What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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ljadw
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#361

Post by ljadw » 19 Jul 2019, 08:25

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:35
RichardAnderson wrote:a Panzer Division would use about 200-210 cubic meters of fuel (c. 55,000 gallons) to move a Panzer division over 50-100 kilometers of ground, depending on the terrain and degree of opposition. A Panzergenadier/Infanterie-Division (mot) would consume 170 cubic meters (c. 45,000 gallons).
Thanks.
So by the mid-range estimate in your figures 20 divs (10 mot, 10pz) would burn 1.000,000 gallons per 75km, 13,333gals/km, 40.7t/km.
Moscow is ~1,000km from Bialystok, call the overall advance 1,500km to be safe.
At 40.7t/km that's 61,000t fuel consumed: 0.7% of Germany's 1941 fuel budget.

Even if we use multiples of that figure for diversions from the east-west line of advance, you have to stretch quite a bit to reach even the 3% figure that, as I argue above, Germany would have been more than happy to trade for victory in the East.

Can we put to rest the idea that fueling 20 additional mobile divisions would cause Germany to run out of fuel?
RichardAnderson wrote:I'm not sure what an "incremental fuel burn" is
Fuel burn attributable to having 20 additional - incremental - divisions as specified in my maximal "Stronger Barbarossa" ATL.
I'm going to start pervasively using terms like "incremental" and "delta" to conceptually separate issues attributable to having more ATL forces from issues endemic to the OTL Heer. Some posters have trouble differentiating generalized OTL issues from those caused by additional forces. Maybe consistent labeling will help relieve some of the mental load of following the ATL.
Fueling 20 additional mobile divisions operating EAST of Moscow was logistically impossible .It was already impossible to fuel the stationary divisions of 6th army before Uranus .
You have no idea how is working a railway system : your 1000/1500 km is wrong : it must be 2000/3000 km, as a train going with fuel over a distance of 1000 km ,must return to the point where it started .
It would take 14 days for a train to go from Bialystok to Moscow with 400/500 ton of fuel and to return to Bialystok .If the mobile divisions would need 4000 ton of fuel daily, that means 10 trains dailty ,multiplied by 14 = 140 trains in total .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#362

Post by Hanny » 19 Jul 2019, 09:02

Russ3Z wrote:
18 Jul 2019, 19:46


To that end, was the rubber supply a further constraint at this time, and if so were Buna/etc production increases possible in a reasonable timeline? I saw the rubber issue very briefly mentioned earlier in this topic, but very little discussion seemed to result.
http://willzuzak.ca/cl/bookreview/Fritz2011Ostkrieg.pdf
General Georg Thomas, the economic expert in the OKW , presented a devastating picture: tire requirements were deficient by some 50 percent, while sufficient fuel existed for only about two months of combat. Note if you look at the planning meeting you find the actual numbers ( Industry produced 7300 tons of tyres, consumption was 12000 tons of tyres)
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#363

Post by MarkN » 19 Jul 2019, 10:37

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 02:17
Hi Mark. Bring some decent research like Hanny or some incisive analysis and I'll be willing to expend effort explaining to you.
This thread is a constuct of your fantasy. The fantasy narrative is reams and reams of words made up in your head. How can l, or anybody else, research your thoughts?

All l and others can do is research the real world and analyse what happened historically. But since your fantasy is premised upon repeated denials of historical reality, what's the point? Why would l spend my time and effort demonstrating that X was possible and Y was impossible, when all you counter with is another diversion to historical reality to claim Y is now possible? You've already dehumanized all the formation commanders so that they operate as robots carry out your gaming commands....

It seems to me that this thread is all about you seeking others to do all your schoolwork for you. You want to know about the real history of BARBAROSSA but are too lazy to do your own research, reading and analysis. You expect others to do the leg work of researching the real world whilst you just sit pinging out your fantasies. Very cristianmunchesque! :roll:

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#364

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Jul 2019, 10:56

MarkN wrote:All l and others can do is research the real world and analyse what happened historically
Get cracking on that research and analysis Mark. I haven't seen any signs of it yet.
MarkN wrote: you seeking others to do all your schoolwork for you
Get cracking Mark.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#365

