How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

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How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#1

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 26 Aug 2019, 05:07

I am curious if anyone knows standard Heer tactics for where motorized infantry should dismount their vehicles relative to the front line. Obviously, the answer will vary depending on whether it is a static or fluid front line, offensive or defensive operation, and whether the vehicle was armored or unarmored. If people have insight on any or all of these situations, I would love to hear about it.

I am particularly interested in how close panzergrenadiers in SPW 251 armored half-tracks would get to the front line before dismounting. While the half-track theoretically provides protection against shrapnel and small arms fire, it is still very thin relative to the destructive capacity of both direct and indirect weapons.

Meanwhile a truck provides no protection at all, so it has to be careful about even entering artillery range of the enemy.

Did only SPW 251s enter enemy artillery range, while truck infantry had to dismount outside of artillery range? Or did both trucks and SPW 251s get as close to the front as possible without entering the direct line of fire? Was there any standard practice?

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#2

Post by Sheldrake » 26 Aug 2019, 11:38

The short answer is that it depended on the circumstances.

Unarmoured trucks could move infantry at a high speed, but very exposed to splinters from artillery and mortar rounds and stray bullets. Traveling in an unarmoured vehicle in the face of direct small arms fire was likely to be suicidal.

BUT

- In high tempo operations in the advance or pursuit combat might ensure from a chance encounter.

- At very long ranges, say in the western Desert or the steppes of Southern Russia troops might stay mounted as they were outside range of direct fire weapons and, so long as they kept moving, hard to hit with indirect fire.

- The terrain might allow a covered route to a position close to the enemy.


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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#3

Post by bored.com » 26 Aug 2019, 13:05

please view youtube vid "panzergrenadier (world war II) mechanized and motorized infantry"
ive no idea to its accuracy but as an ex armoured soldier myself a lot of the ideas sounds about right.

when i first joined the forces in 1980s we had the equivalent of the half track and presumably learnt the same lessons and adopted the the same tactics as the germans.
advancing across a field with a rifle towards a machine gun hasnt changed much at the basic level since then...

our vehicles were better than walking carrying kit but relatively slow, lightly armoured with very little offensive or defensive fire. designed as battle taxis to take us to the forward edge just before direct fire was expected. we would then dismount to make our advance/ assault.
the armament was just a belt fed machine gun on a free mount purely as self defence or for use as a sentry position in a harbour area etc.
if we werent moving we were behind cover and out the back with our faces in the dirt in case of a hit.
a good driver had the ability to terrain hop keeping himself exposed for the shortest amount of time rather than a direct exposed route.

they were built in the 60s using technology and design from the 50s on lessons leant in the 40s.

as our tanks got faster we found we were being left behind by the MBTs and a better vehicle was delivered in the late 80s. ours was warrior. it was faster, better armoured and armed though our tactics were initially still to dismount in order to engage the enemy.

one change was that once we were dismounted the vehicle became a separate "asset" that could be used for mobile fire support etc. it had a 30mm cannon, 7.62 chain gun and a free mounted 7.62.

we would only dismount to engage when necessary and ideally stand off mounted and pour fire onto the position until a foot on the chest of the local opposition commander was required.
as the survivability was realised to be much better we would advance mounted on to the position before being dumped out the back often quite literally straight into the trenches. we could probe a position, move around weakening and testing it before finding a gap and slipping headlong in.

so as sheldrake correctly points out "it depends". if the enemy has good anti armour capability or terrain not suitable we could advance a mile or more on foot. other times just step out the back.

sorry to bore you, have a nice day!

