What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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MarkN
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 05 Jul 2019 16:08

Still no credible argument or explanation how the slightly stronger Barbarossa forces are going to make a tangeable difference to the outcome. Or is that just another premise that posters are expected to accept.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Jul 2019 20:58

ljadw wrote:
05 Jul 2019 06:00
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jul 2019 15:09


OTOH the Heer was terrible in areas in which the Western Allies excelled, such as logistics and grand strategy.



We (the broad community of non-evil humanity) nearly let Hitler win via Munich, American isolationism, etc.
1 Nonsense

2 Nonsense
As far the Jews of Europe are concerned we did let Hitler win.
He should have been stopped no later than 1939 when there was an opportunity for France/UK/USSR anti-Hitler coalition.
This didn't happen because the Poles wouldn't allow Stalin to cross their borders. But the Poles took that stance in reliance on basically lies from France/UK that they would intervene effectively to preserve Poland. Had UK/France been honest and said to Poland "Stalin's your only chance - choose between him and Hitler" then the grand coalition probably could have been sealed.
That's a far better "what if" for world history but also kind of boring militarily: Germany loses quite rapidly because (1) its economy collapses due to blockade, including Soviet/Western interference with Swedish iron ore shipments, (2) militarily it doesn't have sufficient strength to defeat France while defending against SU.
If you add US to this coalition - either actively or via more military aid - it gets easier.
WW2 should have been a relatively simple affair and Hitler just a brief crazy blip on history.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Paul Lakowski » 05 Jul 2019 21:25

Just reading R Forczyk TANK WARFARE ON THE EASTERN FRONT VOL-1 [41-42] &2 [43-44].

Its painfully clear ALL the RED ARMY were very poorly lead , trained and equipped in 1941....due in part to purge, but also massive expansion of army size, particularly in armor. On the other hand the Wehrmacht is riding very high accumulating vast experience in most levels of warfare, short of strategic warfare. That combination of variables generated a "'window of opportunity'" in the EAST. If the Wehrmacht can strike fast enough and hard enough they could pull of a coupe in Russia...and thus "have a reasonable chance of success".

That last part has implications for any long term war, since as far back as 1934 HITLER'S Generals complained that INDUSTRIAL mass production was needed for the existing expansion of the HEER and the expect 'total war' to follow , as out lined in Defence minister Groner's 1928-30 thesis "TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT" .

In any event if you buy into Hitler's FOUR YEAR PLAN, the LW clearly got Groner's message and adapted their expansion programme to accommodate Hitler and still hammer out some semblance of a strategy....al be it at a cost of investing in dive bombers instead of URAL BOMBER . This also explains the JU-88 Fiasco [ designed as a better schnell bomber/twin engine fighter and bastardised into med-bomber/dive-bomber/night fighter to fill the void of no URAL BOMBER etc]. The upshot was- barring BoB - the LW did "WELL ENOUGH" until the end.

In the same way you can certainly tinker with the HEER to achieve some compromise solution that attempts to bridge needs of the HEER with the needs of the Hitler "war gamer" . Expanding the armaments industry is doable but that takes years and thus would needed to have been central part of the FOUR YEAR PLAN already. Failing that tweaking is the best you can do. Any time you increase in one area you must decrease in another, more importantly their must be some form of "currency" exchanged to achieve this in real time .

While the RM would seem the obvious choice, Schacht had enabled Hitler to build his war giant machine- through massive credit programs that lasted a decade. At least in the short term you need to focus on resources as the main method of exchange. At the end you can only work "what's doable".

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by von thoma » 05 Jul 2019 23:04

What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces
We would all be dressed in uniform with the right arm raised
" The right to believe is the right of those who don't know "

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 06 Jul 2019 02:13

MarkN wrote:Still no credible argument or explanation how the slightly stronger Barbarossa forces are going to make a tangible difference to the outcome.
Refer back to this post for the revised OoB:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:ATL Operation Barbarossa Order of Battle: Changes from OTL

To repeat, my ATL Barbarossa adds 10 panzer and 10 motorized infantry divisions to the Wehrmacht, all of which deployed with Ostheer on June 22. In addition, as I'll explain later, I'm going to add the two "late" panzer divisions due to Hitler invading Greece a month or so earlier (in line with better strategic outlook). The additional forces are distributed and deployed as follows:

Army Group North:
Gains 3 panzer and 3 Mot.Inf divisions that form 5th PanzerGruppe (Rheinhardt).
Transfers 3 infantry divisions to AGS.
Deploys 4th PanzerGruppe (Hoeppner)) on the left flank of AGC's 3rd PanzerGruppe (Hoth)
Deploys 5th PanzerGruppe entirely in the Memel region, where half of 4th PzGr deployed in OTL.

