where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[MarkN]

If these historians have done such work, then I haven’t found it.

It would be foolish to assume that every research project ends with a published text. Have tou ever read something and decided it had such little value it would be a waste of time and effortbto pursue further?

I’m saying that Otto is not popularly known or discussed.

And you're assuming, incorrectly, that the reason is due to nobody bothering to do any research into it.

The fact is, as you yourself have pointed out, that published works already exist. The lack of follow up may well be due to those following up not thinking it's worth the bother.

Last year Richard Overy visited RMC and I asked him about Otto. He didn’t even know it existed.

I do. As do many, many others.

Do you work or teach at a university?

Utterly irrelevant.

1. If the transfer of troops to the east was expected and prudent, then why was Hitler not informed?

That's a very, very poor question.

2. It’s exactly our position that these deployments did not fit with defensive actions, especially since previous plans developed by Guderian had suggested a minimal delaying action, before a mass withdrawal leading the overextended Soviets into a trap (similar to the Third Battle of Kharkov).

What force did the Germans leave on the eastern front during Fall GELB and ROT? Consider both quantitive and qualitative.

In 1940, what was the (Canadian) doctrinal frontage in the defence for a battalion/brigade/division in peace time, under conditions of heightened tension and preparing for war?

How long was the 1940 border between Germany and CCCP?

It was simply the beginning of a buildup.

Not moving forces back eastwards after Fall ROT implies they were all needed as occupation forces and the CCCP presented no current or near future threat whatsoever.

In your opinion, post Fall ROT, what scale of forces would you consider to have been a normal readjustment unworthy of historical reevaluation?

3. Otto was developed during a time when Hitler’s eyes were fixed on Britain. And Hitler was going to downsize the army, to the fury of the OKH elite.

Factual it may well be. But how does this help the understanding of the issue? Hitler is dead. That's a fact too. No relevance to the subject matter.

4. If Otto was the staring point of the development of plans leading to Directive 21, why is it so dissimilar to it?

Suggesting that Plan OTTO was the start point of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA is plain daft. Is that your standard rebuttal to those who disagree with you?

I'd argue that Plan OTTO's relative obscurity is directly related to its lack of relevance to the studies and plans later developped. That lack of connection is a key pointer to its purpose and place in the histograph of WW2.

Otto called only for a limited campaign that sought the political objective of creating buffer states, not a complete conquest of the USSR for the purpose of its eventual annihilation. Moreover, a few days after Halder presented a finalized Otto to Weizacker, from July 6 to 9, as Kuchler and Marcks took command of the 18th Army in the east, they put together a proposal for changing the deployment directive from retreat, to attack once the enemy was discovered to be amassing at the border. This is going backwards from Otto. To me, it is simply a means to which Brauchitsch and Halder can more smoothly present Otto to Hitler and his OKW pawns.

5. Also considering the above, the timeline doesn’t match. If you’re saying these proposals made on July 9 from Kuchler and Marcks are the start to Otto, or some part of it at least, why is it A) so different (only the 18th and Guderian Group vs 80 divisions with 400,000 in reserve); and B) Created and submitted well after the date we know Otto to be finalized by Halder and his staff (July 3)?

It would seem your research has been unhealthily biased towards confirmation bias at the expense of trying to understand what the material you are working with means.

Plan OTTO and subsequent studies and plans are completely different because they were predicated on two wholly different premises.

[MarkN]

18. AOK moved east 4 July 1940
12. AOK moved east 16 July 1940
4. AOK moved east 16 August 1940
III. and XVII. AK moved east 4/5 July 1940
XIX. AK (mot) (Gruppe Guderian) moved to Berlin in July, then to Poland and was renamed Panzergruppe 2 in the Generalgouvernment 16 November 1940 (at the same time XXII. AK (mot) (Gruppe Kleist), which was in Germany, was renamed Panzergruppe 1)
XII., XXX. AK, and XXXXIV. moved east 16 July 1940
XXVI. AK moved east in July 1940
I. and IX. AK and XVI. AK (mot) moved east 13 September 1940
XXXX. AK (mot) moved east in September after reorganizing from XXXX. AK in Wehrkreis X
XIV. AK (mot) moved east in October 1940
XXIV. AK returned to Germany from France in November 1940

Large numbers of divisions moved as well, many to reorganize and re-equip in Germany, before they also moved further east to East Prussia and Poland. I doubt Hitler was unaware of these movements, given his penchant for micromanagement of such affairs. The July-September movements are consistent with rebalancing the forces, especially given the minimal strength of the forces in East Prussia and the Generalgouvernment during the western campaigns. Note that little else, especially Armee and Korps headquarters moved east afterwards, despite Hitler's decision to turn east in the fall, until the spring of 1941.

Quite so. Nothing extraordinary in any of these movements, not in timing nor scale.

[Max Payload]

18. AOK moved east 4 July 1940

The order was issued near the end of June, but the transfer of its 15 subordinated divisions took several weeks to complete.

Nothing extraordinary in any of these movements, not in timing nor scale.

Particularly since the fighting in France had concluded and the Soviets had just completed the invasion of the Baltic States; an invasion that, coupled with the Bessarabia ultimatum, infuriated and somewhat unnerved Hitler and his entourage.

... we know Otto to be finalized by Halder and his staff (July 3)?

Do we? I’d like to see the evidence.

[MarkN]

The order was issued near the end of June, but the transfer of its 15 subordinated divisions took several weeks to complete.