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#4

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 26 Aug 2019, 17:30

bored.com wrote:
26 Aug 2019, 13:05
please view youtube vid "panzergrenadier (world war II) mechanized and motorized infantry"
ive no idea to its accuracy but as an ex armoured soldier myself a lot of the ideas sounds about right.

when i first joined the forces in 1980s we had the equivalent of the half track and presumably learnt the same lessons and adopted the the same tactics as the germans.
advancing across a field with a rifle towards a machine gun hasnt changed much at the basic level since then...

our vehicles were better than walking carrying kit but relatively slow, lightly armoured with very little offensive or defensive fire. designed as battle taxis to take us to the forward edge just before direct fire was expected. we would then dismount to make our advance/ assault.
the armament was just a belt fed machine gun on a free mount purely as self defence or for use as a sentry position in a harbour area etc.
if we werent moving we were behind cover and out the back with our faces in the dirt in case of a hit.
a good driver had the ability to terrain hop keeping himself exposed for the shortest amount of time rather than a direct exposed route.

they were built in the 60s using technology and design from the 50s on lessons leant in the 40s.

as our tanks got faster we found we were being left behind by the MBTs and a better vehicle was delivered in the late 80s. ours was warrior. it was faster, better armoured and armed though our tactics were initially still to dismount in order to engage the enemy.

one change was that once we were dismounted the vehicle became a separate "asset" that could be used for mobile fire support etc. it had a 30mm cannon, 7.62 chain gun and a free mounted 7.62.

we would only dismount to engage when necessary and ideally stand off mounted and pour fire onto the position until a foot on the chest of the local opposition commander was required.
as the survivability was realised to be much better we would advance mounted on to the position before being dumped out the back often quite literally straight into the trenches. we could probe a position, move around weakening and testing it before finding a gap and slipping headlong in.

so as sheldrake correctly points out "it depends". if the enemy has good anti armour capability or terrain not suitable we could advance a mile or more on foot. other times just step out the back.

sorry to bore you, have a nice day!
Fascinating. Thank you for your input.

I'm also curious, how dangerous was it to man a machine gun on a "free mount" of an APC? It seems like an extremely exposed position where you could be shot from anywhere at almost any time. Were there strict protocols against manning this gun unless the area was deemed to be secure?

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#5

Post by bored.com » 29 Aug 2019, 12:08

Very dangerous in a defence role as they'll be around you but that's the nature of needing to defend yourself.
If we were doing fire support so putting down fire 800m plus we were much safer though we were always told to be as low as possible in our hole (max of head and shoulders exposed) in case of snipers etc. The vehicle ideally would be behind (below) cover with just the firer above the terrain in case of anti tank fire. We were thinking missile systems but WW2 guys were thinking pak fire etc.
Surprisingly (or not?!?!) Firing exposed was a better position than coaxial from inside. You have better view and perspective and have all round vision. But vulnerable.
When the shoe was on the other foot and we were dismounted in the holes in the ground we were taught to fire longer machine gun fire bursts at armour or platforms firing at us.
Normal anti infantry burst was 3 to 5 seconds, stop, check fall of shot/ target, then another squeeze. Prevented overheat of barrel too.
We had two guns in the fire team working alternately to put a continuous fire down.
When firing at tanks/APC we would shoot 8 to 10 second bursts. Hoping to hit optics, comms equipment etc or prevent the guy using his own free mount for ing him inside. Guns would get hot like that and barrel changing/ reloading takes Teamwork to be quick and smooth that you dont usually have working alone out the top of a turret/ hatch.

All irrelevant info I know, but hope it helps...

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#6

Post by eindhoven » 29 Aug 2019, 18:10

This is what you need
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe - HDv 298/3a

It has been translated to English and your answer is covered in Chapter 16, Deployment/Dismounting for Combat followed by Chapter 17, which provides specifics for situations that a panzer-grenadier will face.

The tactics are inline with what has been put forth already. In 1992 completing AIT our instructors were still referencing lessons learned from WW2 in explaining why we were consolidating after assaulting a position. Specifically Prep for Counterattack.

