The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 01 May 2019 06:39

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
01 May 2019 04:08
This thread has grown long and taken detours as usually happens.

To return somewhat to the original question, what feasible improvements to Barbarossa logistics do we think were possible? Like would doubling the number and equipment of Eisenbahntruppen have allowed the Ostheer to be fully supplied near Moscow and - perhaps more importantly - at/beyond Rostov in late 41 and thereafter?
The refusal of the Crimea doubled number of divisions attacking Rostov. It would become the best solution. Nicht verstehen?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 01 May 2019 08:29

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
01 May 2019 04:02
MarkN wrote:
30 Apr 2019 16:30
Rommel was keen to push on and take Egypt. He had the DAK planners look into it and sent of a request to OKH for the resources he required. Even Wagner at OKH waded into the issue with a 9 page logistics calculation in late August 1941.
Is Wagner's document available online anywhere?
I have no idea. I haven't tried looking for it.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 01 May 2019 10:22

Malta's non-capitalization is sabotage. German supplies were unloaded in Tobruk, Benghazi and Tripoli. And from a very deep rear, British aircraft struck.

WTF???

Image

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 01 May 2019 10:49

Opinion from Italy. Loss of Malta meant defeat of Anglo-Americans in Africa.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/bragadin/index.html

June 1942

The failure of the convoy from Alexandria

By the beginning of June 1942, the air raids on Malta became very weak, but the sea blockade continued to keep the island in a dangerous condition. Within six months, the British fleet could not deliver any serious amount of supplies. The island was threatened, starved, lacked weapons, ammunition and everything.

Hitler believed that Malta should not be turned; attention, since it is “useless” for the British, since the Axis forces will soon capture Suez. The British, on the contrary, made superhuman efforts to organize the supply of the island, even when Rommel’s offensive, which began on May 26, almost reached the Nile Valley. The British knew that, having lost Malta, they would lose the war in the Mediterranean. Moreover, they were already preparing a landing in Algeria for an offensive along the coasts of North Africa. In these plans, the island had the most important: strategic importance. Therefore, for the British, it was vital to maintain control over Malta and to arrange for the delivery of supplies at all costs.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 01 May 2019 17:12

The Germans fought hard for Malta. They sent submarines there! And they were close to victory, but the British survived.

http://warfor.me/boi-za-maltu/

The strengthening of the garrison of Malta immediately affected the effectiveness of its actions: in June-September 1941, island-based submarines and airplanes sent 108 enemy transports to the bottom. As a result, for example, in September a third of the cargo sent to the Italian-German troops in North Africa was lost. Trying to change the situation, the German command sent additional submarines to the Mediterranean Sea. They managed to achieve several high-profile successes: on November 13, 1941, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal was sunk, returning to Gibraltar after the planes were delivered to Malta, and on November 25, the battleship Barham. However, the key to solving the problem of Malta for the Axis countries was only the restoration of air superiority.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 01 May 2019 17:24

As for the logistics of Barbarossa, unlike Malta, is an empty topic. This is about how to drive 20 km with a full tank or half full. As if it has some meaning. Logistics has never determined the possibility of carrying out German operations.
Important to understand what the Barbarossa logistics dispute is. You have fuel for 200 km. It is discussed whether there is enough fuel for 20 km ...

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 14 May 2019 18:17

jesk wrote:
01 May 2019 10:49
Opinion from Italy. Loss of Malta meant defeat of Anglo-Americans in Africa.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/bragadin/index.html

June 1942

The failure of the convoy from Alexandria

By the beginning of June 1942, the air raids on Malta became very weak, but the sea blockade continued to keep the island in a dangerous condition. Within six months, the British fleet could not deliver any serious amount of supplies. The island was threatened, starved, lacked weapons, ammunition and everything.