Army Group Center:
3rd PzGr (Hoth) gains one panzer division.
2nd PzGr (Guderian) gains one Mot.Inf division.

Army Group South:
Gains a total of 8 panzer and 6 Mot.Inf divisions, plus 3 infantry divisions transferred from AGN.
1st PzGr (Kleist) gains 2 panzer, 2 Mot.Inf divisions, deploys in roughly same location as OTL except an additional corps on its left flank.
6th PzGr (Mannstein) has 5 panzer and 5 Mot.Inf Divisions. It deploys in northeast Romania, forming the southern arm of Rundstedt's pincer movement in Ukraine.
11th Army (Schobert) gains 3 infrantry divisions from AGN and 5 divisions from 6th and 17th armies in AGS's northern wing. Schobert moves the 6 OTL infantry divisions to northeast Romania as well.

Mannstein and Schobert have 24 German divisions (10 mechanized) in the southern pincer, Rundstedt has 27 German divisions (13 mechanized) in the northern arm.
See also the disposition of forces on June 22:
Image

Here's how the Border Battles unfold at a high level of generality:

Army Group Center: Same as OTL.

Army Group North: 4th and 5th PzGr execute double-pincer envelopment of 8th and 11th armies in a pocket I'll call the Battle of Kaunas. 4th PzGr strikes from Leeb's far right (Hoth's left); 5th PzGr strikes from Memel. In OTL it took one half of Leeb's mobile forces to deal with the Soviet armored counterattack at Rasenai (sp?), in ATL one half of 5th PzGr would fight that battle while its other corps pressed on to seal the Kaunas encirclement. Reinhardt and Hoepner's spearheads meet up on June 27th near the Lithuania-Latvia border and the Battle of Kaunas ends in early July with ~150,000 prisoners taken and 8th/11th armies effectively destroyed.

Army Group South: Kleist's panzers drive in much the same fashion as OTL on a due east course towards Zhitomir. Reinforced by 2 Pz and 2 Mot.Inf divisions over OTL, Kleist's spearheads sidestep the Dubno-Brody counterattacks and continue their penetration while OTL forces fight that battle. In the Southern pincer (Northeast Romania), the Mannstein/Schobert wing crosses the Prut on the first day and its mobile spearheads have traveled ~10-20miles to the Dnestr by nightfall or the next day depending on location. Assault battalions begin establishing bridgeheads over the river and the Germans have crossed it in force by June 28th over a ~30mi wide front between roughly Khotyn and Mohilev-Podolski. Schobert's infantry mans the flanks of the penetration between the Prut and Dniestr; Mannstein's 10 mechanized divisions are free to advance the ~100 miles necessary to link up with Kleist around the area of Shepetivka.

Stavka and Kirponos as in OTL with counterattacks against Kleist and 6th/17th armies, but they have to draw off some forces from these attacks to deal with Mannstein/Schobert's group. The danger posed by the southern pincer isn't immediately clear, however, in part because its strength doesn't show during the 5-6 days it has to spend crossing the Dniestr. Soviet 9th army attacks its right flank between the Prut and Dniester in the opening days but without success. Stavka moves 19th army from the vicinity of Kiev towards Dniester to block Mannstein and wheels most of 12th army around to face eastward strike the left flank of the southern pincer. Compared to OTL, these steps weaken the opposition to Kleist's advance but don't achieve numerical - let alone combat power - superiority over Mannstein/Schobert. By June 28th at the latest, Kirponos sees the danger of losing his entire front to encirclement and wants to withdraw from Galicia; Stalin and Stavka order him instead to launch more counterattacks.

Mannstein's 10 divisions explode northwards out of their Dniestr bridgeheads from June 28th; his spearheads link up with Kleist's spearheads south of Shepetivka by July 2nd [20mi/day advance]. In 10 days, Kleist's spearheads have advanced ~160 miles from the Bug to Shepetivka [Both of these advances are still far slower than what Guderian/Hoth achieved in the border battles; resistance in Ukraine is a little stronger].