Post by Hanny » 19 Jul 2019, 11:10

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
Hanny continues with his course on how NOT to do alternate history.
Nope, i again pointed out your ATL is an example of how not to do it, by referring to OTL and how far you are from it. You appear confused that i offered an ATl, i have not.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
Once again he can't conceptually distinguish OTL fuel deficits from the deltas to fuel deficits arising from the ATL delta to existing forces.
My post however did however show your 6 Pzr Groups with im going to supply them from production is a strategic error thats cost the wargame (HOI) your playing and you opponents laughs ( because your strrtergy is based on not being able to count) and points at the basic errors you have made, which cost you the game, when you sent your 6 PZR groups expecting enough fuel from production to meet their consumption turned out not to be the case, and you ran out of all fuel in month 3 for the entire military.


TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
In order for his argument to succeed, he'd have to show that the extra divisions would exacerbate fuel shortages to such an extent that something like German collapse would ensue (i.e. Ostheer running completely out fuel).
Wrong. Im taking the piss out of your ATL, due to your inability to think, and ignorance of actual history and economics, which has produced a childish OTL.

All i need do is show the most probably outcome of the changes you made, more formations consuming fuel means the pre war planning of we can do this for 2 to 2.5 months before we run out, you seem unaware the plan was expected to fail from lack of resources, means you have less time to achieve a better outcome because you increased consumption, from more formations with fewer assets. Only someone as mthamaticly challanged as your, thinks combat efficiency improves by having fewer assets.

FM Bock ( amongst others) ordered that “further advances should be temporarily suspended” until supply problems could be overcome.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
In order to make that argument, he'd have to explain why it's impossible for Hitler/OKW to have shifted something like an additional 1% of Germany's fuel budget towards Barbarossa.
He'd be able to make that showing if, for example, total collapse of LW/KM operations or the economy would result from the ~1% shift. But nobody can possibly believe that.
Nope, all need show is that the pre war planning showed when they expected to run out, and how much quicker it would have been under your changes, secondly, you cant purchase what is not there to purchase no matter how much you want to pay for it. As i posted, you cant purchase what is not available to purchase.


TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
In either case, I don't see fuel being the strategic constraint on how many forces are deployed in Barbarossa.
Because your incompetent, cant count of think critically.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36

I wrote that "even IF you're right that 2PzGr need 300,000t fuel, it's still worth it."
Now you're triumphantly proclaiming that your own figure was too high!
Yes you did. Three times i have pointed out i referd to total suopplies, and you refer to that as being fuel, and i am also correct that you not only cannot do math, you cant comprehend the written word. My figure not for fuel, its for all supplies and is not to high for fuel, not least because i have not given it.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36

For other readers capable of grasping conditional logic, note why I do conditional framing of the issues
Learn how to read and count before trying anything more complex. Your trying to hard to sound clever when you actually not.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36

I missed this remark earlier but it's perfectly illustrative of everything you've written in this thread.
Its another fact, there was no more oil for AH to acquire. There is no strategy of spending more to acquire it, he was paying 4 times the barrel price in 40, and another 15% over that in 41 to get all Rom could produce and all Rom it had stockpiled, Rum went short because of it, to get it to the Reich was a further massive expense of RR infrastructure etc.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36

Strategy is simply beyond your capacities, Hanny.
It is?, how odd, i pointed out your strategy of spending more to purchase what is not for sale is flawed, and doomed to fail. Is pointing out constraints in reality to your magic bullet a flawed strategy?, no, will it succeed to convince you, probably not.

Your the one that gambling on a strategy with more MOT to win, only to find out you got the maths wrong, not me.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36

Not sure that's even true. HIstorical evidence of Hitler's pre-war strategy/intent regarding UK is messy, not least due to self-serving memoirs. Best evidence suggests Hitler didn't place high priority on actually conquering Britain and wanted its empire to survive a war.
Nothing you post is worth the time to read. Pre Dunkirk AH did not want a war to end the UK/Empire, after it refused to quit, he changed his mind, because he was now in exactly what he wanted to avoid, a war with no exit strategy opening to him a war of attrition over the long term, he planned therefore to reduce UK population by a third after conquest.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#366

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Jul 2019, 11:25

Hanny wrote:Your [sic] trying to [sic] hard to sound clever when you [sic] actually not.
I appreciate that you make no effort to hide your lack of cleverness.
Hanny wrote:i pointed out your strategy of spending more to purchase what is not for sale
For other readers: I presume you're familiar with the concept of opportunity cost. For example: a ton of gas "spent" on the Heer can't be "spent" on the LW/KM.

