What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[TheMarcksPlan]

Case Blue was a strategic failure that cost von Bock his career- at the same time it was the last time a competitively declining German army achieved a string of minor encirclement victories and projected that level of offensive power.

Again I'm not sure what your point is re the ATL. A central aspect of my thesis - that more mobile divisions would mean more encirclements - is asserted in DRZW Volume 6 regarding Operation Blau: that its "fundamental weakness" was an "inadequate number of mobile formations."



Just as in Barbarossa, Germany could encircle large RKKA formations only with sufficient mobile divisions with (1) the strength to operate behind Red fronts without being overwhelmed and (2) sufficient infantry to mostly seal the pockets. In Blau, Germany deployed only 14 mobile divisions in total, on a front stretching ~1,000km. By contrast, AGC had 17 mobile divisions during its June-July encirclements on a front less than half that breadth. Taifun had even more mobile divisions on a front about as wide as the Smolensk battles.

As the DRZW scholars rightly note, all the controversy over Bock's - or any other general's - operational choices are secondary. The fact is that Germany could not have achieved all of Blau goals - especially encirclement of SU's southern forces - without additional mobile forces. Those forces were not present for several reasons, including (1) German losses during Barbarossa and (2) Germany's ridiculous decision to decrease army production during 1941 at the height of Barbarossa.

Give the Germans forces in Blau and they succeed in that campaign, give them forces in Barbarossa and they win the war.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Victory in Barbarossa is dependent on eliminating the system.

I don't know exactly what this means. It sounds like the usual mainstream thinking about Barbarossa: that the SU has mystic powers of force generation and can't be defeated by any number of losses. Challenge that thinking. We all know that some level of losses in men and territory would make the SU a military non-entity. Taking SU through the Urals, for example, leaves territory with a pre-war population of ~25 million. SU is weaker than Spain at that point; somewhere between that point and the fall of Moscow/Leningrad/Caucasus Germany no longer has a true eastern front even if the SU formally survives.

Arguably the point of SU impotence is at Leningrad/Moscow, though I doubt that. Seems clear to me, however, that German advance to the AA line leaves SU too little resources to be a real threat to Germany.

[jesk]

Again I'm not sure what your point is re the ATL. A central aspect of my thesis - that more mobile divisions would mean more encirclements - is asserted in DRZW Volume 6 regarding Operation Blau: that its "fundamental weakness" was an "inadequate number of mobile formations."

Manstein very upset, having learned that the 11th army will not go to the Caucasus. In the mountains more needed infantry than mobile divisions. Ardennes 1944 is an example.

Order of battle (24 June 1942)

At the disposal of the 11. Armee
- Befehlshaber d. Landengen
LIV. Armeekorps
- 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division (in transit)
- 1/3 132. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division
- 24. Infanterie-Division
- 22. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 73. Infanterie-Division
- 50. Infanterie-Division + 1/3 46. Infanterie-Division
- Romanian 4th Mountain Division
Romainian Mountain Corps
- Romanian 18th Infantry Division
- Romanian 1st Mountain Division
XXX. Armeekorps
- 72. Infanterie-Division
- 170. Infanterie-Division
- 28. leichte Infanterie-Division + 1 Regiment 213. Sicherungs-Division + 1 Regiment 444. Sicherungs-Division
- 1/3 125. Infanterie-Division
- Stab Schröder with 1 Regiment 444. Sicherungs-Division
Gruppe Mattenklott (XXXXII. Armeekorps)
- Gruppe Ritter (Küstenschutz)
- Romanian 8th Cavalry Division
- Romanian 10th Infantry Division
- Romanian 19th Infantry Division
- Romanian Motorized Regiment
- 22. Panzer-Division (part)
- 1/3 132. Infanterie-Division

[TheMarcksPlan]

Jesk nobody pays attention to you. Go away.

[jesk]

Jesk nobody pays attention to you. Go away.

But I know the truth. Mobile divisions are not needed in the mountains of the Caucasus. Can not be so, how are you, blindly trust the pages in the book.

[MarkN]

"The Army, in consequence, is not combat-ready for a war of movement. It cannot make itself combat-ready by the means within its power."

I wrote somewhat earlier in this thread:

I wonder how much longer it takes TheMarksPlan to spot the elephant in the room....

The Paulus war gaming identified offensive burnout somewhere between Smolensk and Moscow. Pretty much what happened when they eventually executed the invasion.

It elicited this response:

I don't even know where to start with this.
Barbarossa failed because of attrition, logistics, and [minor factor] weather.
It was closer than you think. No divisions "burned out" in the sense of losing combat power beyond their attrition rates. Change the attrition rates of both sides and the outcome changes.

I didn't originally reference my comments as I thought is was a generally accepted historical fact understood by posters who are, what the site rules call "reasonably well-prepared".

And now we have this:

"The Army, in consequence, is not combat-ready for a war of movement. It cannot make itself combat-ready by the means within its power."

