Tiger and Stug tactics

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The memoir "Panzer Gunner " (7th Panzer division , Pz IV and Jagdpanzer IV) has a few chapters on the Jagdpanzer IV in 1945 fighting in East Prussia. What is noted is the weakness of the Jagdpanzer IV gun mount- it was very easily to damage and knock the oversized L/70 out of alignment with its long barrel and inadequate mounting. The L/70 also had very little traverse and its great barrel length (combined with low silhouette of the AFV) required a skilled and careful driver. Small mistakes and driving into the wrong terrain could put the main gun out of action.

The author's Jadpanzer IV was disarmed by a driving accident and the L/70 was unreparable. The vehicle was cannibalized for spare parts. He was not particularly impressed with the Jadpanzer IV except for its powerful cannon- he also agreed with the notion that it was not necessary to have SPG-type vehicles with heavy armor.

pg. 168

"Cold and clear, the weather that morning was ideal for pinpoint shooting. Using my main gun's telescopic sight-it had 5x magnification, which gave me a 259 m field of view at 1,000 m, making it about 194 m at 750 m-to check the 750 m mandatory, "

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pg. 173 "Every Jagdpanzer IV would fight its best from an ambush, which meant that its crew had to have a suitable place at which to hide it. However, because we didn't want the ultralong barrels of our Jagdpanzer IVs close to the destructive walls of any of the buildings at that godforsaken extremity of the city"

The Jadpanzer IV was only 1.85 meters tall. All combat accounts in the book are of ambush sniping 1-2 platoon sized groups of Soviet tanks with a platoon of Jadpanzer IV

-Standard tactic of fighting Soviet anti-tank guns: First fire AP and then fire HE. Chances are, HE won't destroy the gun but would damage the crew. AP would destroy the gun but could miss. When encountering them on the move, charge forward without hesitating. (fix and flank, one platoon fixing with the rest of the company flanking)

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The height of Stug is often mentioned as an advantage so I checked. Jadpanzer IV was outstanding in this regard:

Tiger II: 3.09 Meters
Tiger I: 3.0 Meters
Panther: 2.99 meters
Jadpanther: 2.71 meters
PzIV: 2.68 meters

vs


Stug IV: 2.2 meters
Stug III: 2.17 meters
Hetzer: 2.17 meters
Jadpanzer IV: 1.85 meters

[AKahl]

The memoir "Panzer Gunner " (7th Panzer division , Pz IV and Jagdpanzer IV) has a few chapters on the Jagdpanzer IV in 1945 fighting in East Prussia. What is noted is the weakness of the Jagdpanzer IV gun mount- it was very easily to damage and knock the oversized L/70 out of alignment with its long barrel and inadequate mounting. The L/70 also had very little traverse and its great barrel length (combined with low silhouette of the AFV) required a skilled and careful driver. Small mistakes and driving into the wrong terrain could put the main gun out of action.

The author's Jadpanzer IV was disarmed by a driving accident and the L/70 was unreparable. The vehicle was cannibalized for spare parts. He was not particularly impressed with the Jadpanzer IV except for its powerful cannon- he also agreed with the notion that it was not necessary to have SPG-type vehicles with heavy armor.

pg. 168

"Cold and clear, the weather that morning was ideal for pinpoint shooting. Using my main gun's telescopic sight-it had 5x magnification, which gave me a 259 m field of view at 1,000 m, making it about 194 m at 750 m-to check the 750 m mandatory, "

I kind of feel like they should have left the Jagdpanzer IV with the l/48 gun, or at least created a shorter, lighter version of the Panther's gun, with whatever performance tradeoffs that would entail. It was pretty much good enough in it's original form, to me.

Anybody know what the two forms of the Jagdpanzer IV cost and how that compared with the late war STUG III and STUG IV? They had to have similar price points, I would think.

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The Jadpanzer IV's front heavy issues came from the parameters in which it was designed (gun/armor/height/increased weight) which were meant to give it a tactical advantage over the Stug III/IV.

I have no idea as to what it cost, but from seeing price figures I know that the Stug was about 70% of the PzIV in terms of cost, so probably in between the Stug and the Pz IV. The L/70 cannon cost more than the L/48.