Thus by July 2nd Rundstedt's army group had trapped Soviet 6th, 12th, and 26th armies along with several corps brought up to counterattack him (same as in OTL). By July 9th, this kessel known as the Battle of Ternopil resulted in the capture of 400,000 Soviet prisoners and the effective destruction of the formations involved.

Now reference the disposition of Soviet forces after the OTL Border Battles:
Image

From this map remove five armies: 8th and 11th in the north; 6th, 12th, and 26th in the South.
19th army is in Ukraine instead of facing AGC.
Total RKKA strength is ~600,000 lower on July 10th than OTL due to the Kaunas and Ternopil kesselschlacht. Depending on how front strength is defined, this is 25% lower than OTL.

The next stage of Barbarossa:

Army Group Center: The Battle of Smolensk proceeds along the same general outline as OTL except Soviet forces are weaker by at least the 200,000 men of 19th army that had to stay in the Ukraine (See Glantz's Barbarossa Derailed for OoB's and strength figures in OTL Battle of Smolensk). Hoth and Guderian execute a double envelopment except that the RKKA doesn't have sufficient strength to block Hoth at Yaretsevo and keep the Smolensk open for nearly two weeks. Instead, Guderian and Hoth link up by July 23rd and the Smolensk pocket is gone by the end of the month. On Bock's left flank, OKH transfers Hoepner's 4th PanzerGruppe to his command immediately after the Battle of Kaunas. Hoeppner crosses the Dvina at Daugavpils then executes an envelopment of Soviet forces on AGC's left flank at Nevel, in concert with Hoth's left wing [In OTL, AGC attempted this move but lacked the forces the seal the encirclement. Hoepner's 6 divisions will be more than sufficient]. By the end of the month, AGC has liquidated 80% of Western Front's 500,000 men. Bock and his generals, perceiving that Stalin has very weak forces defending Moscow, want immediately to push forward. Hitler forbids this as an operational pause is required to rest and refit the mobile divisions and to allow the railways to catch up to the army group. He reminds his generals that the Wehrmacht will run out of fuel if it forces the Grosstransportraum to operate too far from its railheads. He reminds them that Stalin will continue to put more armies in the field and it will be better to meet and destroy these forces closer to German lines of communication than further. Bock plans to launch Operation Taifun, his assault on Moscow, in the third week of August.

Army Group North: Rheinhardt's 5th PzGr pushes through (and around) Pskov with six divisions. Compared to OTL, Leeb's mobile vanguard is stronger and his opposition weaker. With Bock/Hopener having cleared his flank at Nevel, Leeb can focus everything on cutting off Leningrad. His spearheads are safe from and/or can repulse counterattacks such as 8th panzer's OTL encirclement at Soltsy. By the end of July, Reinhardt has taken Novogord and his PzGr has firmly entrenched Leeb's right flank on the Volkhov river, halfway up to Schusselberg. Like Bock, Leeb pauses here to allow the infantry and railways to catch up and plans to launch his Leningrad assault in the third week of August. Both Leeb and Bock have taken far fewer casualties during July than OTL as they have faced significantly weaker RKKA forces.

Army Group South: After liquidating the RKKA forces in the Ternopil kessel, Rundstedt resumed his advance on July 10th. His opposition consisted of 5th, 18th, and 19th armies plus remnants of the Ternopil forces. Rundstedt had nearly 2:1 numerical superiority by this time. Commanding 23 mobile divisions between his two panzer groups, he struck out in 3 directions initially: Mannstein's group sent 4 divisions southwards from its right flank to roll up and encircle Soviet forces in front of Romania in a maneuver akin to the OTL Uman battle (also conducted by a single panzer corps). The main body of Mannstein's group (7 divisions including one division from Kleist struck due east between Zhitomir and Vinnitsiya. Kleist, with 12 divisions, struck east north of Zhitomir. After the disaster in Galicia, Kirponos wisely withdrew 19th Army from encirclement at Zhitomir towards the relative safety of Kiev and the Dniepr. Kleist's partial pivot northeastwards towards Korosten threatened 5th Army with entrapment in the Pripyat marshes; it withdrew eastwards towards the Dniepr as well [OTL 5th army was able to harass Rundstedt's left flank well into August]. Kleist's powerful group of 12 mobile divisions reached the Dniepr north of Kiev by July 21st. In the South, both of Mannstein's thrusts had broken into the West Ukrainian plain with operational freedom by mid-July. With Schobert, his southern wing encircled and destroyed the majority of 18th and 9th armies around Uman, with the rest of the Red forces retreating southwards into Odessa. Mannstein's northern wing was free to exploit the great bend of the Dniepr, where few Soviet forces were available to oppose it. Krivoy Rog fell on July 23 along with its ore deposits and many factories that could not be evacuated in time [OTL the city fell in late August; Soviets will have trouble evacuating everything on a faster-than-OTL timeline].