...I say that just in case you share with Hanny confusion about whether I'm recommending that Hitler buy more oil from the U.S. or something, rather than making strategic decisions about how to spend limited resources such as fuel.

Hanny - Have you heard the anecdote about how to divide up officers who are lazy/industrious and clever/dull? I mark you as one of the industrious and dull. Which means you can't be on the general staff but, seriously, you can be my research assistant. You've already helped in that regard, actually.
Hanny wrote:Nothing you post is worth the time to read.
ok bye!
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#367

Post by MarkN » 19 Jul 2019, 11:52

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 10:56
MarkN wrote:All l and others can do is research the real world and analyse what happened historically
Get cracking on that research and analysis Mark. I haven't seen any signs of it yet.
MarkN wrote: you seeking others to do all your schoolwork for you
Get cracking Mark.
In the absence of anyone from site management to remind you...
In the research sections of the forum, we ask the posters to be reasonably well-prepared, and not ask others for information which they could easily get for themselves. The purpose of these sections of the forum is to provide a place where historical matters can be intelligently discussed. It is not a research service.
I am not your research service.

I also note you are back to insulting anybody who dares to question your fantasy with their research. No doubt this is your bizarre way of bullying/mocking them into doing even more of your schoolwork.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#368

Post by ljadw » 19 Jul 2019, 12:27

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
ljadw wrote:YOU have given no indication at all that your ATL is possible
lol. What's the response to a post like this except to copy/paste the entire thread?
You and MarkN should have a separate forum entitled, "Can you repeat that?"
In post 276 you said that Germany could defeat the USSR in June 1943 with an undetermined number of mobile divisions ( 20 ? 30 ? 50 ? )on the AA line, which is going and returning, 4000 km from Warsaw.A distance a train would need 3/4 weeks to cover . 20 mobile divisions would need 4000 tons of fuel a day= 8 trains to be multiplied by 25 = 200 trains would be needed to transport fuel , this without ammunition,etc.Conclusion : it would be impossible to supply a big army on the AA line . Thus your ATL proposal deserves an F .Something you could have known if you had read a decent book about the role of the railways in operation Barbarossa,something you wisely have avoided, because it would appear that your proposal was out of the question .
Did you any thinking ? Have you been thinking on the following : if logistics prevented the Allies from crossing the Rhine in 1944, a small distance from Paris, while would logistics not prevent Germant to supply the Ostheer on the AA line, which is farther away from Warsaw ? Or did you start from the conviction that nothing was impossible for the German Landser?
Paris Cologne : 700 km
Warsaw Kazan : 2100 km .
The only German forces that could be supplied at the AA line, would be garrison forces who would need only few supplies and would live of the land .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#369

Post by Avalancheon » 19 Jul 2019, 12:37

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
For AGN to execute a double envelopment, we'd probably need only another six or so mobile divisions. Consider this the "AGN only" version of my original 20-division ATL. In your response to that ATL, I noticed that you think 11th army would likely survive while 8th army wouldn't. Here's the map again:

Image

You seem to envision a strike northwards to Riga that traps 8th army against the Baltic, while 11th army retreats in decent order across the Dvina.
My conception is different: a double-envelopment from the left and right flanks of AGN, with the pincers meeting west of the Dvina in Lithuania. OTL German forces achieved a remarkable pace of advance through this territory; quick penetration and encirclement seems likely IMO given that historical record. Manstein's corps reached the Dvina in 4 days, for example. SU Infantry would be hard pressed to retreat faster than that advance even if they started running on the first day, let alone to beat a faster advance by mechanized forces twice as strong.
Actually, I misunderstood your order of battle for this scenario. I double checked the post where you outlined the Ost Heers composition, and saw my error: viewtopic.php?p=2203114#p2203114

I was under the impression that for Army Group North, you had only provided three panzer corps, rather than four panzer corps. Thus, my objection no longer stands. Your scenario should be able to achieve the destruction of both 8th and 11th armys.


