Here is a criticism of the operation plan. Having sprayed forces on a huge front, the Soviets did not have reserves to strengthen.
http://inbelhist.org/my-za-cenoj-ne-pos ... bagration/
Operation Bagration was planned exclusively on the map. And if the command of the German Center group had the appropriate reserves, it would have ended at best on the Berezina, and at worst 50-100 km from the offensive line.
On June 23, 1944, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic against the troops of the 3rd Tank and 4th Field Armies of the Wehrmacht, went on the offensive.
On the third day (June 25), the 43rd and 39th armies surrounded Vitebsk (it was defended by two infantry and two airfield divisions of the 53rd army corps). The next day, June 26, this corps launched a counterattack to break through, but was almost completely dispersed on June 27. Nevertheless, the Soviet 4th strike army was never able to get close to Polotsk.
An attempt to realize Vitebsk’s success failed - P. Rotmistrov’s 5th Panzer Army, which entered the breakthrough, on the approaches to Berezina ran into the tanks of the 5th Panzer Division, Major General Decker, arriving from Ukraine, and despite its fivefold superiority (524 tanks and self-propelled guns versus 125), was defeated, having suffered very large losses (295 tanks - 56%).
Only a week later, on June 28, the 2nd Belorussian Front managed to force the Dnieper and occupy Mogilev.
Thus, by the end of the week of fighting, the Soviet troops in the northern sector, despite advancement of 50-150 km in different sectors, had not yet reached a strategic breakthrough.
The 1st Belorussian Front launched its offensive, at the request of its commander G.K. Zhukov began days later, on June 24. On the sixth day, June 29, having advanced 100 km forward, the front forces managed to surround and take Bobruisk. The messages of Soviet historians, circulating today, about the "complete destruction of the enemy’s encircled group" in the Bobruisk "cauldron" do not correspond to reality - most of the German group escaped from the Bobruisk area. However, it was this operation that opened the way for Minsk to the Soviet troops.
If after encircling part of their troops near Vitebsk and Mogilev, the Germans nevertheless restored the semblance of the front in those directions using the Berezina River’s border, after the breakthrough Bobruisk formed a hefty “window” that the German units that had just escaped from could not close Under Bobruisk and not having time to either recover or regroup.
From the very beginning, the operation took a turn that was unexpected for the Führer and his closest advisers Jodl and Keitel. German troops in Belarus were attacked by superior forces throughout the front, and not its individual sections. In the directions of the main Soviet attacks, the front was broken through in the early days, and immediately there was a threat of encirclement of the groups defending Vitebsk and Bobruisk. But German troops could not leave in a timely manner from these sections due to the "valuable" instructions of the Führer to ban the withdrawal and to keep the flanks in conditions of deep penetration of the enemy. As a result, the troops were surrounded, although they could easily avoid this fate:
“By observing and analyzing the actions of the German troops and their main command then, we, frankly, were surprised at their grossly erroneous maneuvers that doomed the troops to a catastrophic outcome. Instead of quickly retreating to the rear lines and throwing strong groups to their flanks, which were threatened by Soviet strike groups, German troops were drawn into protracted frontal battles east and north-east of Minsk ”(G. Zhukov. Memoirs and Reflections. T. 2, M. , pp. 256-257).
From the very beginning, difficulties arose among the Soviet troops. The troops that surrounded the Germans near Vitebsk and Bobruisk failed to regroup mobile units for an attack on Minsk, and the 5th Panzer Army introduced into the breakthrough did not achieve a breakthrough. In addition, the infantry, stuck in the front line of the German defense on the elimination of numerous centers of resistance, lagged behind the tank and mechanized units. In the areas east of Minsk, a "mess" was formed, consisting of: a) from broken and retreating German troops; b) the Soviet rifle divisions not too persistently pursuing them; c) Soviet mechanized divisions, detached from their infantry and trying to realize the possibilities of deep coverage; d) partisan formations.
On June 28, specifying a new task for the fronts, the Stavka made a remark to the command of the 5th Panzer Army:
“The Stavka is unhappy with the slow and indecisive actions of the 5th Guards. TA refers this to the poor leadership of Comrade Rotmistrov. The Stavka requires 5 Guards. TA rapid and decisive actions that meet the prevailing situation on the front. "
The pace of advancement of the Soviet units was not maintained. Next came the counterattacks of German reserves from the depths - and the front would have stuck somewhere on the Berezina line. That would have ended the whole Bagration. Would not see "Soviet" Minsk. But here a very simple but extremely important circumstance played its role - in the depths of the German defense it was empty. And where are the reserves?
The point here is not the notorious “Ukrainian tanks” (the role of an armored hammer operating from the depths of its defense could be played by the present 3rd Panzer Army with its five divisions). Yes, here's the trouble - the 3rd tank could not be removed from near Vitebsk, because there was nothing to replace it in the front line of defense. Army Group Center had no effective reserves at all!
For some reason, historians ignore the fact that all three strategic operations of the Red Army in the central sector of the front (Belarus, Vistula-Oder and Berlin) at the final stage of the war unfolded according to the same scenario - a breakthrough of the first line of German defense and ... that’s all. Further, non-stop advance deep into the territory with the complete absence of counterattacks due to the absence of any troops in the depths of the enemy defense.