Indeed. I posted the section of the order pertaining to the AOK.18 move earlier in the thread. The actual time of the moves of the various component parts occured with significant time lag.

Nothing extraordinary in any of these movements, not in timing nor scale.

Particularly since the fighting in France had concluded and the Soviets had just completed the invasion of the Baltic States; an invasion that, coupled with the Bessarabia ultimatum, infuriated and somewhat unnerved Hitler and his entourage.

Quite so. By the doctrinal standards of credible militaries of the time, the so-called "secret" army being assembled by Halder was severely understrength to deal with the threat that the Foreign Office was chirping about.

[Richard Anderson]

Do you work or teach at a university?

1. If the transfer of troops to the east was expected and prudent, then why was Hitler not informed?

Who says he was not?

2. It’s exactly our position that these deployments did not fit with defensive actions, especially since previous plans developed by Guderian had suggested a minimal delaying action, before a mass withdrawal leading the overextended Soviets into a trap (similar to the Third Battle of Kharkov). It was simply the beginning of a buildup.

3. Otto was developed during a time when Hitler’s eyes were fixed on Britain. And Hitler was going to downsize the army, to the fury of the OKH elite.

You appear to be confused as to why many of the divisions moved east and also to have fallen for the myth of the "1940 German Army demobilization". The 1940 "Demobilization of the Heer" is a long-standing story, but what was the actual effect of the “demobilization”?

Panzer Divisions. There were ten in existence at the beginning of the French Campaign. Then, between the end of the French campaign and the opening of the spring campaigns in the Balkan’s, ten more (11 if you count 5. Leichte Panzer) new divisions were formed.

11. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis VIII (Breslau) on 1 August 1940 from 11. Schützen-Brigade and Panzer-Regiment 15.
12. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis II (Stettin) on 10 January 1941 from the reorganized 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
13. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV (Magdeburg) on 9 October 1940 from the reorganized 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
14. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV (Truppenübungsplätzen Milowitz und Königsbrück) on 15 August 1940 from the 4. Infanterie-Division.
15. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis XII (Landau und Heidelberg) on 11 November 1940 from the 33. Infanterie-Division.
16. Panzer-Division in Wehkreis VI on 2 August 1940 from the 16. Infanterie-Division.
17. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis VII on 1 November 1940 from the 27. Infanterie-Division.
18. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV on 15 October 1940, partly from the specialized Tauchpanzer developed for and equipping Panzer-Regiment 18.
19. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis XI on 1 November 1940 from the 19. Infanterie-Division.
20. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IX on 1 November 1940, also from elements of the 19. Infanterie-Division.

So, the Heer lost two Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) and five Infanterie-Divisionen, but gained ten Panzer-Divisionen. Thus the net increase was three.

Motorized Infantry Divisions. As seen, two of the existing four Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) converted to Panzer-Divisionen after the end of the French Campaign. Seven more were created by motorizing existing Infanterie-Divisionen, so there was no net increase or decrease in the overall size of the Heer.

3. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis III (Frankfurt an der Oder) on 27 October 1940 from the reorganized 3. Infanterie-Division.
10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis VII (Regensburg) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 10. Infanterie-Division.
14. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis IV (Leipzig) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 14. Infanterie-Division.
16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis VI (Truppenübungsplatz Sennelager) on 2 August 1940 from the reorganized 16. Infanterie-Division.
18. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis III (Liegnitz) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 18. Infanterie-Division.
25. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis V (Ludwigsburg) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 25. Infanterie-Division.
36. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis XII (Kaiserslautern) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 36. Infanterie-Division.
60. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis II (Truppenübungsplatz Groß-Born) on 17 July 1940 from the reorganized 60. Infanterie-Division.

Mountain Divisions. The existing three divisions were reinforced by the creation of three more during 1940. All were active by the fall. Thus this represents a net increase of three divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

Light Divisions. Four new divisions were created, all after the end of the French Campaign. Thus this represents a net increase of four divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

97. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
99. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
100. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
101. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.

Infantry Divisions. Before the beginning of the French Campaign, ten new divisions were created (290., 291., 292., 293., 294., 295., 296., 297., 298., and 299. Infanterie-Divisionen). All were formed in January-February 1940 and were barely operationally ready by 10 May 1940. In addition. a total of 34 Infanterie-Divisionen, mostly of the 11.-14. Welle, were formed after the close of the French Campaign.

102. Infanterie-Division was formed 10 December 1940.
106. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
110. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
111. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 November 1940.
112. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
113. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
121 Infanterie-Division was formed on 6 October 1940.
122. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
123. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 October 1940.
125. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
126. Infanterie-Division was formed on 23 September 1940.
129. Infanterie-Division was formed on 22 October 1940.
131. Infanterie-Division was formed on 17 September 1940.
132. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
134. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
137. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
199. Infanterie-Division was formed on 1 November 1940 in Norway from existing elements of other divisions in garrison there.
302. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
304. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
305 Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 December 1940.
306. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
319. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
320. Infanterie-Division was formed 18 November 1940.
321. Infanterie-Division was formed 2 December 1940.
323. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
327. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
332. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
333. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
335. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
336. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
337. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
339. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
340. Infanterie-Division was formed 16 November 1940.
342. Infanterie-Division was formed 21 October 1940.

This completed the mobilization through the 14. Welle.