And actually, now that I think more about it, even three panzer corps should be able to destroy 8th army and maul 11th army.
If ?? corps advances to Riga, and 56th corps advances to Daugavpils, they can trap 8th army against the Dvina river. While this is happening, 41st corps can hit 11th army from behind and batter them.

This video is an excellent visual guide to operation Barbarossa across multiple sectors. At the 3 minute mark, you can see Army Group North in action: https://youtu.be/wu3p7dxrhl8
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
Supposing that Leeb traps/destroys the bulk of 8th/11th armies in this pocket, allow me to very roughly sketch the ATL hypothesis:

That leaves Northwest Front with only 27th army (plus rump 8th/11th) to defend the Dvina. Stavka probably will transfer forces from Western Front's right flank northward to cover this front (or will assign reserves otherwise committed against AGC, which functionally amounts to the same thing). Playing out the next month or so, I don't see the terrain between the Dvina and Volkhov rivers as favoring another kessel in AGN's sector. So probably one of AGN's PzGr cooperates with AGC to encircle/destroy forces on Bock's left flank around Nevel (OTL this was attempted but failed - insufficient forces to seal the pocket). With Bock's left flank cleared, Ostheer can capture Velikie Luki and its environs without difficulty and Bock can move forces from his flank to his front to face Timoshenko's counterattacks. Meanwhile, Leeb can concentrate all of his forces on the drive north of Lake Ilmen.
That sounds plausible to me. A double envelopment by four panzer corps would really hurt the Soviets. Army Group North would be able to advance through the Baltics alot faster.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
Long story short, the +6-division ATL should see AGN capture Leningrad, along with Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts (~500k men) during late fall. As discussed above, the Finns are freed to pursue their offensive ambitions in this scenario. If everything else proceeds as OTL, Germany suffers significantly fewer losses in 1941 than OTL and the SU significantly more. It probably holds its front over the winter without crisis. Come spring, the availability of Baltic ports/supplies, combined with greater reinforcements*, should arguably allow Germany to pursue another offensive in the north/center in addition to Blau (e.g. taking Moscow and/or Archangelsk). Which means Blau isn't wrecked by SU forces redirected from the Moscow region.
Again, no arguments here. 6 extra mobile divisions would be a game changer for Army Group North.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
...anyway that's just a sketch of an argument that a mere 6 extra divisions would have been sufficient for Barbarossa to succeed (plus preparation for a long war). I'm far from convinced of the case for that ATL, however. This kind of ATL might see significantly greater success on the Eastern Front but insufficient success to deter Allied invasion in the west to prevent Russian collapse. More people (especially UK/US troops) die in this ATL, but Hitler's still dead at the end of the war. Or it might not make that much difference even in the East. But that's the kind of question I'm interested to discuss. The lowest success condition I could imagine is Germany+6 divisions; 20 divisions seems clearly to decide the war in Germany's favor.
Honestly, even with this more 'modest' scenario where only Army Group North gets reinforced above its historical levels, the results would be significant. The loss of Leningrad and 500,000 extra soldiers would be considerable.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#370

Post by Hanny » 19 Jul 2019, 13:13

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
So by the mid-range estimate in your figures 20 divs (10 mot, 10pz) would burn 1.000,000 gallons per 75km, 13,333gals/km, 40.7t/km.
Moscow is ~1,000km from Bialystok, call the overall advance 1,500km to be safe.
At 40.7t/km that's 61,000t fuel consumed: 0.7% of Germany's 1941 fuel budget.

Even if we use multiples of that figure for diversions from the east-west line of advance, you have to stretch quite a bit to reach even the 3% figure that, as I argue above, Germany would have been more than happy to trade for victory in the East.
Wrong:
1000000 petrol gallons weighs 2,967 tons, at 75 klicks each bound, is 200*2,967=593,400 tons. By the time your Pzr want to attack moscow it has a min of 5 times behind it locked in the supply chain, ( train at 300 klicks a day to pass along the RR line creating depots every 300) there is therefore 2,967,000 tons locked up in the supply chain, for your extra 20 MOT formations according to your maths.

Number of truks jouneys, to move 593,400 tons, is 197,800, when 90*56*3=15120 exist to do it.


