where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[Max Payload]

That's not likely to happen since both Churchill & FSL Pound insisted they would only send capital ships into the channel if the Nazi do the same.

Ah, you hadn’t previously indicated that your hypothetical port-to-port invasion would be restricted to a channel port. In that case, the German ‘dump and run’ strategy might be more difficult to achieve without losses in those relatively restricted waters.
Since you have already “suffered through Sandhurst war-game”, I hesitate to suggest you check out the attached YouTube video. (If you do, despite the opening graphic, it is not about Barbarossa.)
https://youtu.be/YnPo7V03nbY

[Hanny]

Can't understand HANNY , If you don't understand "garbage in garbage out", you are doomed!!!

I understand GIGO/RIRO rather well, and your entire posting history is replete with examples of it, and your doomed to continue to do so it appears.

Yes we have very different views of naval warfare, large warships are a waste of resources.

Yes your view is unique, because its RIRO, every nation in ww2 built them and every amphib landing used them in large numbers.

AMPHIBIOUS INVASIONS count on numbers of smaller vessels not large warships. The only real value of large warships would be to provide long range fast escort in port to port invasions , which could be a day ahead of any Wallie response , so they would be gone before any response arrived. RN Ocean surveillance was so bad most ships transiting the channel and GIUK gap until well into the war [41/42].

Except thats not how any nation in ww2 conducted amphib operations, naval gunfire was one of the 3 pre requiste requirements for amphib ops. See https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a051873.pdf so again your posting RIRO.

What naval exchanges that did occur, went the AXIS way. from 1939-1941 reportedly 90 ALLIED warships with 718 guns battled with 62 German warships sporting 486 guns . In these clashes 15 NAZI warships were sunk or crippled, while 11 were damaged, while 23 ALLIED warships were crippled of sunk and 11 damaged.

Er your counting ( and completly mis using the data in Ohara books) 20mm as a gun, the same as a 14inch is a gun, and counting only the main and secondary armaments of any surface ship of 500 tons.

Using O'HARA VOLUMES; 62 NAZI warship sorties -each averaging 55% chance of inflicting damage on ALLIED warships in these exchanges [34/62].90 ALLIED warships sortie sank/crippled /damaged 26 NAZI warships or 29%.

Your using the following book. it starts with surface fleet strength of 75 German v UK 275, so any tactical engagement has to be a 3 and half in favour of the Germans to to stand still in relation to force strength.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Gkb ... &q&f=false

Lets see what it says about Norway
7 encounters in Norway. Tables list units engaged and outcomes.

1. German CA and DD V Allied 1 DD: Outcome German CA damaged, Allied DD sunk
2. German 2BB V Allied 1 BC and 9DD: Outcome German BB damaged, Allied BC damaged.
3. German MTB 2 and 2 ML/S V Allied 3 ML/S 1 MTB:Outcome German 1 ML/S sunk 1 damaged, 1 MTB damaged. allied 1 ML/S damaged
4.German 3 DD V Allied 2 DD:Outcome Allied 2 DD sunk.
5.German 10 DD V Allied 5 DD:Outcome German 2 DD sunk 5 damged. Allied 2 DD sunk 1 DD damaged.
6.German 8 DD V Allied 1 BB, 9DD:Outcome German 8DD sunk. Allied3 DD damaged.
7.German 2BB V Allied 1 CV, 2DD:Outcome German Allied 1 Cv sunk 2 DD sunk.

German committed to action, 31 ships, sufferd 9 damaged, 13 sunk.
Allied committed to action, 35 ships, suffered 6 damaged, 8 sunk.

German efficiency at sorties resulting in combat action, it required 31 german ships to reduce allied numbers by 14, while Allied required 35 ships to reduce German numbers by 22.

German efficiency at inflicting losses was 14/31=0.4 compared to Allied 22/35=0.6, so the Allies were more efficient over Germany by 50%.

At suffering losses, German lost (sunk/damaged) 71% of its ships committed to action, Allies 40%, the allies were almost twice as efficient at not losing their ship committed to action.

