where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[MarkN]

You post, "Unternehmen BARBAROSSA took Germany into war with the Soviet Union without any consideration of how or when that war would finish."

A few days ago you positively screamed (bold and big) into your keyboard and unleashed the following in the world:

If you persistently avoid answering questions, then posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions.

You do realise that posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions from what posters write too. For example, when I read this, ....

As outlined in earlier posts on this thread, it is clear that the intention and objective was to defeat the USSR beyond recovery by the winter of 1941/42. Barbarossa was undertaken on the assumption that 5 months of trained replacements would be sufficient.

In his July 1941 Table Talk Hitler then envisaged the establishment of an occupation force of some 250,000 men beyond the Urals to suppress any Communist resurgence. Other sources talk of 60-70 divisions for the full occupation including European Russia.

It is certainly true that Hitler was a changeable opportunist who was prone to make spontaneous, unexpected and high-risk decisions before full (or sometimes any) planning was in place. However, the USSR was in his sights for decades for a number of fundamental ideological reasons (i.e. his aversion to "Judaeo-Bolshevism" and desire for Lebensraum). Furthermore, actual planning for an invasion of the USSR was set in train nearly a year before it was launched. So Barbarossa was not some spur-of-the-moment decision embarked upon without forethought.

One might argue over the definition of victory (i.e. was it enough to take Moscow to bring the whole edifice down, or would everything up to Vladivostok have to be occupied to stamp Judaeo-Bolshevism out completely) but to suggest that it was launched ".....without any consideration of how or when that war would finish....." is not supported by the evidence. The Germans clearly got it wrong, but the idea that they hadn't even consider these matters is untenable.

The Germans wanted the initial campaign, that would render the Soviet position irrecoverable, to be over by the winter of 1941/42 and thought they had prepared for this. Thereafter they intended to occupy all of the European USSR and a buffer zone of the Asiatic USSR east of the Urals to prevent any Soviet resurgence.

However, as things turned out, they miscalculated and failed in the first, so the second remained a pipe dream.

... I conclude that, due to the historical (in)accuracy, the (poor) quality of your analysis, the nature of the content and direction, and what appears to be your purpose in posting, it's probably best to continue avoiding engaging with you.

[doogal]

I will engage with you sid

Sid wrote - As outlined in earlier posts on this thread, it is clear that the intention and objective was to defeat the USSR beyond recovery by the winter of 1941/42. Barbarossa was undertaken on the assumption that 5 months of trained replacements would be sufficient.

(Directive no.21)

"to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign" (page 93) this is the intention

"the final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against asiatic Russia" (page 94) the objective

it is clear that the intention and objective were in fact different and not the same thing.

Sid though is entirely correct about the replacements.

Barbarossa was undertaken on the assumption that 5 months of trained replacements would be sufficient

quite simply this was a fantasy, assumptions negate any serious planning and study.

In his July 1941 Table Talk Hitler then envisaged the establishment of an occupation force of some 250,000 men beyond the Urals to suppress any Communist resurgence. Other sources talk of 60-70 divisions for the full occupation including European Russia.

Hitler table talks engaged in assessing what would happen if his assumptions were proved correct, which is laughable.

It is certainly true that Hitler was a changeable opportunist who was prone to make spontaneous, unexpected and high-risk decisions before full (or sometimes any) planning was in place. However, the USSR was in his sights for decades for a number of fundamental ideological reasons (i.e. his aversion to "Judaeo-Bolshevism" and desire for Lebensraum). Furthermore, actual planning for an invasion of the USSR was set in train nearly a year before it was launched. So Barbarossa was not some spur-of-the-moment decision embarked upon without forethought.

i have to agree with sid.

The Germans wanted the initial campaign, that would render the Soviet position irrecoverable, to be over by the winter of 1941/42 and thought they had prepared for this. Thereafter they intended to occupy all of the European USSR and a buffer zone of the Asiatic USSR east of the Urals to prevent any Soviet resurgence.

i think its clear that the occupation of European Russia and a buffer zone were to be achieved before winter 1941:

I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.

[Max Payload]

You do realise that posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions from what posters write ....

And also from what posters fail to write particularly in response to points on which they have been directly challenged. And posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions when posters resort to argumentum ad hominem.

I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.

I’m not at all sure that they were ‘opposing concepts’, but rather that they were were sequential.
First objective (call it an intention if you wish) -
"crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign" (by destroying the combat effectiveness of the Red Army and advancing deep into Soviet territory in order to ‘render the Soviet position irrecoverable’).
And then, since there would always be Russian territory to the east of any German stop-line, to -
"erect a barrier against asiatic Russia"

[MarkN]

I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.