Situation on 1 August:
-RKKA has suffered at least three more large enirclements than OTL (Kaunas, Ternopil, Nevel). As a result, its field strength is no more than 2/3 of its OTL level.
-AGN is poised to cut off Leningrad (take Schlusselberg) ~6 weeks earlier than OTL
-AGC does not need to reinforce its flanks and is poised to conduct Operation Taifun from the middle of August instead of beginning of October.
-AGS has occupied all of right bank Ukraine, has forced the Dniepr and is ready to encircle Kiev and its defenders without assistance from AGC (actually can send reinforcements to AGC if wanted).

Sketch of further '41 campaign season (maybe more detail later, idk):
-AGN takes Leningrad and ~500k prisoners by end of October
-AGC takes Moscow and ~700k prisoners by end of October
-AGS takes Rostov and Voronezh by October, has captured/precluded most of summer/fall Ukraine harvest (didn't happen OTL), overrun many more factories in Kharkov-Donets-Rostov that couldn't be evacuated due to rail capacity constraints [OTL SU was using 60% of its rail capacity June-October to move factories; more rapid advance forces leaving more behind). AGS can encircle/destroy any force put in the field against it after Kiev.
-RKKA strength on Dec. 1, 1941 is not more than 2.5mil [OTL was ~4.5mil including reserves; additional kessels have cost ~2mil PW], therefore no serious winter counteroffensives until later and/or completely ineffective counteroffensives that result in capture of attacking armies
-Ostheer winter offensive towards Grozny and Maikop, taking the ~80% of those oilfields that are north of mountains
-As more Red soldiers are captured, Ostheer has taken far fewer casualties. At 3:1 ratio of "bloody casualties," removal of ~2mil more as PW means Ostheer suffers ~650k fewer casualties by May 1942.
-Instead of 5.7mil RKKA vs. 2.6mil Ostheer in May 42, the force balance is ~4.5mil vs. ~3.4mil. RKKA cannot stop nor push back Ostheer during 42 campaign season, loses Russia up to at least A-A line, with Atyrau on the Ural perhaps replacing Astrakhan on the Volga as the southern "A".
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Jul 2019 03:53

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jul 2019 03:35
As you've done a couple times now, you're being slippery about timelines.
Nothing about an ATL starting in 1939 implies that it ends there.Everything about my heartland alteration - apprehension of true strategic situation - means Germany takes pre- and in-war steps to address its situation.
One of these steps is prioritization of the army, another is a urgency to mobilize factors of production once the war has begun.
There is not even a hint of tension, contradiction, or inconsistency about these points.
No, I'm trying to be very precise about this timeline; all the slipperiness seems to be from your side (see below). So just when in 1939 does this improved strategic "apprehension" occur?

And, yet again, how does Germany "apprehend" its true strategic situation when no war with France or Britain is "apprehended" and rather, Munich has just "proven" to Hitler's satisfaction that he can bend them easily to his will.