The “disbanded” infantry divisions. Some 19 or 20 divisions are usually said to have been “disbanded after the end of the French Campaign. Of those, four were Landwehr divisions (209., 228., 331., and 358. Infanterie-Division). In common with the other Landwehr divisions (205., 206., 208., 211., 212., 213., 214., 215., 216., 217., 218., 221., 223., 225., 227., and 228. were not demobilized) they were mainly composed of older and often married men, some of the more senior of them Great War veterans. Their mobilization probably had had an adverse effect upon the Reichs economy as a whole. The equipment of the divisions was often obsolescent.

A six other divisions, most of them Landwehr, were converted to field commands occupying conquered territories. These included:

365. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 365.
372. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 372.
379. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 379.
393. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 393.
395. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 395.
399. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 399.

Finally, 15 Infanterie-Divisionen (271., 272., 273., 276., 277, 307., 310., 311., 317., 341., 351, 380., 555., 556., and 557.) were all supposedly formed shortly before, and disbanded shortly after, the French Campaign. Some of these (555., 556., and 557.) were created in February 1940 by the renaming of Fortress divisions (Stellungs-Divisionen) as Infantry divisions, which did little to increase either their mobility or their combat readiness (556. Infanterie-Division was formed on 11 February 1940 from Divisions-Kommando z.b.V. 426 and Landsesschuetzen Batallion II/XVII). However, many left little or nothing in the way of records behind and it is unclear how far along their organization was before they were disbanded. It is also unclear if the personnel that had been mustered for these divisions were in fact discharged or were incorporated into the other divisions whose formation was completed. It is curious that all three of the former Stellungs-Divisionen
were disbanded as of 1 October 1940, just as the first of the 11. Welle divisions began activating.

Thus, the Heer created approximately 69 new divisions in the Feld-Heer by the end of 1940. In the same period 19 divisions were disbanded, for a net increase of 50 divisions. Of course that does not include the large number of Urlauber sent home on extended leave so that they could return to industry, which was in one of its periods of maximum labor deficit.

Notice too those divisions reorganizing as Panzer and Infanterie (mot) all returned to the Heimat...and all the newly organized divisions were organized there as well, which also tended to bulk up the number of divisions going "east".

snip

[ljadw]

Hitler had a program, but not a plan,and especially not a stufenplan . It was not so that on January 31 1933 he had written on a piece of paper how and when he would realize his program .

Uhhhhhhhh, what about Mein Kampf??? Zweites Buch????

There is no mention in Mein Kampf ( which was a collection of speeches and newspaper articles about total varied subjects )or in the Zweites Buch,of a stufenplan, or even of a plan .
Hitler did not write in MK that in 1935 he would restore conscription, in 1936 reoccupy the Rhineland, in 1938 execute the Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland etc ...Or that in 1939 he would sign a treaty with the SU .

Lol that is not what Mein Kampf is. While in prison in 1924 Hitler dictated it to Rudolf Hess.

Are you kidding me, all Hitler talks about his autobiographical sections is how he’s always wanted unification between Germany and Austria! Also, in the last chapter, which is about Lebensraum in Russia, Hitler rejects Weimar Germany’s friendship with the Soviets, declaring that no treaty can last. He even goes on to state that the Soviets, being Jews, will betray their trust, so the Germans should betray it first. This is further supported by several talks with his advisers from 1933 all the way to 1940. Hitler alsobtalks extensively of rebuilding Germany into a great power again and doing away with the Treaty of Versailles; this obviously would necessitate reinstating conscription. Specifics aside, Hitler always wanted people of German blood united under one flag. No one is saying that Hitler was a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, but there are unmissable clues present that Hitler was following a program to which he was blindingly loyal.

There was nothing special in Mein Kampf : it was only a lot of generalities expressing the sentiments of the majority of the Geman population .
If Hitler was NOT , as you are now saying, a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, that means that there was NO stufen plan .
And, most of his program was similar to the program of Weimar .Both Weimar and Hitler wanted to undo Versailles and to do this, collaboration with the SU was needed .

[Dre Foerster]

If these historians have done such work, then I haven’t found it.

It would be foolish to assume that every research project ends with a published text. Have tou ever read something and decided it had such little value it would be a waste of time and effortbto pursue further?

I’m saying that Otto is not popularly known or discussed.

And you're assuming, incorrectly, that the reason is due to nobody bothering to do any research into it.

The fact is, as you yourself have pointed out, that published works already exist. The lack of follow up may well be due to those following up not thinking it's worth the bother.

Last year Richard Overy visited RMC and I asked him about Otto. He didn’t even know it existed.

I do. As do many, many others.

Do you work or teach at a university?

Utterly irrelevant.

1. If the transfer of troops to the east was expected and prudent, then why was Hitler not informed?

That's a very, very poor question.

2. It’s exactly our position that these deployments did not fit with defensive actions, especially since previous plans developed by Guderian had suggested a minimal delaying action, before a mass withdrawal leading the overextended Soviets into a trap (similar to the Third Battle of Kharkov).

What force did the Germans leave on the eastern front during Fall GELB and ROT? Consider both quantitive and qualitative.

In 1940, what was the (Canadian) doctrinal frontage in the defence for a battalion/brigade/division in peace time, under conditions of heightened tension and preparing for war?

How long was the 1940 border between Germany and CCCP?

It was simply the beginning of a buildup.

Not moving forces back eastwards after Fall ROT implies they were all needed as occupation forces and the CCCP presented no current or near future threat whatsoever.

In your opinion, post Fall ROT, what scale of forces would you consider to have been a normal readjustment unworthy of historical reevaluation?

