What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[ljadw]

ATTENTION FORUMERS...


Just as Germany could have built different stuff (e.g. battleships instead of tanks, more bombers and fewer fighters, more origami), so could Germany have produced more rolling stock.
This should be obvious from the fact that Germany implemented a plan to quintuple its production of rolling stock in early 1942. Economic conditions in early 1942 were barely different from in 1940 (indeed in many ways they were worse).

Any statement about the inability to supply a larger army by rail must explain why Germany could not have built a larger rail fleet. Such an argument must provide figures for the cost of more rail production and an argument for why such cost would have been prohibitive pre-Barbarossa when it was easily managed immediately after Barbarossa.

This is particularly true regarding arguments about distance of rail supply: While there are other constraints on moving more supplies (e.g. capacity in the "Polish gap"), moving goods farther requires primarily more rolling stock. Rolling stock was cheap; even the emergency building program undertaken in early 1942 consumed ~1% of Germany's munitions budget (the program was placed under a military priority heading).

To repeat once more, the heart of this ATL is not assuming a risibly brief timeline for Barbarossa. Absent that assumption, a competent German planning arm (i.e. not OTL Halder and crew) would have immediately realized that supporting millions of men in the east would overtax Germany's rail transport infrastructure. A competent planning arm would have taken steps to address this painfully foreseeable obstacle. Given the OTL cost of Germany's post-Barbarossa rolling stock program, addressing the rail lift issue seems unlikely to have been cost-prohibitive in 1940-41 or earlier. To repeat once more, Germany had slack in its economy up to at least 19% of GDP even in 1942.

1 That Germany could have produced more rolling stock (in less than a year between the decision for and the start of Barbarossa ) is only handwaving
2 I like to see the proof that Germany decided to quintiple its production of railway rolling stock and that this was successful :FYI Germany had 28630 locs, do you say that it was planning to to produce 112000 locs ?
3 The claim that to move goods farther,it was needed to have more rolling stock is very primitive and does not prove an elementary knowledge of this problem .
4 That rolling stock was cheap is not only questionable but also meaningless .
It is obvious that you have failed ( better : refused ) to consult the thread by Der Alte Fritz,because it would discard your ATL .
You have done the same with Time and Distance, who both are essential in wartime .

[ljadw]

About the claim that the Germans were executing a plan to quintuple the production oof rolling stock in the early months of 1942 :
the following is from this forum ,with as source Mierzejewski :
Rolling-stock acquisitions of the Deutsche Reichsbahn :
1941 : steam locomotives :1,391/passenger cars 104 /freight cars :42,924
1942 :steam locomotives :2,127 /passenger cars : 124 /freight cars :43,032
I see no 500% increase of the production .

[TheMarcksPlan]

Re fuel consumption:

I posted a query elsewhere on the forum and got this response: viewtopic.php?p=2213841#p2213841

Second Panzer Army burned 111,645t POL during 1941 (I'm using 2PzGr because its composition was fairly uniform throughout the campaign whereas the other PzGr of AGC were highly variable).

2PzGr had 9.5 mobile divisions but also consistently had at least an infantry corps attached to it during operations.
As you can see from the posts, the infantry armies actually didn't burn much less fuel than the PzGr...
From these figures, a decent ballpark figure for a single motorized/panzer division throughout Barbarossa is 10,000 tons, with the rest of 2PzGr's fuel consumption going to its attached infantry armies.

So 20 additional divisions would burn ~200,000t additional tons of POL or 2.4% of Germany's 1941 oil production.

That's quite a bit less than the high estimate of 355,000t from this thread and a lot more than the low estimate of ~60,000 tons.

Either way, as I said upthread, it's a manageable POL delta. As described in my operational sections, 20 additional divisions would wreak absolute havoc on the RKKA and almost any diminution in LW/KM activity in the West is worth a dramatically more successful Barbarossa that sets up Germany to render the SU militarily impotent in 1942.

Additionally, my ATL would see the Germans enter winter quarters by the end of October at the latest. So that removes over a month of offensive activity and, during the winter, the Red Army will be too weak to force large scale maneuver warfare. That alone would save hundreds of thousand of POL tons.

