Yuri wrote: ↑30 Apr 2019, 20:43
MarkN wrote: ↑29 Apr 2019, 15:14
AbollonPolweder wrote: ↑29 Apr 2019, 13:13
ljadw wrote: ↑28 Apr 2019, 21:26
In Weisung 21 it is very clearly mentioned that the orderly retreat from intact Soviet units to the east had to be prevented :
in German :der Abzug kampkrächtiger Teile (des Russischen Heeres ) in die Weite des russischen Raumes (soll ) verhindert werden .
You have made great progress! Congratulations! Before you wrote about preventing retreat Soviet units to the east. Now it is about
intact Soviet units. It remains for you to bring the numbers of the Soviet divisions that crossed the DD-Line remaining intact. But first I advise you to determine what does the term "intact" mean.
I spotted that too. I'm looking forward to ljadw's analysis of which Red Army formations west of the DD Line managed to escape eastwards "
intact". And how it was those formations that caused BARBAROSSA's failure.
Why the divisions? Two armies (16th and 19th) were withdrawn intact, can point to the airborne corps.
There is no complete data on the number of troops of the 16th and 19th Army, which were withdrawn beyond the Dnieper line.
Such information is available on the Seaside army, which evacuated over the line of Dnieper, on 16 October 1941. The Army of General Petrov acted in the area of Odessa.
Total from Odessa was evacuated:
In August 1941:
a) the civilian population - 58 thousand people;
b) cargo – 67.6 thousand tons.
In September 1941:
a) the civilian population - 67 thousand people;
b) cargo – 44.8 thousand tons.
15 days of October, 1941:
a) civilian population — 18,000;
b) cargo – 18.5 thousand tons.
Total from August 15 to October 15, 1941 evacuated:
a) the civilian population – 143 thousand people;
b) cargo – 130.9 thousand tons
Among the property withdrawn beyond the Dnieper line.
a) industrial equipment
– plant "Bolshevik»;
– machine-tool plant named Lenin;
– shipbuilding and ship repair plants;
– plant of agricultural machines named the October Revolution;
– plant heavy scale production named Starostin ,
– superphosphate plant;
– sugar, canning, and other factorys.
b) locomotives and railway cars;
c) fuel, metal and other raw materials;
d) the museum treasures and art galleries.
Evacuation of troops the Seaside Army from Odessa in the period from 1 to 16 October 1941:
a) staff troops – 86 thousand people;
b) tanks and armoured vehicles - 19
c) guns and howitzers – 463;
d) vehicles – 1158;
e) horses – 3 625;
f) the military cargo (ammunition, property) – 25,000 tons.
Losses of the Seaside Army for the period from August 15 to October 16:
a) dead, wounded, missing and prisoners of war – 15,578 person;
b) wounded and sick – 24,690 persons.
Total losses: 40,286 person.
Result:
the total number of soldiers of the Seaside Army – 111 thousand people
of which was 86 thousand people or 77.5% were evacuated beyond the DD line (to Crimea).
We can not say that the Army of General Petrov was evacuated in full one piece.
However, we can not say that it was not a combat-ready army.
By the way, the Petrov's Army has not allowed the 11th army under General Manstein to capture in November 1942, Sevastopol is a strategic point outside the line DD.
The influence of the Seaside Army's fighting on the General course of the war can be seen to some extent here.
Together with the Romanian army in Odessa acted Heer and Luftwaffe of the German Wehrmacht (for example, 50th infantry division).
You can tell that in Odessa there were mainly Romanian troops which fighting capacity is lower than German troops. The Germans had assessed the fighting ability of their allies in 50% of their troops. Whether or not to agree with this assessment is a personal matter.
However:
First, Romanian troops were supplied from their resources and at a short distance from their bases;
Second, well, let's assume that the combat capability of Romanians is really 50% of German troops.
In this case – the Germans need to find another 213 thousand only Heer with the same result: the Seaside Army goes beyond the DD line.
To prevent evacuation - it takes more than 213 thousand. How much 250? 300?.
And they were these 250-300 thousand Heer?
And if Heer had these 250, how to supply that fighting capacity was 50% higher than the Romanians?
At the expense of Romanians?
Romania can not provide German troops in the same way as their own – the Germans and Romanians different weapons systems.
There is no such success as the Seaside Army, but for the line of the Dnieper were assigned to the 9th and 18th Armies.
On the combat capability of these armies, you can learn from the memoirs of Manstein, he just in September 1941 was appointed commander of the 11th Army.