3. Otto was developed during a time when Hitler’s eyes were fixed on Britain. And Hitler was going to downsize the army, to the fury of the OKH elite.

Factual it may well be. But how does this help the understanding of the issue? Hitler is dead. That's a fact too. No relevance to the subject matter.

4. If Otto was the staring point of the development of plans leading to Directive 21, why is it so dissimilar to it?

Suggesting that Plan OTTO was the start point of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA is plain daft. Is that your standard rebuttal to those who disagree with you?

I'd argue that Plan OTTO's relative obscurity is directly related to its lack of relevance to the studies and plans later developped. That lack of connection is a key pointer to its purpose and place in the histograph of WW2.

Otto called only for a limited campaign that sought the political objective of creating buffer states, not a complete conquest of the USSR for the purpose of its eventual annihilation. Moreover, a few days after Halder presented a finalized Otto to Weizacker, from July 6 to 9, as Kuchler and Marcks took command of the 18th Army in the east, they put together a proposal for changing the deployment directive from retreat, to attack once the enemy was discovered to be amassing at the border. This is going backwards from Otto. To me, it is simply a means to which Brauchitsch and Halder can more smoothly present Otto to Hitler and his OKW pawns.

5. Also considering the above, the timeline doesn’t match. If you’re saying these proposals made on July 9 from Kuchler and Marcks are the start to Otto, or some part of it at least, why is it A) so different (only the 18th and Guderian Group vs 80 divisions with 400,000 in reserve); and B) Created and submitted well after the date we know Otto to be finalized by Halder and his staff (July 3)?

It would seem your research has been unhealthily biased towards confirmation bias at the expense of trying to understand what the material you are working with means.

Plan OTTO and subsequent studies and plans are completely different because they were predicated on two wholly different premises.

1. You're misunderstanding me. I just meant that I can't be expected to know about research if I have no access to it, or even if its exists. This would require it to be published, heard in a lecture or discussed in conversation (but obviously I can't view every lecture or talk to every expert on earth).

2. That doesn't explain:
A) Why Richard Overy, as well as many experts on the Second World War besides him that I've talked to (mostly via RMC, Queens and Dal), not even knowing of Otto's existence;
B) Almost no books give it a glancing mention, let alone several pages of dedication. Even if it's not that important (as the only plan that called for a limited campaign and the only one which had any logistical sense to it, I think it's value is obvious), the simple fact of its existence should at the very least garner some mention, like a note in an annex or something.

3. Okay, but how am I supposed to telepathically know that? Like I said, I can't talk to every expert on the earth.

4. This question wasn't meant as an attack or anything, and I apologize if you took it that way. I was just curious. That's why I separated it from the rest of the text. I mean I'm just a lowly Officer Cadet with an undergrad, so I don't really care about supposed credentials when it comes to one's knowledge or arguments.

5. By that logic I can just say that this is a very poor response to a question. Insulting someone or their points isn't a valid argument man.

6. A) You can't compare two completely different militaries of two very different countries, in unique contexts with unique cultures, doctrines, etc. in such a way and come away with anything meaningful, let alone universal in its application. This is especially true when we're talking about the inner most thoughts and intentions of people in very specific situations. So I don't really see the relevance of this question.
B) Roughly 2800 km

7. It's not what I think that matters. It matters what Halder thought:

Spring, 1939: Halder says to his fellow generals that with Poland swept aside, he hoped Russia would be next on Germany's hit-list.

June 28: Halder notes in his diary that there's no need for any more fighting in the west. Germany is finally free to move east. He also states that the mission of AOK 18 will Initially be one of documenting presence of Russia troops. Rolf-Dietrich Mueller concludes that this was an attempt at a buildup for an eventual invasion by gambling that Hitler's immediate attention could be turned east.

June 30: Halder meets with Weizacker and notes that the priority was to show enough force IOT get Britain to back down, so Germany could have a "free hand in the east".

July 3: The same day Otto is presented to Weizacker, Halder meets with Greiffenberg, and notes “Britain, which must be dealt with separately, and the east are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany’s dominant position in Europe. Special issues, such as the Baltic and Balkan countries, may introduce some variants” (pg. 221). Hmm, I wonder what that could mean? During his meeting with Weizacker, when asked about Hitler's knowledge of Otto, Halder simply responds that he was "working towards the Fuehrer" (i.e. he's assuming what's at the back of Hitler mind and what his long term goals are, then acting on them, or at least that's his excuse - similar to how Hitler tried to avoid a direct connection to the Holocaust by giving broad 'Fuehrer Orders' verbally to his subordinates, which they would then interpret or execute as they pleased)

July 21: Hitler is finally informed of Otto, and Halder notes “Russian forces are to be defeated or, at least, as much Russian territory occupied as is necessary to prevent enemy air attacks on Berlin and Silesia’s industrial areas. Desirable to advance far enough for our Luftwaffe to destroy Russia’s most important areas. Political objectives: Ukrainian Empire; a Baltic federation; Byelorussia; Finland. Baltic states ‘thorn in the side’. Require 80-100 div: Russia has 50-75 good div. If we attack Russia this autumn, the aerial pressure on Britain will be relieved…” (pg. 224-225). This is essentially Otto. What's very important to note is that Halder writes that the political objectives here do not fit with Hitler's fanatical obsession with Lebensraum and the annihilation of the USSR, along with their peoples. Hitler never even bothered to listen to such advise from Halder, Jodl and Rosenberg to turn the Soviet peoples against their communist masters. So, this is clearly Halder's own, independent intentions.