And how does any of that improve Germany's economic situation vis a vis its FY 39-40 crisis?
OMG you are SUCH a lame dad - what McKenzie? No I'm looking at instagram not posting on a history website - lame. Does this picture look cute?
OMG then stop acting like such a lame little girl and making everything about how you look. Try arguing substance rather than style for one.
Investment for that plan began several years earlier though. What's your argument that Hitlerian pragmatism re Bulgarian/Bolshevik alliance/pact is ideologically "kosher" while using Poles is not, provided that the strategic rationale for the latter move becomes apparent?
So then, your timeline has IG Farben and the Nazis planning on building a buna rubber plant at Monowitz POLAND "several years earlier" than April 1940? And you want to be taken seriously? So what is your take on the Americans seizing British airports in the colonies during the Revolutionary War? :roll: :lol:
As I say pages ago in the setup, better intelligence, analysis, staff work by OKH, and advocacy by Halder et. al. to apprise national leadership of the actual military situation. Instead the institutional Heer went along with the most facile Nazi conceptions of Soviet/Slavic capabilities.
"Better intelligence, analysis, staff work"? Something tells me you've never worked in intelligence collection, analysis, or on an intelligence staff or working group. The German intelligence on the Soviet Union was actually fair, especially in identifying the locations and capabilities of its ground and air units along the frontier and in much of European Russia. Where it failed was in identifying the Soviet intent to persevere through ruthless prioritization and utilization of its assets, something that is extremely difficult for intelligence analysis to forecast.
That's military as portion of public spending; I'm talking military as portion of national spending. The latter increased as Germany apprehended its strategic crisis, would have and should have happened earlier. Hitler had political room to demand more of the German public, especially after France when he was arguably the most popular German ever.
Uh, no, Germany's NNP/GDP increased as it increased the Grossreich, incorporating Austria, the Protectorate, the General Government, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Northern France, and so on. Oh, and by diddling the pension books in the giant ponzi scheme that became German war financing.
It's you who's dodging my answer. THere's no compulsion, just harder negotiations. If Italy/Hungary/etc. want steel and coal they have to give Hitler more workers. OTL Hitler chose to strut rather than admit - more like acknowledge - his strategic desperation. Accordingly he exported ~8mil tons of steel in 1940 IIRC for very little return from Europe in terms of workers and commodities. Far less than he got later in the war when Germany's goose was obviously cooked.
Oh, so "harder negotiations" to go along with "harder thinking"? Riiiiight. Italy did not need more German steel and coal before May 1940 when Mussolini decided to enter the war. Ditto Hungary. Yes, Germany exported 8.31 million tons of steel in 1940, not to gain workers and commodities, but to gain foreign exchange to balance the Reich's books...of course, it helped that during that same period the Reich seized 8.58 million tons of steel production from its conquests, so the exports were actually excess to German production...but then the reasons and issues are all explained by Tooze.
Fair point but I don't need finesse. I need increased army production equivalent to 1-2% of GDP; putting the screws to Europe and domestic economy could have yielded orders of magnitude greater results as happened later in the war. My goal at this stage is to prove feasibility rather than fine-grained detail. Achieving 12% of the labor recruitment later achieved gets the million workers. Taking the administrative/political steps earlier towards that recruitment should easily achieve that 12% by 1941
How do you "put the screws to Europe" before the French campaign is concluded? How do you put the screws to neutral Europe if they remain neutral or if they do not enter the war until after May 1940?

The "later" labor recruitment was recruitment, it was coercion, without leverage to coerce there could be no coercion. Please note that Todt tried to recruit labor from neutral Europe, but failed miserably...even the few thousand Spaniards were actually forced labor, undesirables expelled by Franco.
I don't need the French to accelerate production; I just need them to replace Germans inducted into the Heer from early 41. So that timeline is fine. Increased recruitment of Poles, Italians etc plus cuts to domestic consumption gets the added army equipment.
Sorry, you need them in play by early fall 1940 at latest...all of the "new" Panzer divisions (11.-20.) were organized between mid August and mid October 1940 and were operational April-May 1941. Any divisions organized in 1941 are unlikely to be ready by 22 June.
To quote Jim Croce, your riposte is bad, bad.
No, your understanding of why time is so significant a problem for your proposal is bad, bad.
Fine. And yet the LW you see as validated in its prewar beliefs (I agree) held scant hope for winning war via Battle of Britain. So nothing has changed in LW worldview since 38/39.
Sorry, but that makes no sense. The Luftwaffe prewar "belief", its doctrine, was that its tactical and operational capability was a war-winning force multiplier and that interdiction and close air support was its future...since it had eschewed any strategic capability long before your ATL begins. Of course then they had scant hope of winning a strategic air battle of Britain, but that has zero to do with its actual capabilities, which were substantial...as demonstrated in Spain, Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France.

So what causal agent is there that would tell the German high command that it should instead invest more heavily in the uncertain power of the Schnelltruppen? Until its capabilities were first demonstrated in Poland and then confirmed in France, there was no certainty that it was any more the way forward than the Luftwaffe...they were both equally untested in doctrine and capability (aside from Spain, which led to glowing reports about air power, but noticeably lukewarm reviews for massed armor).

