One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[EKB]

It’s a widely accepted view that German military culture was more efficient in many, if not most respects.

I have no doubt you are a member of many Facebook Groups that really really really believe that but it is not 'widely accepted'.

The U.S. Army was loaded with clerks, assistants, technicians and non-combat personnel. As losses mounted Germany did have not enough manpower to consider those luxuries, whether deemed necessary or not.

The German Army probably had more horse-holders that the British Army had Infantrymen.

Given the length of the war, they accomplished more than just muddling through it.

That 'belief' is based on the false assumption the outcome of the war was only decided in May 1945. In 1943 Germany knew for certain she was beaten and the insane, illogical and pointless continuation of hostilities for 2 years after that date gained her absolutely nothing and lost her everything If she had sought terms in 1943 then Germany would have been in a much better position for recovery than she was in 1945. It is also a fact that over 100 combat ready German Divisions laid down their arms when the Insane Dear Leader shot himself. By no stretch did they fight to the last man, horse or bullet-they only fought to the last lunatic!
I do not think the relatives of the 2 million+ Germans killed in the last year of the war would share your view that this was a magnificent performance. What is it that drives people admire and defend this sort of senseless slaughter?

I don't do Facebook and almost every war is senseless.

The RAF strategic bomber raids often amounted to pointless slaughter, with nothing gained. Those men who cracked or declined to continue were accused of lacking in moral fibre (LMF). Apparently we are not allowed to admire the courage of the crews who were forced to fly on these suicide missions, because that would run afoul of your politics.

[TheMarcksPlan]

So my thinking is that all incremental production would go to Pz III/IV instead of 38(t). The specific pre-war change that I envision - not cutting the Pz III/IV program - would be focused on those tanks.

Fair enough. I left out the MkIV since both division types would use it so I figured it's a wash.

easily dismisses logistics

A person who has to misrepresent his opponent's argument is telling on himself.

The programs were not "cut". The contracts remained the same. Production of the Panzer III grew from 40 in September 1939 to 87 in August 1940 and averaged 53.66 per month for that year. It grew from 91 in September 1940 to 179 in August 1941, averaging 114.08 per month for that year. Production of the Panzer IV grew from 0 in September 1939 to 28 in August 1940 and averaged 17 per month for that year. It grew from 17 in September 1940 to 44 in August 1941 and averaged 30 per month for that year.

Richard Anderson is committing a basic intellectual error: He's responding to a point about the delta between ATL and OTL production rates with a point about intra-OTL production rates. This kind of error is common in ATL threads.
Nothing about the fact that production increased during OTL implies that production couldn't have increased faster.

Mr. A claims that the "contracts remained the same" despite a cut in planned production. Does he have any proof of that? Does he have any proof that different contracts would have been issued under a planning program for more tanks, as any reasonable person would conclude?

Given that the foregoing sentence contains a contingency embedded within an alteration to a historical contingency, I expect him to trip up on this.

[Michael Kenny]

The RAF strategic bomber raids often amounted to pointless slaughter, with nothing gained.

Again you assume your bias is fact. Your assertion is incorrect. The bombing did have a detrimental effect on the Nazi ability to wage war.

[David Thompson]

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[EKB]

The RAF strategic bomber raids often amounted to pointless slaughter, with nothing gained.

Again you assume your bias is fact. Your assertion is incorrect.

The Butt Report suggested otherwise...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report

The bombing did have a detrimental effect on the Nazi ability to wage war.

Ground action was far more detrimental. And Sir Henry Tizard – the scientist largely responsible for installation of the British radar chain – was less optimistic about strategic bombing after the war …

“ Experience has shown that a nation, with toughness and a will to work, can stand far more punishment in the form of bombardment of cities and homes than most people thought possible before the trial. No one now thinks that it would have been possible to defeat Germany by bombing alone. The actual effort in man-power and resources that was expended in bombing Germany was greater than the value in manpower of the damage caused.”

(Ref: The Strike Wings by Roy Conyers Nesbit)

[Michael Kenny]

The Butt Report suggested otherwise...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report

So a report from May 1941 is the final word on the subject?
In 1940-1941 a total of 32,000 RAF aircraft bombed Germany. This increased in every following year.
1942, 23,000
1943. 48,000
1944. 78,000
1945. 55,000

.
Note I did not include US Bombing numbers.

And Sir Henry Tizard – the scientist largely responsible for installation of the British radar chain – was less optimistic about strategic bombing after the war ...............…

Given that it is not being claimed bombing won the war I am at loss at what you are trying to prove. That up to 1942 bombing results were poor?
How does that negate the much greater impact of the bombing in 1942, 1943, 1944 & 1945?

.

[EKB]

The Butt Report suggested otherwise...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report

So a report from May 1941 is the final word on the subject?
In 1940-1941 a total of 32,000 RAF aircraft bombed Germany. This increased in every following year.
1942, 23,000
1943. 48,000
1944. 78,000
1945. 55,000

.
Note I did not include US Bombing numbers.

And Sir Henry Tizard – the scientist largely responsible for installation of the British radar chain – was less optimistic about strategic bombing after the war ...............…

Given that it is not being claimed bombing won the war I am at loss at what you are trying to prove. That up to 1942 bombing results were poor?
How does that negate the much greater impact of the bombing in 1942, 1943, 1944 & 1945?

You have me confused with someone else. I never wrote that all strategic bombing raids were ineffective.

Stop deflecting from the original message.

[Michael Kenny]

You have me confused with someone else. I never wrote that all strategic bombing raids were ineffective.

Stop deflecting from the original message.

You deflected/introduce the bombing and used a Wiki article about a 1941 report to (try) and suggest it applied to all the bombing. But if you agree that the Bombing crippled transport links and oil production in Germany then we can default back to your unbeaten-in-a-fair-fight German Army fantasy.

