The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#496

Post by ljadw » 05 Oct 2019, 07:23

Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
MarkN wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 18:02
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 15:53
MarkN wrote:
03 Oct 2019, 10:55
Aida1 wrote:
03 Oct 2019, 01:40
You have from the beginning tried to downplay the effect of weather on military operations.
What an absurd statement. It is you the is refusing to acknowledge that competent military commanders should/do take expected weather conditions into account.

Your silllyness is not helped by trying to cover it up with absurdities.
Aida1 wrote:
03 Oct 2019, 01:40
Those that argued with Hitler about going for Moscow early enough were not bizarre.They had solid reasons for that.Taifun started off too late.And you are very unwilling to accept that the onset of mud favoured the defender.You will get more quotes that prove you wrong whether you like it or not.You quoting yourself does not make much of an impression.
Diversionary drivvel.
Competent military commanders did take weather into consideration by urging strongly for an attack towards Moscow to start late august.Once the operation starts in october taking into account weather would have meant to have stopped the operation as soon as mud seriously impeded movement but in the context of the conviction that the USSR could and should be finished off in 1941 that would hardly happen.Take that context away and the advance would have been stopped.
Posting yet more nonsensical drivel doesn't improve your argument.

The Heer were obsessed with going to Moscow from the very beginning. The argument in August had little to do with weather. It was certainly not the main cause for concern. If it were of such concern, they would not have tried to go for it once TAIFUN had got under way.

The rest of your post is your own fabricated drivel to try and hide your previous absurdities.

Looking forward to all the quotes you promised evidencing how the Heer factored expected weather conditions into their planning for TAIFUN and how it affected their decisonmaking once they had started.
Hateful retoric does not make much of an impression. Moscow had to be taken before winter so weather was an important consideration in starting early enough.Moscow was not an obsession.Going for Moscow was a means of fighting a decisive battle with the main forces of the red army.
And quotes where already posted concerning the why of going on after the first phase of Taifun instead of going on the defensive which,in hindsight,would seem the sensible thing to do..Also the reason why the operation was started in the first place as late as october.A quote was already posted also about the awareness of the impending bad weather and Taifun being a gamble and a race against time.Decisiomaking would have been different if there had not been the conviction that one needed to finish off the USSR in 1941.
Weisung 35 does not mention that Moscow had to be taken . Not before the winter. Not during the winter. Not after the winter .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#497

Post by Aida1 » 05 Oct 2019, 11:00

MarkN wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 22:53
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Hateful retoric does not make much of an impression. Moscow had to be taken before winter so weather was an important consideration in starting early enough.Moscow was not an obsession.Going for Moscow was a means of fighting a decisive battle with the main forces of the red army.
And quotes where already posted concerning the why of going on after the first phase of Taifun instead of going on the defensive which,in hindsight,would seem the sensible thing to do..Also the reason why the operation was started in the first place as late as october.A quote was already posted also about the awareness of the impending bad weather and Taifun being a gamble and a race against time.
:lol: :lol: :lol:
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Decisiomaking would have been different if there had not been the conviction that one needed to finish off the USSR in 1941.
This is probably the only useful sentence you have posted in several days. It brings us full circle back to the question of hubris, delusion, stupidity or incompetence.
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.Realistically speaking one could not have done better as it is difficult to get intelligence on a closed society like the USSR.


ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#498

Post by ljadw » 05 Oct 2019, 11:35

Aida1 wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 11:00
MarkN wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 22:53
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Hateful retoric does not make much of an impression. Moscow had to be taken before winter so weather was an important consideration in starting early enough.Moscow was not an obsession.Going for Moscow was a means of fighting a decisive battle with the main forces of the red army.
And quotes where already posted concerning the why of going on after the first phase of Taifun instead of going on the defensive which,in hindsight,would seem the sensible thing to do..Also the reason why the operation was started in the first place as late as october.A quote was already posted also about the awareness of the impending bad weather and Taifun being a gamble and a race against time.
:lol: :lol: :lol:
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Decisiomaking would have been different if there had not been the conviction that one needed to finish off the USSR in 1941.
This is probably the only useful sentence you have posted in several days. It brings us full circle back to the question of hubris, delusion, stupidity or incompetence.
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.Realistically speaking one could not have done better as it is difficult to get intelligence on a closed society like the USSR.
The conviction that that could be done was not based on faulty intelligence picture, but on the correct assumption that the SU could not be defeated in a war of attritiuoin, thus that the only remaining option was a short ''blitzkrieg '',who would be won by a decisive battle .
Blaming FHO is the same as blaming Hitler, general mud and general winter .
What FHO was saying did not influence/changing the Barbarossa planning .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#499

Post by MarkN » 05 Oct 2019, 12:19

ljadw wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 11:35
The conviction that that could be done was not based on faulty intelligence picture, but on the correct assumption that the SU could not be defeated in a war of attritiuoin, thus that the only remaining option was a short ''blitzkrieg '',who would be won by a decisive battle .
Blaming FHO is the same as blaming Hitler, general mud and general winter .
What FHO was saying did not influence/changing the Barbarossa planning .
As far as the Heer was concerned, the success of BARBAROSSA was indeed predicated upon the Heer successfully defeating the bulk of The Red Army in the first bound. The Heer failed.