Available here. Of note, tactics changed and there are various dated Ausbildungsvorschrift

https://www.germanmanuals.com/REmanuals.html
HDv298-3a-org.jpg
HDv298-3a-org.jpg (331.45 KiB) Viewed 3553 times
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe - HDv 298-3a.jpg
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe - HDv 298-3a.jpg (52.68 KiB) Viewed 3555 times

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#7

Post by Sheldrake » 30 Aug 2019, 00:25

eindhoven wrote:
29 Aug 2019, 18:10
This is what you need
Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe - HDv 298/3a

It has been translated to English and your answer is covered in Chapter 16, Deployment/Dismounting for Combat followed by Chapter 17, which provides specifics for situations that a panzer-grenadier will face.

The tactics are inline with what has been put forth already. In 1992 completing AIT our instructors were still referencing lessons learned from WW2 in explaining why we were consolidating after assaulting a position. Specifically Prep for Counterattack.

Available here. Of note, tactics changed and there are various dated Ausbildungsvorschrift

https://www.germanmanuals.com/REmanuals.html

HDv298-3a-org.jpg

Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe - HDv 298-3a.jpg
These manuals are dated 1944, by which time the war had been going on for almost four years. So they may not reflect what was the practice before that date. The notes may reflect the type of training introduced in 1943 within 12 SS Panzer Division and commented on by Gewr v Schweppenburg as innovative.

I was stumped by this as I have lots of books and references to then training of the Panzer Troops themselves, but can't find much on the Panzer grenadiers.

I turned to the Trueppenfuhrung H.Dv.300, the German Army Manual for Unit command in WW2, written by Beck Fritsch and v Stulpnagel and the regulations under which the German army prepared for war. Part 2 (1934) includes the emerging technology of motor transport, aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles. There are sections of motor transport for out of contact movement.Para 289 has a reference to only the motororised units capable of direct combat moving by special (non screened?) routes where there is a risk of contact with the enemy. This might include armoured cars and motorcycle troops, but did this include trucks mounted infantry? There is no mention of motoirisied infantry. They are simply infantrymen moving in trucks.

So I turned to Guderian, Achtung Panzer! (1937) is a history of armoured warfare to that date and a survey of the state of tyhe art in the 1930s. Guderian does have a section on motorised infantry in his chapter on the German Mechanised forces. He noted that the French assigned infantry units to support tanks in 1917, but these were on foot. He praises the Dragons of the DLMs mounted in half tracks and notes that for success you need equipment, specialised transport, training and practice. He also noted that the German army didn't have any good cross country vehciles so the infantry accompanying tanks rode motorcycles and unarmoured trucks. The main tasks of the motorised infantry are to follow up at speed behind tanks and exploit and complete their sucess without delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly large complement of machine guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking power of the infantry resides in the bayonet....since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks...... Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayonet but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive point.

Now 1940 didn't always would the way Guderian pictured it. I seem to recall the Guderian's Corps needed quite a bit of storming in with the bayonet to cross the Meuse, but when their normal state of moving in open warfare the schutzen then Panzer Grenadiers were all about deploying lots of firepower rather than bayonets.

I suspect the panzergrenadier doctrine remained a work in progress - which to a certain extent it still it.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#8

Post by Sheldrake » 30 Aug 2019, 00:39

bored.com wrote:
26 Aug 2019, 13:05
please view youtube vid "panzergrenadier (world war II) mechanized and motorized infantry"
ive no idea to its accuracy but as an ex armoured soldier myself a lot of the ideas sounds about right.

when i first joined the forces in 1980s we had the equivalent of the half track and presumably learnt the same lessons and adopted the the same tactics as the germans.
advancing across a field with a rifle towards a machine gun hasnt changed much at the basic level since then...

our vehicles were better than walking carrying kit but relatively slow, lightly armoured with very little offensive or defensive fire. designed as battle taxis to take us to the forward edge just before direct fire was expected. we would then dismount to make our advance/ assault.
the armament was just a belt fed machine gun on a free mount purely as self defence or for use as a sentry position in a harbour area etc.
if we werent moving we were behind cover and out the back with our faces in the dirt in case of a hit.
a good driver had the ability to terrain hop keeping himself exposed for the shortest amount of time rather than a direct exposed route.