As for your idea, another method would be to lower the number of Tigers produced (with each Tiger's price in RM equal to a platoon or half a battery of AG) to leverage the propaganda value and deploy them as a special heavy company attached to AG/TD battalions or Pz Regiments. Interestingly enough, General der Panzertruppen Balck's viewpoint was that the Tiger battalions were a mistake (detrimental to repair/recovery and a dispersion of heavy armor into penny packets throughout the front) and they should have been integrated into special heavy Panzer divisions.

[Jan-Hendrik]

Well...two Abteilungen were integrated into PzKorps n.A.....which was in my opinion better than to integrete them into specific Divisions.

Jan-Hendrik

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Well...two Abteilungen were integrated into PzKorps n.A.....which was in my opinion better than to integrete them into specific Divisions.

What's PzK NA? two battalions of ?

[Jan-Hendrik]

Panzerkorps neuer Art...like Panzerkorps FHH where sPzAbt. 503 was integrated in...

Jan-Hendrik

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http://www.niehorster.org/011_germany/45/45_pzk-na.html

[Yoozername]

This translated report...

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/6

...gives the German viewpoint regarding the state of the Tiger Battalions and use in October 30th, 1943.....

Supreme Command of the Land Forces
4300/43 Secret
October 30th, 1943

Combat training instruction #14
Usage of PzKpfw VI Tiger tanks

Rules were composed based on summarized experience of units that used the PzKpfw VI Tiger tank in recent battles.

1. Vulnerability of the tank

The frequently displayed opinion about the invulnerability of the PzKpfw VI is a mistake, and often leads to improper use of the Tiger tank, which causes excessive losses.


The PzKpfw VI can be penetrated by the Russian long barreled 76.2 mm gun at a favourable angle from the following distances:
From the front at 500 meters.
From the side and rear at 1500 meters.
According to Russian data, the Tiger can be penetrated by:

Weapon
Ammunition
Front
Side
Rear
45 mm gun mod. 37
Subcaliber
-
200 m
200 m
45 mm gun mod. 42
Subcaliber
-
500 m
500 m
57 mm gun
Subcaliber
500 m


Armour piercing
-
600 m
600 m
76 mm AA gun
Subcaliber
700 m


Armour piercing

500 m
500 m
76 mm gun
Subcaliber
100 m
700 m
700 m
85 mm AA gun
Armour piercing
-
1000 m
1000 m
122 mm gun
Armour piercing
1000 m
1500 m
1500 m
152 mm gun-howitzer
Armour piercing
500 m
1000 m
1000 m


Even massed fire from all weapons (including light infantry weapons) can reduce the combat value of a Tiger, even if in most cases the thick armour is not penetrated, vulnerable parts can be damaged (suspension, gun, turret, optic sights).

2. Concentration in the direction of the main attack

The rule to use tanks in massed formations applies to the Tiger as well. A Tiger attack only had chances of success if all Tigers are concentrated in the direction of the main attack and all guns, especially artillery, support the attack. Spreading Tigers out over a large area reduces available technical support, which is especially valuable for such a complicated and technically sensitive fighting vehicles. A battalion of Tigers only has one repair company and one battalion for recovery of trophies.

3. Cooperation with infantry

It is important to take the following factors into account when using Tigers:

Thanks to its powerful gun and thick armour, the Tiger should be used to suppress tanks and AT guns, and only used to suppress infantry as an exception. Its power is focused in its gun, which can suppress tanks from a range up to 2000 meters.
The conclusion is that Tigers support infantry by fighting enemy tanks and AT guns from a long range. Tigers must aim to engage from a range of over 1000 meters.
The Tiger weighs a lot and has a high ground pressure. Thorough preliminary reconnaissance of terrain is important. The use of Tigers on terrain that has not been scouted out is usually ineffective and leads to loss of valuable vehicles.
Reconnaissance must be performed regarding crossings over water hazards, bridges, and paths through swamps.
The rule to calculate if a Tiger can cross terrain is as follows: check if a soldier with an extra load can stand on one foot and does not sink into the ground.
Tigers cannot hide from enemy observation. According to experience, the Russians destroy individual Tigers with massed fire from all weapons.
Advancing infantry must keep a certain distance away from the Tigers so it does not suffer from fire aimed at the Tiger.
Tigers fire from prepared positions, determined by terrain. Positions should be well camoulflaged. For long range guns, it is immaterial if the position is 100 meters closer or 100 meters further from the target.
Tigers must have freedom to select a firing position according to terrain. They don't have to be bound to the infantry. While the Tiger stands still, the infantry must move forward under its protection. When the Tiger is moving up, infantry supports it with fire from its weapons.
The Tiger is invulnerable to mines. Mostly they deal insignificant damage that can only be exacerbated by enemy fire. Tigers that are immobilized are very hard to tow into cover due to their heavy weight.
The commander's cupola on the left side reduces visibility to the right and creates a dead zone, creating a danger of being knocked out from close range. Every Bolshevik that destroys a Tiger in close combat is mentioned in an operative summary of his unit.
It is unreasonable to send one Tiger into combat. Tiger tanks must cooperate with infantry and other tanks to protect them from tank destroyer teams.