This passage depicts what I term "offensive burnout". The motorized/mechanized vehicles are in such a sorry state, and the Heer has not sufficient internal capacity to rectify that state, to continue the offensive. Offensive burnout. Not so?

Perhaps TheMarcksPlan can explain how he thinks all these vehicles came to be in such a sorry state. Perhaps it is even explained on the preceding page. Remember, these are not vehicles which have been lost or destroyed to combat action., these are vehicles which the Heer still has in their possession but lack the capacity to fix and maintain.

[ljadw]

Research question:
What was the actual fuel consumption during Barbarossa?

From DRZW volume VI, I have a figure of 667,292 cubic meters (448,000t) for the entire Ostheer from mid-October 1941 through March 1942:



So far I have accepted, for the purposes of argument, the absolute highest estimate (355,000t) provided in this thread. I doubt these estimates and don't trust their authors but it serves the argument to show that even the worst-case-scenario isn't a prohibitive fuel delta for 20 extra mobile divisions.

The figures from DRZW are more credible than anything produced here. Per those figures, this thread's highest estimate would mean 20 divisions burn 80% of what the entire Ostheer burned over five months of fighting. Admittedly that fighting was mostly defensive (the first 7 weeks were not), but that defensive was quite fluid and involved many counterattacks. 80% is obviously wrong; incremental fuel burn would have been closer to the 60,000t estimate at the lower end of the thread so far.

Sigh, sigh : 448000 tons of fuel means 1000 trains going and returning over a distance of 2 X 1000 km,over Russian railways who were only partly regauged ,during a period of 150 days = 6,66 trains a day
How long would a German train do over 2000 km ? Minimum 15 days : 6,66 X 15 = 100. Thus to transport every day 400tons of fuel, only 400 , the German railways would need 100 trains,with the needed personnel and coal .The coal had to come from Germany,as German locs could not use Soviet coal, for this coal additional trains would be needed,etc.
And this is only for fuel for an army that was mostly not moving .And 448000 tons is the consumption : it is very possible that more than 448000 tons would be needed .And this is only fuel : in the same time the Ostheer consumed 390000 tons of ammunition and the needs were probably higher than 390000 tons , thus again additional trains would be needed, with coal,personnel,and resources and manpower for the existing railway stations .
And all this should pass over a destroyed /still not regauged railway system .And ,now, one is saying that not only the existing 150 divisions ( 30 mobile ) could be supplied, but also 20 more mobile divisions . :roll:

[jesk]

How long would a German train do over 2000 km ? Minimum 15 days : 6,66 X 15 = 100.

300 km per day

https://scharapow-w.livejournal.com/131383.html

- The train can go up to 150-200 miles per day, 60 if in a combat zone.
- Loading the train, depending on the conditions, from 2 to 12 hours, unloading twice as fast.

[ljadw]

300 km a day is much to much : the average speed of a train was 20 km per hour,besides the daily distance was limited by the number of supply points and the distance between them .At each of these supply points, the train had to stop to take water and coal, which would take a lot of time .

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both the forum's greater WHAT IF constituency and the community as a whole. Howdy troops! Now, what really saddens me, is to watch a number of quite bright and very well read individuals engaging in what is tantamount to a running gunnery duel of ONE-UPMANSHIP. Can anyone of you tell me where and how this ultimately concludes? JUST ASKING! Well, that's my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this open-ended saga wandering down DRANG NACH OSTEN lane - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid every last one of you an especially copacetic day no matter where you just might happen to find yourselves on good old Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[TheMarcksPlan]

ATTENTION FORUMERS...

The state of Germany's rail transport capacity in 1941 was not some metaphysically fixed constant.
Just as Germany could have built different stuff (e.g. battleships instead of tanks, more bombers and fewer fighters, more origami), so could Germany have produced more rolling stock.
This should be obvious from the fact that Germany implemented a plan to quintuple its production of rolling stock in early 1942. Economic conditions in early 1942 were barely different from in 1940 (indeed in many ways they were worse).

Any statement about the inability to supply a larger army by rail must explain why Germany could not have built a larger rail fleet. Such an argument must provide figures for the cost of more rail production and an argument for why such cost would have been prohibitive pre-Barbarossa when it was easily managed immediately after Barbarossa.

This is particularly true regarding arguments about distance of rail supply: While there are other constraints on moving more supplies (e.g. capacity in the "Polish gap"), moving goods farther requires primarily more rolling stock. Rolling stock was cheap; even the emergency building program undertaken in early 1942 consumed ~1% of Germany's munitions budget (the program was placed under a military priority heading).

To repeat once more, the heart of this ATL is not assuming a risibly brief timeline for Barbarossa. Absent that assumption, a competent German planning arm (i.e. not OTL Halder and crew) would have immediately realized that supporting millions of men in the east would overtax Germany's rail transport infrastructure. A competent planning arm would have taken steps to address this painfully foreseeable obstacle. Given the OTL cost of Germany's post-Barbarossa rolling stock program, addressing the rail lift issue seems unlikely to have been cost-prohibitive in 1940-41 or earlier. To repeat once more, Germany had slack in its economy up to at least 19% of GDP even in 1942.

