where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Richard Anderson
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Apr 2019 16:33

doogal wrote:
28 Apr 2019 00:30
2 million German soldiers carried the occupation service in Europe
if you could provide your sources for this number. And suggest a suitable figure for occupying these territories:
It all depends.

On when?

On what constitutes "occupation service"?

On what constitutes "Europe"?

A bunch of different numbers lurk in those three variables. :D :D :D

However, if the date is on or about 1 June 1944, if all Wehrmacht forces (H, KM, LW, W-SS, FW, OT, NSKK, and RAD) are included, if Europe = Ob.West (HG-B, D and AG-G), plus the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, but excludes HG-C, E, and F, then the total is c. 1.3 to 1.4 million.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by ljadw » 28 Apr 2019 20:26

MarkN wrote:
28 Apr 2019 14:19
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 08:04
Besides, the campaign in the East could only succeed if it was won in 2 months.
Do you have evidence for this statement or did you just make it up?
It was a question of distances : it was impossible to go to the Wolga with an army of 3 million + men .Thus the decision would be obtained in the region between the border and the DD line (Dnjepr-Dvina ) ,and to do this ,5 months would not be needed .
In Weisung 21 it is very clearly mentioned that the orderly retreat from intact Soviet units to the east had to be prevented :
in German :der Abzug kampkrächtiger Teile (des Russischen Heeres ) in die Weite des russischen Raumes (soll ) verhindert werden .
Germany could not win by going after the Soviet Army, the Soviet Army had to go to the west(border-DD) where it would be destroyed ,this would be followed by a rapid pursuit of the defeated enemy til the Wolga .This means also that the strength of the forces available for this pursuit was not very important,as such a pursuit could only happen by small forces : the stronger the army, the slower the advance .
Time was essential and time = distance and distance is time .
The SU had to be eliminated before the American intervention,which, following Berlin, was very close . Even without PH .It is not so that without PH ,war with the US would only occur in 1943 or 1944 .
Germany was in a hurry .
That was one of the reasons why the plan was depending on 3 assumptions
1 The Soviets had to go to the West (when they did it, Halder jubilated in his diary : the enemy accepts the battle )
2 The Soviets had to be defeated west of the DD line
3 The Soviets should not be able to continue the war east of the DD line .
If one of these assumptions was wrong, the campaign would fail .
And number 3 was wrong .
Number one was dubious, but probable for 60%.
Everyone in Rastenburg believed in number two.
Number three : they could only hope and guess ,but it had to be correct,otherwise Germany would fail,thus everyone was convincing his neighbour that it would happen .

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Apr 2019 21:06

doogal wrote:
28 Apr 2019 15:38
rom Nigel Askey Operation Barbarossa Volume II B P 82
Norway : 123000
AG D West
7th A : 141000
1st A : 106000
15th A : 205000
Reserves : 55000

12th A (Balkans ) : 169000

DAK : 82000

Replacement Army : 1076000

Total : 1960000,of whom less than 900000 for occupation duties . The 2 million figure for occupation forces is wrong .
The figure of 1960000 includes army, WSS, LW ground and Naval Coastal artillery units .
I think it is clear that even a significant reduction of occupation forces and there use in the east would not in any real sense have had a positive effect. In reality it may have hastened Nazi Germanys defeat.
Norway 123000? Why are you fooling yourself? Up to half a million at the peak reached the number of German groups there. I think 4 divisions psychologically comfortable figure for the defense of Norway. But the divisions were 14. Hitler wanted to lose war. And he did it. LOOOL

Order of battle (21 Aug 1943)

At the disposal of Armee Norwegen
- 25. Panzer-Division
- 196. Infanterie-Division
- 274. Infanterie-Division (forming)
- 280. Infanterie-Division
LXXI. Armeekorps
- 230. Infanterie-Division
- 270. Infanterie-Division
- 199. Infanterie-Division
XXXIII. Armeekorps
- 14. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division
- 702. Infanterie-Division
- 181. Infanterie-Division
LXX. Armeekorps
- 269. Infanterie-Division
- 295. Infanterie-Division (forming/in transit)
- 214. Infanterie-Division
- 710. Infanterie-Division

jesk
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Apr 2019 21:11

In March 1943, Hitler promised to take 10 divisions from the Taman Peninsula for Ukraine. The word of course did not keep. German mistakes are grotesquely primitive.