8. That's actually the exact opposite of what I said. At least my standard rebuttal isn't to insult the other person.

9. An eye roll is not a valid argument.

10. A) You don't know me. You don't know the amount of time and effort I put into my work, my personality or my mindset during my research.
B) You didn't address my response to your point. You just sidestepped it.

[Dre Foerster]

Do you work or teach at a university?

1. If the transfer of troops to the east was expected and prudent, then why was Hitler not informed?

Who says he was not?

2. It’s exactly our position that these deployments did not fit with defensive actions, especially since previous plans developed by Guderian had suggested a minimal delaying action, before a mass withdrawal leading the overextended Soviets into a trap (similar to the Third Battle of Kharkov). It was simply the beginning of a buildup.

3. Otto was developed during a time when Hitler’s eyes were fixed on Britain. And Hitler was going to downsize the army, to the fury of the OKH elite.

You appear to be confused as to why many of the divisions moved east and also to have fallen for the myth of the "1940 German Army demobilization". The 1940 "Demobilization of the Heer" is a long-standing story, but what was the actual effect of the “demobilization”?

Panzer Divisions. There were ten in existence at the beginning of the French Campaign. Then, between the end of the French campaign and the opening of the spring campaigns in the Balkan’s, ten more (11 if you count 5. Leichte Panzer) new divisions were formed.

11. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis VIII (Breslau) on 1 August 1940 from 11. Schützen-Brigade and Panzer-Regiment 15.
12. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis II (Stettin) on 10 January 1941 from the reorganized 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
13. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV (Magdeburg) on 9 October 1940 from the reorganized 13. Infanterie-Division (mot.).
14. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV (Truppenübungsplätzen Milowitz und Königsbrück) on 15 August 1940 from the 4. Infanterie-Division.
15. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis XII (Landau und Heidelberg) on 11 November 1940 from the 33. Infanterie-Division.
16. Panzer-Division in Wehkreis VI on 2 August 1940 from the 16. Infanterie-Division.
17. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis VII on 1 November 1940 from the 27. Infanterie-Division.
18. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IV on 15 October 1940, partly from the specialized Tauchpanzer developed for and equipping Panzer-Regiment 18.
19. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis XI on 1 November 1940 from the 19. Infanterie-Division.
20. Panzer-Division in Wehrkreis IX on 1 November 1940, also from elements of the 19. Infanterie-Division.

So, the Heer lost two Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) and five Infanterie-Divisionen, but gained ten Panzer-Divisionen. Thus the net increase was three.

Motorized Infantry Divisions. As seen, two of the existing four Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) converted to Panzer-Divisionen after the end of the French Campaign. Seven more were created by motorizing existing Infanterie-Divisionen, so there was no net increase or decrease in the overall size of the Heer.

3. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis III (Frankfurt an der Oder) on 27 October 1940 from the reorganized 3. Infanterie-Division.
10. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis VII (Regensburg) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 10. Infanterie-Division.
14. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis IV (Leipzig) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 14. Infanterie-Division.
16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis VI (Truppenübungsplatz Sennelager) on 2 August 1940 from the reorganized 16. Infanterie-Division.
18. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis III (Liegnitz) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 18. Infanterie-Division.
25. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis V (Ludwigsburg) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 25. Infanterie-Division.
36. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehkreis XII (Kaiserslautern) on 1 November 1940 from the reorganized 36. Infanterie-Division.
60. Infanterie-Division (mot.) in Wehrkreis II (Truppenübungsplatz Groß-Born) on 17 July 1940 from the reorganized 60. Infanterie-Division.

Mountain Divisions. The existing three divisions were reinforced by the creation of three more during 1940. All were active by the fall. Thus this represents a net increase of three divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

Light Divisions. Four new divisions were created, all after the end of the French Campaign. Thus this represents a net increase of four divisions in the Heer, all during 1940.

97. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
99. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
100. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
101. leichte Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.

Infantry Divisions. Before the beginning of the French Campaign, ten new divisions were created (290., 291., 292., 293., 294., 295., 296., 297., 298., and 299. Infanterie-Divisionen). All were formed in January-February 1940 and were barely operationally ready by 10 May 1940. In addition. a total of 34 Infanterie-Divisionen, mostly of the 11.-14. Welle, were formed after the close of the French Campaign.

102. Infanterie-Division was formed 10 December 1940.
106. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
110. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
111. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 November 1940.
112. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
113. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 December 1940.
121 Infanterie-Division was formed on 6 October 1940.
122. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
123. Infanterie-Division was formed on 10 October 1940.
125. Infanterie-Division was formed on 2 October 1940.
126. Infanterie-Division was formed on 23 September 1940.
129. Infanterie-Division was formed on 22 October 1940.
131. Infanterie-Division was formed on 17 September 1940.
132. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
134. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
137. Infanterie-Division was formed on 5 October 1940.
199. Infanterie-Division was formed on 1 November 1940 in Norway from existing elements of other divisions in garrison there.
302. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
304. Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 November 1940.
305 Infanterie-Division was formed on 15 December 1940.
306. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
319. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
320. Infanterie-Division was formed 18 November 1940.
321. Infanterie-Division was formed 2 December 1940.
323. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
327. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
332. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
333. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
335. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
336. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
337. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 November 1940.
339. Infanterie-Division was formed 15 December 1940.
340. Infanterie-Division was formed 16 November 1940.
342. Infanterie-Division was formed 21 October 1940.

This completed the mobilization through the 14. Welle.