Apart from that, your post is just a continuation of your deceit and deceiving.

After the Heer failed in the first bound, it turned to a war of attrition to overcome the Red Army.

Moreover, BARBAROSSA was not a campaign to defeat the Soviet Union, it was a land grab of part of the Soviet Union. The best parts of course. The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#500

Post by Yuri » 05 Oct 2019, 15:22

MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
Moreover, BARBAROSSA was not a campaign to defeat the Soviet Union, it was a land grab of part of the Soviet Union. The best parts of course. The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.
Correct me if I'm wrong.
The result success Barbarossa to East from Volga (and more precisely to East from Urals) could be exist state Russians. However, this state must be completely powerless to resist the four the tank corps of Wehrmacht (8 PzDs, 4 IDs(mot.) and several IDs), which must make a raid on Urals to destroy the last production capacity of the Russian state. Between Volga and Urals 400-700 kilometers from West to East and 700-1000 kilometers from South to North. If 12+ tank and motorized divisions commit raid on such distance on such territory and are returning ago, then this means the next: to East from Volga should lie corpse and the main problem for the tank corps in is to the tracks of tanks and shoes of grenadiers and infantrymen not got dirty about this corpse.
You speak of a state to East from Volga, whereas Barbarossa speaks of a state corpse.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#501

Post by Max Payload » 05 Oct 2019, 15:26

MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.

Really? Then I must have been reading some particularly inaccurate translations, though admittedly the Directives do not assert the converse; that the offensives will, or might be expected to, bring Russian resistance to an end.
But there is this reported conversation between Hitler and Bock on the eve of the February ‘41 conference;
“On 2 February Hitler received Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, the commanding general of Army Group Center, with whom he discussed the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. Bock expressed his belief that the Germans would be able to defeat the Russians, if the latter chose to give battle. He was wondering, however, how they could be forced to make peace. The Fuehrer replied that the German Army's seizure of the Ukraine and capture of Moscow and Leningrad would surely compel the Russians to come to terms. If, however, the Soviets refused to abandon the struggle even then, German motorized forces would have to advance as far as the Urals.”
Quoted from The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940 - 1941) DoA Pamphlet No.20-261a page 30.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#502

Post by MarkN » 05 Oct 2019, 16:58

Max Payload wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 15:26
MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.
Really? Then I must have been reading some particularly inaccurate translations, though admittedly the Directives do not assert the converse; that the offensives will, or might be expected to, bring Russian resistance to an end.
But there is this reported conversation between Hitler and Bock on the eve of the February ‘41 conference;
“On 2 February Hitler received Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, the commanding general of Army Group Center, with whom he discussed the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. Bock expressed his belief that the Germans would be able to defeat the Russians, if the latter chose to give battle. He was wondering, however, how they could be forced to make peace. The Fuehrer replied that the German Army's seizure of the Ukraine and capture of Moscow and Leningrad would surely compel the Russians to come to terms. If, however, the Soviets refused to abandon the struggle even then, German motorized forces would have to advance as far as the Urals.”
Quoted from The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940 - 1941) DoA Pamphlet No.20-261a page 30.
If nothing else, this thread should have highlighted to all how bad others try to spin history to you. Some of the posters on AHF are the very worst. But many of the published storytellers are not that much better either. For example, and I hinted at this earlier, TAIFUN was not initially put in motion as an attack on Moscow - and yet TAIFUN and the Battle of/for Moscow are now considered synonymous. How? Why? Understanding how TAIFUN morphed into an attempt to encircle Moscow is an excellent excercise in understanding Heer thought process and attitude.

Solution to thus for those interested in historical reality not the stories that others want you to learn is to read the primary documents yourself.

Marcks' initial Entwurf of August 1940 had the Heer going to the Archangelsk-Gorki-Rostov line but with the caveat that they may have to go further if the Soviets were not suitable accomodating.