Hitler believed that Malta should not be turned; attention, since it is “useless” for the British, since the Axis forces will soon capture Suez. The British, on the contrary, made superhuman efforts to organize the supply of the island, even when Rommel’s offensive, which began on May 26, almost reached the Nile Valley. The British knew that, having lost Malta, they would lose the war in the Mediterranean. Moreover, they were already preparing a landing in Algeria for an offensive along the coasts of North Africa. In these plans, the island had the most important: strategic importance. Therefore, for the British, it was vital to maintain control over Malta and to arrange for the delivery of supplies at all costs.
What Bragadin said is not correct .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 14 May 2019 20:58

ljadw wrote:
14 May 2019 18:17
jesk wrote:
01 May 2019 10:49
Opinion from Italy. Loss of Malta meant defeat of Anglo-Americans in Africa.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/bragadin/index.html

June 1942

The failure of the convoy from Alexandria

By the beginning of June 1942, the air raids on Malta became very weak, but the sea blockade continued to keep the island in a dangerous condition. Within six months, the British fleet could not deliver any serious amount of supplies. The island was threatened, starved, lacked weapons, ammunition and everything.

Hitler believed that Malta should not be turned; attention, since it is “useless” for the British, since the Axis forces will soon capture Suez. The British, on the contrary, made superhuman efforts to organize the supply of the island, even when Rommel’s offensive, which began on May 26, almost reached the Nile Valley. The British knew that, having lost Malta, they would lose the war in the Mediterranean. Moreover, they were already preparing a landing in Algeria for an offensive along the coasts of North Africa. In these plans, the island had the most important: strategic importance. Therefore, for the British, it was vital to maintain control over Malta and to arrange for the delivery of supplies at all costs.
What Bragadin said is not correct .
Where is your correct quote?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 15 May 2019 07:14

1 Malta was not important for operation Torch .
2 The loss of Malta would not result in the loss of the war in the Mediterranean : at the start of the war with Italy (June 1940 ) ,the British chiefs of staff proposed to give up Malta because the supply of Malta would demand too much supplies .
3 For the Axis also, Malta was not that important : the capture of Malta would not give Rommel more supplies .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 20 May 2019 21:02

ljadw wrote:
15 May 2019 07:14
the British chiefs of staff proposed to give up Malta because the supply of Malta would demand too much supplies .
This phrase is certainly taken out of context. I asked to quote.
3 For the Axis also, Malta was not that important : the capture of Malta would not give Rommel more supplies .
This is contrary to the sources. I have already quoted, Malta has blocked the supply.

http://maxpark.com/community/129/content/5256392

Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlane wrote:
“Delivery of supplies through the Mediterranean to Rommel’s army was reduced to an average of 6,000 tons per month, meeting only about one-fifth of our usual needs.
Three-quarters of our transports, which transferred supplies from Italy to North Africa, were sunk by British aircraft or the navy. Since we could not create the necessary supplies for the future, any possibility of a decisive battle fell away.
The power of the British air force has now, more than ever, increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the shock power of Kesselring aviation steadily declined. Replenishments did not arrive - almost all German aviation was concentrated by Hitler on the Russian front. The number of German fighter aircraft has become extremely small. The king of the African sky, Captain Marcel, the winner in 158 air battles, was killed.
Malta again became the most important base from which strikes were carried out on convoys of ships cruising between Italy and North Africa.
Most of the transports were now heading from Sicily to Benghazi, the main port for unloading German-Italian troops, and this route was within the reach of British aircraft based in Malta.
The capacity of the Tobruk port was completely inadequate. In connection with this, endless columns of trucks stretched from Benghazi and other remote ports of unloading to the Alameinian positions, and were constantly threatened by British aviation. A lot of fuel was spent on fueling vehicles that carried cargo.
At the same time, our troops experienced a great need for road transport. It was about 500 kilometers from Tobruk to the front, 1,000 kilometers from Benghazi and more than 2,000 kilometers from Tripoli, where a large number of supplies were also unloaded. The British supply bases were not far from the troops of the 8th Army: 90 kilometers from Alexandria, and a little more than 350 kilometers from Suez.
While Malta was in the hands of the British, it was impossible, without increasing the Kesselring air force several times, to deliver the necessary quantity of supplies to our troops in Africa. But even now Hitler did not think about taking this fortress.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 21 May 2019 18:34

jesk wrote:The power of the British air force has now, more than ever, increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the shock power of Kesselring aviation steadily declined. Replenishments did not arrive - almost all German aviation was concentrated by Hitler on the Russian front.
But I thought GROFAZ was wanting to lose on the OstFront :duckface:

The king of the African sky, Captain Marcel, the winner in 158 air battles, was killed.
Sob detail of no importance to the level being discussed (in war soldiers die, no?) shows piece is propagandistic, not informational in nature.

