There were detailed balance reports for divisions (at least I've seen many from 1944). An example of how it looked:
124 Rifle Division as of 1.7.44 - 642 officers, 1442 NCOs, 2957 privates on strength, total 5041
Arrivals in July
91 officers from the 43 Rifle Corps
replacements - 106 NCOs+295 privates
from hospitals - 2 NCOs, 10 privates
NCOs demoted to privates - 20
privates promoted to NCOs - 9
Departures:
Losses according to the casualty report - 89+273+526 = 888
privates promoted to NCOs - 9
to courses of junior lieutenants - 36 NCOs, 5 privates
to an academy - 1 officer
former pilots transferred - 3 NCOs
to party leaders courses - 6 NCOs
pregnant women demobilized - 1 NCO+2 privates
NCOs demoted to privates - 20
to the staff of the 59 Army - 1 officer
deserters - 1 private
Total departures - 91 officers, 339 NCOs, 543 privates = 973 men
On strength as of 1.08.1944 - 642 officers, 1220 NCOs, 2739 privates, total 4601 men.
(TsAMO f. 1337, op.1. d.73, l.167)
On division/brigade levels reports on strength and losses were submitted every 5 days. On army/front - every 10 days. I doubt that there were such detailed balance checks on the front level, there were too many sub-units involved. In any case in addition to personnel strength arrivals/departures of units and replacements had to be reported every 10 days.
If we address the most problematic period - the year 1941 (and 1942 to some extent) both the personnel situation and reporting were very haphazard. For example, there were huge numbers of stragglers collected and assimilated into alien units. That made precise accounting very difficult.
convicts sent to NKVD penal units