they were built in the 60s using technology and design from the 50s on lessons leant in the 40s.

as our tanks got faster we found we were being left behind by the MBTs and a better vehicle was delivered in the late 80s. ours was warrior. it was faster, better armoured and armed though our tactics were initially still to dismount in order to engage the enemy.

one change was that once we were dismounted the vehicle became a separate "asset" that could be used for mobile fire support etc. it had a 30mm cannon, 7.62 chain gun and a free mounted 7.62.

we would only dismount to engage when necessary and ideally stand off mounted and pour fire onto the position until a foot on the chest of the local opposition commander was required.
as the survivability was realised to be much better we would advance mounted on to the position before being dumped out the back often quite literally straight into the trenches. we could probe a position, move around weakening and testing it before finding a gap and slipping headlong in.

so as sheldrake correctly points out "it depends". if the enemy has good anti armour capability or terrain not suitable we could advance a mile or more on foot. other times just step out the back.

sorry to bore you, have a nice day!
Bored.com, Old chap

Pull up a sand bag and swing the lantern while I crack open a Yellow handbag, or would you prefer a pint of Wobbly? If I give Wolfgang the grid reference we can have a bratty as well.

I suspect that thee and me have a similar approach to this topic,from Warminster, Brecon or Larkhill as practised over such evocative alphabet soup as SPTA , SLTA, STANTA or BATUS. We are mere faux panzer grenadiers, because we are British.

- The gates of Hell would open before the School of Infantry signed up to Guderian's idea that combat wasn't about getting close and personal with the bayonet.

- We don't think like the Panzer truppen,. We move between fights, rather than fighting between moves. Our battle maps are full of goose eggs, and phased objectives rather than thrust lines or empty spaces in which the defender manouvres between boundaries.

- We love order and doing things by numbers. Its why Guards NCOs train our officers. It is against British military nature to keep orders simple and short. I once heard a Gaurds battlegroup commander start the general outline of his orders for an armoured counter stroke with the words Gentlemen . we will mount a counterstroke in sixteen phases....

Not just writing as a cold war warrior. Even 30 years later the Germans still think differently. We need input from someone who has trained at Munster Nord or Letzlingerheide.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#9

Post by Sarge3525 » 04 Sep 2019, 13:53

Let's also not forget the German kradschuetzen (motorcycle sharpshooters) with the guy in the side-car with an MG.
In video footage they show them going full speed, swerving, and gunning at the same time, and dismounting at the last moment and using the inertia to continue the infantry assault.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#10

Post by Duncan_M » 06 Sep 2019, 18:45

Sheldrake wrote:
30 Aug 2019, 00:25

So I turned to Guderian, Achtung Panzer! (1937) is a history of armoured warfare to that date and a survey of the state of tyhe art in the 1930s. Guderian does have a section on motorised infantry in his chapter on the German Mechanised forces. He noted that the French assigned infantry units to support tanks in 1917, but these were on foot. He praises the Dragons of the DLMs mounted in half tracks and notes that for success you need equipment, specialised transport, training and practice. He also noted that the German army didn't have any good cross country vehciles so the infantry accompanying tanks rode motorcycles and unarmoured trucks. The main tasks of the motorised infantry are to follow up at speed behind tanks and exploit and complete their sucess without delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly large complement of machine guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking power of the infantry resides in the bayonet....since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks...... Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayonet but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive point.
That guy was such a dreamer, completely devoid of reality. Look what happened during Barbarossa when he outdrove the infantry armies and couldn't even close the encirclements. Him never getting a combat command again makes so much sense...