If ItaloGermans use some resources to conquer Malta, then same resources will not be available in North Africa, isn't it? Again an issue of Axis spread too thin, not of "Dolchstoßlegende 2 - Die Grofaz Fuhrer Lied".
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2019 08:44

From June to October 1941,the Axis sent some 500000 tons of supplies to NA of which 82000 tons were lost by Malta Forces = some 16,4 % .
For the whole of 1941 1015000 tons were sent,of which 165000 tons were lost by Malta forces = some 16 % .
Source :Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-1943 by Douglas Austin .
In 1935 the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta for Alexandria .( Same source ) .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 22 May 2019 09:24

ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 08:44
From June to October 1941,the Axis sent some 500000 tons of supplies to NA of which 82000 tons were lost by Malta Forces = some 16,4 % .
For the whole of 1941 1015000 tons were sent,of which 165000 tons were lost by Malta forces = some 16 % .
Source :Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-1943 by Douglas Austin .
In 1935 the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta for Alexandria .( Same source ) .
Fighting was conducted until May 1943. The source speaks about sinking of 3/4 transport ships.
Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlane wrote:
“Delivery of supplies through the Mediterranean to Rommel’s army was reduced to an average of 6,000 tons per month, meeting only about one-fifth of our usual needs.
Three-quarters of our transports, which transferred supplies from Italy to North Africa, were sunk by British aircraft or the navy. Since we could not create the necessary supplies for the future, any possibility of a decisive battle fell away.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2019 11:43

What Bayerlein said was nonsense and it is also disingenuous: Axis supplies to NA ( mostly for the Italians )were monthly always more than 6000 ton .
And about the proposal to abandon Malta : the source is Lutton '' Malta and the Mediterranean '' P 33 ,quoted in '' Comparison of the Invasion of Crete and the proposed invasion of Malta '' P 11 Note 3 .
The text is : Churchill vetoed on June 20 1940 a proposal to abandon Malta and the Eastern Mediterranean and withdraw the fleet to Gibraltar .
Last point : the shipping losses were lower than the supply losses : for June-October 1941 500000 GRT was sent to NA ,which would mean 200 MV,of which 36 were lost, but as the MV had to return to Italy,the real number is some 400 (200X 2 ),which means losses of 9 % .
If Malta was lost,what would be the influence on the shipping losses ? the shipping losses would be lower than 9 % but higher than 1 %, as the aircraft /submarines from Malta would still operate from other ports .
It is the same for the supply losses .
The fall of Malta would result in only a marginal gain for the Axis,and this marginal gain would have only a less than marginal influence on the outcome of the fighting .
What arrived in NA was mostly determined by what was sent and not by what was lost .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2019 11:51

jesk wrote:
22 May 2019 09:24
ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 08:44
From June to October 1941,the Axis sent some 500000 tons of supplies to NA of which 82000 tons were lost by Malta Forces = some 16,4 % .
For the whole of 1941 1015000 tons were sent,of which 165000 tons were lost by Malta forces = some 16 % .
Source :Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-1943 by Douglas Austin .
In 1935 the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta for Alexandria .( Same source ) .
Fighting was conducted until May 1943. The source speaks about sinking of 3/4 transport ships.
Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlane wrote:
“Delivery of supplies through the Mediterranean to Rommel’s army was reduced to an average of 6,000 tons per month, meeting only about one-fifth of our usual needs.
Three-quarters of our transports, which transferred supplies from Italy to North Africa, were sunk by British aircraft or the navy. Since we could not create the necessary supplies for the future, any possibility of a decisive battle fell away.
Bayerlein is totally wrong : he said that the monthly Axis needs were 30000 tons of which only 20 % (6000 ) arrived . If this was so, why did the Axis send 500000 ton in 5 month ( June-October 1941 ) of which 133000 ton in June ?
If you need 30000 ton monthly, why sending 133000 ton ?
Besides, if only 20 % of the needed Axis supplies arrived, why could they fight during 3 years in NA ?

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