A better answer is:

Pzr Group fuel allocation per Division, 430 ton in engines to be consumed, 4-500 ton containerised fuel load for resupply which is replaced in 24 hours from the depots. 900 tons is 292,250 gallons and a 5 day supply.

1000 klm is direct line to Moscow, planners used 2 units of fuel for every mile moved forward. 20 klicks was planned for rail conversion and this fuel resupply from it.

In theory, using daily resupply, to reach Moscow at 1000klm distance at 20 klicks forward bound a day, is a refuel total of 50 resupplies. So there are 50 depots each pushing a days supply forward. At Moscow a units is consuming a days fuel in ops, behind it are depots pushing forward that fuel to it.Total amount of fuel per day in the supply chain, at that point is therefore, 50*1800=90000 per Division. ATL had 56 of them, requiring 14,000,000 tons of re fuel a day to operate, in the supply chain or consumed in 50 days by the 6 Pzr groups. But wait, each day they only go forward 20 klicks, ( 40 klicks in ops) and have consumed not all but 40% of their fuel so dont need a full resuplly. so, 8,400,000 was in supply chain or consumed and needs replacement. But wait thats what a leg army can march and is tied to the RR, a Pzr group is more mobile and can go 50 klm easy. Sure it can but its base of supply is still back on the RR head, the more you go forward the further distance your re supply has to come. This was bridged by the Grosstruppen, which gave the Pzr Groups that extra operational reach, they consume fuel to move depots near to where the PZR are operating, so re supply can take place the instead of the RR depot. These 20k (60,000 tons forward lift) Grosstruppen ( equivalent in consumption to another 10 Pzr/Mot in daily consumption of fuel) moved it from the rail head to where it was needed, creating a daisy chain away from the rail depots.

So we have a rr depot, from which 10 (fuel consumption PzR equivalent) Grosstruppen move supplies each day out to depots from which the Pzr groups draw on in a daisy chain. Instead of being tied to the daily resupply from the RR, we can reach out to either side with depots, perhaps 100-150 miles or so, from there the front line Pzr Groups draw supplies and are operating another 50 further away in combat and daisy chain back to the RR.

Pzr in contact, draws supply from depot a day to its rear, which draws supply from a rail head to its rear. To manover for combat used half the petrol in the engines. So the Div supply sets out to draw replace that 50 tons and its own consumption from the trip, from the depot in 24 hours, when it does the depot draws 50 from the rail depot who draws it from the Reich. So that 50 tons required at the front meant 400 being in the supply chain.

Each Pzr Div had 3 supply companies of trucks (90 total of 3 ton capacity) total capacity of resupply was therfore 270 tons to the range of a truck in 24 hours.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 06:36
Can we put to rest the idea that fuelling 20 additional mobile divisions would cause Germany to run out of fuel?
No. Germany ran out of fuel with existing force levels, increasing the principle users of fuel will just make it occur quicker. Your ATL just makes it happen a lot quicker.

September 41 total fuel received on Eastern front for the month 9620 tons.
Last edited by Hanny on 19 Jul 2019, 17:11, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#371

Post by Hanny » 19 Jul 2019, 13:35

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 11:25
I appreciate that you make no effort to hide your lack of cleverness.
I dont apreaciate your ignorance and incomptence, but you seem determined to continue to do so, adding dishonesty into the mix was only to be expected.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 11:25

For other readers: I presume you're familiar with the concept of opportunity cost. For example: a ton of gas "spent" on the Heer can't be "spent" on the LW/KM.
They unlike you are familiar with i want to buy more of something that is not for sale so why cant i have it. There was no more oil to be purchased at any price. Or your latest lets move the deckchairs around as the total number of chairs cant change or perhaps you think ship fuel oil can run a tank.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 11:25
...I say that just in case you share with Hanny confusion about whether I'm recommending that Hitler buy more oil from the U.S. or something, rather than making strategic decisions about how to spend limited resources such as fuel.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 11:25
I said German Production
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 11:25
"Stocks come from production and are set - not just replaced - according to strategic decisions. Change the strategic decisions and you can change the stocks."
Your just being dishonst at this point. Just how CM operated, he too thought he was writing a book, just like you.
Last edited by Hanny on 19 Jul 2019, 14:01, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#372

Post by Hanny » 19 Jul 2019, 13:55

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Jul 2019, 02:15
Hanny wrote:No strategy can command something that does not exist into existence
I missed this remark earlier but it's perfectly illustrative of everything you've written in this thread.