Oh, sorry, I keep forgetting, harder thinking.
Seydlitz and Zeppelin. I haven't even included any of these savings in, for example, my spreadsheet. There's enough room not to worry about it.
Seydlitz was laid down 29 December 1936, just over a year before your ATL begins. She was funded in FY 36-37.
RichardAnderson wrote:ATL starts in 38 so we're good.
Zepplin was laid down the day before Seydlitz. She was also funded in FY 36-37. You know, the boom year...construction on both slowed during the next bust year.

Which raises a big question I keep forgetting to ask you. When exactly does your ATL begin in terms of the German FY (April-March)? You keep saying "1939". Do you mean 1 April 1939?
RichardAnderson wrote:This poor fucking horse. Once again, point isn't work done on Z plan pre-war, it's investment plans cut in early 1939.
Yeah, the problem is you apparently don't know how to beat the horse properly, dead or alive. The Z Plan "pre-war" work and investment did not begin until 1 April 1939 and was barely begun when war broke out five months later. Since most of the Z-Plan required major capital investment and work enlarging the yards and building slips for the behemoth's, very little work - or expenditure had actually occurred. So your "savings" is pretty illusory.

BTW, you do realize that prewar the KM was all of about 50,000 strong? And as mobilized on 1 September 1939 was just 127,523 strong. By 1 June 1941, it was 580,221, but its not going to be much of a source of additional manpower either.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 06 Jul 2019 05:30

RichardAnderson wrote:Where it failed was in identifying the Soviet intent to persevere through ruthless prioritization and utilization of its assets, something that is extremely difficult for intelligence analysis to forecast.
It failed to identify the massive reserve of trained soldiers that could be mobilized within months of war, entering the field as German units reached the end of their supply lines.
RichardAnderson wrote:Germany's NNP/GDP increased
My point was about neither military as a portion of public spending (your first try) nor GDP/NNP (your second try). It's about military spending as portion of GDP, which rose as Germany realized its strategic situation and should have risen earlier given better strategic thinking.
RichardAnderson wrote:OMG then stop acting like such a lame little girl
SHUT UP DAD I HATE YOU!!!!!!!!!!
RichardAnderson wrote:So just when in 1939 does this improved strategic "apprehension" occur?
As already stated, strategic review in 1938 during/after international tension escalations, especially rearmament worldwide. I think this is the point we started on pages ago.
RichardAnderson wrote:how does any of that improve Germany's economic situation vis a vis its FY 39-40 crisis?
You're asking me to repeat the whole argument...
RichardAnderson wrote:So then, your timeline has IG Farben and the Nazis planning on building a buna rubber plant at Monowitz POLAND "several years earlier" than April 1940?
Huh? Use Polish industrial labor earlier and more. I said nothing about Monowitz specifically coming earlier.
RichardAnderson wrote:So what is your take on the Americans seizing British airports in the colonies during the Revolutionary War?
My dear leader said it and he never lies so it must be true.
RichardAnderson wrote:Yes, Germany exported 8.31 million tons of steel in 1940, not to gain workers and commodities, but to gain foreign exchange to balance the Reich's books...of course, it helped that during that same period the Reich seized 8.58 million tons of steel production from its conquests, so the exports were actually excess to German production...but then the reasons and issues are all explained by Tooze.
Yes they were excess to OTL production plans, which were too low.
Yes the exports helped balance the books but finance didn't constrain German output at any point in the war and should not have been a determinative consideration (unlike pre-war when compulsion was less regular).
RichardAnderson wrote:How do you "put the screws to Europe" before the French campaign is concluded? How do you put the screws to neutral Europe if they remain neutral or if they do not enter the war until after May 1940?
Screws need not be tightened much, if at all, before France falls. Most of the production delta is post-France but enabled by investment decisions pre-France. Only after investments in greater vehicle etc. production come on line are greater labor and materials inputs needed. Plenty of time between France and Barbarossa to produce the additional armaments.
RichardAnderson wrote:The "later" labor recruitment wasn't [ftfy] recruitment, it was coercion, without leverage to coerce there could be no coercion. Please note that Todt tried to recruit labor from neutral Europe, but failed miserably
Sure, and it was mostly coercion done by foreign governments against their own people as in Vichy's STO. Start pushing those governments earlier, in immediate aftermath of France. Hitler already knows he's gonna invade USSR, needs more men and stuff.
RichardAnderson wrote:So what causal agent is there that would tell the German high command that it should instead invest more heavily in the uncertain power of the Schnelltruppen? Until its capabilities were first demonstrated in Poland and then confirmed in France, there was no certainty that it was any more the way forward than the Luftwaffe...they were both equally untested in doctrine and capability (aside from Spain, which led to glowing reports about air power, but noticeably lukewarm reviews for massed armor).
You'll note that nowhere in my writing have I said Hitler should have upped investment in panzer divisions specifically pre-war. Rather I've advocated across-the-board higher investment in the Heer, some of which includes higher investment in panzers. I have purposely avoided allowing myself the hindsight bias of panzer focus pre-Poland.

