What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[Hanny]

I wont nitpick every mistake you made, but here are just a few:

Nor will you even attempt to answer question put to you. So sad.

Your understanding of rail transport needs work. You should talk to an expert. If you have only a single line, the trains only go in one direction. That means, when two trains meet up, engine to engine, things either come to a halt ( best case scenario ) or get tragically funny in a Gomez Addams sort of way ( worst case scenario ) Remember, if you are taking trains to Murmansk, you are also feeding Murmansk, and taking them food, coal, and oil, etc. You aren't just hauling Lend lease out.
If you are moving a train north from Archangelsk to Murmansk, NO trains can be moving south, unless you put them on shunt lines ( passing lines ) while the opposite direction train passes. And, if you go on Google Earth, you won't find many shunt lines on that track. Trains would be stopping and waiting. And waiting. And, with the well known reliability of Soviet rail equipment, they will be ...... waiting.....

You stated that the Soviets had only lost 15% of their rail cars and locomotives. However, the Soviets admit that, in the first two years of the war, they lost over 16,000 engines to bombing and other causes. This implies that the Soviet Union had 106,000 locomotives at the start of the war ? Sorry, but at the start of the war, the Soviet Union had only 25,000 locomotives and 600,000 rail cars of ALL types. This means that the Soviet Union, in the first two years of the war, lost 60 % of its pre war rail engines. This was why they were so desperate to get their hands on American Decapods.

Will an expert, unlike you, know the difference between losses from all causes, in two years, and those in the entire war?.

Nope thats not how single track lines operated, more on that later. No 16000 is for the entire period of the war lost, not the first two years. No it does imply 106000 locomotives. So desperate for foreign locomotives,they dont ask for them till after kursk was fought and won, none sent till late 43 and none in use before 44.

1. Average speed of a current Russian Freight Train is 6.5 miles per hour, which is just slightly slower than it was during WW2. ( these are official Russian figures ) This is slower than a U.S. Freighter. During the war, the NKPS tried to run its trains at a standard 25 kmph ( about 15 mph )

2. By Rail, from Moscow to Murmansk, the shortest line is 1081 miles, almost all on a double track line from Archangelsk It is longer if you go through Leningrad ( 1299 miles ) but that was cut off in 1941. But, if Moscow falls, the Archangelski double track line becomes cut off, and now you are going to take a round about route of some 1321 miles, almost all on single track lines. ( Figures direct measurement from Google Earth )

3. A typical Soviet WW2 freight train comprised a number goods wagons or specialist wagons, and a brake van, and during a day’s travel it would have a number of different engines. Soviet trains were 120 axles long, which gave a gross weight of 1,200 tonnes for the rolling stock and cargo or a net weight of 650 tonnes of cargo. Typically this was 60 two-axle goods wagons, each carrying 10–15 tonnes of cargo, 40 men or eight horses.

4. The capacity of a particular line was the number of trains that could run down its length both up and down, usually given as 12 pairs of trains a day for single lines or 24 pairs of trains for double track lines for restored military railways.


So, to summarize, it is further from Moscow to Murmansk than you think, the Soviet trains run slower, they carry less cargo, and have to spend a lot of time stopped waiting for other trains to pass.

Just the simple math, 80,000 tons LL per month divided by 650 tons per train means 123 trains per month. And. moving at 15 mph for over 1320 miles, that implies a minimum travel time of 176 hours round trip. ( Thats with no loading time, unloading time, sit time at sidings waiting for oncoming trains to pass, or breakdowns. ) If you add a day for loading, another for unloading, that adds 48 hours, add in another
6 hours waiting on sidings, ( you have 4 trains per day each way, each train takes 3.5 days each way, that means 14 trains on the line going each way, or a train meets another train about every three hours. So, every three hours, you have to go to a siding. If there is a siding there. If not, you go to the siding you are close to, and wait. and wait. It works out to be about 230 hours per run, or about 9.5 days.

And this means that some of the Lend lease cargo is going to sit out in the open for a month before it gets hauled South. That's the effect of Moscow being taken by the Germans.

So, while the Lend lease of 1941 might be doable, the Lend lease of 1942 is going to start stacking up. This will be a problem.