German 75 reduced by 13 sunk is a 17% loss, UK 275 reduced by 8 of 275 is 3% sunk, German 75 reduced by 22 sunk and damaged is 30%, and Uk 14 sunk and damaged is 5%

In other words NAZI sortie were twice as effective as ALLIED sortie at inflicting damage during battles.

As usual, your GIGO/RIRO claims can be shown for the trollish nonsense they are, chiefly because you cannot use maths to find the answer.

[MarkN]

We agree that (3) is not to be taken literally,

No we don't. It's your conjecture to help you reengineer all the unhelpful words of that conversation to fit your preconceived narrative.

But given the above record from Halder of Hitler’s stated objectives, to claim that the objectives of the Barbarossa plan, the one that Hitler was content to sign off on in December, were “in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands” is ludicrous.

Ludicrous?

Halder wrote that Hitler demanded...

The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots in one blow. Holding part of the country alone will not do.

The Heer responded with a plan that only went to the Volga, did not crush Russia and did not shatter the Russian state to its roots.

[Hanny]

That's not likely to happen since both Churchill & FSL Pound insisted they would only send capital ships into the channel if the Nazi do the same. The real world is never a war-game.

What do you know about actual real history?, nada.

By order of WSC and Pound, and fobes who commanded home fleet, in anticipation of invasion when a cromwell invasion alert went out, the following ships were dispatched to engage, Friday, 13 September 1940

Battleship NELSON, battlecruiser HOOD, anti-aircraft cruisers NAIAD and BONAVENTURE, and destroyers KASHMIR, KIPLING, ZULU, SIKH, SOMALI and ESKIMO were ordered from Scapa Flow to S coast for anti invasion duties.

These ships departed Scapa Flow on the 13th and were joined at sea by destroyers JACKAL and ELECTRA,Anti-aircraft cruiser CAIRO battleship RODNEY, REVENGE Destroyers COSSACK and MAORI MATABELE, ASHANTI, TARTAR, and PUNJABI BEDOUIN, and light cruiser EMERALD

ADM208/3-The Red List (Minor War Vessels in Home Waters as of 4pm 15/09/1940) list several 00 small armed ships to be used in anti invasion duties, which would also be used.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
I wrote:
Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.
Documentary evidence:
Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
...

" ... The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. Attack achieves
its purpose only if Russian State can be shattered to its
roots with one blow. Holding part of the country alone
will not do.
...
Qbject is destruction of Russian manpower. "

In the sentence - Holding part of the country alone
will not do - the keyword is alone. Capturing only a part of the territory is useless! It is necessary to occupy part of the territory and "to destruct the Russian manpower". Only a combination of these two factors will lead to the achievement of the goal. Are you completely sure that Wermacht was not able to crush the Red Army on the part of the USSR to the West of the Dvina and the Dnieper?

[Dre Foerster]

Either Hitler intended that sentence to be taken literally (i.e. the Wehrmacht would be required to advance to Vladivostok) or he did not.

Anyway, whilst you are fixated on Vladivostok, the statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant only to the Volga. The documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind. That makes the statement true just as much as Vladivostok does.

You can't have it both ways.

No, you can't have it both ways.

I wrote:
Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.
Documentary evidence:
Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.

It is not for me to prove or disprove whether Hitler was speaking literally or not. The words are there in black & white that demonstrate my statement was accurate.

Now, you may choose to disbelieve Hitler's words when it suits you. You may also speculate to you heart's content as to what you think he really meant.

But my statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant the whole of the CCCP meant only up to the Volga.

It is not for me to prove or disprove your speculation.

If he didn't intended that sentence to be taken literally (which you now seem to acknowledge) then, since the country being referred to stretches all the way to the Pacific, you have also "reengineered the words "Holding part of the country alone will not do" through your conjecture into something that fits your preconceived narrative."

???