Another interesting "what if," however, is what if Guderian had the political position of Goering?
RichardAnderson wrote:When exactly does your ATL begin in terms of the German FY (April-March)? You keep saying "1939". Do you mean 1 April 1939?
1938. I didn't specify a month but say September. Adjustments to programs didn't occur only at FY turnover.
RichardAnderson wrote:The Z Plan "pre-war" work and investment did not begin until 1 April 1939
Ugh. Here's the point:
Curtailing the panzer production program in early 39 set back the clock on the investment path Germany needed to take to ramp up its armored forces.
RichardAnderson wrote:BTW, you do realize that prewar the KM was all of about 50,000 strong? And as mobilized on 1 September 1939 was just 127,523 strong. By 1 June 1941, it was 580,221, but its not going to be much of a source of additional manpower either.
I do realize that. Which is why I've said not a word about getting manpower from the KM.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 06 Jul 2019 06:58

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jul 2019 20:58
ljadw wrote:
05 Jul 2019 06:00
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jul 2019 15:09


OTOH the Heer was terrible in areas in which the Western Allies excelled, such as logistics and grand strategy.



We (the broad community of non-evil humanity) nearly let Hitler win via Munich, American isolationism, etc.
1 Nonsense

2 Nonsense
As far the Jews of Europe are concerned we did let Hitler win.
He should have been stopped no later than 1939 when there was an opportunity for France/UK/USSR anti-Hitler coalition.
This didn't happen because the Poles wouldn't allow Stalin to cross their borders. But the Poles took that stance in reliance on basically lies from France/UK that they would intervene effectively to preserve Poland. Had UK/France been honest and said to Poland "Stalin's your only chance - choose between him and Hitler" then the grand coalition probably could have been sealed.
That's a far better "what if" for world history but also kind of boring militarily: Germany loses quite rapidly because (1) its economy collapses due to blockade, including Soviet/Western interference with Swedish iron ore shipments, (2) militarily it doesn't have sufficient strength to defeat France while defending against SU.
If you add US to this coalition - either actively or via more military aid - it gets easier.
WW2 should have been a relatively simple affair and Hitler just a brief crazy blip on history.
This proves not having even an elementary knowledge of the pre war period .
1 The SU had NO intention to join a coalition against Hitler . There was no reason for them to do this .
2 France and the UK did not promise to intervene to preserve Poland .
3 The promises of Britain and France had no influence on the attitude of Poland .Poland said already no to the German demands in the winter of 1938/1939 , before the French/British guarentee .And there was no reason for Poland to accept Soviet forces in Poland .
4 France and Britain had not the power to start a big offensive in 1939 that would save Poland .
5 The influence of the Iron ore shipments from Sweden is much overestimated
6 US could not intervene in 1939 :
militarily it was powerless
more economic aid would not help and was impossible
Congress would never declare war in 1939 : proof ? There was no US DOW when Germany attacked Poland .
The foreign policy of France and Britain before the war had only one aim : preventing war, IOW appeasement .They did not need Poland that was militarily unimportant . The only reason they had to declare war was morality : they could not look the other way if Hitler attacked an other country,Poland, or an other one . They had told Hitler that he could get Poland, on the condition that it happened without war .
Hitler did not understand this .He argued as a pre WWI politician, when morality remained where its place was : locked up in a box and released when there were elections ,and locked up again the evening of the elections . Britain and France did not declare war when Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire , if Poland existed before 1914, they would also not declare war if Germany /Russia attacked Poland .

MarkN
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 06 Jul 2019 09:13

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 02:13
MarkN wrote:Still no credible argument or explanation how the slightly stronger Barbarossa forces are going to make a tangible difference to the outcome.
Refer back to this post for the revised OoB:
That's not credible argument.

