One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[ljadw]

On September 13 1941, Goebbels, who was the last man in Germany to be suspected of defeatism,wrote the following in his diary :

''We are fighting with our back to the wall .''
Source : Stahel : Kiew 1941 : Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East . P 193.

[MarkN]

Historical reality had the German military strategy for success predicated on defeating the bulk of the Red Army on the border. The failed to achieve this. Part of the reason why they failed was their inability to seal the pockets and prevent Red Army units retreating to fight another day.

As an exercise in relative numbers, TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario is entirely predicated on every pocket being perfectly sealed after encirclement and no Red Army forces being able to escape snd fight another day.

I wonder what magic formula TheMarcksPlan's fantasy Germans have to prevent the historical "leakage", what changes to military tactics were required, what changes in military commanders were required and whether the certainty of this effort is credible.

[Richard Anderson]

I wonder what magic formula TheMarcksPlan's fantasy Germans have to prevent the historical "leakage", what changes to military tactics were required, what changes in military commanders were required and whether the certainty of this effort is credible.

Well, since the speculation involves motorizing two infantry divisions and moving two more from the west to compensate apparently for the loss of three converted to motorized in HG-Nord, one wonders which ones?

81., 82., 83., and 88.ID were 6.-Welle divisions comprised mostly of Landwehr and Grenztruppen personnel and were released at the end of the French Campaign as part of the "work vacation" rebalancing of the Heer (August-February). When returned to service in March 1941 they were comprised of newly inducted troops so was not included in the Barbarossa OB.
205., 208., 211., 212., 215., 216., 218., 223., 225., 227., and 246., ID were 3.-Welle divisions comprised mostly of Landwehr personnel and were released at the end of the French Campaign as part of the "work vacation" rebalancing of the Heer (August-February). When returned to service in March 1941 they were comprised of newly inducted troops so was not included in the Barbarossa OB.
302., 304., 305., 306., 319., 320., 321., 323., 327., 332., 333., 335., 336., 337., 339., 340., 342., and 702.-719. ID were 13.-15.-Welle divisions created specifically as immobile occupation divisions.

None of these were considered suitable as field divisions in spring 1941. All of them had indifferent personnel resources, limited vehicular mobility, and made extensive use of obsolete, obsolescent, and captured weapons. Many of these were eventually reorganized, retrained, and reequipped as field divisions as personnel of JG-22 and later were trained up and incorporated into them, along with experienced personnel from burnt out divisions from the east, but it is difficult to see how that process could occur before 22 June 1941.

Never mind - yet again - where the personnel, vehicles, and equipment for the five additional Panzer divisions comes from. Hand-waving anyone?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Never mind - yet again - where the personnel, vehicles, and equipment for the five additional Panzer divisions comes from. Hand-waving anyone?

If anyone here is hand-waiving it's you. I addressed the production issues in several posts, including a long one on foreign labor moves in 1940.
As part of those posts, I repeated once again my request to you for evidence that the cut in planned panzer production during 1939 had zero effect.
I repeat that request for evidence again - what proof do you have that the production cuts had no impact on procurement contracts and/or plans to issue such contracts?

moving two more from the west to compensate apparently for the loss of three converted to motorized in HG-Nord, one wonders which ones?

No, I don't directly compensate AGN for the loss of three reserve divisions, which didn't participate in the border battles anyway.
"Compensation" comes from the fact that AGS removes about a million more Red soldiers in the first couple months, meaning AGN and everyone else faces weaker opposition. You seem to have hand-waived this element away as well.
Later in the campaign, AGN will retain all its armor and receive the two reserve panzer divisions to ensure link-up with the Finns on the Svir.

one wonders which ones?

Germany scraped these formations for battle-worthy replacements throughout Barbarossa. Just do that process earlier.
You're probably going to say, "What about later when the Ostheer needs the replacements but they've already been scraped into the initial forces?"
Response: Ostheer suffers far fewer casualties in this ATL, as hundreds of thousands of Reds who shot at and were killed/wounded by the Ostheer OTL are instead sitting in prison camps from early in the campaign.

