D Day through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France, by Jonathan Trigg

[Mori]

I think you are being a bit unfair to Richard. It is evident that he was not writing a tactical/operational history and never intended to. He wrote a from the POV of German memoir...and mostly of the Landser, not the genrals. In that sense it is highky impessionistic rather than analytical and I think deliberately so.

Fair point. He did not aim at an operational history, so can't blame him for not delivering one.

But even when writing from what the Landser remembered, I would have welcomed some ability to step back from the testimonies. Hargreaves never showed what the memoirs he used omit or what they infer.

E.g.,
blaming Allied superiority => blaming Luftwaffe inferiority => deflecting the defeat on another service than the army

In the end, his book is a fine compilation of testimonies, but it's not the work of a historian who criticize his sources.

[Mori]

So you say that that is all fiction.These Lagebeurteilungen of June 30 do exist you know.They are a matter of record.I read them in the book i quoted..You should try to do some reading.

Well, I'm reading RH 19-I-25 right now, between 2 posts on the forum. I suggest you drop the despising tone.

[Richard Anderson]

I think you are being a bit unfair to Richard. It is evident that he was not writing a tactical/operational history and never intended to. He wrote a from the POV of German memoir...and mostly of the Landser, not the genrals. In that sense it is highky impessionistic rather than analytical and I think deliberately so.

Fair point. He did not aim at an operational history, so can't blame him for not delivering one.

But even when writing from what the Landser remembered, I would have welcomed some ability to step back from the testimonies. Hargreaves never showed what the memoirs he used omit or what they infer.

E.g.,
blaming Allied superiority => blaming Luftwaffe inferiority => deflecting the defeat on another service than the army

In the end, his book is a fine compilation of testimonies, but it's not the work of a historian who criticize his sources.

Again in all fairness, it is difficult sometimes to critique what those at the time said, given they often simply didnt know any different. So it's easy to come across as an asshole taking advantage of hindsight to show what idiots they were. What is most slowing me down niw is writing the critiques of the first person accounts in For Purpose of Service Test. Well, one of the things slowing me down.

[Richard Anderson]

So you say that that is all fiction.These Lagebeurteilungen of June 30 do exist you know.They are a matter of record.I read them in the book i quoted..You should try to do some reading.

Well, I'm reading RH 19-I-25 right now, between 2 posts on the forum. I suggest you drop the despising tone.

No fair bringing actual sources into yet another extended opinion post at AHF.

[Cult Icon]

E.g.,
blaming Allied superiority => blaming Luftwaffe inferiority => deflecting the defeat on another service than the army

In the end, his book is a fine compilation of testimonies, but it's not the work of a historian who criticize his sources.

The only materials I've personally read that gave me this impression was Hasting's outdated and generalist books 15 years ago.

Read other material...

[Aida1]

I think you are being a bit unfair to Richard. It is evident that he was not writing a tactical/operational history and never intended to. He wrote a from the POV of German memoir...and mostly of the Landser, not the genrals. In that sense it is highky impessionistic rather than analytical and I think deliberately so.

Fair point. He did not aim at an operational history, so can't blame him for not delivering one.

But even when writing from what the Landser remembered, I would have welcomed some ability to step back from the testimonies. Hargreaves never showed what the memoirs he used omit or what they infer.

E.g.,
blaming Allied superiority => blaming Luftwaffe inferiority => deflecting the defeat on another service than the army

In the end, his book is a fine compilation of testimonies, but it's not the work of a historian who criticize his sources.

So when a German soldier gives a realistic description of how unfunny it is to undergo allied air superiority you make it into a blame game.Obviously army soldiers Will have unfavourable sentiments about their own airforce in these circonstances.Not that the Luftwaffe could do anything about it.You are clearly still in denial about what happens if one side has total air superiority.

[Aida1]

So you say that that is all fiction.These Lagebeurteilungen of June 30 do exist you know.They are a matter of record.I read them in the book i quoted..You should try to do some reading.

Well, I'm reading RH 19-I-25 right now, between 2 posts on the forum. I suggest you drop the despising tone.

When you reject sources because they contradict your prejudices you cannot expect praise.Same goes for your unjust comments about hargreaves book.

[Mori]

Again in all fairness, it is difficult sometimes to critique what those at the time said, given they often simply didnt know any different.

Definitively...

So it's easy to come across as an asshole taking advantage of hindsight to show what idiots they were.

Point is, when writing in the 2000s, an author cannot ignore hindsight either. He should know the systematic biais in what he reads.

I'll give an example. Germans keep complaining about lack of munitions. It's then interesting to see if there is a case when an Allied unit complained about a massive enemy artillery bombardment. Then investigate whether / how / why there were locations or times when Germans did not lack munitions after all; or show that not too many shells are enough to be perceived as "massive artillery bombardment".

I came across such cases when I studies the 1945 campaigns. Reading the FMS, you get the feeling Germans suffered from scarcity in everything everywhere. It's a very consistent message across this source.

Reading more, I realized the Allied advance was completely blocked end of February 1945 during operation Blockbuster (Hochwald, Simonds's II Can Corps). The Allies complained about massive artillery concentrations against them. Wait a minute, Germans all said they did not have munitions, and even when they had they had such a variety of guns that munitions never fit the right gun. This contradiction triggered more analysis to understand whether, and then how, a "massive wall of artillery" could happen while there were "no munitions".

=> that's the type of thinking that is nowehre to be found in Hargreaves. He never reflects on what the witnesses state.

