One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[TheMarcksPlan]

The ATL invents greater German weapons production and claims that this could enable Germany to send weapons to Turkey, which it could not do .

The ATL specifies a path to greater armaments production, including greater recruitment of foreign labor. The ATL has a long post on this topic with heavy citation to source material. I will not repeat the argument every time someone says it doesn't exist - that's just a means to waste the time and attention of everyone following this thread.

In addition to the principles set forth in Terry Duncan's preceding post, I request that forum moderation look unfavorably on statements like "X never provided evidence of Y" when X has plainly provided such evidence at great effort.

If it's not going to be endorsed by forum staff/mods, then let me just remind readers that this is my position and I am ignoring several posters in this forum who repeatedly ask for evidence already presented and/or pretend that no such evidence was ever presented.

This should be a norm of any intellectual discourse: do not misrepresent your opponent's assertions.

[Terry Duncan]

An off-topic post from ljadw was removed by this mod. Please refrain from posts that have no content other than sarcasm and emojis as they will be removed without further warning.

If a sensible discussion cannot be had without having digs at other members (and this applies to all members) to the thread will be locked or the offending member will be subject to the standard disciplinary procedure to see if that has a suitable effect.

Terry Duncan

[Terry Duncan]

A post from MarkN was removed by this mod dues to needless comments directed at another poster. Will you all please start addressing the actual details presented and not make derogatory comments about the other posters. If you regard the thread as too outlandish to be a workable proposal state your reasons why. This present thread certainly does not come into ASB territory, so it deserves to be either dismissed with evidence or proven to be impossible with evidence, whilst the OP is perfectly justified in offering factual details to support his proposal.

I will agree that whilst the Germans did achieve X number of encirclements, this does not mean that they will do so in every attempt to do so, albeit with the chances of doing so likely reducing the more times it happens, but that does not mean they could not do so one or two more times and maybe inflict a significant defeat that would not be easy to recover from. Such details are for the debating members to discuss and put forward the details for why they hold their views, and to do so in a courteous manner.

Terry Duncan

[HistoryGeek2019]

I think TheMarcksPlan's proposed ATL addresses the key failure of Operation Barbarossa: The Red Army was not destroyed west of the Dnieper and Dvina rivers as planned. Only the Soviet Western Front was destroyed, and a sizeable portion of its forces were able to escape the encirclement and make it back to Soviet lines. This ATL would likely result in the destruction in the first half of July 1941 of most of the Soviet Southwestern Front, which was the largest Soviet Front at the time. It also leaves Germany's Army Group South in a stronger position after the initial encirclement, because it now has two panzer groups instead of only one. AGS can also advance over relatively clear and open terrain in the Ukraine compared to the forests of Belarus (meaning that there will be fewer encircled Soviet troops hiding in the forests to ambush AGS's rear units).

The implications of this for the war are far reaching. First, fewer Soviet reserves are sent to Smolensk, so perhaps AGC succeeds in defeating the Soviets there in July without getting bogged down in a months long grind. And AGS is now potentially in a position where it can turn north to outflank the Soviet forces attacking Smolensk. AGS can also potentially deploy forces to seize Sevastopol in the summer of 1941 before the remnants of the Soviet Southern Front can evacuate there from Odessa, effectively wiping out a third Soviet front.

Since AGC no longer has to turn south in September 1941, it can instead go for Moscow at least a month earlier than in the OTL. Since it was the October rains that saved Moscow in the OTL, this means Moscow likely falls in September 1941 in this ATL. This would effectively cut off Leningrad from the rest of the Soviet Union, so we can assume that it falls in 1941 as well. Meanwhile AGS should reach Rostov earlier than in OTL, giving it time to dig in and hold the city months ahead of the time Soviet reserves were able to attack in the OTL.

Plus there is no Operation Typhoon. Germany can dig in and consolidate its forces in October 1941 instead of advancing in the rain and losing significant amounts of equipment in the mud. This gives the Germans 2 months to prepare for Soviet winter counter-attack (as opposed to a few days in OTL), so Germany suffers fewer causalties and less loss of equipment than in OTL. Meanwhile the Soviets have lost more territory with large populations, industry and infrastructure than in the OTL. Thus, Germany is in a much better position to take the Caucasus in 1942 than in OTL.

I don't know if Murmansk and Archangelsk had direct rail lines to Gorki, but assuming they didn't, Russia is cut off from one of its three main lend-lease ports for the duration of the war in 1941. If the Germans cut off the Caucasus in 1942, that leaves Vladivostok as the sole lend-lease port for the Soviet Union. Given that lend-lease was critical to the Soviet was effort, this alone might eliminate Russia as an offensive threat to Germany after 1942.

