome
June :23077 tons
July :101594
August:118855
September: 107870
...

Which yields per Div per day.
June 5
July 22
Aug 26
Sept 23
...”

Yet Glantz (Barbarossa Derailed p141) quotes the two panzer groups in Fourth Army (around 20 divisions) requiring 2,000 tons per day of ammunition; a factor of four discrepancy with the above.
Even assuming that a panzer division had a greater daily ammunition requirement than an infantry division, there would appear to be an error in one or both sets of data.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#222

Post by jesk » 17 Apr 2019, 07:18

Max Payload wrote:
17 Apr 2019, 00:14
jesk wrote:
16 Apr 2019, 23:11
Glantz as a source with good reason I reject. No longer need to refer to him as a logistics expert. His work is replete with mistakes and contradictions.

jesk may have a point because some of the figures used here don’t add up.
This from Hanny (Post #6)
“The 1941 munition supplies reaching the front by month. Source: Germany and WWII Tome
June :23077 tons
July :101594
August:118855
September: 107870
...

Which yields per Div per day.
June 5
July 22
Aug 26
Sept 23
...”

Yet Glantz (Barbarossa Derailed p141) quotes the two panzer groups in Fourth Army (around 20 divisions) requiring 2,000 tons per day of ammunition; a factor of four discrepancy with the above.
Even assuming that a panzer division had a greater daily ammunition requirement than an infantry division, there would appear to be an error in one or both sets of data.
The war was fought from June 22, 9 days of the month. The number 5 in June is wrong. Glantz has inaccuracies about supply. He writes, operations are no further than Smolensk. The number of trains in Molodechno decreased from 11 to 5-6. But there were already 2 supply bases. One on the Dnieper, during July first base lost importance.
Further Glantz refers to Halder's diary about 14 trains per day. The number 11 is taken from the ceiling.
Glantz did not investigate this question (about supply), several articles came to hand and wrote in places nonsense.
Already in July, the group "Center" could attack Moscow. Without pauses, in a continuous advance. Wagner makes it clear.
Hanny's main sources: Halder and Wagner. But these two considered it possible to attack Moscow. In his posts, I encountered the most cynical out of context. In the interpretation of Hanny quotes Wagner and Halder prove the inability of the offensive on Moscow. And this is terrible.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#223

Post by ljadw » 17 Apr 2019, 07:52

jesk wrote:
14 Apr 2019, 11:34
Stolfi does not see problems with progress to Moscow in the summer of 1941.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/11.html
In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.
That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.
By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.
Stolfi is not a serious historian, but a fanboy : a serious historian knows that to prove his claim,he has to give informations about the strength of both sides : saying that an advance to Moscow would be possible because the Germans would/could /should (the usual handwaving ) have more supplies, but remaining silent about the logistical situation of the opponent, is proving that one has
a hidden goal,which is :without the intervention of the Bohemian corporal, the glorious armies of the Third Reich would have destroyed the evil bolchevists .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#224

Post by jesk » 17 Apr 2019, 07:58

ljadw wrote:
17 Apr 2019, 07:52
Stolfi is not a serious historian, but a fanboy : a serious historian knows that to prove his claim,he has to give informations about the strength of both sides : saying that an advance to Moscow would be possible because the Germans would/could /should (the usual handwaving ) have more supplies, but remaining silent about the logistical situation of the opponent, is proving that one has
a hidden goal,which is :without the intervention of the Bohemian corporal, the glorious armies of the Third Reich would have destroyed the evil bolchevists .
How else to make a decision on the offensive, taking into account the logistic component? One can only believe Wagner. And he agrees with von Bock. The Germans could take Moscow in July.
Regarding the attack on Moscow, there is no need for difficult decisions. Wagner’s testimony is enough ... Logistics has never defined a German strategy. Logistics should be studied only for the sake of logistics. Combat operations separately and the connection between them is indirect.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#225

Post by ljadw » 17 Apr 2019, 12:47

jesk wrote:
17 Apr 2019, 07:58
ljadw wrote:
17 Apr 2019, 07:52
Stolfi is not a serious historian, but a fanboy : a serious historian knows that to prove his claim,he has to give informations about the strength of both sides : saying that an advance to Moscow would be possible because the Germans would/could /should (the usual handwaving ) have more supplies, but remaining silent about the logistical situation of the opponent, is proving that one has
a hidden goal,which is :without the intervention of the Bohemian corporal, the glorious armies of the Third Reich would have destroyed the evil bolchevists .
How else to make a decision on the offensive, taking into account the logistic component? One can only believe Wagner. And he agrees with von Bock. The Germans could take Moscow in July.
Regarding the attack on Moscow, there is no need for difficult decisions. Wagner’s testimony is enough ... Logistics has never defined a German strategy. Logistics should be studied only for the sake of logistics. Combat operations separately and the connection between them is indirect.
Going to the Wolga was possible only if the Soviets were defeated west of the DD line and if they could not replace their losses :if this was so, the advance was possible and German logistic situation was irrelevant . Thus what Wagner was saying is totally irrelevant .An offensive to the Wolga was impossible: the only possible was the pursuit of a defeated enemy . And as the enemy was not defeated ......

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