Carefully study all proposals and suggestions from masters of their weapons, the Tiger commanders, about the use of the PzKpfw VI.

Signed for: Zeitzler
Confirmed accurate: General Staff Colonel Zerbel

[Yoozername]

But the initial Hetzer roll out actually went to a Battalion of Panzerjager, and it was very slowly brought into infantry divisions.

The official designation of the vehicle is Panzerjager 38 fur 7.5cm Pak 39 L/48 Sd Kfz. 128/2.
Might that be the reason why it was not issued to the Stug Abt. ?

Just for clarification, it is Sd.Kfz. 138/2, not Sd Kfz. 128/2. Do you have a source for this?

Also, while the name went through some iterations, it is generally called out as a Jagdpanzer 38. In fact, it is named as such in October 1944, as far as this document.

[Michael Kenny]

Just for clarification..............

The point was the name Jagdpanzer/Panzerjager gave a huge clue as to which type of Unit it would end up in.

[Yoozername]

Just for clarification..............

The point was the name Jagdpanzer/Panzerjager gave a huge clue as to which type of Unit it would end up in.

I take this to be your speculation or theory. But, compare that same thinking with Panzerjäger 38 (t) for 7.5-cm-Pak 40/3 Ausf. H and M (Sd.Kfz. 138) deliveries.

[Yoozername]

Edited in a readable table...The Germans certainly were aware of Soviet weapon's capabilities it seems

This translated report...

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/6

...gives the German viewpoint regarding the state of the Tiger Battalions and use in October 30th, 1943.....

Supreme Command of the Land Forces
4300/43 Secret
October 30th, 1943

Combat training instruction #14
Usage of PzKpfw VI Tiger tanks

Rules were composed based on summarized experience of units that used the PzKpfw VI Tiger tank in recent battles.

Even massed fire from all weapons (including light infantry weapons) can reduce the combat value of a Tiger, even if in most cases the thick armour is not penetrated, vulnerable parts can be damaged (suspension, gun, turret, optic sights).

2. Concentration in the direction of the main attack

The rule to use tanks in massed formations applies to the Tiger as well. A Tiger attack only had chances of success if all Tigers are concentrated in the direction of the main attack and all guns, especially artillery, support the attack. Spreading Tigers out over a large area reduces available technical support, which is especially valuable for such a complicated and technically sensitive fighting vehicles. A battalion of Tigers only has one repair company and one battalion for recovery of trophies.

3. Cooperation with infantry

It is important to take the following factors into account when using Tigers:

Thanks to its powerful gun and thick armour, the Tiger should be used to suppress tanks and AT guns, and only used to suppress infantry as an exception. Its power is focused in its gun, which can suppress tanks from a range up to 2000 meters.
The conclusion is that Tigers support infantry by fighting enemy tanks and AT guns from a long range. Tigers must aim to engage from a range of over 1000 meters.
The Tiger weighs a lot and has a high ground pressure. Thorough preliminary reconnaissance of terrain is important. The use of Tigers on terrain that has not been scouted out is usually ineffective and leads to loss of valuable vehicles.
Reconnaissance must be performed regarding crossings over water hazards, bridges, and paths through swamps.
The rule to calculate if a Tiger can cross terrain is as follows: check if a soldier with an extra load can stand on one foot and does not sink into the ground.
Tigers cannot hide from enemy observation. According to experience, the Russians destroy individual Tigers with massed fire from all weapons.
Advancing infantry must keep a certain distance away from the Tigers so it does not suffer from fire aimed at the Tiger.
Tigers fire from prepared positions, determined by terrain. Positions should be well camoulflaged. For long range guns, it is immaterial if the position is 100 meters closer or 100 meters further from the target.
Tigers must have freedom to select a firing position according to terrain. They don't have to be bound to the infantry. While the Tiger stands still, the infantry must move forward under its protection. When the Tiger is moving up, infantry supports it with fire from its weapons.
The Tiger is invulnerable to mines. Mostly they deal insignificant damage that can only be exacerbated by enemy fire. Tigers that are immobilized are very hard to tow into cover due to their heavy weight.
The commander's cupola on the left side reduces visibility to the right and creates a dead zone, creating a danger of being knocked out from close range. Every Bolshevik that destroys a Tiger in close combat is mentioned in an operative summary of his unit.
It is unreasonable to send one Tiger into combat. Tiger tanks must cooperate with infantry and other tanks to protect them from tank destroyer teams.