You have just counted it as a round trip time, so you double the time to deliver, you trebbled the load unloading times the SU operated under, youv used average speed a quarter of what it was, and the question was is their the capacity in 41 to move it in a realistic manner. They actually carried more, a lot more, not less cargo. You ended with how the Germans operated, not how the Russian operated.

Simple maths things then. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewc ... odmilintel

U. S. S. R. railroads are of broad gauge. The capacity of a Soviet train, approximately 1,200 'short tons, is more than twice the capacity of a comparable train of Western European cars. Soviet troop trains average from 12 to 15 miles per hour.

c. Railroad capacity. The average daily capacity of main U. S. S. R. double-track lines is from 30 to 40 trains. Single-track lines averagr from 15 to 20 trains daily.
To iT'crease the capacity of railroad lines during operations, the Soviets operate lines one way only. Trains maintain visual distance. This mt::hod increases the capacity of even hastily repaired single.track lines to from 40 to 50 trains daily.

d. Military trains. Standard Russian military trains total 120 axles. However, trains on trunk lines may have from 166 to 172 axles. Cars are either 2- or 4-axle types, of 20· or 55- to 66-short ton capacities respectively.


1200 tons a train, 40 to 50 a day on single track line, is a daily capacity of 48000-60,000 tons a day in transit. Cargo is 26000 to 32000 in transit each day.

Here is an example of the speed of deliveries of LL, the Matildas and 3 months logistics for them, arrive in Murmansk on the 11th Oct, travail to kazan and inspected on the 14th by 15th they in service/training for the 15 day training period for the crews,in Moscow Kazan Tank school.

3/4 days from Murmansk to Moscow.

Right. The 1943 map. A lot of that outer ring was single track line, with few shunt lines and no marshalling yards. These were all built during the war, starting in summer of 1942, after the front had stabilized, and continuing into the 1960s. In fact, some of lines were still single track as late as the 1990s, according to Google Earth.

Your the only one using google, you should stop that.http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png is the 43 original map. Acording to the russians it was all built pre war and finished during 42-44. the map you posted shows towns 00s of miles past Moscow under German control.

Trouble is, we're talking about 1941 - 1942. You can't run a train on a track that isn't built yet, no matter how good a communist you are.

Oh dear, the map shows what is present, your the one now claiming its wrong on what was present as well.

Apparently the German General Staff didn''t know how to read a map. But, then again, they'd screwed up 27 years earlier, so, what else is new ?

The question is your inability to read the map.

Well, if the Germans occupy Moscow, they capture anything the Soviets fail to destroy. And, as for food, I have no doubt that several hundred thousand Russian civilians will be captured, which could dramatically lower the requirement for shipping rations to the German troops.....

If. Having 70% of your rail inoperative gives you only 30% of your daily needs arriving at rail head, from there with half your trucks inoperative your only getting half of that close to the front, at the front, with half your trucks gone, you can only get half of that to the end user.

00s of 000s of extra months means not more required, acording to the regs for civilains, but less, you have a basic disconnect with how to use maths to answer anything.

Yes, but this included over 55,000 Studebaker deuce-and-a-halfs. Mr. Hanny, do you know what the slang term for a military truck is in the Russian Army ? An ex-Soviet soldier told me: ' Shtoodabakker ' .

Was, not is, its not the 50s dont you know.

The cold war SU viewpoint point went right over your cold war head, the SU fought and won in 41/2 with very little LL playing a part on who will win, from late 43 to 44 it played a large part in how quickly the SU would win and where the rec Army would end up being.

[MarkN]

Obviously the Soviets were too stupid to build passing sidings.

Apparently so. :roll:

If you have only a single line, the trains only go in one direction. That means, when two trains meet up, engine to engine, things either come to a halt ( best case scenario ) or get tragically funny in a Gomez Addams sort of way ( worst case scenario )

[Richard Anderson]

I was being sarcastic, since that is all this thread deserves at this point...

[Carl Schwamberger]

May deserve closure & action against individuals.