I wonder what magic formula TheMarcksPlan's fantasy Germans have to prevent the historical "leakage", what changes to military tactics were required, what changes in military commanders were required and whether the certainty of this effort is credible.

Richard your quoting of this passage does you no credit.
The other poster is asserting that my ATL relies on stopping leakage from OTL pockets when I have explicitly rejected - and argued against - emphasizing leakage-reduction instead of forming more pockets.
The reason is easy to see: Would you prefer 1 pocket with 0% leakage or 2 pockets with 20% leakage? If the pockets are same-sized then the latter gets you 60% more POW. But AGS's pocket would be significantly larger than AGC's so the answer is even more obvious.

You can imagine the frustration you'd feel if somebody reviewed your book by misrepresenting the arguments you actually made.
That's about how I feel regarding your efforts in this thread. Unlike with some interlocutors in this thread, I don't doubt you have the ability to make relevant and helpful comments. But you seem unwilling to invest the time and/or thought to respond to what I'm actually saying, preferring instead to address what random people have decided I'm saying.

[MarkN]

The other poster is asserting that my ATL relies on stopping leakage from OTL pockets when I have explicitly rejected - and argued against - emphasizing leakage-reduction instead of forming more pockets.

So how much leakage have you allowed for in your attrition calculations?

Your fantasy theory...

.... with adding one panzer group to Army Group South: So equipped, AGS could have executed a double envelopment of Southwest Front (from Romania and Poland) during the border battles, removing 3 armies and ~600k soldiers from the map.

"Removing them from the map" has the ring of little or no leakage. 600k removed from the orbat? So how many troops did these 3 armies start with?

And again...

Three SU armies (6th, 12th, 26th) plus large reserves would be trapped.

Trapped? No leakage?

Rather than handwaving, it would be helpful if you substantiated your claims a bit further. How much leakage have you actually fed into your calculations?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Thus, by the end 1942, the Turkish Army could have called on some 250,000 rifles, with another 130,000 over the next three years. That's about enough rifles to equip 15 divisions, or about five full corps of infantry.

First, let's resist the temptation to let the Turkish question sidetrack the discussion. Turkey's entry is not necessary for German victory, I just judge it to be likely and beneficial.
Second, I said in my own post that the Turkish army would require equipment. In this ATL, Germany has captured much more equipment from RKKA via more encirclements - that alone could equip dozens of divisions.
Third, the ATL specifies greater German weapons production due to more rational exploitation of European labor and other factors directly flowing from recognition of the strategic situation. That also enable Germany to send weapons to allies, whether Turkey or others.

That said, Turkey was interested in expanding its borders and closely monitored developments on the eastern front. From Frank Weber's Evasive Neutral



Pan-Turanianism was a widely-subscribed ideology in Turkey that supposed unification of Turkic peoples under Ankara's banner.

[TheMarcksPlan]

"Removing them from the map" has the ring of little or no leakage. 600k removed from the orbat? So how many troops did these 3 armies start with?

Southwest Front started with 864,000 men. See, e.g., Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind Kindle location 3468.
In addition, Southwest Front was reinforced by several reserve corps during the border battles whose proximity can be seen in the map below. Southwest Front also received the new 18th army within weeks.

[TheMarcksPlan]

On September 13 1941, Goebbels, who was the last man in Germany to be suspected of defeatism,wrote the following in his diary :

''We are fighting with our back to the wall .''
Source : Stahel : Kiew 1941 : Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East . P 193.

Not sure what ljadw means by this but apparently it's that even Goebbels perceived Germany's dire straits in September 1941.
That doesn't contradict anything I've claimed: I've always said that Barbarossa was doomed from the outset under the operational plan, available forces, and strategic conception executed.

What I'm seeing repeatedly from folks in this thread is a retreat to generalities (too many Red soldiers), hand-waiving the ability to generate slightly greater forces given different strategic precepts, and non-specific objections based on fashionable buzz-words like logistics.