The “disbanded” infantry divisions. Some 19 or 20 divisions are usually said to have been “disbanded after the end of the French Campaign. Of those, four were Landwehr divisions (209., 228., 331., and 358. Infanterie-Division). In common with the other Landwehr divisions (205., 206., 208., 211., 212., 213., 214., 215., 216., 217., 218., 221., 223., 225., 227., and 228. were not demobilized) they were mainly composed of older and often married men, some of the more senior of them Great War veterans. Their mobilization probably had had an adverse effect upon the Reichs economy as a whole. The equipment of the divisions was often obsolescent.

A six other divisions, most of them Landwehr, were converted to field commands occupying conquered territories. These included:

365. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 365.
372. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 372.
379. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 379.
393. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 393.
395. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 395.
399. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 399.

Finally, 15 Infanterie-Divisionen (271., 272., 273., 276., 277, 307., 310., 311., 317., 341., 351, 380., 555., 556., and 557.) were all supposedly formed shortly before, and disbanded shortly after, the French Campaign. Some of these (555., 556., and 557.) were created in February 1940 by the renaming of Fortress divisions (Stellungs-Divisionen) as Infantry divisions, which did little to increase either their mobility or their combat readiness (556. Infanterie-Division was formed on 11 February 1940 from Divisions-Kommando z.b.V. 426 and Landsesschuetzen Batallion II/XVII). However, many left little or nothing in the way of records behind and it is unclear how far along their organization was before they were disbanded. It is also unclear if the personnel that had been mustered for these divisions were in fact discharged or were incorporated into the other divisions whose formation was completed. It is curious that all three of the former Stellungs-Divisionen
were disbanded as of 1 October 1940, just as the first of the 11. Welle divisions began activating.

Thus, the Heer created approximately 69 new divisions in the Feld-Heer by the end of 1940. In the same period 19 divisions were disbanded, for a net increase of 50 divisions. Of course that does not include the large number of Urlauber sent home on extended leave so that they could return to industry, which was in one of its periods of maximum labor deficit.

Notice too those divisions reorganizing as Panzer and Infanterie (mot) all returned to the Heimat...and all the newly organized divisions were organized there as well, which also tended to bulk up the number of divisions going "east".

snip

No, no, no, you're misunderstanding me. Like I've said twice before now, I know that demobilization never truly occurred. I'm arguing that fear of it occurring helped push the OKH toward action in getting Hitler to turn east. Also, I can't see it as a coincidence that once the OKH starts planning for an invasion of the Soviet Union, that plans for demobilization were essentially reversed or worked around.

[Dre Foerster]

Hitler had a program, but not a plan,and especially not a stufenplan . It was not so that on January 31 1933 he had written on a piece of paper how and when he would realize his program .

Uhhhhhhhh, what about Mein Kampf??? Zweites Buch????

There is no mention in Mein Kampf ( which was a collection of speeches and newspaper articles about total varied subjects )or in the Zweites Buch,of a stufenplan, or even of a plan .
Hitler did not write in MK that in 1935 he would restore conscription, in 1936 reoccupy the Rhineland, in 1938 execute the Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland etc ...Or that in 1939 he would sign a treaty with the SU .

Lol that is not what Mein Kampf is. While in prison in 1924 Hitler dictated it to Rudolf Hess.

Are you kidding me, all Hitler talks about his autobiographical sections is how he’s always wanted unification between Germany and Austria! Also, in the last chapter, which is about Lebensraum in Russia, Hitler rejects Weimar Germany’s friendship with the Soviets, declaring that no treaty can last. He even goes on to state that the Soviets, being Jews, will betray their trust, so the Germans should betray it first. This is further supported by several talks with his advisers from 1933 all the way to 1940. Hitler alsobtalks extensively of rebuilding Germany into a great power again and doing away with the Treaty of Versailles; this obviously would necessitate reinstating conscription. Specifics aside, Hitler always wanted people of German blood united under one flag. No one is saying that Hitler was a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, but there are unmissable clues present that Hitler was following a program to which he was blindingly loyal.

There was nothing special in Mein Kampf : it was only a lot of generalities expressing the sentiments of the majority of the Geman population .
If Hitler was NOT , as you are now saying, a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, that means that there was NO stufen plan .
And, most of his program was similar to the program of Weimar .Both Weimar and Hitler wanted to undo Versailles and to do this, collaboration with the SU was needed .

If Mein Kampf was a general statement of popular German sentiment, then why was Hitler considered a radical for so long, never even gaining a majority before having dictatorial powers, while his book only ever had meager sales?

You make a lot of claims over and over again, but fail to back them up with evidence, or even to address my points.

[Dre Foerster]

18. AOK moved east 4 July 1940

The order was issued near the end of June, but the transfer of its 15 subordinated divisions took several weeks to complete.

Nothing extraordinary in any of these movements, not in timing nor scale.

Particularly since the fighting in France had concluded and the Soviets had just completed the invasion of the Baltic States; an invasion that, coupled with the Bessarabia ultimatum, infuriated and somewhat unnerved Hitler and his entourage.

... we know Otto to be finalized by Halder and his staff (July 3)?

Do we? I’d like to see the evidence.

It's from archival information connected to a July 3 entry from Halder in his dairy, which I got from my thesis adviser, Dr. Benoit Lemay. I'm afraid I don't have a digital file, and sadly, this summer I'm not allowed to leave Kingston, Ontario for medical reasons. I was originally supposed to go with Dr. Lemay to the archives in Freiburg (softly cries lol).

