TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑06 Jul 2019, 06:30
It failed to identify the massive reserve of trained soldiers that could be mobilized within months of war, entering the field as German units reached the end of their supply lines.
What "massive reserve of trained soldiers"? There was none, which was part of Germany's problem. Despite the legends of von Seeckt diddling the Versailles Treaty, 1921-1934 were lost years in terms of reserve training in Germany, the birth year groups 1901-1913 became known as the "Weißen Jahrgänge" and at the end of 1934 and during 1935, 58 special training battalions "Ergänzungs-Bataillone" were organized to begin their training as reservists, a force that was doubled in 1936. The Ergänzungs-Bataillonen formed the 14 4. Welle divisions mobilized in 1939, which interrupted the reserve training function just as it had begun. By 4 February 1941, the number of available trained personnel in the Weißen Jahrgänge were fully expended. The "reserve" as of 1 June 1941 consisted of 80,000 personnel in the divisional FEB and 320,000 trained replacements in the Ersatzheer. Otherwise, the only manpower pool available was Jahrgänge 1922, whose call up had been delayed in order to ease the civilian employment situation. Thus, of 565,060 men registered as fit for service (in what was assessed as an uncommonly large year group), 117,565 already volunteered and were in the Wehrmacht, 72,435 were deferred as critical civilian workers (UK-gestellte), and 375,062 were classed as Reserve I personnel available for service. Of those, 170,125 were already doing RAD service (pre-military work training), so 200,000 were available for call up. Under existing plans, 72.5% would go to the Heer, 22% to the Luftwaffe, 4.1% to the Kriegsmarine, and 1.4% to the SS; manpower was always prioritized to the Heer.
BTW, the expansion of the Panzerwaffe was dependent on the ten training battalions available as of June 1940.
My point was about neither military as a portion of public spending (your first try) nor GDP/NNP (your second try). It's about military spending as portion of GDP, which rose as Germany realized its strategic situation and should have risen earlier given better strategic thinking.
Um, in 1938 Germany allocated 18% of NNP on the military, which amounted to 80% of public spending. That grew to 25% in 1939, 44% in 1940, 58% in 1941, 69% in 1942, and 78% in 1943 (the last year of reliable figures. That is actually not dissimilar from the UK, far exceeds the US mobilization rate, and is only exceeded by the USSR, which went from 20% in 1940 to 75% in 1942. However, the Soviets did not achieve that by "better strategic thinking", they achieved it by ruthless prioritization.
SHUT UP DAD I HATE YOU!!!!!!!!!!
Oh dear, anger issues too.
As already stated, strategic review in 1938 during/after international tension escalations, especially rearmament worldwide. I think this is the point we started on pages ago.
Sorry, 1938, 1939, 1937, its all the same in my mind as far as the fantasy goes. So you imagine the Germans were doing a quadrennial review a la the U.S. DOD?
Sorry, but such unified political-military strategic reviews are a product of the postwar world. It becomes even more problematic a notion when the actual "strategic review" process in place is understood (OKW created 4 February 1938 to remove power from the Ob.d.Heeres) and replaced by Adolf Hitler's strategic review.
You're asking me to repeat the whole argument...
No, I'm asking you to demonstrate that you actually understand the ramifications of the various problems the Nazis encountered. And to demonstrate you've done some real research on the subject other than a superficial skimming of Alan Tooze and Heinz Guderian.
Huh? Use Polish industrial labor earlier and more. I said nothing about Monowitz specifically coming earlier.
No, you stated the German plans for using Auschwitz as a hub for forced labor predated its actual creation by a "few years". I was asking you to clarify that bizarre claim...it is akin to the Dear Leader's declarations regarding the American revolution. Is your teleprompter broke too?
And, yet again, an earlier quadrennial review by the German high command is not going to change Nazi prejudices any quicker...
My dear leader said it and he never lies so it must be true.
Aber natürlich.
Yes they were excess to OTL production plans, which were too low.
Not exactly, production plans, primarily for ammunition, were decreased at the end of the French Campaign, because stocks were considered to have grown too high. The primary consumption of steel was not tanks or ships, it was ammunition. Ammunition was perceived as in excess, so steel could be diverted to export, especially given the acquisition of foreign steel sources. The consequence was felt pretty early in the Russian Campaign and ammunition production - and steel allocations - increased.
The problem is the prewar ammunition stocks were created based upon assumptions from the Great War experience that weren't really subject to improvement via strategic review...it required new data from a new war experience. If you are interested, I can refer you to a nice thesis by a Bundesweht officer on the subject.
Yes the exports helped balance the books but finance didn't constrain German output at any point in the war and should not have been a determinative consideration (unlike pre-war when compulsion was less regular).
Say what? Finance constrained German output throughout the war...its part of the reason the Nazis pulled their social security Ponzi scheme and massive deficit spending to finance the war.
Screws need not be tightened much, if at all, before France falls. Most of the production delta is post-France but enabled by investment decisions pre-France. Only after investments in greater vehicle etc. production come on line are greater labor and materials inputs needed. Plenty of time between France and Barbarossa to produce the additional armaments.