[T. A. Gardner]

Combat effectiveness value. I'd rather not adjudicate this controversy here; there are tons of threads in which we can do so.

I must agrees. Good performance by Germany in World Wars. Came second twice in 30 years.

As one of the few who actually knows anything about the derivation of CEV and what it did and did not assess, it always amuses me when someone easily dismisses logistics in a discussion of combat effectiveness.

I'll be more than happy to jump into that discussion too.

[ljadw]

About Spain :
Franco would only join the Axis if the war was ending victoriously for the Axis and ,in this case, the Axis did not need Franco .
On the first setback of the Axis , the insincere Spanish proposals were withdrawn .When Hitler asked Franco's consent for an attack on Gibraltar, the answer was :NO .
At the end of 1940 the German chances to win the war had become a fata morgana, thus there was no reason for Franco to join the sinking ship .
Besides,due to the destructions of the Civil War,the Spanish army was unable to operate outside Spain . This has already been discussed here in the past.
And without fuel and food from aboard, Spain would suffer a big famine .

[ljadw]

No one remembers what happened at Hendaye ,October 26 1940,during the meeting of Hitler and Franco ?
When Hitler had to wait,because,due to the bad situation of the Spanish railways, Franco was too late ?
When Hitler proposed to send German forces to capture Gibraltar, because Spain could not do it ?
When Franco said : NO ?
And when Hitler said afterwards : Franco is only a .... .I prefer to let remove my tooths than to discuss again with that .....?
And no one knows that the German situation had to be desperate for Hitler to propose to send in the winter !! an army to the south of Spain over railways with a different gauge, and over a country that still was not pacified, for something that would have no influence on the outcome of the war ?
Franco knew ,and he was that intelligent not to enter a sinking ship .

[ljadw]

Source :
The Spanish Government and the Axis
1 Memorandum by the German ambassador in Madrid August 8 1940 .

[John T]

So my thinking is that all incremental production would go to Pz III/IV instead of 38(t). The specific pre-war change that I envision - not cutting the Pz III/IV program - would be focused on those tanks.

Fair enough. I left out the MkIV since both division types would use it so I figured it's a wash.

...
How does "incremental production" go to the "Pz III/IV instead of 38(t)" when BMM was incapable of producing any Pz III/IV? It was lack of plant capacity and capability that was the driver for the early limitations of Panzer output, not some fictitious "cut". Production of the Panzer IV was limited to Krupp Grusonwerk and did not expand until Vomag was upgraded from a repair facility to an assembly plant in late 1940 and early 1941 and until Nibelungenwerk was completed and operational in late 1941.

Production of the Panzer III was restricted by the late acceptance of the production type, as well as limitations in the production plant. Expansion of the Henschel Mittelfeldwerk did not begin until late 1939. MIAG did not begin its production run until September 1939.

My emphasis above

Do you know the work hours and shifts used in tank plants at that time?

Alan Hambys web page on Tiger I , says Tiger production was 2 shift a 12 hours, but that was later during the war.
http://www.alanhamby.com/factory1.shtml
I have a notion from somewhere that most of german arms production operated on one shift surprisingly long into the war.

When Sweden mobilized her industry during 1940 two measures where implemented,
1. Increase in work hours by 10 hours a week - simple to implement if you can motivate the workforce.
2. Two shift, this required obviously more manpower, transfers from other parts of the company and/or new hiring's.
but as every new worker have a more experienced colleague, on the job training where fairly efficient.

Cheers
/John

[T. A. Gardner]

The real, major, problem with German industry was it was just inefficient compared in particular to the Western Allies. There was little incentive until mid-war when it was too late to simplify production. Most German factories made limited use of assembly lines instead using far more handwork. The Meister system of craftsmen put a crimp on expansion as there were only so many of these skilled workers available.
The Germans also made little attempt to undo bottlenecks that would slow or hold up production. Probably the most famous is the Ta 154 Moskito. When the Tego glue factory was demolished in a bombing raid, there was no alternative available in Germany to produce this polymer resin glue.

The result of all this was a low production rate due to a lack of adequate facilities, lack of skilled workers, and production processes that unnecessarily created massive bottlenecks.

[Cult Icon]

All of this pre-supposes that having more combat troops the logistics system can adequately supply them. The problem for Germany in the East, and even elsewhere, wasn't sufficient combat troops. It was an adequate logistics system running on an adequate transportation system.

In the East, the Germans didn't need more combat troops. They needed more civil engineers, and in particular railway construction units with state-of-the-art equipment to quickly rebuild the rail system. In addition, they needed more civil engineers and equipment that would allow rapid road and shelter construction.

The Germans desperately needed more bulldozers, road graders, road rollers, rock crushing plants, and things like the British Nissan hut or US Quonset hut. Add that the rail operators needed to be able to quickly string and expand communications systems so the lines could be run to maximum efficiency and the ability to build and stock water and coaling stations.

Had they had this sort of thing in good supply, then the logistics bottlenecks would have been largely alleviated. Better quality roads would mean that trucks lasted longer so replacement of them would occur at a lower rate. Rail lines that could handle more traffic and get closer to the front would mean more supplies reaching the troops. Quickly erected buildings would mean that the weather would have less effect on men and supplies. Equipment losses due to the poor operating conditions could have been seriously reduced.

This would have equaled far more than a few more divisions of combat troops.

For comparison, a single US Navy Construction Battalion, or a US Army engineer battalion with attached equipment company, both running about 1000 men, had more capacity for civil engineering construction than an entire German corp's worth of engineers. That's the kind of engineer support Germany needed in Russia.

sources?