[TheMarcksPlan]

2 I like to see the proof that Germany decided to quintiple its production of railway rolling stock and that this was successful :FYI Germany had 28630 locs, do you say that it was planning to to produce 112000 locs ?

You'll notice that I don't respond to your posts very often. It's because of stuff like this. I can't believe I have to say this but there's a difference between production (rate) of locos and their total stock.
This abysmal kind of intellectual error has been repeated over and over in this thread - you and Hanny are repeat offenders.
It literally hurts my head to explain this.

The source is DRZW volume 6, pages 880-2.

1941 : steam locomotives :1,391/passenger cars 104 /freight cars :42,924
1942 :steam locomotives :2,127 /passenger cars : 124 /freight cars :43,032
I see no 500% increase of the production .

Of course there wasn't a 400% increase (i.e. quintupling - check your math) in production during the year the program started! It would take time to ramp up of course. I'm not sure to what extent the program was completed - probably losses/retreats in the East decreased rail lift requirements and program was curtailed later. DRZW says the plan was to produce 200 locos/month in 1942, something they achieved or exceeded given 1942 loco production and the fact that the program started during that year.

Your figures probably overstate 1941 production: requisitions from Europe were still happening at break-neck pace during that year while by 1942 the continent would have been stripped closer to bare. A good portion of 1941 DRB acquisitions would have been requisitions, proportionately much less so in 1942.

I don't need a quintupling of rail stock, one-tenth of that delta will do. Your own figures establish a 50% increase in loco production during 1942, which is a pretty darn dramatic improvement.

1 That Germany could have produced more rolling stock (in less than a year between the decision for and the start of Barbarossa ) is only handwaving

As your own figures show, Germany achieved at least 50% increase in loco production during 1942, despite beginning its increased effort only in March of that year. A decision to increase loco production after France gives a full year before Barbarossa. Furthermore, the need doesn't reach its peak until fall when the Heer is further east. So Germany would have had 15-17 months to achieve what it achieved in ~9 months during 1942.

[ljadw]

You said that Germany planned to quintuple its production of railway rolling-stock in the early months of 1942 . I have given figures from Mierzejewski who prove that it was not so .The number of freight-cars increased in 1942 with 0,25 % compared to 1941 = a total of 108 .
I challenge you to prove that the figures from Mierzejewski overstate the 1941 production .
Besides : there was no need to increase even more the production in July 1940, as the Barbarossa decision was taken only in the autumn .
About quintuple : quintuple means : 5 times as much = an increase of 500 /400 %
And the production of 1942 was not increased by 500 % ,but by 50 % as was the production in 1940 compared to 1939,and in 1941 compared to 1940 .
Besides, there was no need to increase the production of locs in 1941 for Barbarossa, neither in 1942 . There is no proof that the increase was related to the war in the east .
Bigger distances do not require more locs or more wagons : the distances were smaller in 1943 than in 1942, but the loc production was the double in 1943 :4533 and still more in 1944 than in 1942 when the Soviets and allies were at the German border: 3063.
The majority of locs, passenger and freight cars were used outside the east and in Germany .In December 1942 the Germans had 203000 wagons available in the East, while the total in January 1943 was 1,040,000: only 20 % was tied in the East .
More locs and wagons are only needed if more goods must be transported .
It took the Germans 5 years to increase their number of locs from 25889 in 1939 to 37810 in 1944 ,thus saying that they could quintuple the 1941 production (1391 ) to 7000 in 1942 is nonsense .

[Michael Kenny]

Just as Germany could have built different stuff (e.g. battleships instead of tanks, more bombers and fewer fighters, more origami), so could Germany have produced more rolling stock. .....more this.........more that.....more the other...........

I have heard this exact same argument over a decade back. Could it be Darrin has learned to spell.................

[ljadw]

Re fuel consumption:

I posted a query elsewhere on the forum and got this response: viewtopic.php?p=2213841#p2213841

Second Panzer Army burned 111,645t POL during 1941 (I'm using 2PzGr because its composition was fairly uniform throughout the campaign whereas the other PzGr of AGC were highly variable).