And the validity of that narrative requires not that the "documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind" but that the evidence establishes it as factual. Only then can you perhaps claim, ....

Maybe it's time that you started to offer some evidence that establishes your conjecture as factual before you get uppity about me having to provide evidence that documented evidence is factual.

You can't have it both ways.

...could you indulge me and answer the point I raised earlier today in relation to your claim that, "the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands",
"If that were true why would Hitler have signed Directive 21?"

Why? We can only speculate why Hitler chose to accept the Heer's plan/offer as there does not appear to be any documentary evidence that explains the reason why.

And l see no point in speculating on something with you when you've already set the ground work to deny any speculation l say that doesn't fit your narrative.

No plan called for the complete conquest of Soviet territory, only up to the Urals, and even then, this idea only came about its fullest extent with Directive 21 (ie Operation Barbarossa).

The Marcks Plan, Lossberg Study, Greifenberg Study and Paulus War Games (at first codenamed Fritz, then changed to Otto) all expected the Soviet Union to collapse, at the latest, once Moscow was captured. The only true plan for a limited campaign was Plan Otto (not to be confused with Op or Case Otto - I know it's confusing). Also, with each of these, there were only two army groups, not three, as there were fewer objectives; the idea was to enact a "blitzkrieg" and traditional "kesselschlakt" style campaign to first encircle, then destroy enemy border armies, and proceed deep into enemy territory, where most areas not considered strategically necessary would be bypassed.

In the end, we cannot say that Barbarossa was either in accordance with or against Hitler's wishes, since these were not completely clear. Everyone agreed that the priority should be the destruction of the Red Army. What was disagreed on was how to do this once the enemy began to retreat into the vast space of Ukraine and Western Russia. Everyone also agreed that the Soviet Union would most likely collapse within the first few weeks of the campaign. Hitler was, more than anything, concerned with securing the flanks and collecting that territory which fit into his campaign for eventual genocide through clearing out Lebensraum. The Generals, led by Halder, Brauchitsch and Guderian, were more interested in creating a German hegemony, as well as traditional understandings of how to win a conventional war (i.e. taking the capital). Hitler wasn't usually right about too many things when it came to military strategy, but he was right on the money when he stated that his generals didn't care about the economics of warfare.

[Max Payload]

In the end, we cannot say that Barbarossa was either in accordance with or against Hitler's wishes, since these were not completely clear.

They may not have been entirely clear to everyone, but presumably they were clear to him. Hitler was not averse to criticising his subordinates or rejecting proposals from them that he deemed inadequate. If the plan submitted to him in December had been against his wishes he would surely have made that clear, and he did in fact amend the plan in respect of the priority given to Moscow. There was still time in December for Hitler to reject the submitted plan and to demand of the Wehrmacht that they come up with something more in accordance with his wishes. He didn’t. It is not impossible that he accept the Barbarossa plan despite it being against his wishes but that seems, to me at least, highly unlikely.

[MarkN]

It is not impossible that he accept the Barbarossa plan despite it being against his wishes ...

Very true.

...but that seems, to me at least, highly unlikely.

And yet, that is precisely what the documentary evidance indicates.

[aurelien wolff]

just find this video on the subject:
https://youtu.be/6FoiU_jkL0Q

[Dre Foerster]

In the end, we cannot say that Barbarossa was either in accordance with or against Hitler's wishes, since these were not completely clear.

They may not have been entirely clear to everyone, but presumably they were clear to him. Hitler was not averse to criticising his subordinates or rejecting proposals from them that he deemed inadequate. If the plan submitted to him in December had been against his wishes he would surely have made that clear, and he did in fact amend the plan in respect of the priority given to Moscow. There was still time in December for Hitler to reject the submitted plan and to demand of the Wehrmacht that they come up with something more in accordance with his wishes. He didn’t. It is not impossible that he accept the Barbarossa plan despite it being against his wishes but that seems, to me at least, highly unlikely.