[ljadw]

Some corrected figures
In June 1941 the Soviets had 20000/25000 locs and 650000 waggons.
The Germans captured in 1941 2173 locs (1223 operational ) and 53850 waggons (all operational )
They built 1146 locs and 1000 waggons and received from LL 1900 locs and 11000 waggons .
Sources : Geschichtforum and Forum der Wehrmacht .

[TheMarcksPlan]

The thread has gone a bit off topic...
Anyone want to start a "what if Russia loses Moscow and its rail junction" thread?

As I've said already, I don't think losing Moscow alone dooms the SU.
Per Barber and Harrison's work on the SU economy, the entire Moscow region produced ~17% of SU's coal in 43. Had Moscow fallen, many workers and plant would have been relocated further east to the KuzBas and Karaganda coal mining regions, so the net impact would have been slightly less.
The region was important and its loss would have stung but not enough to change the outcome.

Germany needed to reach the A-A line by the end of the '42 campaign to push Stalin's warmaking potential down to ~half its 1943 OTL power.
Losing the Caucasus and the new oil region around Kuibyshev would have cut Soviet domestic production by ~95%, meaning that Russian war effort was tied to the endurance of its stocks and L-L shipments. Loss of Archangelsk and the Caucasus would cut off ~50% of L-L capacity as the Persian route's main course ran through Baku and the Caspian, while SU/Allies would have taken a while to build a new rail route and/or port facilities through Kazakhstan to the front.

How does Germany reach the A-A line by the end of 1942 campaign? IMO there's no operational/strategic path except one that involves (1) stronger forces at the outset of Barbarossa and (2) a commitment to a multi-year campaign with the appropriate logistical/economic footing implied.

I've presented two amplifications of German force: a 20-division ATL and an 8-division ATL. IMO an extra 8 divisions is sufficient but I'm open to other theories. Working backwards from the minimum initial force amplification to the economic path to those forces would present the complete path of an ATL to the A-A line. One could still argue then about whether the path is too radical a departure from German mindset and whether the post-AA-line war leaves Hitler in control of Europe.

When I say that Germany was close to winning Barbarossa, keep in mind what I mean: I most certainly do not mean it was close by the operation's end in December 1941. Rather, I mean that slightly stronger forces would have changed attrition picture sufficiently in Germany's favor that by the end of '41 Germany was able to hold its front easily over the winter and push to the Volga in '42. Basically we're looking at an exponential feedback loop here where stronger German forces at time A mean weaker SU at time B, which means stronger Germans and weaker Russians at time C, etc.

"Close" means that Germany was close to having sufficient forces to kill/capture Reds faster than SU could field them (at a broad level, even with 20 extra German divisions, SU will field more men in June 1942 than June 1941. SU just won't be able to field enough to stop/push back Germany).

An ATL in which Germany faces "only" ~4mil RKKA along the Volga/AA front in June 1943 (as opposed to ~7mil OTL) is one in which Germany can really drop the hammer on the Allies in Italy and/or can inflict another season of devastating losses on the Eastern Front. Having taken the Caucasus, Germany by mid-43 has at least the ~5mil tons of oil flowing from Maikop and Grozny. It therefore has a stronger LW (more fuel for training) and/or better productivity out of fuel-starved occupied Europe. If Germany can get the Baku operation running they're doubly powerful in 1944. They have additional resources flowing from the Donets Basin, where Germany had been investing seriously prior to its liberation by RKKA.

With sufficient determination and willingness to lose millions of men, UK/USA can probably get to Berlin some day. But Churchill had absolutely no stomach for this and I doubt Americans would have put up with it either.

[Hanny]

Some corrected figures
In June 1941 the Soviets had 20000/25000 locs and 650000 waggons.
The Germans captured in 1941 2173 locs (1223 operational ) and 53850 waggons (all operational )
They built 1146 locs and 1000 waggons and received from LL 1900 locs and 11000 waggons .
Sources : Geschichtforum and Forum der Wehrmacht .

Origin of that is schluer Logistics in russia https://www.beck-shop.de/schueler-logis ... ct/9009727 but he does not provide all operational for the wagons which include passenger and freight, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Nv4 ... ns&f=false

The forum you used is changing what the author wrote.