Suppose Hitler decided to defeat the UK with origami cranes. AFAIK OTL Germany produced no origami of any type.
Had Hitler adopted this strategy however, he easily could have produced millions of origami cranes. Import origami instructors for domestic crane-production from his ally Japan, for example, in exchange for mass shipments of wienershnitzel on U-boats.
Pursuant to his strategic vision, Hitler could have had the Luftwaffe blanket Britain in well-made origami from Brighton to Aberdeen.

Previously there had been no Luftwaffe origami bombs, after just one strategic decision the British are awash in paper delights.

Strategy is simply beyond your capacities, Hanny.
In Germany its called paper folding they had been doing it for centuries. It was not used in the war because Origami cranes have no military application and are non lethal.

Only you would send the LW to drop non lethal paper creations over the Uk airspace where it lost so many of its most experienced aircrews, for no practical military gain.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#373

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Jul 2019, 14:04

The meaning of "Barbarossa Derailed"(Glantz) was that AGC was fixed in place by relentless Soviet counterattacks for a period of some six weeks or so- critically delaying progress. Soviet reserves, previously unavailable- were deployed.
This can be seen on a day to day basis and the assaults largely fell on German infantry divisions while von Bock pulled the mobile ones into the rear.

If somehow, 20 infantry divisions were magically refitted into motorized ID then the question still exists of the Soviet perspective- could they succeed in fixing an army group again? In the end, the vast majority of German formations in Barbarossa were semi-mobile horse-drawn infantry divisions.

These Barbarossa AH usually don't have much about the Soviet perspective, which is just as important as what the Axis are doing.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 19 Jul 2019, 14:06, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#374

Post by Avalancheon » 19 Jul 2019, 14:05

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
Avalancheon wrote:Your scenario should be developed further.
Thanks again and I'd certainly welcome any contributions to developing it further.

When I started the scenario, the motivating thought was "What is the minimum condition for a successful Barbarossa?" Like how close was the world to irrevocable disaster in 1941?

This thread is sort of a first stab at that; I'm more than open to other conceptions. As I've said upthread, the process of articulating the operational scenario has convinced me that Barbarossa+20 divisions is very clearly a German win. Therefore I'm very interested in the question of the minimum conditions for a successful Barbarossa. If the bar for Barbarossa success is lower than 20 divisions, it's easier to chart the ATL path economically and more interesting - and chilling - historically.
I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment. The encirclement battles at the border would go considerably worse for the Soviets, and alter the entire course of the war on the Eastern front. They would lose more troops and get overrun more quickly than they historically did. Its a pretty clear cut German victory, in the end.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
The 20-division ATL involves a northern double-pincer that is arguably extraneous: if AGS destroys Southwest front at the border and destroys its subsequent reincarnation somewhere in Ukraine (either at Kiev or farther east after an orderly withdrawal from that city) then I still don't see how the SU recovers. The forces needed to reconstitute Southwest/South Fronts alone would likely lead to loss of Moscow/Leningrad; failure to reconstitute a Ukrainian defense would lead to industrial/demographic/morale losses about as serious as the loss of a front. So one candidate for a "minimal Barbarossa" is +14 divisions and AGS reinforcement only.
If your interested in a 'minimal Barbarossa' scenario, I could see an Ost Heer composition like this:

Army Group North:
Gains 2 panzer and 1 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 1 fallschirmjager and 1 air landing divisions.

Army Group South:
Gains 4 panzer and 5 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 2 regular infantry divisions.

Army Group North would conduct an airborne landing against Riga on the 1st day of the invasion and capture it, cutting off the escape route for 8th army. The fallschirmjagers would be reinforced with an air landing division (basically, an infantry division that is air transportable). One of the panzer corps advances to Daugavpils, while another panzer corps advances to Jakobpils, in order to trap 8th army against the Dvina river. Meanwhile, the third panzer corps can hit 11th army from behind and batter them. Thats a variation of the plan I gave to you before.

