In the context of schemes and evidence; not the city matters. 70% of the Red Army (including the newly formed armies) were on the Moscow direction. Von Bock insisted on their destruction. It is difficult to imagine that the Russians would be able to restore the front after such a rout. This is the end. Attacking Uman and Kiev, Hitler took the threat from the main Soviet forces.AbollonPolweder wrote: ↑07 May 2019 16:06There is and other evidence, for example:
As you can see, Adolf argues that from the very beginning he spoke of the secondary importance of Moscow.
I called Halder, clarified my position and said that I consider this operation ill-considered, since it primarily prevents the offensive from going eastwards. All directives say that the capture of Moscow is not of great importance! I want to destroy the enemy army, and the main forces of this army are concentrated on my front! For this reason, the rotation of a part of the army of the Army Group Center will threaten the implementation of the main task of the Army Group, namely the destruction of the most combat-ready units of the Red Army before the onset of winter.
All in vain! In the evening, an order came from the Supreme Command of the ground forces to transfer "troops from the Gomel area" and, if possible, three more mobile units heading south.