The question was the level of SU rail assets captured by start of Typhoon, i gave that number, Heer captured 2,237 rail cars and 231 locomotives from the Soviets as of 1.11.1941 now if you have another authors view on how many they had captured by the start of typhoon, that would of use.

650,000 wagons is for 1938,( see same thread post 58) after Poland and the Baltic Stataes were taken over it rises to 715,000 viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286&start=30 see post 38.

[Hanny]

More on this later.

3. A typical Soviet WW2 freight train comprised a number goods wagons or specialist wagons, and a brake van, and during a day’s travel it would have a number of different engines. Soviet trains were 120 axles long, which gave a gross weight of 1,200 tonnes for the rolling stock and cargo or a net weight of 650 tonnes of cargo. Typically this was 60 two-axle goods wagons, each carrying 10–15 tonnes of cargo, 40 men or eight horses.

This you got from https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... -19411945u

The 650 tons used is the average military transfer loads, ie its not the nett load of a train but an average of a number of inputs over time,the author goes on

"The economic daily car loadings at 30,570 represent 565,545 tonnes or another 510 freight trains (of 120 axles and 1,100 tonnes net)"


See post 31 https://www.forum.axishistory.com/viewt ... 6&start=30 1941 average nett daily tonnage of a wagon in 1941 actual transfer of freight,17.1 tonns.

So you used 650 nett, when according to the website, using Hunter data the daily average was 60*17.1=1026 tons net, you used 6.5 mph while the author uses 25 mph.

[EKB]

We know how quickly the SU distributted the LL in 41, its roughly:
40 miles an hour average speed of train.

Average of 40 mph … in a war zone?

I was a train crew member for Canadian Pacific Railway, which also operates in the United States. In 2015 the national average speed for a CP train was about 21 mph, but in my personal experience the average was closer to 15 mph. My job was conductor, on freight trains that stretched up to one mile in length.

I worked on a CP-owned line that was also leased by Amtrak for passenger service. On certain parts of the main line, the posted speed limit for freight service was 59 mph. I don’t believe that we ever held that speed for more than a total of 30 minutes during one 12-hour shift.

Speed limits are set by classification of track, loaded weight, condition of trains, track and ties, curvature, company rules, and government regulations. Track integrity varies quite a bit, even on the same line. This depends on craftsmanship, age and quality of materials, repair history, number of hills, valleys, crossings, firmness of ground under tracks and bridges.

Aside from constant changes in speed limits, the train often stopped to let others pass, or because dispatchers had to sort out traffic jams, calls from maintenance staff, equipment failures, derailments, and other incidents that blocked movement. Not enough sidings exist to move a train around every problem that emerges.

The raw fact is, a single track train line is MUCH less efficient than a two track line. You are constantly shunting onto spurs to allow trains to move in the opposite direction, and the material handling capabilities on these lines were limited at best. While the Soviets were not cut off from Murmansk, they had trouble moving material until they began to double sections of the line in summer of 1943.

Another raw fact is the level of efficiency is irrelevant, if a single track can carry the load required, in the time required, having a double track and increasing efficiency is not relevant.

Managing trains moving in opposite directions on a single track is not just inefficient, it's also extremely dangerous. Even with modern communications, real time monitoring and computerized rail traffic control equipment that Russia obviously did not have in 1941. It would be instructive to compare safety data and accident rates on wartime railways versus current standards.

I don’t know how the reliability of a World War II steam engine stands up to the General Electric AC4400CW diesel locomotives that I crewed. Most of the road breakdowns that I saw on the job were caused by worn out or broken parts on the freight cars.

[Hanny]

Average of 40 mph … in a war zone?

What war zone?, the SU was transferring freight across its own controlled areas. But your right its way to high a value, as i meant klm not miles an hour.

LL Matildas made it in 3 days, 72 hours at 25 mph/40klm ( 1800 miles travail distance with tank school 1200 miles from Murmansk) puts them in Tank school, from Murmansk, and the train that delivered them well on its way somewhere else.

Aside from constant changes in speed limits, the train often stopped to let others pass, or because dispatchers had to sort out traffic jams, calls from maintenance staff, equipment failures, derailments, and other incidents that blocked movement. Not enough sidings exist to move a train around every problem that emerges.