Order of battle (9 Apr 1943)

At the disposal of the 17. Armee
- 13. Panzer-Division (most) + 4. Gebirgs-Division (part)
Gruppe Wetzel (V. Armeekorps)
- 4. Gebirgs-Division (most)
- 125. Infanterie-Division + 101. Jäger-Division (part) + Romanian 10th Infantry Division (part)
- 73. Infanterie-Division + Romanian 6th Cavalry Division (part)
Romanian Cavalry Corps (subordinated to Gruppe Wetzel)
- Romanian 9th Cavalry Division
- Romanian 6th Cavalry Division (most) + 1/3 Romanian 10th Infantry Division
XXXXIV. Armeekorps
- 9. Infanterie-Division + Romanian 3rd Mountain Division
- 97. Jäger-Division + Romanian 19th Infantry Division (part)
- 101. Jäger-Division (most) + Romanian 19th Infantry Division (part) + 5. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division (part)
XXXXIX. Gebirgs-Armeekorps
- 370. Infanterie-Division
- 50. Infanterie-Division

jesk
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 28 Apr 2019 21:24

In the Soviet criminal code from 1926 to 1958 there was an article on sabotage. Then removed. It is difficult to prove whether a person sabotaged or simply made a mistake. There is no direct evidence against Hitler. But since his every decision is in favor of the enemy, the logic shouts: he did it on purpose! I'm sure a million percent. 8-)

MarkN
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 28 Apr 2019 21:58

ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:26
MarkN wrote:
28 Apr 2019 14:19
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 08:04
Besides, the campaign in the East could only succeed if it was won in 2 months.
Do you have evidence for this statement or did you just make it up?
It was a question of distances : it was impossible to go to the Wolga with an army of 3 million + men .Thus the decision would be obtained in the region between the border and the DD line (Dnjepr-Dvina ) ,and to do this ,5 months would not be needed .
In Weisung 21 it is very clearly mentioned that the orderly retreat from intact Soviet units to the east had to be prevented :
in German :der Abzug kampkrächtiger Teile (des Russischen Heeres ) in die Weite des russischen Raumes (soll ) verhindert werden .
Germany could not win by going after the Soviet Army, the Soviet Army had to go to the west(border-DD) where it would be destroyed ,this would be followed by a rapid pursuit of the defeated enemy til the Wolga .This means also that the strength of the forces available for this pursuit was not very important,as such a pursuit could only happen by small forces : the stronger the army, the slower the advance .
Time was essential and time = distance and distance is time .
The SU had to be eliminated before the American intervention,which, following Berlin, was very close . Even without PH .It is not so that without PH ,war with the US would only occur in 1943 or 1944 .
Germany was in a hurry .
That was one of the reasons why the plan was depending on 3 assumptions
1 The Soviets had to go to the West (when they did it, Halder jubilated in his diary : the enemy accepts the battle )
2 The Soviets had to be defeated west of the DD line
3 The Soviets should not be able to continue the war east of the DD line .
If one of these assumptions was wrong, the campaign would fail .
And number 3 was wrong .
Number one was dubious, but probable for 60%.
Everyone in Rastenburg believed in number two.
Number three : they could only hope and guess ,but it had to be correct,otherwise Germany would fail,thus everyone was convincing his neighbour that it would happen .
So the short answer is indeed you made it all up.

It was not a planning assumption at the time that "the campaign in the East could only succeed if it was won in 2 months."

jesk
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 29 Apr 2019 08:02

Richard Anderson wrote:
28 Apr 2019 16:33
doogal wrote:
28 Apr 2019 00:30
2 million German soldiers carried the occupation service in Europe
if you could provide your sources for this number. And suggest a suitable figure for occupying these territories:
It all depends.