That would make perfect sense if Hitler was a rational actor, but he wasn’t, at least not post Battle of France. The invasion of the Soviet Union was the endgame in Hitler’s stufenplan, the culmination of his entire political career; put simply, it was an ideological act, through and through. Hitler was, more than anything, concerned with the annihilation of “Judeo-Bolshevism” from the face of the earth. Add that to his propensity for changing his mind or delaying making a decision, as well as the German consensus that the Untermesch Soviets would be swiftly crushed, and it becomes very difficult to determine anything long term in Hitler’s thinking beyond a basic desire to destroy the USSR.

[Max Payload]

The invasion of the Soviet Union was the endgame in Hitler’s stufenplan, the culmination of his entire political career; put simply, it was an ideological act, through and through.

The discussion in this thread has not really been about Hitler’s racist ideology. Rather much of it had been about the practical objectives wrt Russia (territorial, economic, strategic, demographic etc) and the military means by which he intended they could be accomplished. And what evidence is there that Hitler’s ambition would have stopped at the invasion of the SU (the assumed successful ‘endgame to Hitler’s stufenplan’)?

Hitler was, more than anything, concerned with the annihilation of “Judeo-Bolshevism” from the face of the earth. Add that to his propensity for changing his mind or delaying making a decision, as well as the German consensus that the Untermesch Soviets would be swiftly crushed, and it becomes very difficult to determine anything long term in Hitler’s thinking beyond a basic desire to destroy the USSR.

That seems somewhat over-simplistic. Judeo-Bolshevism he saw as the most immediate threat but it was but one element in what he saw as a truly international Jewish conspiracy. And his long term thinking also included -
a determination to achieve German autarky
an ambition to achieve the conditions for a prolonged period of German prosperity and population growth
an ambition to sustain and develop what he saw as superior German/Aryan racial/genetic characteristics
the maintenance of superior military strength as a political tool in international relations (based on a social-Darwinian predator/prey perception of those relations)
the elimination, or at least the containment, of the perceived international Jewish conspiracy
a contempt for democracy and democratic institutions
a determination to establish and maintain indefinitely National Socialism as the sole political movement in Germany (and by implication himself as absolute dictator)

[ljadw]

In the end, we cannot say that Barbarossa was either in accordance with or against Hitler's wishes, since these were not completely clear.

They may not have been entirely clear to everyone, but presumably they were clear to him. Hitler was not averse to criticising his subordinates or rejecting proposals from them that he deemed inadequate. If the plan submitted to him in December had been against his wishes he would surely have made that clear, and he did in fact amend the plan in respect of the priority given to Moscow. There was still time in December for Hitler to reject the submitted plan and to demand of the Wehrmacht that they come up with something more in accordance with his wishes. He didn’t. It is not impossible that he accept the Barbarossa plan despite it being against his wishes but that seems, to me at least, highly unlikely.

That would make perfect sense if Hitler was a rational actor, but he wasn’t, at least not post Battle of France. The invasion of the Soviet Union was the endgame in Hitler’s stufenplan, the culmination of his entire political career; put simply, it was an ideological act, through and through. Hitler was, more than anything, concerned with the annihilation of “Judeo-Bolshevism” from the face of the earth. Add that to his propensity for changing his mind or delaying making a decision, as well as the German consensus that the Untermesch Soviets would be swiftly crushed, and it becomes very difficult to determine anything long term in Hitler’s thinking beyond a basic desire to destroy the USSR.

It is very questionable that there was a stufenplan .What Hillgruber said does not convince me .

[ljadw]

Hitler had a program, but not a plan,and especially not a stufenplan . It was not so that on January 31 1933 he had written on a piece of paper how and when he would realize his program .

[MarkN]

Hitler had a program, but not a plan, ....

When is a plan not a plan but a program? When ljadw decides the paperwork is not to his/her satisfaction.

Hitler clearly had some pretty grand ideas: political, economic, social, racial and ideological when it came to invading CCCP. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was never conceived to deliver any of that. At best it was a limited land grab that would offer some decent Lebensraum and, if it hadn't been completed destroyed, some decent transport and manufacturing infrastructure upon which to build.