Carefully study all proposals and suggestions from masters of their weapons, the Tiger commanders, about the use of the PzKpfw VI.

Signed for: Zeitzler
Confirmed accurate: General Staff Colonel Zerbel

[Yoozername]

By 1944 the Stug was vulnerable to all Allied guns. In fact the situation was so bad that it was decided that Jgd Panzers were to be attached to Stug Units to protect them. The Stug never got their escorts.
So one area a Tiger had the advantage-it could last longer than 30 seconds once its position was established.

The allocation of Jagdpanzer IV (7,5 cm Pak 39 L / 48) (Sd.Kfz. 162) from March to the end of 1944 is almost entirely Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. The 'Vomag' version, Panzer IV / 70 (V); Panzerwagen 604/10 (V) (m 7,5 cm Pak 42 L / 70), went almost entirely to Panzer units...

But the Panzer IV / 70 (A); Panzerwagen 604/9 (A) (m 7,5 cm Pak 42 L / 70) were issued to StuG units (Sturmartillerie)...

JANUARY 1945
7. Pz.Div. = 10 from H.Za. on the 2nd of January 1945
24. Pz.Div. = 14 from H.Za. on Jan. 13, 1945
Stu.Gesch.Schule Burg = 2 from H.Za. on the 13th of January 1945
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 394 = 3 from H.Za. on Jan. 18, 1945 Not received? Stock 15.3.1945 = 0
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 244 = 4 from H.Za. on Jan. 18, 1945 Not received? Stock 15.3.1945 = 0
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 902 = 3 from H.Za. on 18. Jan. 1945 inventory 15.3.1945 = 4
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 341 = 3 from H.Za. on 18. Jan. 1945 inventory 15.3.1945 = 4
I./Pz.Rgt. 29 = 14 from H.Za. on the 24th of January 1945 use Ostfront, staff Pz.Brig. 103 subordinates
H.Stu.Art.Brig. 911 = 3 from H.Za. on Jan. 28, 1945 Führer-Gren.Div. subordinates
H.Stu.Art.Brig. 905 = 3 from H.Za. on Jan. 28, 1945 Not received? Stock 15.3.1945 = 0
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 280 = 3 from H.Za. on Jan. 28, 1945 Hold 15.3.1945 = 6
FEBRUARY 1945
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 301 = 3 from H.Za. on Feb. 3, 1945 Not received? Stock 15.3.1945 = 0
H.Stu.Art.Brig. 236 = 3 from H.Za. on 3 Feb. 1945
H.Stu.Art.Brig. 667 = 3 from H.Za. on 3. Feb. 1945 inventory 15.3.1945 = 6
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 243 = 3 from H.Za. on Feb. 4, 1945 Not received? Stock 15.2.1945 = 0
Stu.Gesch.Brig. GD = 31 from H.Za. on 9. Feb. 1945
MARCH 1945
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 210 = 4 from H.Za. on the 7th of March 1945
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 300 = 4 from H.Za. on the 7th of March 1945
H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 311 = 4 from H.Za. on March 7, 1945
(H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 190) = 3 from H.Za. on March 7, 1945 instead to Stu.Art.Lehr-Brig. 111 delivered!
(H.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 276) = 3 from H.Za. on March 7, 1945 instead to Stu.Art.Lehr-Brig. 111 delivered!
(Stu.Art.Lehr-Brig. 111) = 16 from H.Za. on 15 Mar. 1945 instead at Fhr.Gren.Div. (= 6) u. 5. Jg.Div. (= 10) delivered!

A nice clear picture....



https://c1.staticflickr.com/5/4625/2540 ... c949_h.jpg