It's the internet and anybody can post so I'm not surprised that most responses regarding rail involve slipshod calculations and fail to wrestle with what the ATL actually changes. I'm appreciative of the few of you who do get the idea.

[Takao]

300 km a day is much to much : the average speed of a train was 20 km per hour,

A slow coal drag maybe...Those locomotives were designed to run best at speeds in the 15-20MPH range. But, will be locomotive dependent, as steam locomotives were designed to perform better at certain speeds, which was not necessarily it's maximum speed. Still, speeds will drop precipitously in active combat areas.

You also have to note, how are you judging "average speed"? Piont-to-point, or return trip?

besides the daily distance was limited by the number of supply points and the distance between them .

Yes, that was one of the problems in the USSR, where coaling and watering stations were further apart than those the Germans used. So, the Germans had to construct additional ones.

At each of these supply points, the train had to stop to take water and coal, which would take a lot of time .

Again, your thinking of a 100+car coal drag that took anywhere from 1-4 hours to load. A tender could be loaded with some 24 tons of coal and 15,000 gallons of water in 4 minutes. Big difference.

[ljadw]

In the old thread ''Germany and railway bottlenecks in the East '' Qvist gave an average speed of 20 km and he said that the Germans had to double the number of coaling and watering stations .
And 4 minutes is a lot of time, as a train would have to stop several times to take coal and water .
And the number and location of the stations would also influence /limit the distance a train could cover every day : when would the train stop before the night ?when he had still 50 % of his water and coal ? or 25 % ? of 15 % ?
Or is it : where would he stop for the night ? at a supply point ? or at a railway station ?
If over a distance of 200 km ,there were coaling and watering stations at 40 km, 70 km, 120 km and 150 and 200 km , where would the train stop for the night ?After 150 km ? Or would he take the risk to go to 200 km ? Probably after 150 km,as trains do not drive til the last ton of coal and the last gallon of water .
But, we have no informations how much a train carrying 400 ton,would consume and also nothing about the number ,location and stock of the supply points : that a tender could be loaded with 24 tons of coal and 15000 gallons of water,is meaningless unless we know that there were that many coal/water available at the supply station .And unless we know how long ,how far a train could drive with 24 ton of coal and 15000 gallons of water .

[ljadw]

Available information is contradicting;
there were tenders with a capacity of 10000 gallons of water, 19000 gallons, 24000 gallons,14 tons of coal, 26 tons of coal,42 tons of coal .There is also not much about the consumption ratio of water to coal : I have seen a claim that much more water ( 7 X )was consumed than coal ,but still nothing about the question how long/how far would last 10000 gallons of water .Probably it would depend on the loc,load, weather, etc,.. There is a claim that 2 water-stops were needed for one coal-stop,not that this is helping us .

[MarkN]

To repeat once more, the heart of this ATL is not assuming a risibly brief timeline for Barbarossa.

Your fantasy scenario is based upon a completely different German leadership making completely different decisions regarding the invasion of CCCP for a complete different purpose than historical reality.

Your fantasy scenario requires a completely different economy supporting a completely different industrial and manufacturing base.

Your fantasy scenario now includes a completely different transport and logistics network to support that invasion.

Your fantasy scenario requires a completely different Heer to implement that invasion and the supporting Luftwaffe and Kriegesmarine are mere shadows of their historical organizations due the previous alterations to industrial and manufacturing priorities.

Your fantasy scenario requires formation commanders to be utterly dehumanized and to simply be executors of your gaming instructions and inputs.

Your fantasy scenario requires the Heer's equipment to be of a mechanical standard beyond the capabilities of German industry and manufacturing.

All of these alterations to historical reality need to be enacted to deliver the "slightly stronger Barbarossa forces".

This what if is not about BARBAROSSA, the third reich or even Germany circa 1941. This what if is predicated upon a complete fantasy.

There has been no attempt to discuss "What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces". You have demanded the outcome of the what if is a fixed result of your choosing. This thread is about you getting others to help you find a way to deliver that fantasy outcome. This thread is not a what if, it's a let's invent.

The point of this thread clearly is intellectual theft. The deliberate attempt by you, TheMarcksPlan, to bully/mock/insult other posters into doing all the research you are too lazy to do yourself.

Any statement about the inability to supply a larger army by rail must explain why Germany could not have built a larger rail fleet. Such an argument must provide figures for the cost of more rail production and an argument for why such cost would have been prohibitive pre-Barbarossa when it was easily managed immediately after Barbarossa.

This is particularly true regarding arguments about distance of rail supply: While there are other constraints on moving more supplies (e.g. capacity in the "Polish gap"), moving goods farther requires primarily more rolling stock. Rolling stock was cheap; even the emergency building program undertaken in early 1942 consumed ~1% of Germany's munitions budget (the program was placed under a military priority heading).

Do my research for me.
Do my research for me.
Give me your knowledge.
Give me your knowledge.

This thread is a simple theft of others' intellectual effort and thought through fraudulant fantasy.