On when?

On what constitutes "occupation service"?

On what constitutes "Europe"?

A bunch of different numbers lurk in those three variables. :D :D :D

However, if the date is on or about 1 June 1944, if all Wehrmacht forces (H, KM, LW, W-SS, FW, OT, NSKK, and RAD) are included, if Europe = Ob.West (HG-B, D and AG-G), plus the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, but excludes HG-C, E, and F, then the total is c. 1.3 to 1.4 million.
Need to consider fleet. The conspirators on July 20 in France “forgot” about the fleet and were arrested by sailors who retained loyalty to the authorities.

jesk
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 29 Apr 2019 08:09

Higher forces controlled history. It would be interesting if Rommel had not been seriously wounded on July 17, as events would have developed. I read that main reason for the failure of the conspiracy in France was Kluge’s indecision. When he found out about the failure of the assassination. He withdrew and refused to use the levers of power that he possessed.
July 17, God shot Rommel. Hitler must complete the mission to the end..

Sid Guttridge
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 29 Apr 2019 10:04

Hi ljadw,

You post, "Sid, you are starting from a wrong point of view: it is not so that Barbarossa failed because the Germans were not strong enough. Barbarossa could succeed with a weaker Ostheer, it also could fail with a stronger Ostheer. Barbarossa failed because the Soviets refused to give up, and, even with a stronger Ostheer the Soviets would refuse to give up ."

Soviet response is an unpredictable variable. One man on foot with a pistol and a packed lunch from his Mum could have conquered the USSR if the Soviets had given up.

What is your point?

Only German planning and strength were within the control of either Hitler, or the German Army. What we are trying to establish here is whether either of these were sufficient for the task of conquering the USSR and, if not, whether Hitler, the German General Staff, or both, were responsible for any limitations.

Cheers,

Sid

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 29 Apr 2019 10:49

Hi MarkN,

You post,

"The Heer were well aware even then that the Soviets enjoyed a numerical superiority. They then used the idea that they were not certain as to how great that numerical superiority was as an excuse for their failure. But they knew that numerical superiority was great enough to prevent them winning the war outright and thus they drew up a military plan that was only a land grab rather than a war winning campaign. They always knew they would never have enough to completely defeat the Soviets. BARBAROSSA was devised as a "quick campaign" that started a war of undefined duration. Moreover, and just for their limited land grab, the Heer had deluded themselves into believing that they had a tactical strategy that would overcome that numerical inferiority and allow a victorious BARBAROSSA."

Much of this seems highly speculative. You are essentially saying that Hitler and his Army colluded to undertake a war they could not win. If so, this is a particular indictment of Hitler, who launched the war, rather than the Army, who were constitutionally bound to carry out his orders.

Shorn of their more or less reliable minorities, the Third Reich had 80 million Germans and the USSR some 120 million Russians.

Certainly it was clear that the USSR had a numerical advantage, but the reliable national cores were only about 3:2 in Soviet favour, and not much over 2:1 even if all the USSR's minorities are included and Germany's own are not. The German problem was that they felt they needed higher quality troops to help make up the difference but had less trained reserves (due to the "White Years" of the Versailles Treaty) than the USSR, however poorly prepared the latter may have been. Germany didn't, for whatever reason, develop enough troops to its own required standard sufficient to handle the USSR's willingness to put bodies into the field regardless of their degree of preparation.

The loyalties of all the intervening peoples between Germany and Russia were more or less negotiable and offered the prospect of making up much of the numerical, if not qualitative, difference, if properly cultivated. However, the Germans did not begin to seriously cultivate most of them until the war had already turned against them. This was a political decision. The German Army proved more than willing to use hundreds of thousands of Hiwis, even in combat, when it ran short of replacements in 1941-42 and even circumvented political instructions that it should not employ them. By contrast, the still ethnically purist W-SS was slow to do so.