The Heer's conceptual ideas of what they would do remained fairly constant from the earliest studies to the execution phase. Almost nothing in that body of work can be seen to have translated from Hitler's presumed intentions or recorded statements. What links exist are tenuous.

It is well documented that, once BARBAROSSA was seen to be failing, not delivering what the Heer had expected and promised, Hitler started meddling in operational decisionmaking. Which does not really surprise. Trying to take that meddling backwards to argue that BARBAROSSA was his thought from the very beginning seems only to be an attempt to sustain the Nuremburg narrative of only following orders.

[Dre Foerster]

The invasion of the Soviet Union was the endgame in Hitler’s stufenplan, the culmination of his entire political career; put simply, it was an ideological act, through and through.

The discussion in this thread has not really been about Hitler’s racist ideology. Rather much of it had been about the practical objectives wrt Russia (territorial, economic, strategic, demographic etc) and the military means by which he intended they could be accomplished. And what evidence is there that Hitler’s ambition would have stopped at the invasion of the SU (the assumed successful ‘endgame to Hitler’s stufenplan’)?

Hitler was, more than anything, concerned with the annihilation of “Judeo-Bolshevism” from the face of the earth. Add that to his propensity for changing his mind or delaying making a decision, as well as the German consensus that the Untermesch Soviets would be swiftly crushed, and it becomes very difficult to determine anything long term in Hitler’s thinking beyond a basic desire to destroy the USSR.

That seems somewhat over-simplistic. Judeo-Bolshevism he saw as the most immediate threat but it was but one element in what he saw as a truly international Jewish conspiracy. And his long term thinking also included -
a determination to achieve German autarky
an ambition to achieve the conditions for a prolonged period of German prosperity and population growth
an ambition to sustain and develop what he saw as superior German/Aryan racial/genetic characteristics
the maintenance of superior military strength as a political tool in international relations (based on a social-Darwinian predator/prey perception of those relations)
the elimination, or at least the containment, of the perceived international Jewish conspiracy
a contempt for democracy and democratic institutions
a determination to establish and maintain indefinitely National Socialism as the sole political movement in Germany (and by implication himself as absolute dictator)

1. In my opinion, it is impossible to discuss the policies of Hitler, in any domain, without understanding and incorporating his racial beliefs. These were the core of his very being, and greatly influenced every decision he made.

2. You can easily trace Hitler's obsession with the Soviet Union as the hub of the international Jewish conspiracy, the destined final battlefield for history's long race struggle between Ubermensch and Untermensch, and the perfect place to acquire Lebensraum, back to Mein Kampf. The last chapter pretty much spells out what Hitler intended to do concerning Russia, and that this was the most important aspect to German foreign policy. So when it came to those secondary grand strategic tasks which you just laid out, were thought by Hitler to be mostly achievable through destroying the Soviet Union (that is, once everyone else was out of his way - i.e. Western Europe).

3. I am not saying though, that practical reasons (or at least what seemed practical to the Germans) did not play an important role in the Third Reich and Wehrmacht's decision making. If one actually examines the events within the German "High Command" between May and July 1940, you will actually find Hitler's attention being turned away from Britain toward Russia by Halder and Brauchitsch (who had secretly been building an army in the east while developing Plan Otto, all without approval from the Fuehrer). There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil. Lastly, Hitler believed an invasion of Britain would be unwise, so thought that taking away their "last hope" in Russia, would be the best course of action.

4. The point that I am trying to emphasize is that, despite the above, Hitler was first and foremost concerned with his supposed messianic mission. Anything that he thought went against this was deemed not even worth consideration. Sure he would listen, but it was going in one ear and out the other. Worst of all for the Germans, when it came to specifics, Hitler would often change his mind because he trusted his own on the spot intuition then any advice or forethought.

5. I think that the debate between Continentalists and Globalists is too big of an issue for this thread. It would probably be best to have it be a topic all of its own.