A few days ago you positively screamed (bold and big) into your keyboard and unleashed the following in the world:
You do realise that posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions from what posters write too. For example, when I read this, ....
... I conclude that, due to the historical (in)accuracy, the (poor) quality of your analysis, the nature of the content and direction, and what appears to be your purpose in posting, it's probably best to continue avoiding engaging with you.Sid Guttridge wrote: ↑13 Jun 2019 10:14As outlined in earlier posts on this thread, it is clear that the intention and objective was to defeat the USSR beyond recovery by the winter of 1941/42. Barbarossa was undertaken on the assumption that 5 months of trained replacements would be sufficient.
In his July 1941 Table Talk Hitler then envisaged the establishment of an occupation force of some 250,000 men beyond the Urals to suppress any Communist resurgence. Other sources talk of 60-70 divisions for the full occupation including European Russia.
It is certainly true that Hitler was a changeable opportunist who was prone to make spontaneous, unexpected and high-risk decisions before full (or sometimes any) planning was in place. However, the USSR was in his sights for decades for a number of fundamental ideological reasons (i.e. his aversion to "Judaeo-Bolshevism" and desire for Lebensraum). Furthermore, actual planning for an invasion of the USSR was set in train nearly a year before it was launched. So Barbarossa was not some spur-of-the-moment decision embarked upon without forethought.
One might argue over the definition of victory (i.e. was it enough to take Moscow to bring the whole edifice down, or would everything up to Vladivostok have to be occupied to stamp Judaeo-Bolshevism out completely) but to suggest that it was launched ".....without any consideration of how or when that war would finish....." is not supported by the evidence. The Germans clearly got it wrong, but the idea that they hadn't even consider these matters is untenable.
The Germans wanted the initial campaign, that would render the Soviet position irrecoverable, to be over by the winter of 1941/42 and thought they had prepared for this. Thereafter they intended to occupy all of the European USSR and a buffer zone of the Asiatic USSR east of the Urals to prevent any Soviet resurgence.
However, as things turned out, they miscalculated and failed in the first, so the second remained a pipe dream.