As for the plausibility of this ATL, I haven't crunched TheMarcksPlan's numbers, but it seems plausible enough that at some point in the 1930s, Hitler could have come to the realization that increasing the motorization of the Heer is more important than a big navy or JU 88s. It seems that all that would be required is for a motorization advocate in the Heer to gain more sway over Hitler than Goering and Raeder. Manstein gained such sway over his superiors in 1940, so it's not outside the realm of plausibility.

And if this extra panzer group exists, then the planning conflict between Hitler and Halder largely goes away. There are enough forces for Halder to take Moscow, and enough forces for Hitler to take the Ukraine. This means an overall smoother planning and execution of the operation as a whole.

In the long-run though, none of this saves Germany. Germany can't stop America from landing in North Africa. Germany can't stop Britain from bombing Baku into oblivion. Germany now is facing Allied forces in Persia by the end of 1942, stretching its forces even thinner than in the OTL. None of this helps Germany hold on to North Africa or defend Sicily. Even if fewer German forces are needed overall on the Eastern Front, Germany still has to defend the entire coast of Norway, France, Italy and Greece from Britain and the USA, who can also attack through Spain, Turkey or the Caucasus if they like. Being on the defensive is a disadvantage for Germany, because it has to cover all these places against a potential invasion, whereas the Allies can simply mass their forces wherever they feel like attacking.

This ATL also doesn't help Germany retain air superiority in the West. Even if Germany can send more fighters West from the East, it seems like the air battle in the West was never really close. The Allies can simply overwhelm the Luftewaffe by 1944. Without air superiority, Germany can't defend France. It's just a matter of time before the Allies overwhelm Germany and come marching into Berlin.

[ljadw]

I disagree totally with the claim of the OP that AGS ould have destroyed the SWF if it had a second PzGr,because success or failure for the Germans did not depend on the number of PzD/mobile divisions, whatever may say the Panzer lobby .
It is perfectly possible that he use of a second PzGr in the south would have adverse results, and it is perfectly possible that AGC could have obtained the same results with only one PzGr.It is perfectly possible that it would be impossible for a second PzGr to operate in the south .
The German successes were caused as much by the situation of the Soviet forces,and this was catastrophic : whole Soviet divisions collapsed while advancing to the border,before having fired even one bullet,without having seen one German . ( source : Boris Sokolov )
The OP totally denies the presence of the Red Army and forgets that there are always at least two parties in a war .

[ljadw]

This ATL would likely result in the destruction in the first half of July 1941 of most of the Soviet Southwestern Front, which was the largest Soviet Front at the time.

The implications of this for the war are far reaching. First, fewer Soviet reserves are sent to Smolensk, so perhaps AGC succeeds in defeating the Soviets there in July without getting bogged down in a months.

Since AGC no longer has to turn south in September 1941, it can instead go for Moscow at least a month earlier than in the OTL. Since it was the October rains that saved Moscow in the OTL, this means Moscow likely falls in September 1941 in this ATL.
Plus there is no Operation Typhoon. Germany can dig in and consolidate its forces in October 1941 instead of advancing in the rain and losing significant amounts of equipment in the mud. This gives the Germans 2 months to prepare for Soviet winter counter-attack (as opposed to a few days in OTL), so Germany suffers fewer causalties and less loss of equipment than in OTL. Meanwhile the Soviets have lost more territory with large populations, industry and infrastructure than in the OTL. Thus, Germany is in a much better position to take the Caucasus in 1942 than in OTL.

Given that lend-lease was critical to the Soviet was effort, this alone might eliminate Russia as an offensive threat to Germany after 1942.

As for the plausibility of this ATL, I haven't crunched TheMarcksPlan's numbers, but it seems plausible enough that at some point in the 1930s, Hitler could have come to the realization that increasing the motorization of the Heer is more important than a big navy or JU 88s. It seems that all that would be required is for a motorization advocate in the Heer to gain more sway over Hitler than Goering and Raeder. Manstein gained such sway over his superiors in 1940, so it's not outside the realm of plausibility.

And if this extra panzer group exists, then the planning conflict between Hitler and Halder largely goes away. There are enough forces for Halder to take Moscow, and enough forces for Hitler to take the Ukraine. This means an overall smoother planning and execution of the operation as a whole.