Ok, thats how the west does and did it, but its not how the commies did it in ww2.viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286&start=15 see post 29 see http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewc ... odmilintel how the SU military used one way traffic.

[Hanny]

It would be instructive to compare safety data and accident rates on wartime railways versus current standards.

J Erickson, The Soviet High Command, gives for 1934: 62000 accidents with damage to 7000 locomotives. NKVD took over safety on the railroads next year, but he does not say what effect that had.

[ljadw]

Some corrected figures
In June 1941 the Soviets had 20000/25000 locs and 650000 waggons.
The Germans captured in 1941 2173 locs (1223 operational ) and 53850 waggons (all operational )
They built 1146 locs and 1000 waggons and received from LL 1900 locs and 11000 waggons .
Sources : Geschichtforum and Forum der Wehrmacht .

Origin of that is schluer Logistics in russia https://www.beck-shop.de/schueler-logis ... ct/9009727 but he does not provide all operational for the wagons which include passenger and freight, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Nv4 ... ns&f=false

The forum you used is changing what the author wrote.

The question was the level of SU rail assets captured by start of Typhoon, i gave that number, Heer captured 2,237 rail cars and 231 locomotives from the Soviets as of 1.11.1941 now if you have another authors view on how many they had captured by the start of typhoon, that would of use.

650,000 wagons is for 1938,( see same thread post 58) after Poland and the Baltic Stataes were taken over it rises to 715,000 viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286&start=30 see post 38.

On page 116 of Deutsche Reichsbahn 1939-1945 ( By Andreas Knipping and Reinhard Schulz ) one can read the following :

Bis Ende August 1941 vielen etwa tausend sowjetische Loks in deutsche Hände,davon die Hälfte betriebsfähig .
The Germans had captured at the end of August 1941 some 1000 sovjet locs,of which 500 were operational .
No source is given .
If this is correct,the number of captured sovjet locs at the start of November 1941 would be much higher than 231.

[Avalancheon]

The lynchpin of this ATL is a slightly more powerful Operation Barbarossa that actually achieves its central strategic goal: destruction of the bulk of the Red Army west of the Dvina-Dniepr line. Contrary to common perception, the Ostheer largely failed at this task: the largest Red Army grouping (Southwest Front) retreated intact – though damaged – from the border battles, as did Southern Front and Northwest Front. Only Army Group Center succeeded.

Operational failure by AGS and AGN enabled Stavka to concentrate its entire first echelon of reserves (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd armies plus several mechanized corps) and most of the first wave of newly-mobilized forces against Army Group Center (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 43rd armies at least). These forces reconstituted Western Front repeatedly and forced AGC into a costly and prolonged Smolensk battle that disrupted German planning and shook confidence in early victory. Relatively speaking, the Red Army contained AG’s South and North with little reinforcement. See maps from Glantz’s Stumbling Colossus below:

This is a fascinating thread. What TheMarcksPlan has written here is worthy of consideration.

If the Heer had been able to raise 20 additional motorised divisions for operation Barbarossa, then they certainly would have been able to destroy a greater proportion of the Red Army before it could withdraw behind the Dvina and Dnieper river. This would tear much larger holes in the Soviet front line that would be harder to fill with their reserve forces. In turn, this would enable the Germans to make faster progress through the USSR and more easily overrun their territory.

The Ostheer possesses 20 additional divisions (10 panzer and 10 motorized infantry) on June 22, 1941 in this ATL. Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August.

This seems quite achievable. Although depending on how you count them, it would more likely be four armys totally destroyed (with one badly damaged).

With two panzer groups at its disposal (one in Poland, one in Romania), Army Group South could conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy three armys. Panzer group 1 would strike to Zhytomir, and panzer group 6 would strike to Berdychiv. This would trap 6th, 26th, and 12th armys in a pocket, along with a number of reserve forces. 5th army would probably escape, albeit badly mauled.

With three panzer corps at its disposal (all in East Prussia), Army Group North could likewise conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy one army. Two panzer corps would strike to Daugavpils and Jakobpils, while one panzer corps would strike to Riga. This would trap 8th army in a pocket. 11th army would still escape, however.



