A State Defense Committee's decree of 2 May 1943 maintained that the Red Army had a large surplus of officers - 1.595.238 officers per 9.192.995 enlisted men (or almost 15%). This proportion didn't become smaller in the following two year. As of 20 April 45 there were 1.553.000 officers and students of academies/courses per 8.598.798 NCOs/privates/cadets (>15%).
viewtopic.php?p=2061471#p2061471
Simply speaking by mid-1943 the Soviet Army produced a huge number of officers and had to maintain a large number of units (albeit small and under-strength) to find some sort of occupation for all of them. Which once again demonstrate skills and qualifications of men in charge of its organization and personnel policy.
Size of WW2 Red Army divisions
Re: Size of WW2 Red Army divisions
Authorized vs actual personnel strength of the Red Army (Shchadenko to Stalin on 8 July 1942)
June 1941 - 4 656 610 authorized vs 4 275 713 actual
1 July 1941 - 9 360 286 vs. 9 005 713
August 1941 - 12 711 214 vs. 6 677 779 (?)
September 1941 - 12 858 616 vs. 9 216 907
October 1941 - 10 282 927 vs. 8 166 524
November 1941 - 11 748 478 vs. 8 712 738
December 1941 - 10 772 535 vs. 8 812 108
January 1942 - 10 933 518 vs. 8 978 574
February 1942 - 11 376 333 vs. 9 424 065
March 1942 - 12 286 577 vs. 9 979 245
April 1942 - 12 630 906 vs. 10 288 434
May 1942 - 12 666 566 vs. 10 525 114
June 1942 - 12 656 167 vs. 10 497 057
Actual strength numbers doesn't include patients in hospitals. So beginning from summer 41 there was a chronic shortfall of personnel caused by formation of new units despite deactivation of destroyed formations/units and reductions in TO&Es of existing units. Or in other words no sufficient numbers of men were available to maintain all units fielded. Which naturally prompts to question the rationale of all these endless formations.
June 1941 - 4 656 610 authorized vs 4 275 713 actual
1 July 1941 - 9 360 286 vs. 9 005 713
August 1941 - 12 711 214 vs. 6 677 779 (?)
September 1941 - 12 858 616 vs. 9 216 907
October 1941 - 10 282 927 vs. 8 166 524
November 1941 - 11 748 478 vs. 8 712 738
December 1941 - 10 772 535 vs. 8 812 108
January 1942 - 10 933 518 vs. 8 978 574
February 1942 - 11 376 333 vs. 9 424 065
March 1942 - 12 286 577 vs. 9 979 245
April 1942 - 12 630 906 vs. 10 288 434
May 1942 - 12 666 566 vs. 10 525 114
June 1942 - 12 656 167 vs. 10 497 057
Actual strength numbers doesn't include patients in hospitals. So beginning from summer 41 there was a chronic shortfall of personnel caused by formation of new units despite deactivation of destroyed formations/units and reductions in TO&Es of existing units. Or in other words no sufficient numbers of men were available to maintain all units fielded. Which naturally prompts to question the rationale of all these endless formations.
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Paul_Atreides
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Re: Size of WW2 Red Army divisions
There is no waste, there are reserves (Slogan of German Army in World Wars)
Re: Size of WW2 Red Army divisions
Yes, I've noticed that. I believe that Shchadenko's numbers from July 41 are planning numbers based on the number of men called up rather than what was actually reported. On the other hand Krivosheev's figure for the 1 July (4.8 mln simply cannot be true).