1 Likely is not an argument
2 Why would the defeat of the SWF mean that the Soviets would send less forces to Smolensk?
3 AGC could not go a month earlier to Moscow than in the OTL,because there would be an operational pause whatever the results of AGC would be .Besides,there is no proof that if AGC was going a month earlier to Moscow,that Moscow would fall .and there is no proof that if Moscow would fall the war would be over .
4 The October rains did not save Moscow : Moscow was saved because after the battles of Briansk/Viazma,the Soviets replaced the defeated forces and the Germans were to weak to defeat these also . This would have happen even without the October rain .
5 Without Typhoon the USSR would have lost less territory and resources which would it have made even more difficult for the Germans to conquer the Caucasus . Besides, there is no proof that the conquest of the Caucasus would have resulted in the end of the war .
6 LL was not critical to the Soviet war effort .
7 It is not so that an increase of the motorisation of the army was more important than a big navy or more JU 88s. More motorised divisions would not help the Germans for Barbarossa and even also not in their war against the West .Besides, no big navy/less JU 88s do not mean more motorised divisions .Germany could not afford an increase of the motorisation of its army, and the results would be negative if the motorisation would be increased .The geografic circumstances of Eastern Europe made this part of Europe less fit for a motorised war .
8 The conflict between Halder and Hitler is much exaggerated : Hitler also ''wanted Moscow " and Halder did not resign when a part of AGC was going to the south ( the Kiew decision ) .

[ljadw]

Common knowledges are mostly half-truths :the winter had a limited effect on the Germans but hindered more the Soviets:their winter offensive failed and the Ostheer survived the winter .

[ljadw]

The claim about clean and open terrain in the Ukraine in Post 289 is also a common knowledge, because it fails to grap the fact that movement,advance ande supply of a mobile division were depending on road and railroad space and infrastructure,which were very bad in the SU and which were not better in Ukraine than in the north ( source :German armored traffic control during the Russian campaign ) . If one is adding the distances, it was farther to go to Kiev than to Smolensk, the fact is that it would be unwise to give AGS more mobile divisions than it had in the OTL= 5 Pz and 2 mot.divisions with 799 tanks .A better solution would be to give the additional ATL divisions to AGC, IF road and railroad space would permit it . But,as there is no proof that additional mobile divisions could change the outcome of the war in the east,the best solution was not to create additional mobile divisions .Mobile divisions were good for advance/movement /fighting on small distances with decent road and railroad infrastructure and capacity . Their use in the east had only a small effect .
Western Europe and Eastern Europe were 80 years ago 2 totally different worlds. Today,not much has changed .
In the Autumn of 1944 47 motorised Allied divisions operating in Western Europe,were unable to defeat a running German army .The reason was not that there were only 47 Allied divisions, more would not have succeeded to finish the war before Christmas, the reason was that the existing road/railroad capacity and infrastructure was not able to supply these 47 divisions .
The same situation existed in 1941 in Eastern Europe .

[ljadw]

The ATL invents greater German weapons production and claims that this could enable Germany to send weapons to Turkey, which it could not do .

The ATL specifies a path to greater armaments production, including greater recruitment of foreign labor. The ATL has a long post on this topic with heavy citation to source material. I will not repeat the argument every time someone says it doesn't exist - that's just a means to waste the time and attention of everyone following this thread.

In addition to the principles set forth in Terry Duncan's preceding post, I request that forum moderation look unfavorably on statements like "X never provided evidence of Y" when X has plainly provided such evidence at great effort.

If it's not going to be endorsed by forum staff/mods, then let me just remind readers that this is my position and I am ignoring several posters in this forum who repeatedly ask for evidence already presented and/or pretend that no such evidence was ever presented.


This should be a norm of any intellectual discourse: do not misrepresent your opponent's assertions.

There is no proof that more foreign labour was possible, that more raw materials were available, that more factories could be built .
Besides : if it was possible, why were the Germans not doing it ?

[MarkN]

A post from MarkN was removed by this mod dues to needless comments directed at another poster. Will you all please start addressing the actual details presented and not make derogatory comments about the other posters. If you regard the thread as too outlandish to be a workable proposal state your reasons why. This present thread certainly does not come into ASB territory, so it deserves to be either dismissed with evidence or proven to be impossible with evidence, whilst the OP is perfectly justified in offering factual details to support his proposal.

I will agree that whilst the Germans did achieve X number of encirclements, this does not mean that they will do so in every attempt to do so, albeit with the chances of doing so likely reducing the more times it happens, but that does not mean they could not do so one or two more times and maybe inflict a significant defeat that would not be easy to recover from. Such details are for the debating members to discuss and put forward the details for why they hold their views, and to do so in a courteous manner.