Indeed. However, for greater clarity it would be better written as: The intention of the invasion of the USSR and the objective(s) of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA were wholly different.

[MarkN]

And also from what posters fail to write particularly in response to points on which they have been directly challenged.

Far too many challenges simple do not merit a response. Having the right to ask a question does not automatically confer entitlement to an answer. Those that feel entitled perhaps need to readjust their expectations.

[MarkN]

In his July 1941 Table Talk Hitler then envisaged the establishment of an occupation force of some 250,000 men beyond the Urals to suppress any Communist resurgence. Other sources talk of 60-70 divisions for the full occupation including European Russia.

Hitler table talks engaged in assessing what would happen if his assumptions were proved correct, which is laughable.

The elevation of pep talks above policy documents and directives in the understanding of policy is more than laughable.

The Germans wanted the initial campaign, that would render the Soviet position irrecoverable, to be over by the winter of 1941/42 and thought they had prepared for this. Thereafter they intended to occupy all of the European USSR and a buffer zone of the Asiatic USSR east of the Urals to prevent any Soviet resurgence.

i think its clear that the occupation of European Russia and a buffer zone were to be achieved before winter 1941:

Weisung 32 states:

B.) Aus dieser Lage heraus, wie sie sich nach der siegreichen Beendigung des Ostfeldzuges ergeben wird, können der Wehrmacht für den Spätherbst 1941 und den Winter 1941/42 folgende strategische Aufgaben erwachsen:

There is no argument over how long the German decisionmakers thought they would need to accomplish Unternehmen BARBAROSSA.

The problem here is that a certain poster is obsessed with starting an argument over the word short when the word short is not being disputed and he has decided that one of Hitler's pep talks holds greater relevance and gravity than the policy outlined in Weisung 32. That pep talk merely demonstrates how out of touch Hitler's ramblings were with the reality going on around him.

[AbollonPolweder]

how and when would planned finish of Unternehmen Weiss, Gelb and Marita?

I have never researched, studied or analysed German intentions, planning or preparations for either WEISS or GELB.
...

So you assume that these plans are as vague as Barbarossa, and maybe even more uncertain?

Could you answer why Hitler did not listen to General Marcks?

Who says he didn't? Have you established that as a historical reality?

Marcks’ plan is significantly different from Barbarossa.I already posted about this in mid-April.

I tried, based on the text of Ost’s plan of General Erich Marcks, to show the originality of his ideas. It can be carefully (for now) argued that Marx did not borrow other people's ideas, at least Hitler's ideas.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941 ... prilozenia
Let's start with the "little things".
1. The time of the operation: from mid-May to early October, and if the winter is warm, then from early May. Yes, Hitler spoke about spring and May on July 31, but it follows from the phrase of Marcks that he independently and in detail studied this question.
2. 2. It is necessary to pay attention to the phrase about Moscow as the economic and political center of the USSR. Marcks does not have the word transport, but not because he did not take into account this moment. On the contrary. He highlighted the nuance of transport in a separate item. For example, Marx counted. that in order to terminate the railway connection with the Urals and the Far East, it is enough to destroy the railway lines in such cities as Gorki, Kasan, Uljanowsk and Sysran. But then he has the word "spiritual." The military man understood the importance of seizing a political and spiritual center in a dictatorial state. You take the Kremlin = you take all of Russia to the last village. This could be done by the Poles at the beginning of the 17th century, the Bolsheviks did it at the beginning of the 20th century, and this was demonstrated by the Russian pseudo-democrats at the end of the 20th.
3. Marcks proposes to start the campaign with 2 Army Groups, and after leaving the forest and crossing the Dvina, add the 3rd Army Group, using the AОК 18 as basis. Starting with three groups, in his opinion, meant slowing down the movement of troops advancing north Pripyat because of the small number of roads.
4. Well, the main idea: the seizure of Moscow and turn to the south to capture Ukraine. Yes, first isolate the railway center, in order to deprive the USSR of the transfer of troops from different regions through Moscow to the south. Very logical!

[ljadw]

In his July 1941 Table Talk Hitler then envisaged the establishment of an occupation force of some 250,000 men beyond the Urals to suppress any Communist resurgence. Other sources talk of 60-70 divisions for the full occupation including European Russia.

Hitler table talks engaged in assessing what would happen if his assumptions were proved correct, which is laughable.

The elevation of pep talks above policy documents and directives in the understanding of policy is more than laughable.