All things taken into consideration, this scenario would result in an even more lopsided victory for the Heer. These massive blows would shatter the Red Army and put them on a substantially worse footing than they were historically. The reserve forces sent to fill the huge gaps in their front lines would be more thinly spread, leading to worse outcomes in July and August.

AGC executes the Smolensk battle with little trouble, sealing the central pocket by July 20th and going over to a relatively peaceful operational pause until early August. During this pause, AGC is reinforced by one of AGN’s PanzerGruppe (6 mobile divisions) and by one of AGS’s mobile corps (2 Pz + 1 Mot.Inf divisions).

Army Group South cannot send any of its panzer corps to Army Group Center. Not in August, at any rate. The two Army Groups are essentially isolated from each other by the Pripyat marshs. Its a gigantic swamp with minimal infrastructure. They can't link up until the Kiev salient is liquidated. This is one small problem with your scenario.

On August 6th, AGC launches Operation Typhoon spearheaded by its three PanzerGruppe, encircling nearly half of the Red Army’s standing field forces around Vyazma and Bryansk. After another brief operational pause and further reinforcement by AGS mobile forces, AGC is poised to launch the final assault on Moscow by September 6th with overwhelming force. Stalin is forced to concentrate the bulk of his undertrained new forces to defend the capital.

August 6th is likely too soon to launch an attack on Moscow. Even with the battle of Smolensk having been settled more quickly. They would need more time to build up a supply stockpile, particularly fuel. Mid to late August is a more likely date for operation Typhoon. This would give the Red Army a bit more time to prepare for the battle of Moscow (but not enough to matter, in the end).

Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.

The fall of Leningrad would be a major defeat for the Soviets, and a major victory for the Germans. It would greatly affect the balance of power in the northern sector, and have political and morale implications as well. Leningrad was regarded as Russias second capital city (after Moscow), and was the birthplace of the Soviet revolution. Its fall would be a blow to their prestige. Capturing the city would also allow the Germans to link up with the Finns, something they were never able to do in real life.

Leningrad would be a logistical hub for them, enabling them to ship supplys back and forth by rail. That is a game changer in the far north. The Germans could send trains up to Salla and Kuusamo, and resupply their troops. The Finns would be able to push from Petrozavodsk to Pindushi, thus cutting the Kirov railway. This would be easy, taking into account all the divisions that would be freed up after the siege. The liquidation of the Leningrad pocket would considerably shorten the Finnish front lines.

Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.

It isn't clear how Army Group South is is supposed to liquidate the Kiev salient by itself. Without assistance from Army Group Center, they would be forced to conduct either a frontal attack against Kiev itself (which was fortified), or a single envelopment through Kremenchuk. Neither approach will enable them to create an actual pocket. This would lead to the escape of a significant number of Soviet troops.

With only ~2 million men at the front in early September – many of them woefully undertrained - the Red Army can perhaps defend the capital if it abandons the fights around Leningrad and the far-eastern Ukraine. But of course Stalin can't accept that option. Leningrad falls with a massive prisoner haul in October, Moscow follows with a bigger haul in November. AGS pushes its weakened foes to the Don and takes Kharkov, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov by the onset of the worst weather in early December. Rundstedt is poised for Hitler’s next primary strategic goal of taking the Caucasus.

The Red Army would likely have well over 2 million soldiers by this point, given the failure to create a pocket at Kiev. But in spite of this, they would still be in a desperately vulnerable position, caught between a rock and a hard place. Too much to defend with too few troops. They would undoubtedly lose both battles.

The fall of Leningrad would yield about 400-500,000 prisoners. The fall of Moscow would probably yield even more prisoners. By this point, the Soviet Union would be in utter chaos. Most of their major population centers, agricultural areas, resources and infrastructure would be in German hands. The Red Army would be in tatters.