Nobody has so far made an argument that AGS would fail to encircle Southwest Front given the additional units, despite the fact that Ostheer succeeded in encircling its enemies EVERY TIME it deployed two panzer armies - until November 41 when it was literally and figuratively out of gas.

Does anybody have a good argument against the ATL battleplan for AGS or should I just assume you've all conceded the issue?

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother "THE-MARCKS-PLAN" and the community as a whole. Howdy T.M.P. (or Erich if you so prefer)! Well Herr General Oberst, in respect to your posting of Monday - August 26, 2019 - 5:33pm, this interlocutor does have one very important question regarding your projected A.T.L. battleplan for Army Group South. Now, never you mind what the rest of us might think, but do you believe that your well crafted marvel will pass muster with Der Fùhrer? Just asking. Well, that's my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this continued sojourn to Vladivostok - for now anyway. Incidentally, you also have my condolences in advance over the deaths of your three sons who will also lose their young lives in the pointless WAR IN THE EAST. For the sake of your wife, I hope the sacrifice is worth it. As always, this interlocutor would like to bid you an especially copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[TheMarcksPlan]

do you believe that your well crafted marvel will pass muster with Der Fùhrer?

This is an opportunity to remind folks of the important point that my ATL is more in line with Hitler's vision than with OKH's. Hitler stated "Ukraine first, Leningrad second, Moscow third." He was unwilling/unable to impose that vision on his generals at this stage of the war, however. Hitler had a better strategic conception of Barbarossa than Halder et. al.; any Barbarossa revision that moves towards Hitler's is an improvement.

Both Hitler and Halder/OKH were derisively wrong about the staying power of the SU, however. My ATL changes that. Hitler demonstrated deep misgivings about Barbarossa and vacillated for several months before issuing its final order. Halder, by contrast, was wildly confident in Barbarossa's success, mostly on account of his judgment that the SU would suffer political collapse after initial defeats. Obviously international politics was not a sphere of Halder's expertise or training; his willingness to stake the success of the operation he planned upon his political judgment is egregious incompetence.

My ATL Halder is a competent officer in the tradition of the German General Staff, one of whose core competencies was to attack its own intellectual structures/assumptions. Had such a competent Halder alerted Hitler to the SU's power, Hitler would have planned differently.

Howdy T.M.P. (or Erich if you so prefer)

I chose my name in reference to the possibility of different Barbarossa conceptions, not to identify with any of the German generals.
IMO they were all competent practitioners of a system that they inherited from their forebears.
And they all should have been hanged.

[ljadw]

On September 13 1941, Goebbels, who was the last man in Germany to be suspected of defeatism,wrote the following in his diary :

''We are fighting with our back to the wall .''
Source : Stahel : Kiew 1941 : Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East . P 193.

Not sure what ljadw means by this but apparently it's that even Goebbels perceived Germany's dire straits in September 1941.
That doesn't contradict anything I've claimed: I've always said that Barbarossa was doomed from the outset under the operational plan, available forces, and strategic conception executed.

What I'm seeing repeatedly from folks in this thread is a retreat to generalities (too many Red soldiers), hand-waiving the ability to generate slightly greater forces given different strategic precepts, and non-specific objections based on fashionable buzz-words like logistics.

Nobody has so far made an argument that AGS would fail to encircle Southwest Front given the additional units, despite the fact that Ostheer succeeded in encircling its enemies EVERY TIME it deployed two panzer armies - until November 41 when it was literally and figuratively out of gas.

Does anybody have a good argument against the ATL battleplan for AGS or should I just assume you've all conceded the issue?