That is just a long list of your fantasy gaming moves coupled with one assumption after another that each move will be a success giving the outcome you've invented.

Where is the credible argument to explain it could pan out that way?

Or is that just another long list of your premises that you demand we all accept?

Not intetested in real world realities, just desperate to get others to buy into your fantasies.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 06 Jul 2019 09:29

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Jul 2019 03:53
No, I'm trying to be very precise about this timeline; all the slipperiness seems to be from your side (see below).
Don't worry. For every possible slip that you spot, he will have a ready, tailormade what if premise for you to accept.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Jul 2019 02:19
I haven't had time to do it, along with the associated research, yet.
Always better to do the research and analysis first then build you understanding from that.

Like so many others, you start with the answer you want and then try to reengineer history into complete fantasy to fit the answer.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Boby » 06 Jul 2019 14:15

ljadw wrote: .
3 The promises of Britain and France had no influence on the attitude of Poland .Poland said already no to the German demands in the winter of 1938/1939 , before the French/British guarentee .And there was no reason for Poland to accept Soviet forces in Poland
Unconvincing. Without the backing of UK/France I doubt Poland had remained obstinate over the Dantzig issue in the summer, if exerted to some classic german pressure. They have zero possibilities, like McGregor in a boxing match against Mayweather.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 06 Jul 2019 14:55

There was no backing of Poland by Britain and France over the Dantzig issue,because the issue was not about Danzig .The issue was if Poland would accept the German demand to become a German satellite .Poland knew that before the war it would have no aid from Britain and France and that if there was a war ,Britain could do nothing and France could not advance to Berlin .
Poland knew that it would lose against Germany ,but that was not important, as Poland was convinced that there would be no war .
Poland was convinced that Hitler bluffed .
France and Britain were convinced that Hitler bluffed.
Hitler was convinced (til August 25 ) that Poland, Britain and France were bluffing .
Even without the guarentee, Poland would have rejected Hitler's demands, because they knew that Stalin would never admit a German occupation of the whole of Poland .
The only thing France and Britain could do was to prevent Germany from attacking Poland . When Germany attacked Poland, they could do nothing to help Poland ,unless waging a war of revenge wich would result in the destruction of he British and French empire, the destruction of Germany, of Poland and the liberation and occupation by the USSR . Something which happened in 1945 .
Poland could survive as an independent state,only as long as its two neighbours agreed .And as long as its two neighours survived . If Germany was defeated, Poland would become a Soviet satellite,if the SU was defeated ,Poland would be destroyed by Germany . There was nothing France could do. And Britain could do even less .
That's why the ''backing '' by UK/France was not important .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Boby » 06 Jul 2019 17:18

Without the august pact, It seems unlikely germany would go further than the Curzon line, because in any case eastern Poland would be rapidly occupied by the Soviets.

Are you sure Poland knew the situation, that they would receive no effective help from Britain/France?

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 06 Jul 2019 17:36

Britain could send 2 divisions, who were in France at the end of september .After the guarentee, Poland wanted to modernize its army and wanted to buy waepons and other war material in Britain, on credit . Britain refused .But Britain proposed Germany a credit of billions of pounds to prevent it from attacking Poland .
Hitler wanted Poland .
Poland wanted to remain independent .
France and Britain wanted to avoid war ,as long as there was no war, the fate of Poland was no problem for them .
Stalin wanted 2 things :
1 Eastern Poland ,which he could not get
2 prevent Germany from occupying eastern Poland .
Stalin was not interested in the fate of the other part of Poland .
How could Poland remain independent? Only if there was no war : if there was one, the fate of Poland was sealed, whatever the outcome would be .
And, how could war be avoided ? If France and Britain threatened Hitler with war if he attacked Poland . The problem was that Hitler knew that France and Britain could not help Poland if there was a war ,and that Hitler was thus convinced that they bluffed .
Thus the problem was not the military cooperation between Poland and France and Britain if there was a war , but how Britain and France could prevent Hitler from attacking Poland .
The decision of war or peace never was in the hands of France and Britain, but in the hands of Hitler and Beck .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Boby » 06 Jul 2019 19:31

I lack sources. I don't know what was Poland POV in August 1939.

What they expected from Berlin? I find it difficult to believe it was just "bluffing".

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