Uh, they can't be tightened at all if there is nothing to leverage the opposite nation with. Most of the "production delta" immediately after the French Campaign was due to the widespread looting of French resource stockpiles and machine tools. Furthermore, "investments in greater vehicle etc. production" require capital investments, primarily in plant buildings, rail and road connections, power, and acquisition and installation of machine tools suitable for the purpose. One reason that BMM and Skoda only built 38(t)-based vehicles was the limitations of the construction halls in terms of space and overhead crane capacity...and the cost (time, finance, labor) to refit them.
Sure, and it was mostly coercion done by foreign governments against their own people as in Vichy's STO. Start pushing those governments earlier, in immediate aftermath of France. Hitler already knows he's gonna invade USSR, needs more men and stuff.
How do you coerce a foreign government when you don't have any coercive means? Coercion worked really well with Spain. :roll: It worked really well with Sweden. :roll: It worked really well with Hungary. :roll: It worked really well with Romania. :roll: It worked really well with Italy. :roll: They were all neutrals or allies. What are they going to "push" them with? Tweets in all CAPS? Withhold exports that are as vital for Germany to export as they are vital for the country to receive? That is wacko-Trump-trade thinking.
Now they could coerce countries very easily after they occupied them. The Poles and French, as well as other later attest to that. They could coerce populations after they captured them, as in British, French, Dutch, and other PW put to work. However, they cannot be coerced if they aren't in German control.
Vichy? The actual arm twisting took a couple of months of negotiations and then it was six months before 240,000 skilled French workers (in addition to the 100,000 French non-coerced workers that went to Germany June 40-June 42) were at work in Germany. The second requisition of 240,000 French took another six weeks to negotiate and further months to round up and send to Germany. And so on. It was not overnight.
BTW, Hitler waffled back and forth on the whole "invade Russia" thing.
You'll note that nowhere in my writing have I said Hitler should have upped investment in panzer divisions specifically pre-war. Rather I've advocated across-the-board higher investment in the Heer, some of which includes higher investment in panzers. I have purposely avoided allowing myself the hindsight bias of panzer focus pre-Poland.
Who said anything about "panzer divisions"? Schnelltruppen, literally "fast troops" included the Panzerwaffe, Infanterie (mot), Panzerjäger, Aufklärung, and Reiterei...all more or less "motorized" as in the 20 extra motorized divisions you are talking about. As of the end of the French Campaign they were 19 divisions of 167 or 11.4%. An "across the board higher investment" to double that under your scheme would mean enlarging the Heer to 334 divisions, which seems extreme. Similarly, if the prewar 15 Schnelldivisionen out of the 112 planned are doubled in an "across the board higher investment" that means an expansion to 224 divisions. Not bloody likely.
Another interesting "what if," however, is what if Guderian had the political position of Goering?
I was waiting for good old Heinz to enter the pantheon. On 1 February 1938, Guderian was promoted from Generalmajor (brigadier general) to Generalleutnant (major general, don't be confused by the usual transliteration, a Generalleutnant was a senior divisional or junior corps commander) as commander of the 2. Panzerdivision. He was appointed commander of XVI. Armeekorps on 4 February and promoted to General der Panzertruppen on 1 November 1938 and was appointed Chef der schnellen Truppen im Oberkommando des Heeres on 20 November 1938.
1938. I didn't specify a month but say September. Adjustments to programs didn't occur only at FY turnover.
No, budgets were readjusted of course by supplementary budgets, but the major funding was planned according to the fiscal year. So then, September 1938 it is.
Ugh. Here's the point:
Curtailing the panzer production program in early 39 set back the clock on the investment path Germany needed to take to ramp up its armored forces.
Ugh back at you. Here's the point: the Panzer production program was not "curtailed" in early 39. Production of the Panzer III was delayed by its problematic development history. Production of the Panzer IV could not be substantially increased until Nibelungenwerke was completed and Vomag converted from producing heavy trucks, since the Krupp-Grusonwerke was maxed out.
However, Nibelungen did not begin work until 10 February 1941 doing assembly work of components manufactured by Steyr, about 21 months after construction was authorized, did not begin actual production of components itself until March-April 1941...and completed its first actual Panzer IV in November 1941. All of one of them and then two more the next month for good measure. In fact, construction of the production halls continued into 1942. Vomag was directed to begin rebuilds of Panzer IV in June 1940 and then expanded its facilities to do full scale production in 1941, although construction of its Panzerhalle was not completed until 1943. It completed its first Panzer IV in August 1941 (two of them).
On 11 July 1938, Inspektorat 6 (In 6) of the Allgemeines Heeresamt awarded extension orders for 759 Panzer III and 223 Panzer IV in addition to the 2,155 Panzer III and 640 Panzer IV already ordered. By 1 April 1940, 414 Panzer III had been delivered and 2,156 remained on order, 10 StuG III had been delivered and 520 remained on order, and 308 Panzer IV had been delivered and 848 remained on order.
I do realize that. Which is why I've said not a word about getting manpower from the KM.
Good, just wanted to be sure.