The Germans wanted the initial campaign, that would render the Soviet position irrecoverable, to be over by the winter of 1941/42 and thought they had prepared for this. Thereafter they intended to occupy all of the European USSR and a buffer zone of the Asiatic USSR east of the Urals to prevent any Soviet resurgence.

i think its clear that the occupation of European Russia and a buffer zone were to be achieved before winter 1941:

Weisung 32 states:

B.) Aus dieser Lage heraus, wie sie sich nach der siegreichen Beendigung des Ostfeldzuges ergeben wird, können der Wehrmacht für den Spätherbst 1941 und den Winter 1941/42 folgende strategische Aufgaben erwachsen:

There is no argument over how long the German decisionmakers thought they would need to accomplish Unternehmen BARBAROSSA.

The problem here is that a certain poster is obsessed with starting an argument over the word short when the word short is not being disputed and he has decided that one of Hitler's pep talks holds greater relevance and gravity than the policy outlined in Weisung 32. That pep talk merely demonstrates how out of touch Hitler's ramblings were with the reality going on around him.

As everyone knows, Weisung 32 is about the period after Barbarossa
Weisung 32 mentions 2 points
1 The organisation ,exploitation and securisation of the conquered territories in the East
2 The continuation of the war against Britain ( with the help of other countries,help which was a fata morgana, because Germany was not able to force on its own Britain to give up ).
It is obvious that point 2 would be activated only if Britain did not surrender after the collaps of the SU .
There was NO point 3 : no intention to continue the war against the possible remainings of the Soviet state . That means that for Berlin a successful Barbarossa in 1941 would mean the end of the war against the SU .There were no plans for a Barbarossa II in 1942 .

[AbollonPolweder]

I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.

Indeed. However, for greater clarity it would be better written as: The intention of the invasion of the USSR and the objective(s) of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA were wholly different.

I apologize, but the intention and objective are different concepts, at least in Russian. The intention means how, in what way. And the objective - what for. Do you want to say that Barbarossa's intention could not lead to the achievement of it's objective?

[MarkN]

how and when would planned finish of Unternehmen Weiss, Gelb and Marita?

I have never researched, studied or analysed German intentions, planning or preparations for either WEISS or GELB.

So you assume that these plans are as vague as Barbarossa, and maybe even more uncertain?

I have made no assumptions at all about WEISS or GELB. Nor have l commented on them in any way.

There was little to no uncertainty in the Unternehmen BARBAROSSA plan. There was simply no consideration of when or how the war with CCCP would end.

Could you answer why Hitler did not listen to General Marcks?

Who says he didn't? Have you established that as a historical reality?

Marcks’ plan is significantly different from Barbarossa.I already posted about this in mid-April.

What's that got to do with Hitler "listening" to Marcks?

[MarkN]

As everyone knows, Weisung 32 is about the period after Barbarossa
Weisung 32 mentions 2 points
1 The organisation ,exploitation and securisation of the conquered territories in the East
2 The continuation of the war against Britain ( with the help of other countries,help which was a fata morgana, because Germany was not able to force on its own Britain to give up ).
It is obvious that point 2 would be activated only if Britain did not surrender after the collaps of the SU .
There was NO point 3 : no intention to continue the war against the possible remainings of the Soviet state . That means that for Berlin a successful Barbarossa in 1941 would mean the end of the war against the SU .There were no plans for a Barbarossa II in 1942 .

More nonsensical garbage from ljadw....

[MarkN]

I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.

Indeed. However, for greater clarity it would be better written as: The intention of the invasion of the USSR and the objective(s) of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA were wholly different.

I apologize, but the intention and objective are different concepts, at least in Russian. The intention means how, in what way. And the objective - what for. Do you want to say that Barbarossa's intention could not lead to the achievement of it's objective?

Translating between languages often leads to some quite spectacular failures in understanding.

[Hanny]

Translating between languages often leads to some quite spectacular failures in understanding.

Hannibal instructed a local guide to show him and his army the way to Casilinum, so he could dominate the pass there and protect allies land, instead, due to his difficultly to pronounce latin he was taken to Casinum many miles from where he intended and in a an exposed position, hence the guide was crucified.

[ljadw]

As everyone knows, Weisung 32 is about the period after Barbarossa
Weisung 32 mentions 2 points
1 The organisation ,exploitation and securisation of the conquered territories in the East
2 The continuation of the war against Britain ( with the help of other countries,help which was a fata morgana, because Germany was not able to force on its own Britain to give up ).
It is obvious that point 2 would be activated only if Britain did not surrender after the collaps of the SU .
There was NO point 3 : no intention to continue the war against the possible remainings of the Soviet state . That means that for Berlin a successful Barbarossa in 1941 would mean the end of the war against the SU .There were no plans for a Barbarossa II in 1942 .

More nonsensical garbage from ljadw....

[ljadw]

Such answers prove that the person who writes them,has no answer .