Army Group South would conduct a double envelopment with two panzer groups. Panzer group 1 advances to Rive and draws in the bulk of the Soviets mobile forces. Since they advanced on a broader front, they are able to immediately deploy their full strength*. Then, panzer group 5 advances to Khmelnytskyi and cuts off the Soviets from behind. At that point, 6th, 26th, and 12th armys would be encircled. The two panzer groups link up at Shepetivka and liquidate the pocket**.

*The addition of two extra infantry divisions results in a faster capture of Kovel or Rava Rus'ka.
**If the battle takes longer to develop, then the encirclement would have to take place further to the east, like Zhytomir and Berdychiv.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
But does AGS really need 14 divisions to execute the encirclement from Romania and southern Poland? I can see a good argument that 10 divisions would have sufficed: Southwest Front needed all of its strength to prevent total collapse against Kleist's 9 mobile divisions OTL; doubling the mechanized forces puts a huge strain on Kirponos' ability to prevent local penetrations from becoming operational rout and encirclement. So maybe 10 divisions is a possible candidate. That could be a thread topic in itself.
Historically, panzer group 1 achieved its breakthrough at Volodymyr-Volynsky and Sokal. The problem was, the supporting attacks on their left (at Kovel) and their right (at Rava Rus'ka) were unsuccessful. Thus, they were forced to advance on a narrow frontage that only permitted them to employ three of their nine mobile divisions. If Army Group South had been able to more quickly capture Kovel or Rava Rus'ka, this wouldn't have happened.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 09:36
IMO it's hard to see the Germans attempting a Romania-Poland encirclement with a small panzer army like the OTL six divisions in Hoepner's 4th PzGr. A strike from Romania is fairly isolated and therefore needs to be able to counter a strong Russian response on its own - six divisions doesn't seem sufficient if Stavka moves most of its reserves against it. So if we'd want to investigate a smaller force delta we'd have to look either at a border encirclement by AGS west of Pripyat (as I've sketched upthread) or else a force delta somewhere besides AGS, AGN being the only real possibility.
I don't think its that implausible, especially given that most of the Soviets mobile forces had been flung against panzer group 1. If another panzer group had been stationed in northern Romania, they would have been able to move through this gap into the Ukraine without much opposition. Securing their long flank against the retreating Soviets would be harder, though, which is why this panzer group shouldn't move too far away from the border.

I see no reason why a Poland-Romania encirclement would not work. The only real question is where they are able to close the pocket. Would it be closed at Shepetivka, or further east at Zhytomir and Berdychiv?

ljadw
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Posts: 15585
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#375

Post by ljadw » 19 Jul 2019, 16:12

[quote=Avalancheon post_id=2213218 time=1563537909 user_id=74001]
[quote=TheMarcksPlan post_id=2212737 time=1563262589 user_id=80684]
[quote="Avalancheon"]Your scenario should be developed further.[/quote]

Thanks again and I'd certainly welcome any contributions to developing it further.

When I started the scenario, the motivating thought was "What is the minimum condition for a successful Barbarossa?" Like how close was the world to irrevocable disaster in 1941?

This thread is sort of a first stab at that; I'm more than open to other conceptions. [b]As I've said upthread, the process of articulating the operational scenario has convinced me that Barbarossa+20 divisions is very clearly a German win[/b]. Therefore I'm very interested in the question of the minimum conditions for a successful Barbarossa. If the bar for Barbarossa success is lower than 20 divisions, it's easier to chart the ATL path economically and more interesting - and chilling - historically. [/quote]

I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment. The encirclement battles at the border would go considerably worse for the Soviets, and alter the entire course of the war on the Eastern front. They would lose more troops and get overrun more quickly than they historically did. Its a pretty clear cut German victory, in the end.

[quote=TheMarcksPlan post_id=2212737 time=1563262589 user_id=80684]The 20-division ATL involves a northern double-pincer that is arguably extraneous: if AGS destroys Southwest front at the border and destroys its subsequent reincarnation somewhere in Ukraine (either at Kiev or farther east after an orderly withdrawal from that city) then I still don't see how the SU recovers. The forces needed to reconstitute Southwest/South Fronts alone would likely lead to loss of Moscow/Leningrad; failure to reconstitute a Ukrainian defense would lead to industrial/demographic/morale losses about as serious as the loss of a front. So one candidate for a "minimal Barbarossa" is +14 divisions and AGS reinforcement only.[/quote]

If your interested in a 'minimal Barbarossa' scenario, I could see an Ost Heer composition like this:

[b]Army Group North:[/b]
Gains 2 panzer and 1 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 1 fallschirmjager and 1 air landing divisions.