Barbarossa was doomed from the outset whatever would be the operational plan,available forces and strategic conception .The USSR was invincible .
You have failed to prove that Germany could raise additional forces, that it could supply these forces,that these forces could operate in the east .
You have also failed to prove that these forces would be sufficient to defeat definitively the SU .You have wisely hidden the fact that is proving that your ATL would fail ,which is that in 1942 the Germans failed with 167 divisions,thus why should they succeed in 1941/1942 with less than 167 divisions .
Finally ,you refuse to admit ,for obvious reasons,the fact that a stronger army will advance slower,because : DISTANCE DECAY POWER .
Barbarossa could only succeed if the SU collapsed in the summer of 1941 .
And, some one who,80 years after the facts is creating as a magician,an ATL where Germany would win ,not only in the East,but would win WWII,can be rightfully suspected of having the hidden intention that Germany should have won and in the East and against the Allies .
Even if Germany won WWII, the Third Reich would collaps before 1953 .

[MarkN]

The TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario is based around attritional numbers calculations and starts with this fantasy tactical success.

.... with adding one panzer group to Army Group South: So equipped, AGS could have executed a double envelopment of Southwest Front (from Romania and Poland) during the border battles, removing 3 armies and ~600k soldiers from the map.

TheMarcksPlan language is ambiguous. Perhaps deliberately so. Does he drawdawn his calculation by 600,000 or 3 armies AND 600,000???

Assuming what he means is 3 armies are defeated for the loss if 600,000 from the Red Army orbat, for credibility purposes, it would be interesting to know how may troops he has starting in his fantasy 3 armies and thus an understanding of the level of leakage.

The answer...

Southwest Front started with 864,000 men. See, e.g., Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind Kindle location 3468.
In addition, Southwest Front was reinforced by several reserve corps during the border battles whose proximity can be seen in the map below. Southwest Front also received the new 18th army within weeks.

Complete avoidance and misdirect.

Your handwaving has not served you well because your numbers have no credibility and, to add to your woeful narrative, you have subsequently undermined them.

To focus your attention in an effort to clean up this handwaving mess,
1) how many troops did your 3 fantasy armies (6th, 12th and 26th) start with?
2) how many of those troops managed to escape your fantasy encirclement?
3) how many additional fantasy troops joined them in the pocket prior to encirclement - which formations and where?
4) how many of those additional troops managed to escape the fantasy encirclement?

Or, is your misdirection actually a revision to the fantasy scenario and you now claim the entire Red Army Southwest front had moved forward and were battling west of Sheptovka?

[ljadw]

About the quote from Goebbels : he also said, before the start of Typhoon,that the war in the East could no longer be won in 1941 .
Hitler went farther and admitted that it was no longer possible to win the war in the East by military means only ,that's why in 1942 he was going to the Caucasus ,under the illusion that without the oil of the Caucasus, the USSR would be forced to give up . Although his own economic advisers had warned him that this was only an illusion .But, as there was no other way to defeat the SU, Hitler transformed this illusion in a fact .

[ljadw]

Second, I said in my own post that the Turkish army would require equipment. In this ATL, Germany has captured much more equipment from RKKA via more encirclements - that alone could equip dozens of divisions.
Third, the ATL specifies greater German weapons production due to more rational exploitation of European labor and other factors directly flowing from recognition of the strategic situation. That also enable Germany to send weapons to allies, whether Turkey or others.





Pan-Turanianism was a widely-subscribed ideology in Turkey that supposed unification of Turkic peoples under Ankara's banner.

The ATL invents greater German weapons production and claims that this could enable Germany to send weapons to Turkey, which it could not do .
The Turkish army would need much more than equipment : the Turkish army was a WWI army commanded by WWI officers and NCOs and it would take years before it would be transformed in a WWII army .

[Terry Duncan]

A post from TheMarckPlan that served only to denigrate others was removed by this mod. Please avoid making comments about the other members, and when asked people need to respond with details as far as possible. I know 'What If' involves areas where no historical evidence can be shown at times, but any idea put forward must have some degree of detail to support it. Likewise, any dismissal of the proposal put forward should also include as much supporting evidence as possible. What is deemed 'Common Knowledge' is acceptable as evidence, such as in this thread pointing out the severe Russian winter had an adverse effect upon the Germans, is perfectly suitable.

Anyhow, no further personal comments from anyone please, and also will all please provide as much detail as possible to support what they are saying.

Terry Duncan