I would also question the "limited" nature of the land grab. According to Hitler on 5/6 July, it was unlimited in that ".....In case of necessity, we shall renew our advance wherever a new centre of resistance is formed." Furthermore, the area he intended to occupy contained some 80% of the USSR's population. This does not seem particularly "limited".

There is also the question as to what Hitler expected to happen to Siberia beyond his notional occupation line some ±200 miles beyond the Urals. Was this to be Japan's share of the spoils if it joined in? Do we have anything on this?

It seems to me highly implausible that the Germans launched their war knowing they could not win it. It seems more likely they were overconfident and thought they could clear their back sufficiently to be able to turn their attention again to finishing off the British and their empire without having a massive Soviet threat in their immediate rear.

It seems to me that this is likely to be an insoluble debate because of the nature of Hitler's leadership. He seems to have made policy on the hoof, following advantage where he saw it. There therefore does not seem to be the sort of policy paper trail found in more collegiate governments.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 29 Apr 2019 12:13

ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:26
...
In Weisung 21 it is very clearly mentioned that the orderly retreat from intact Soviet units to the east had to be prevented :
in German :der Abzug kampkrächtiger Teile (des Russischen Heeres ) in die Weite des russischen Raumes (soll ) verhindert werden .
...
You have made great progress! Congratulations! Before you wrote about preventing retreat Soviet units to the east. Now it is about intact Soviet units. It remains for you to bring the numbers of the Soviet divisions that crossed the DD-Line remaining intact. But first I advise you to determine what does the term "intact" mean.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 29 Apr 2019 14:04

MarkN wrote:
27 Apr 2019 23:42
...
Dear leader wanted to erase 'jewish bolshevism' from the map,
...
It seems to me that your statement of Hitler's intention to erase 'jewish bolshevism' from the map has few grounds. If you refer to the documents and the real actions of Adolf, you can see that he was, on the one hand, ready to conclude treaties with the USSR and, on the other hand, did not consider the USSR as a serious opponent and underestimated him.
Image
Look at the document about the arrival of Hitler on August 4, 1941 in the Army Group Center. Since you know German then I will not translate. But grab attention that Guderian and Hoth talk about the need to replace tank engines to perform deep operations. And what does Adolph answer them? I deliberately concealed his answer that you would try to give your version of the answer. So: August 4, the city of Borisov, von Bock's headquarters. How does Hitler begin his answer to his tank generals about the engines needed to erase Jewish Bolshevism from the map?
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 29 Apr 2019 14:14

AbollonPolweder wrote:
29 Apr 2019 12:13
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:26
In Weisung 21 it is very clearly mentioned that the orderly retreat from intact Soviet units to the east had to be prevented :
in German :der Abzug kampkrächtiger Teile (des Russischen Heeres ) in die Weite des russischen Raumes (soll ) verhindert werden .
You have made great progress! Congratulations! Before you wrote about preventing retreat Soviet units to the east. Now it is about intact Soviet units. It remains for you to bring the numbers of the Soviet divisions that crossed the DD-Line remaining intact. But first I advise you to determine what does the term "intact" mean.
I spotted that too. I'm looking forward to ljadw's analysis of which Red Army formations west of the DD Line managed to escape eastwards "intact". And how it was those formations that caused BARBAROSSA's failure. :lol:

However, I suspect you are wrong to think ljadw is making progress. I doubt that is true. It seems to me to be another failed attempt to sell the incoherent and historically false fantasy narrative into something more credible. Again, ljadw demonstrates a lack of ability to perform such mental gymnastics.

When I read this, ...
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 08:04
Besides, the campaign in the East could only succeed if it was won in 2 months.
... I too thought there was progress. At last ljadw accepts BARBAROSSA was intended as a "quick campaign" which starts a war of unknown duration not a "short war". But then ljadw posted this, ...
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:26
The SU had to be eliminated before the American intervention,which, following Berlin, was very close .
... It's back to the same old falsehoods again.

Can't cope with the mental gymnastics.