[MarkN]

You don't know me.

Quite right. Moreover l have not the slightest interest in knowing who you are.

You don't know the amount of time and effort I put into my work, my personality or my mindset during my research.

No l don't and nor am l interested.

I am responding pure and simple to the words you post here. Your credibility, and the credibility of your arguments, rest soley on how you express yourself. It's the same for everyone.

I find the words you post here incoherent. The manner in which you make bold statements, assume them to be facts, and then derive nonsensical conclusions from them is most unfortunate for someone promoting themself as 'academic'. You have difficulty clearly articulating to others your argument(s). If you find that insulting, l suggest that sharing your opinions with the world is not your best strategy.

[Dre Foerster]

You don't know me.

Quite right. Moreover l have not the slightest interest in knowing who you are.

You don't know the amount of time and effort I put into my work, my personality or my mindset during my research.

No l don't and nor am l interested.

I am responding pure and simple to the words you post here. Your credibility, and the credibility of your arguments, rest soley on how you express yourself. It's the same for everyone.

I find the words you post here incoherent. The manner in which you make bold statements, assume them to be facts, and then derive nonsensical conclusions from them is most unfortunate for someone promoting themself as 'academic'. You have difficulty clearly articulating to others your argument(s). If you find that insulting, l suggest that sharing your opinions with the world is not your best strategy.

Right, so, instead of responding to my posts, you degrade me by essentially saying I'm stupid. That's pretty childish.

[Max Payload]

June 28: Halder notes in his diary that there's no need for any more fighting in the west. Germany is finally free to move east.

He notes no such thing in his diary on 28 June.

June 28: Halder ... also states that the mission of AOK 18 will Initially be one of documenting presence of Russia troops. Rolf-Dietrich Mueller concludes that this was an attempt at a buildup for an eventual invasion

What was the basis of Mueller's conclusions?

June 30: Halder meets with Weizacker and notes that the priority was to show enough force IOT get Britain to back down, so Germany could have a "free hand in the east".

Where is the record of this aspect of the conversation? Certainly not in Halder's diary entry referencing his 11am meeting with Weizacker.

July 3: Halder meets with Greiffenberg, and notes “Britain, which must be dealt with separately, and the east are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany’s dominant position in Europe. Special issues, such as the Baltic and Balkan countries, may introduce some variants” (pg. 221). Hmm, I wonder what that could mean?

Well it could mean that after the Soviet interventions in the Baltic States and Bessarabia, Germany needed to demonstrate its dominance over its last remaining continental rival through some act of military intervention of its own. It would be stretch to suggest that this was Halder proposing a march on Moscow.

July 3: The same day Otto is presented to Weizacker, ... During his meeting with Weizacker, when asked about Hitler's knowledge of Otto, Halder simply responds that he was "working towards the Fuehrer"

Halder makes no reference to a meeting with Weizacker in his diary. Where is the record of this meeting and what reliance can be placed on the record of it? It seems that much of your proposed article hinges on this.

July 21: Hitler is finally informed of Otto

Is he? What is your evidence for this?

July 21: ... Halder notes “Russian forces are to be defeated or, at least, as much Russian territory occupied as is necessary to prevent enemy air attacks on Berlin and Silesia’s industrial areas. Desirable to advance far enough for our Luftwaffe to destroy Russia’s most important areas. Political objectives: Ukrainian Empire; a Baltic federation; Byelorussia; Finland. Baltic states ‘thorn in the side’. Require 80-100 div: Russia has 50-75 good div. If we attack Russia this autumn, the aerial pressure on Britain will be relieved…” (pg. 224-225). This is essentially Otto.

What you have quoted is not from 21 July, it is from 22 July, AFTER the conference and AFTER Halder had been briefed by Brauchitsch as to the content of the previous day's meeting.
Here is an English translation of the last item of Halder’s diary entry for 22 July as it relates to his meeting with Brauchitsch (which includes, in its essential elements, your quote above) -
“Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning. The Fuehrer has been given the following information:
a) German assembly will take at least 4-6 weeks.
b) Object: To crush Russian Army or slice as much Russian territory as is necessary to bar enemy air
raids on Berlin and Silesian industries. It is desirable to penetrate far enough to enable our Air Force to smash Russia’s strategic areas. (Check with Foreign Armies East.)
c) Political aims:
Ukrainian State,
Federation of Baltic States,
White Russia — Finland
Baltic States as a permanent thorn in the flesh.
d) Strength required: 80 -100 Divs.; Russia has 50 -75 good Divs. If we attack Russia this fall,
pressure of the air war on Britain will be relieved. United States could supply both Britain and Russia.
e) Operations: What operational objective could be attained? What strength have we available? Timing and area of assembly? Gateways of attack: Baltic States, Finland, Ukraine. Protect Berlin and Silesian industrial area. Protection of Romanian oilfields. (Check with Op. Sec.)”

The first sentence suggests that to Halder’s knowledge their attention had not previously been turned to ‘tackling the Russian problem’ in any meaningful way and that planning had not been prepared. It is not clear when Hitler was given the information (a) to (e). It could have been (most probably was in my view) later on 22 July and is the sort of thing that could have been cobbled together by a competent strategic planning staff in a matter of hours. And I doubt that (e) had been given to Hitler, it isn't 'information', it's largely a list of questions.

[ljadw]

Uhhhhhhhh, what about Mein Kampf??? Zweites Buch????