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#11

Post by Duncan_M » 06 Sep 2019, 18:46

Sarge3525 wrote:
04 Sep 2019, 13:53
Let's also not forget the German kradschuetzen (motorcycle sharpshooters) with the guy in the side-car with an MG.
In video footage they show them going full speed, swerving, and gunning at the same time, and dismounting at the last moment and using the inertia to continue the infantry assault.
Then would get easily slaughtered in even a very light small arms engagement. By the end of Barbarossa they were wanting to get rid of the motorcycles.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#12

Post by Duncan_M » 06 Sep 2019, 18:59

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
26 Aug 2019, 05:07
Did only SPW 251s enter enemy artillery range, while truck infantry had to dismount outside of artillery range? Or did both trucks and SPW 251s get as close to the front as possible without entering the direct line of fire? Was there any standard practice?
It was entirely METT-T dependent.

With Germans in their half tracks, if they could brave the fire often they'd NEVER dismount, they'd just drive through with everyone shooting over the sides. Remember, German doctrine was surfaces and gaps, they tried to AVOID engagements to drive deep behind the enemy lines to cut off their lines of communication to force an encirclement. If they left an entire enemy division intact, that was fine as long as they go through them. Follow on infantry would deal with them (often necessitating frontal assaults) while the mobile units would be in the rear sealing the cauldrons.

If not, with a lightly armored half track they could provide some fire support on the advance, or else perform an overwatch function, using their height and their machine gun to engage a faraway target as the dismounted infantry squad maneuvered on it.

With regular trucks, they aren't mobile enough for offroading. If fighting is happening far off road, everyone dismounts wherever to assemble into dismounted formations to do their thing, while the trucks just wait. If the fight is happening on a road, since they are entirely unprotected against any sort of small arms fire let alone indirect, if possible, the mounted infantry will dismount at least one terrain feature away from the enemy observation*. If not, they infantry dismount and the trucks get the hell out of there quick (or face being disabled or destroyed by light fire).

*That means put a hill, a wood, something that blocks observation between the dismounting infantry and their trucks and the enemy position (and any OPs). That doctrine also exists for thin skinned APCs from the Cold War to modern warfare. Unless the enemy is very weak in heavy weaponry, or the mission is important enough that losing a few transport vehicles isn't that big of a deal if it means their MG can be brought to fire, the vehicle either stays out of the fight altogether or performs a long range overwatch function, usually hull down if possible (if it even possesses a roof mounted machine gun). Very very rarely will they drive up with the advancing dismounts to provide fire support. They lack the protection, they lack the firepower, they lack the mobility.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#13

Post by Sheldrake » 06 Sep 2019, 22:27

Duncan_M wrote:
06 Sep 2019, 18:45
Sheldrake wrote:
30 Aug 2019, 00:25

So I turned to Guderian, Achtung Panzer! (1937) is a history of armoured warfare to that date and a survey of the state of tyhe art in the 1930s. Guderian does have a section on motorised infantry in his chapter on the German Mechanised forces. He noted that the French assigned infantry units to support tanks in 1917, but these were on foot. He praises the Dragons of the DLMs mounted in half tracks and notes that for success you need equipment, specialised transport, training and practice. He also noted that the German army didn't have any good cross country vehciles so the infantry accompanying tanks rode motorcycles and unarmoured trucks. The main tasks of the motorised infantry are to follow up at speed behind tanks and exploit and complete their sucess without delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly large complement of machine guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking power of the infantry resides in the bayonet....since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks...... Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayonet but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive point.
That guy was such a dreamer, completely devoid of reality. Look what happened during Barbarossa when he outdrove the infantry armies and couldn't even close the encirclements. Him never getting a combat command again makes so much sense...
In interesting take on the performance of the Spitz of the Blitzkrieg. Can you remind me how Soviet PW were taken as a result of his PanzerGruppe's actions at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and V'asma?