[Mori]

So when a German soldier gives a realistic description of how unfunny it is to undergo allied air superiority you make it into a blame game.Obviously army soldiers Will have unfavourable sentiments about their own airforce in these circonstances.Not that the Luftwaffe could do anything about it.You are clearly still in denial about what happens if one side has total air superiority.

<yawnnnnn>

Have you investigated books assessing what Allied superiority meant pratically?

Besides, when remembering defeats, how much do army men admit that they weren't good enough fighters? Take the Eastern Front: they blamed weather, poor roads / bad maps, wrong intelligence, poor leadership from Berlin, insufficient logistical planning (no winter clothes etc.), lack of ammunitions, material inferiority to the Russians etc. It's exceptional that a general admits he made wrong operational decisions, that a captain says he made bad tactical decisions, that the soldiers describe how they surrendered, cracked down or ran away panicking.

So there are quite a few things you would almost never read in soldiers memoirs. Yet they existed. Just using memoirs as the sole source to tell what happened to "Germans in Normandy" is putting a very serious biais on one's work.

[Mori]

Well, I'm reading RH 19-I-25 right now, between 2 posts on the forum. I suggest you drop the despising tone.

No fair bringing actual sources into yet another extended opinion post at AHF.

Especially when this source is about 1940...

[Aida1]

So when a German soldier gives a realistic description of how unfunny it is to undergo allied air superiority you make it into a blame game.Obviously army soldiers Will have unfavourable sentiments about their own airforce in these circonstances.Not that the Luftwaffe could do anything about it.You are clearly still in denial about what happens if one side has total air superiority.

<yawnnnnn>

Have you investigated books assessing what Allied superiority meant pratically?

Besides, when remembering defeats, how much do army men admit that they weren't good enough fighters? Take the Eastern Front: they blamed weather, poor roads / bad maps, wrong intelligence, poor leadership from Berlin, insufficient logistical planning (no winter clothes etc.), lack of ammunitions, material inferiority to the Russians etc. It's exceptional that a general admits he made wrong operational decisions, that a captain says he made bad tactical decisions, that the soldiers describe how they surrendered, cracked down or ran away panicking.

So there are quite a few things you would almost never read in soldiers memoirs. Yet they existed. Just using memoirs as the sole source to tell what happened to "Germans in Normandy" is putting a very serious biais on one's work.

So you are saying that weather.lack of maps,lack of winterclothing,poor roads,material superiority of the opponent and some poor decisions by higher command ..have no negative effects on military operations.Obviously they have and that goes for any war.For you it must always be bad decisions.And where the eastern front in WW2 is concerned, these problems were already mentioned during the war.No memoir is needed for that.

[Mori]

.For you it must always be bad decisions

You have a point: I believe officers or generals do make decisions. And these decisions can't be neglected when it comes to explaining their defeats. And their crimes, by the way.

Besides, I'm not sure you are into any constructive discussion. You have a hard time not being agressive, haven't you?

[Aida1]

Again in all fairness, it is difficult sometimes to critique what those at the time said, given they often simply didnt know any different.

Definitively...

So it's easy to come across as an asshole taking advantage of hindsight to show what idiots they were.

Point is, when writing in the 2000s, an author cannot ignore hindsight either. He should know the systematic biais in what he reads.

I'll give an example. Germans keep complaining about lack of munitions. It's then interesting to see if there is a case when an Allied unit complained about a massive enemy artillery bombardment. Then investigate whether / how / why there were locations or times when Germans did not lack munitions after all; or show that not too many shells are enough to be perceived as "massive artillery bombardment".

I came across such cases when I studies the 1945 campaigns. Reading the FMS, you get the feeling Germans suffered from scarcity in everything everywhere. It's a very consistent message across this source.

Reading more, I realized the Allied advance was completely blocked end of February 1945 during operation Blockbuster (Hochwald, Simonds's II Can Corps). The Allies complained about massive artillery concentrations against them. Wait a minute, Germans all said they did not have munitions, and even when they had they had such a variety of guns that munitions never fit the right gun. This contradiction triggered more analysis to understand whether, and then how, a "massive wall of artillery" could happen while there were "no munitions".

=> that's the type of thinking that is nowehre to be found in Hargreaves. He never reflects on what the witnesses state.

When some German soldier complains about lack of munitions then there was lack of munitions at that particular time.Does not imply that the Germans always lacked munitions so your mention of strong German artillery barrages in a particular operation does not mean a thing.You are again making hargreaves book into something it is not meant to be and reject testimonies that do not suit you.For getting information about lack of munitions on the German side one does not need postwar testimonies anyway.

[Aida1]

.For you it must always be bad decisions

You have a point: I believe officers or generals do make decisions. And these decisions can't be neglected when it comes to explaining their defeats. And their crimes, by the way.

Besides, I'm not sure you are into any constructive discussion. You have a hard time not being agressive, haven't you?

I am not going to be nice when you ignore common sense concerning the factors that impact on military operations and that goes for all wars.For you it can only be bad decisions.

[Mori]

When some German soldier complains about lack of munitions then there was lack of munitions at that particular time.Does not imply that the Germans always lacked munitions so your mention of strong German artillery barrages in a particular operation does not mean a thing.You are again making hargreaves book into something it is not meant to be and reject testimonies that do not suit you.

The first 2 sentences are precisely you "rejecting testimonies that do not suit you". LOL!