2PzGr had 9.5 mobile divisions but also consistently had at least an infantry corps attached to it during operations.
As you can see from the posts, the infantry armies actually didn't burn much less fuel than the PzGr...
From these figures, a decent ballpark figure for a single motorized/panzer division throughout Barbarossa is 10,000 tons, with the rest of 2PzGr's fuel consumption going to its attached infantry armies.

So 20 additional divisions would burn ~200,000t additional tons of POL or 2.4% of Germany's 1941 oil production.

That's quite a bit less than the high estimate of 355,000t from this thread and a lot more than the low estimate of ~60,000 tons.

Either way, as I said upthread, it's a manageable POL delta. As described in my operational sections, 20 additional divisions would wreak absolute havoc on the RKKA and almost any diminution in LW/KM activity in the West is worth a dramatically more successful Barbarossa that sets up Germany to render the SU militarily impotent in 1942.

Additionally, my ATL would see the Germans enter winter quarters by the end of October at the latest. So that removes over a month of offensive activity and, during the winter, the Red Army will be too weak to force large scale maneuver warfare. That alone would save hundreds of thousand of POL tons.

You have claimed but not proved that 20 additional divisions would wreck absolute havoc on the RKKA .There is also no proof for the winter quarters at the end of October and for the claim that the Red Army would be too weak too threaten the Ostheer .
200000 additional tons of POL is not 2,4 % of Germany's oil production but a much higher % of motor and diesel oil production ,it is also 500 additional trains .

[TheMarcksPlan]

Just as Germany could have built different stuff (e.g. battleships instead of tanks, more bombers and fewer fighters, more origami), so could Germany have produced more rolling stock. .....more this.........more that.....more the other...........

I have heard this exact same argument over a decade back. Could it be Darrin has learned to spell.................

Link to a thread? No need to reinvent the wheel if already done.

[ljadw]

You said that Germany planned to quintuple its production of railway rolling-stock in the early months of 1942

This is why I don't engage with you much. Saying Germany adopted a plan in 1942 to quintuple production doesn't mean Germany planned to achieve that goal during 1942, let alone that it actually did so.

A 50% increase over the course of mere months is dramatic increase and ample evidence that it could have been done earlier.

You have claimed but not proved that 20 additional divisions would wreck absolute havoc on the RKKA

What does it mean to "prove" something in alternative history? This is an epistemological question and the thought of debating it with you is giving me a literal headache. Make an argument for why 20 divisions wouldn't have the operational consequences I sketched or find somewhere else to frustrate people with your obtuseness.

A 50 % increase over the course of a YEAR ( not mere months ) is NOT ampel evidence that it could have been done earlier, because : IT WAS DONE EARLIER.
Between 1938 and 1939 the loc production increased from 125 to 660,between 1939 and 1940 from 660 to 982, from 1940 to 1941 from 982 to 1391,between 1942 and 1943 from 2127 to 4533!
Thus there was no dramatic increase , and the increase was NOT caused by a decision from bureaucrats,because, in the real world, increases are caused by investments : more resources, more staff, more machine tools, etc
And this is a long-term work .
What does it mean to ''prove '' something in alternative history ?
Translation : I need no proofs in alternative history : I can invent what I want to make Germany winning and the others must prove that I am wrong .

[ljadw]

Meanwhile you can continue to parrot the Speer propaganda and whine : no one understands me,but a genius never is understood during his life .
50% increase is not dramatic .No one said that the 1939/1940 increase of 50 % was dramatic .Besides, it is also meaningless .More locs does not mean more wagons and more wagons does not mean an increase of the transport of supplies,weapons and men .
The result of the ''dramatic '' (HAHA ) increase of the production of locs in 1942 was that the number of transported tons of goods was going DOWN by 12 million: from 656 million to 644 million . Something very dramatic (HAHA ).And the number of daily available freight-cars was also going down from 153000 to 147000 ,the lowest figure since 1937 .Something very dramatic ( HAHA ).

And you said that the increase of 50 % was not done earlier . I proved you to be wrong .