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#14

Post by Duncan_M » 10 Sep 2019, 01:02

Sheldrake wrote:
06 Sep 2019, 22:27
Duncan_M wrote:
06 Sep 2019, 18:45
Sheldrake wrote:
30 Aug 2019, 00:25

So I turned to Guderian, Achtung Panzer! (1937) is a history of armoured warfare to that date and a survey of the state of tyhe art in the 1930s. Guderian does have a section on motorised infantry in his chapter on the German Mechanised forces. He noted that the French assigned infantry units to support tanks in 1917, but these were on foot. He praises the Dragons of the DLMs mounted in half tracks and notes that for success you need equipment, specialised transport, training and practice. He also noted that the German army didn't have any good cross country vehciles so the infantry accompanying tanks rode motorcycles and unarmoured trucks. The main tasks of the motorised infantry are to follow up at speed behind tanks and exploit and complete their sucess without delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly large complement of machine guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking power of the infantry resides in the bayonet....since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks...... Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayonet but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive point.
That guy was such a dreamer, completely devoid of reality. Look what happened during Barbarossa when he outdrove the infantry armies and couldn't even close the encirclements. Him never getting a combat command again makes so much sense...
In interesting take on the performance of the Spitz of the Blitzkrieg. Can you remind me how Soviet PW were taken as a result of his PanzerGruppe's actions at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and V'asma?
whatever the number, not nearly enough. And would have been significantly higher had he actually bothered sealing the encirclements he participated in, instead of trying to start a new one they couldn't achieve while the old one was not even properly being dealt with.

His relief should have occurred many months earlier when he was disobeying orders left and right for the detriment of AGC.

There is ZERO that Guderian could provide as a field commander that there wasn't a better replacement who couldn't do better.

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Re: How close to the front line would motorized infantry dismount?

#15

Post by Sheldrake » 11 Sep 2019, 10:50

Duncan_M wrote:
10 Sep 2019, 01:02
Sheldrake wrote:
06 Sep 2019, 22:27
Duncan_M wrote:
06 Sep 2019, 18:45
Sheldrake wrote:
30 Aug 2019, 00:25

So I turned to Guderian, Achtung Panzer! (1937) is a history of armoured warfare to that date and a survey of the state of tyhe art in the 1930s. Guderian does have a section on motorised infantry in his chapter on the German Mechanised forces. He noted that the French assigned infantry units to support tanks in 1917, but these were on foot. He praises the Dragons of the DLMs mounted in half tracks and notes that for success you need equipment, specialised transport, training and practice. He also noted that the German army didn't have any good cross country vehciles so the infantry accompanying tanks rode motorcycles and unarmoured trucks. The main tasks of the motorised infantry are to follow up at speed behind tanks and exploit and complete their sucess without delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly large complement of machine guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking power of the infantry resides in the bayonet....since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks...... Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayonet but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive point.
That guy was such a dreamer, completely devoid of reality. Look what happened during Barbarossa when he outdrove the infantry armies and couldn't even close the encirclements. Him never getting a combat command again makes so much sense...
In interesting take on the performance of the Spitz of the Blitzkrieg. Can you remind me how Soviet PW were taken as a result of his PanzerGruppe's actions at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and V'asma?
whatever the number, not nearly enough. And would have been significantly higher had he actually bothered sealing the encirclements he participated in, instead of trying to start a new one they couldn't achieve while the old one was not even properly being dealt with.

His relief should have occurred many months earlier when he was disobeying orders left and right for the detriment of AGC.

There is ZERO that Guderian could provide as a field commander that there wasn't a better replacement who couldn't do better.
Guderian was the commander of a Panzer Army, that provided one arm of the pincers that encircled Soviet forces in the pockets of 1941 that netted some 3,000,000 PW. There were other panzer and infantry armies. These were huge operations spread over areas bigger than some US States. How was a single army commander responsible for the operations of an army group? Which orders did Guderian disobey that allowed the Red army to escape? Are you for real or is this a wind up?

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