Terry Duncan,

I am disappointed that you have deleted my post where l ask TheMarcksPlan to evidence how his fantasy scenario succeeds in taking 600,000 Red Army troops in the first battles in HGS. You say it was needless, when answers to that question are central to the credibility of his entire narrative.

TheMarcksPlan has stated he believes the failure of BARBAROSSA was a close run thing. That, with slight tweaks here and there, failure can be turned into success. His understanding of this is based entirely on relative strengths. That the Heer failed at the crucial moment because the Red Army was stronger at that point. His fantasy scenario is all about getting the Heer to that point with greater forces than what is left of the Red Army to tip the balance.

The number of Red Army troops eliminated at each stage of the campaign are central to the credibility of his calculations. If he claims 600,000 are removed in battle X, when realistically only 100,000 is credible, that's half a million troops that resurface in later battles that he has written off.

TheMarcksPlan claims that 600,000 will be removed from the Red Army orbat according to his fantasy scenario posited on page 1 of this thread. There has been no attempt to explain how and why this number has any credibility.

Historically, the area which his fantasy scenario encircles probably held no more than 300,000 Red Army troops. But since this is his fantasy scenario, perhaps he's overloaded the area with many more troops. How many? Which formations? Where from? What scale of leakage occured?

Now, you ask doubters to evidence their doubt. But how? How can anybody refute what resides in TheMarcksPlan's head and nowhere else? How can anybody refute the possibility that X formation was captured in the pocket if TheMarcksPlan has not advised which formations his fantasy scenario has in the pocket? The words he has written, and the maps produced, don't put the total encircled much above 300,000. Where does the number 600,000 come from? How can doubters discuss the impact of these changes to historical reality if we don't know what the changes are?

TheMarcksPlan has stated....

All I need is for the extra divisions to perform as average German mobile divisions performed in Barbarossa.

...and...

The historical record of Red Army and Ostheer performance during panzer Kesselschlachten is all I need.

...and...
TheMarcksPlan has bemoaned the significant leakage from historical encirclements which, he states, he does not change in his fantasy scenario.

So, with 50% leakage he needs 1,200,000 troops in the pocket historically populated by about 300,000. At 75% he needs 2,400,000. And so on.

See the problem with the coherence of the narrative and the credibility of the entire scenario posited?

[Terry Duncan]

Terry Duncan,

I am disappointed that you have deleted my post where l ask TheMarcksPlan to evidence how his fantasy scenario succeeds in taking 600,000 Red Army troops in the first battles in HGS. You say it was needless, when answers to that question are central to the credibility of his entire narrative.

I was also disappointed that you made a post containing personal comments within a couple of hours of my posting asking all members to refrain from doing so. Reword your post so it makes the points you wish to raise without making reference to the other person and there will be no problem. Comments about threads in the 'What If' section being products of someone elses imagination, or suggesting proving that the What IF ideas are not possible is akin to proving legendary creatures does not exist are hardly helpful when a situation is already heated, and, being the 'What If' forum in the first place products of the imagination tend to go with the territory at least somewhat. If the answer to every 'What If 'scenario was 'it cannot work because they didnt do it' then all threads would be very short, as they would also be if the answer was 'this works because I say so'!

This is where the art of civil discussion comes into play, and where the forum rules requiring people to provide details to support whatever proposal they are putting forward, either pro or con the scenario, need to be followed by everyone.

[Terry Duncan]

The ATL invents greater German weapons production and claims that this could enable Germany to send weapons to Turkey, which it could not do .

The ATL specifies a path to greater armaments production, including greater recruitment of foreign labor. The ATL has a long post on this topic with heavy citation to source material. I will not repeat the argument every time someone says it doesn't exist - that's just a means to waste the time and attention of everyone following this thread.

In addition to the principles set forth in Terry Duncan's preceding post, I request that forum moderation look unfavorably on statements like "X never provided evidence of Y" when X has plainly provided such evidence at great effort.

If it's not going to be endorsed by forum staff/mods, then let me just remind readers that this is my position and I am ignoring several posters in this forum who repeatedly ask for evidence already presented and/or pretend that no such evidence was ever presented.


This should be a norm of any intellectual discourse: do not misrepresent your opponent's assertions.

There is no proof that more foreign labour was possible, that more raw materials were available, that more factories could be built .
Besides : if it was possible, why were the Germans not doing it ?

Maybe it would be helpful to your case if you could offer figures to show how much foreign labour the Germans were using at this point, and what efforts were being made to increase it where needed? We do know the Germans were building more factories later in the war, as well as employing larger numbers of forced labour, so is it possible to show there was little more that they could try in the timeline of this scenario?