[David Thompson]

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[TheMarcksPlan]

A 50 % increase over the course of a YEAR ( not mere months ) is NOT ampel evidence that it could have been done earlier, because : IT WAS DONE EARLIER.

I earlier read the all-caps quote as "it was NOT done earlier," which caused me paroxysms of frustration (why say something like that in ATL forum?). A definite weakness of mine is to get incredibly frustrated when I think I'm dealing with someone who lacks the capability to understand an argument and to lash at them because what else is there to do, were such evalution true, but disengage (always the wiser choice, btw). But that's not what ljdaw said, my mistake. I apologize.

Your other assertions, however, are faulty:

The result of the ''dramatic '' (HAHA ) increase of the production of locs in 1942 was that the number of transported tons of goods was going DOWN by 12 million: from 656 million to 644 million

Tons isn't the metric for rail capacity; it's ton-miles/km. It's easier to haul a billion tons within Germany then to haul half that amount around the entire European continent. What are the stats for ton-miles?

[MarkN]

TheMarcksPlan,

Have you given any thought to how your fantasy scenario will overcome the realife offensive burnout experienced historically by the realife Heer before they got to Moscow?

You kindly posted this excerpt which needs addressing.

"The Army, in consequence, is not combat-ready for a war of movement. It cannot make itself combat-ready by the means within its power."

How do the extra 20 mech divs in your fantasy scenario ovecome this problem when, according to your fantasy scenario, they will have to do even more hard fighting than was historically experienced?

[ljadw]

It's easier to haul a billion tons within Germany then to haul half that amount around the entire European continent.

Not necessarily : I can imagine occasions where it would be easier to supply a garrison of 1000 man 1000 km away,than a garrison of 10000 men,100 km away .
While distance is an important factor,as the greater the distance, the more trains are needed to carry the same load everyday,there are other factors,who could it make easier to supply a garrison of 1000 men,1000 km away and who would neutralize the distance facor .
Factors as
loading and unloading capacity
transport capacity from the railway station to the garrison .
railway space : there can ride less trains over a distance of 100 km than over a distance of 1000 km
stock capacity
And the relation between Germany and the rest of Europe was not 1 billion to half a billion : in 1943 the Reichsbahn transported a weight of almost 700 million tons, of which 43 % ,292 million , of coal : the overwhelming majority of these 700 million tons had as destination Germany,while the non military transports between Germany and the occupied parts of the SU ( import and export )were only 6,4 million tons ,less than 1 % of the total.

[TheMarcksPlan]

You kindly posted this excerpt which needs addressing.
Image
"The Army, in consequence, is not combat-ready for a war of movement. It cannot make itself combat-ready by the means within its power."

That passage describes the state of the army after Spring 1942. Couple points:

Once more I need to remind folks that what matters is the delta between ATL and OTL; not the delta between an ideally-supplied Ostheer and the OTL Ostheer. I am NOT fixing all of the Ostheer's logistics problems. All I need is for the extra divisions to perform as average German mobile divisions performed in Barbarossa.

If the extra divisions aren't combat-ready until summer 1942 (as with OTL divisions in the excerpt) it wouldn't matter to the outcome: with Moscow, Leningrad, everything in the south up to Vornezh-Rostov line gone, the SU can't recover. And btw the German divisions described in the excerpt above drove ~1,000km a few months later during Blau.

Additionally, the conditions described resulted from SU offensives over the winter. Capture 2 million more Red soldiers during Barbarossa and those winter offensives either don't happen or they function as self-internment when weak forces are surrounded and destroyed by stronger defending Germans.

Finally, the parlous state of German forces in early 1942 owed largely to Hitler's ridiculous decision during Barbarossa to cut army production. My ATL plans for at least a two-year campaign; those cuts don't happen.

Before saying that some suboptimal condition of the OTL Ostheer needs addressing, you should ask yourself whether (1) it describes average conditions for German forces and therefore is irrelevant because I'm not changing average Ostheer traits and (2) whether the condition stems from facts that would likely be altered by greater operational/strategic success during Barbarossa.