Rundstedt begins the Caucasus campaign during January, planning to reach Baku by October 1942 unless Soviet collapse enables a quicker advance. AGC and AGN resume their advance in the spring, occupying the Volga basin and cutting off or capturing Murmansk and Archangel in conjunction with the Finns. By early 1943 at the latest, Stalin – should he retain power – will be left with a population of only ~50 million aside from the dubiously loyal Central Asian republics. Perhaps as important, he will have virtually no oil production and only the Vladivostok lifeline to his Western Allies. Japan plans to sever that lifeline as the desperate Red Army rushes forces westward. The USSR will have lost all major agricultural regions, preventing any hope of evacuating most residents of the occupied territories with the retreating armies.

A winter advance towards the Caucasus is unfeasible. The terrain and weather would not permit it, nor would the logistical situation. Army Group Souths advance would likely terminate in Rostov. They would have to wait out the winter until they could resume their advance.

All in all, though, this scenario would be an unmitigated disaster for the USSR. Their ability to militarily resist the Germans would be greatly diminished by the end of 1941. Out of all the alternate Barbarossa scenarios that have been proposed on this website, yours would come the closest to achieving the Archangel-Astrakhan line. A Nazi victory of this scale would be utterly chilling.

It would not only give them permanent hedgemony over Europe, but would also put them in a position to execute their genocidal schemes. Not just the Holocaust, but Generalplan Ost as well. They would have no real need to gain the cooperation and compliance of the Slavs, and could rule them in the same brutal and merciless fashion they did with the Jews.

By the spring of 1943, Hitler can dictate harsh terms to the USSR and pivot all of his forces west, or can advance into the Urals and Central Asia with a significantly smaller Ostheer. The repeated Kesselschlacht of ’41 and ’42 have meant the Ostheer faced a much less numerous and competent Red Army after the Border Battles and has suffered far fewer casualties. The Wehrmacht has ~1 million more men at its disposal in May 1943 than in OTL and can spare at least a million more from Ostheer. Peace in the East or not, Hitler has sufficient forces to annihilate any incursion into Europe, a fact the West knows and accepts.

Basically, this entire scenario would result in a more extreme version of the Anglo-American Nazi war. A hellish grimdark dystopia.

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TheMarcksPlan, you have written a detailed, plausible, and very interesting project. Despite several small flaws, it is a very good work of alternate history. Your scenario should be developed further.

[Hanny]

On page 116 of Deutsche Reichsbahn 1939-1945 ( By Andreas Knipping and Reinhard Schulz ) one can read the following :

Bis Ende August 1941 vielen etwa tausend sowjetische Loks in deutsche Hände,davon die Hälfte betriebsfähig .
The Germans had captured at the end of August 1941 some 1000 sovjet locs,of which 500 were operational .
No source is given .
If this is correct,the number of captured sovjet locs at the start of November 1941 would be much higher than 231.

Beute des Heeres as of Nov 1 1941 says 2,237 RR cars and 231 locomotives captured.

Since you have accepted that number, and used and re used this number, on this forum and others, why now do you doubt it?.

[MarkN]

TheMarcksPlan, you have written a detailed, plausible, and very interesting project. Despite several small flaws, it is a very good work of alternate history. Your scenario should be developed further.

It might have credibility if the proposal was based upon realistic changes in decision-making and credible arguments rather than hand waves.

The Heer fell short of achieving the objectives they themselves set. The fell a long, long way short. The reasons they failed are numerous, interwoven and complex. There is no "magic bullet" solution how to give Germany victory, because there is no simple, single element of the complex issue to change from failure-bringer to success-bringer.

The Heer ground to a halt before they even got half way to their geographical objective. They fell short after having failed to achieve their principle tactical objective - destruction of the majority of the Red Army at the border.

TheMarksPlan offers no substance to his premise that an additional 20 mech divs would have made the difference necessary to achieve the tactical objective - he just hand waves that they will. TheMarksPlan assumes his 'attrition ratios' are fixed and undeniable to justify his belief that, after Smolensk, the Heer has sufficient combat power to press on. Anybody can spit out loss ratios from their own head that fit their own desired end state.

TheMarksPlan recognises that to create and support this additional 20 mech divs, a series of very significant strategic decisions have to be altered from what were historically done. Quite unrealistic.

In brief, there is no credible argument that an additional 20 mech divs would make a difference - one is expected just to accept the premise, and the decision-making process required to deliver that additional force and it's support is quite unrealistic.