[Richard Anderson]

If average German divisional performance is the metric, then we can count on ten extra divisions inflicting about 180,000 additional casualties. Maybe. If there is a way to gin up five operational divisions from the dregs in the west and five operational Panzer divisions from whole cloth.

[MarkN]

I was also disappointed that you made a post containing personal comments within a couple of hours of my posting asking all members to refrain from doing so. Reword your post so it makes the points you wish to raise without making reference to the other person and there will be no problem. Comments about threads in the 'What If' section being products of someone elses imagination, or suggesting proving that the What IF ideas are not possible is akin to proving legendary creatures does not exist are hardly helpful when a situation is already heated, and, being the 'What If' forum in the first place products of the imagination tend to go with the territory at least somewhat. If the answer to every 'What If 'scenario was 'it cannot work because they didnt do it' then all threads would be very short, as they would also be if the answer was 'this works because I say so'!

This is where the art of civil discussion comes into play, and where the forum rules requiring people to provide details to support whatever proposal they are putting forward, either pro or con the scenario, need to be followed by everyone.

Terry Duncan,

I do not write this in argument but as an explanation or defence of my words.

Personal comment.
I do not believe my post contained any negative commentary about TheMarcksPlan himself. It was, however, negatively questionning the (lack of) credibility of his scenario.

Imagination.
By definition, what if discussions revolve around just that: imagination. TheMarcksPlan's scenario here is entirely of his imagination. It is not a what if discussing a point of divergence to history, it is a let's see how we can achieve the non-historical outcome predetermined by TheMarksPlan. Each individual element of the scenario is also, in itself, imaginary until such time as it is demostrated as being credible/realistic. Only TheMarcksPlan can present that, and that has still to be done. Specifically, the 600,000 claim is imaginary until such time as he can provide credible substance.

Mythical creatures and already heated discussion.
The discussion would be unlikely to become heated if senior moderators had taken steps at an early stage to enforce their own rules and guidelines. You will notice from TheMarcksPlan post at the top of this page that he still thinks he is not required to evidence his claims and suggests it is your job to police out doubter's questions. TheMarcksPlan has not explained how the 600,000 is calculated. It is crucial to guaging the credibility of his entire narrative. What evidence he has produced indirectly points to a number considerably less than 600,000.

It cannot work.
At no time have l written that his scenario cannot work. Since the scenario is a product of his imagination, it needs lengthly, credible explanations. I have not said it is impossible for 600,000 to be lost. I've asked how he has got to that figure. Did he start with 1,200,000 in the pocket and assume 50% got out? If so, which formations. Then, and only then, can serious discussion be had on the consequences. Remember, TheMarcksPlan has repeatedly riled against those who dismiss his narrative when set against historical reality and demands we only comment on the outcomes of is fantasy narrative. OK. But he has to provide that information in detail. He hasn't. Similarly, l've asked how he overcomes the offensive burnout, how he overcomes the reasons behind General Marck's decision not to launch a panzer group out of Romania etc etc.

Civil discussion.
There is no discussion, civil or other, until the basic framework is established. This thread has become 'uncivil' because TheMarcksPlan is unable or unwilling to provide the basic framework to his scenario and his claims. Yes, he has written volumes. No, they have not substantiated the core elements - they have (deliberately) caused misdirection and frustration. Senior moderators at an early stage could have got this thread, and others, on track. They didn't. Hoping for poster self-moderation isn't working.


I still have no idea how the 600,000 is derived. From a historical point of view, it is quite unrealistic. Whether it is realistic in TheMarcksPlan narrative depends on how he got to that figure. The very same applies to every stage of his narrative. Why? Simple. The outcome that he has predetermined is based upon those numbers holding true. The entire narrative collapses if they are unrealistic. Can, and how does, he make them realistic? Which formations were located in the pocket? With that information, others can begin to analyse the realism of that and the consequences.

[TheMarcksPlan]

This thread has become 'uncivil' because TheMarcksPlan is unable or unwilling to provide the basic framework to his scenario and his claims.

Mark this is precisely why I have stopped responding to your posts, the last exception (and this one) aside.
No matter how much framework and evidence one provides, it is always possible baldly to assert that one has not provided such evidence.
I know this tactic well from the courtroom; it doesn't work there and it shouldn't work here.
I will not play a time-wasting game of responding to requests for evidence/framework from someone so clearly intent on ignoring the provision of evidence/framework.
That will be my policy unless and until your tone and the veracity of your portrayals of my assertions change.
I will be happy to engage you in productive discussion at that point.

As always, anyone else is free to request clarification of points by posters with whom I am choosing not to engage.