MarkN
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 29 Apr 2019 14:21

AbollonPolweder wrote:
29 Apr 2019 14:04
MarkN wrote:
27 Apr 2019 23:42
...
Dear leader wanted to erase 'jewish bolshevism' from the map,
...
It seems to me that your statement of Hitler's intention to erase 'jewish bolshevism' from the map has few grounds. If you refer to the documents and the real actions of Adolf, you can see that he was, on the one hand, ready to conclude treaties with the USSR and, on the other hand, did not consider the USSR as a serious opponent and underestimated him.
Image
Look at the document about the arrival of Hitler on August 4, 1941 in the Army Group Center. Since you know German then I will not translate. But grab attention that Guderian and Hoth talk about the need to replace tank engines to perform deep operations. And what does Adolph answer them? I deliberately concealed his answer that you would try to give your version of the answer. So: August 4, the city of Borisov, von Bock's headquarters. How does Hitler begin his answer to his tank generals about the engines needed to erase Jewish Bolshevism from the map?
I believe Hitler's decision to attack Russia in June 1941 flowed from his ideology. That ideology is to be found in Mein Kampf.

However, real life is different to ideological desires. At times it was stategically prudent to be best of friends with the judeo-bolsheviks. BARBAROSSA was never designed to erase judeo-bolshevism, it was a limited land grab.

jesk
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 29 Apr 2019 17:12

An interesting article about Rommel's mistakes. The author suspects him of sabotage in favor of the British. Where is the problem. Woe from the mind ... The high average intellectual level of the Germans turns war into ordinary business.

http://maxpark.com/community/129/content/5256392

Field Marshal Rommel actually destroyed the defense of the Wehrmacht in Normandy

He did not create a reserve in the rear, misplaced tank groups and suggested guessing the landing site in order to locate the main forces there .....

So Rommel proposed to send the main forces to Holland, considering that everything will happen exactly there.

But Hitler, heeding the voice of reason, refused this "offer"

And precisely in that, in which the allies did not plan to land.

Fans of Rommel sure that there is not a betrayal, but a fatal mistake. However, the fact is:

--Rommel reserves in the rear did not create

- the Allies quietly landed, smashed in parts the German units entered into the battle

- Using the lack of rear reserves from the enemy, the Allies made a dash to the “Siegfried Line” - they staged an experienced German generals in 1941.

"Guessing" Rommel called different landing sites, but whatever he called, it was not the place where the landing zone was ...


And when fortune, for obvious reasons, turned away from Rommel, which is not surprising since the supply was to hell, Rommel ran. This is how Kesselring describes it:

“I’m against the immediate withdrawal of Rommel’s army, because it would contradict the basic action plan for the defense of Tunisia, but I advocate withdrawing certain parts from the battlefield and redeploying to the west - provided that Rommel does not use this as a pretext for further weakening resistance and even faster retreat.

I must declare with all frankness that after El Alamein he did not offer the enemy the firm and decisive resistance that I, knowing him, had the right to expect from him. ”

When the situation in Africa became hopeless Rommel abandoned troops in Tunisia and fled to Europe.

In Germany, Rommel to the slaughter Hitler issued another army. When the threat of an Allied invasion of Italy arose, Rommel made another “erroneous” decision. Kesselring writes:

“As I have already noted, Rommel insisted on the evacuation of our troops from Africa. In Italy, we, in his opinion, had to hold back the enemy for some time, and then give him a real battle in the Apennines or the Alps. With such views on the conduct of hostilities on land, I was categorically disagree. "

……………….

Admirers of Rommel, explain: how could an outstanding commander repeatedly offer such idiotic solutions?

Can talk about Overlord as the greatest amphibious operation? Can the opening of the second front be considered the military achievement of the allies?

- Rommel won a war in Africa for the Allies, not allowing Malta to be captured

- success "Overvold" provided Rommel, not allowing the creation of a strong rear Wehrmacht

In other words, Rommel was an English spy, most likely recruited before the start of the Second World War

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