There is no mention in Mein Kampf ( which was a collection of speeches and newspaper articles about total varied subjects )or in the Zweites Buch,of a stufenplan, or even of a plan .
Hitler did not write in MK that in 1935 he would restore conscription, in 1936 reoccupy the Rhineland, in 1938 execute the Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland etc ...Or that in 1939 he would sign a treaty with the SU .

Lol that is not what Mein Kampf is. While in prison in 1924 Hitler dictated it to Rudolf Hess.

Are you kidding me, all Hitler talks about his autobiographical sections is how he’s always wanted unification between Germany and Austria! Also, in the last chapter, which is about Lebensraum in Russia, Hitler rejects Weimar Germany’s friendship with the Soviets, declaring that no treaty can last. He even goes on to state that the Soviets, being Jews, will betray their trust, so the Germans should betray it first. This is further supported by several talks with his advisers from 1933 all the way to 1940. Hitler alsobtalks extensively of rebuilding Germany into a great power again and doing away with the Treaty of Versailles; this obviously would necessitate reinstating conscription. Specifics aside, Hitler always wanted people of German blood united under one flag. No one is saying that Hitler was a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, but there are unmissable clues present that Hitler was following a program to which he was blindingly loyal.

There was nothing special in Mein Kampf : it was only a lot of generalities expressing the sentiments of the majority of the Geman population .
If Hitler was NOT , as you are now saying, a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, that means that there was NO stufen plan .
And, most of his program was similar to the program of Weimar .Both Weimar and Hitler wanted to undo Versailles and to do this, collaboration with the SU was needed .

If Mein Kampf was a general statement of popular German sentiment, then why was Hitler considered a radical for so long, never even gaining a majority before having dictatorial powers, while his book only ever had meager sales?

You make a lot of claims over and over again, but fail to back them up with evidence, or even to address my points.

The book had meager sales because it was not a serious book, but a collection of newspaper articles and speeches about subjects going from syphilis ( 13 pages !! ) to religion.It was very poorly written and most people did not take it serious. Hitler was a brilliant orator ,but a very bad writer .
Hitler said that MK was only fantasies behind bars that wqere little more than a series of articles for the Völkischer Beobachter and he told Hans Frank : If I had had any idea in 1924 that I would have become chancellor, I never would have written the book .
YOU said that he had a stufen plan ,referring to MK . The truth is that a stufen plan is a paper where is written ;
First in ...I will do .....
The following year, I will do ....
Etc .
Such a paper does not exist ,All Hitler's decisions were spontaneous,made when the moment offered the possibility .
Example : the infamous Hossbach conference, which had as subject the rearmament problems between LW and KM ,but was transformed by Hitler in a monologue about his foreign policy ( something those present had heard already countless times ): Hitler said : IF there is a civil war in France (for which there was no certainty ) ,we will use the opportunity to eliminate first CZ and then Austria .
And what happened ? No civil war in France and still Hitler eliminated first AUSTRIA and then CZ.
And why did Hitler have not much success in Weimar ? Because the policies of the other parties were not that different, and because the NSDAP was only a group of incapables and because between 1924 and 1930 the economic situation was relatively good .
Thus Hitler's stufenplan : an invention only .

[MarkN]

Right, so, instead of responding to my posts, you degrade me by essentially saying I'm stupid. That's pretty childish.

This encapsulates the principle problem that you seem to have: misunderstand the words you are reading and march straight to the wrong conclusion.

I did not call you stupid. I have no idea of the level of your intelligence. What I can discern is a poor ability to articulate your argument(s) to others. Let's use this small snippet I've culled from one of your first posts here.

3. I am not saying though, that practical reasons (or at least what seemed practical to the Germans) did not play an important role in the Third Reich and Wehrmacht's decision making. If one actually examines the events within the German "High Command" between May and July 1940, you will actually find Hitler's attention being turned away from Britain toward Russia by Halder and Brauchitsch (who had secretly been building an army in the east while developing Plan Otto, all without approval from the Fuehrer). There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil. Lastly, Hitler believed an invasion of Britain would be unwise, so thought that taking away their "last hope" in Russia, would be the best course of action.

You claim, and present it as fact, "you will actually find Hitler's attention being turned away from Britain toward Russia by Halder and Brauchitsch". No attempt whatsoever to substantiate this claim other than to advise others to go off and read Dirks & Janssen.

Then, "who had secretly been building an army in the east while developing Plan Otto". Again no evidence to support your claim that a secret army was being built. Moreover, you write sentce in a manner that implies building this army is separate from Plan OTTO. I have hinted to you that the redeployment of forces eastwards after Fall ROT was nothing out of the ordinary. Your thesis is based upon it being entirely out of the ordinary. No evidence to support that claim just a presumption that everybody should agree with you.

Then, "all without approval from the Fuehrer". All of the redeployment orders were issued according to normal procedure. There was no attempt whatsoever to divert from normal procedure to either hide the movements from Hitler knowledge or to keep it a "secret".

And finally, for now perhaps, "There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil." So, as a military officer (under training) would you agree that the DS answer to what scale of forces should be deployed on the eastern front to confront this Red Army threat equates to 18 divisions: more than 18, exactly 18, or that 18 is overkill?

If you want to have a serious discussion, you can't just throw out a bunch of your unsubstantiated opinions, expect others to accept them as facts and then expect everybody else to fall into line with your debating methods. I'm not the only one here questionning your research credentials and analytical credibility. EVERYBODY is questionning your reasoning, conclusions and lack of evidence.