[b]Army Group South:[/b]
Gains 4 panzer and 5 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 2 regular infantry divisions.

Army Group North would conduct an airborne landing against Riga on the 1st day of the invasion and capture it, cutting off the escape route for 8th army. The fallschirmjagers would be reinforced with an air landing division (basically, an infantry division that is air transportable). One of the panzer corps advances to Daugavpils, while another panzer corps advances to Jakobpils, in order to trap 8th army against the Dvina river. Meanwhile, the third panzer corps can hit 11th army from behind and batter them. Thats a variation of the plan I gave to you before.

Army Group South would conduct a double envelopment with two panzer groups. Panzer group 1 advances to Rive and draws in the bulk of the Soviets mobile forces. Since they advanced on a broader front, they are able to immediately deploy their full strength*. Then, panzer group 5 advances to Khmelnytskyi and cuts off the Soviets from behind. At that point, 6th, 26th, and 12th armys would be encircled. The two panzer groups link up at Shepetivka and liquidate the pocket**.

*The addition of two extra infantry divisions results in a faster capture of Kovel or Rava Rus'ka.
**If the battle takes longer to develop, then the encirclement would have to take place further to the east, like Zhytomir and Berdychiv.

[quote=TheMarcksPlan post_id=2212737 time=1563262589 user_id=80684]But does AGS really need 14 divisions to execute the encirclement from Romania and southern Poland? I can see a good argument that 10 divisions would have sufficed: Southwest Front needed all of its strength to prevent total collapse against Kleist's 9 mobile divisions OTL; doubling the mechanized forces puts a huge strain on Kirponos' ability to prevent local penetrations from becoming operational rout and encirclement. So maybe 10 divisions is a possible candidate. That could be a thread topic in itself.[/quote]

Historically, panzer group 1 achieved its breakthrough at Volodymyr-Volynsky and Sokal. The problem was, the supporting attacks on their left (at Kovel) and their right (at Rava Rus'ka) were unsuccessful. Thus, they were forced to advance on a narrow frontage that only permitted them to employ three of their nine mobile divisions. If Army Group South had been able to more quickly capture Kovel or Rava Rus'ka, this wouldn't have happened.

[quote=TheMarcksPlan post_id=2212737 time=1563262589 user_id=80684]IMO it's hard to see the Germans attempting a Romania-Poland encirclement with a small panzer army like the OTL six divisions in Hoepner's 4th PzGr. A strike from Romania is fairly isolated and therefore needs to be able to counter a strong Russian response on its own - six divisions doesn't seem sufficient if Stavka moves most of its reserves against it. So if we'd want to investigate a smaller force delta we'd have to look either at a border encirclement by AGS west of Pripyat (as I've sketched upthread) or else a force delta somewhere besides AGS, AGN being the only real possibility.[/quote]

I don't think its that implausible, especially given that most of the Soviets mobile forces had been flung against panzer group 1. If another panzer group had been stationed in northern Romania, they would have been able to move through this gap into the Ukraine without much opposition. Securing their long flank against the retreating Soviets would be harder, though, which is why this panzer group shouldn't move too far away from the border.

I see no reason why a Poland-Romania encirclement would not work. The only real question is where they are able to close the pocket. Would it be closed at Shepetivka, or further east at Zhytomir and Berdychiv?
[/quote]
There is no proof that more German mobile divisions would result in more Soviet losses in June/July 1941 .
War is not maths : if 30 mobile divisions resulted in 813000 Soviet POWs in June/July ( a questionable assumption ),than is it no so that 50 mobile divisions would result in 1,350,000 Soviet POWs .There is no rule of three in war .
It is also very questionable to say that worse ( for the SU ) encirclement battles would alter the course of the war : most Soviet losses were not caused by encirclment battles .
About the use of paratroopers : this is out of the question : after operation Mercury, the Germans had no available airborne units .

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