Weisung 21, in effect Paulus' plan with amendments, had the Heer going to the Archangelsk-Volga line. No further. The words in the text imply that the Soviets will still be a threat, but one which can be contained.

Between Weisung 21 and June 1941, Hitler made several comments to various people about going further. To the Urals. He even kept that line up into July ir August 1941 when it became clear that BARBAROSSA had failed.

Notwithstanding the previous paragraph, Weisung 32 which is the directive for what happens after a successful BARBAROSSA clearly identifies a Soviet State east of the Volga which they will remain at war with, how rhey will contain it and how the scale of forces to remain in the east and what forces can be diverted elsewhere will depend on the scale of threat posed. There is no suggestion that the Heer should cross the Volga and chase the Soviets any further east, Weisung 32 reconfirms to the Volga and no further.

Don't believe me, go and read the documents yourself.

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#503

Post by Yuri » 05 Oct 2019, 18:52

Aida1 wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 11:00
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.Realistically speaking one could not have done better as it is difficult to get intelligence on a closed society like the USSR.
One of the two.
Sorry, Either you are completely unaware of the situation in the USSR 20-30-ies of the twentieth century and fully trust the fabrications of Western propaganda, or deliberately distort the facts.
All of the following is only for the first case.
In the period from 1928 to 1937, tens of thousands of foreign engineers and craftsmen worked on the construction sites of the first and second five-year plans in Soviet Union, Mostly from Germany.
All contracts concluded before 1933, German firms performed and after the democratic election of Hitler as Chancellor, and then Führer. Censorship and the law on universal military duty were adopted in USSR only on September 01, 1939, that is, after the beginning of the German-Polish war.
Before that, foreign journalists and everyone who wanted to look at these five-year's construction projects could do it freely.
For example, the famous American pilot Lindbergh visited aviation enterprises of USSR and spoke to the workers. With this American guy met and talked aircraft designer Yakovlev - fighter Yak-1/Yak-3 his child (see memoirs Yakovlev "Purpose of life", if in the West these memoirs are not published, the claim should be made to Western propaganda, "closed society like the USSR" has nothing to do with it). However after meeting with Hitler's Germany, Lindbergh became a fan of his and began to say nasty things about the Soviet Union.
No secrets visitors to the Soviet factories could not open because, for example, the Moscow aviation factory in Fili built a firm Junkers.
Further, if you read the Grabin's memoirs (a famous Soviet designer guns -the most famous Soviet gun 76 mm ZIS-3 his child), you will learn about his collaboration with German designers guns.
When the German engineers returned from the USSR in 1935-37, SS-obergruppenführer Heydrich's special Department of RSHA interviewed these engineers.
In all the exercises of the Red Army was attended by foreign attachés. For reference: in 1932, the future field Marshal Keitel spent several weeks in the Caucasus observing the manevrs of the red Army.
In Germany, the USSR was known more than any other country.
Finally, in autumn 1940 and spring 1941, the Soviet engineers and designers visited German factories. The above-mentioned aircraft designer Yakovlev visited Germany twice, met Messerschmitt, Henkel, Udet, Milch and Goering. Udet personally demonstrated the products of the Luftwaffe aircraft to Soviet visitors.
The same is true of tanks and guns.
For its part, from Germany to the Soviet Union sent similar delegations from Germany.
About ignorance of Germans of existence in the USSR of the tank T-34 or KV-1 it is a fairy tale. German engineers and military experts at the tanks didn't show interest, because they believed such tanks are impractical. In addition, they were skeptical of diesel engines on tanks. On the website wwii.germandocsinrussia.org you can see a special file with a collection of documents on Barbarossa planning.
There is accurate and complete information about industry, agriculture, climate
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/22007/zooms/8 http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/24688/zooms/8 http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/24761/zooms/8 http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/207822/zooms/8
and human reserves of the USSR
Schulatlad-43.jpg
UdSSR-People.jpg

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#504

Post by Max Payload » 06 Oct 2019, 00:01

MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 16:58
Weisung 21 ... had the Heer going to the Archangelsk-Volga line. No further. The words in the text imply that the Soviets will still be a threat
Implying they will still be a threat is substantially different to your earlier claim that :
MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.
.
.
.
MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 16:58
Weisung 32 which is the directive for what happens after a successful BARBAROSSA clearly identifies a Soviet State east of the Volga which they will remain at war with, how rhey will contain it and how the scale of forces to remain in the east and what forces can be diverted elsewhere will depend on the scale of threat posed. ... Weisung 32 reconfirms to the Volga and no further.

Don't believe me, go and read the documents yourself.
Directive 32 only states that, “After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces ... [no] serious threat to Europe by land will then remain.” And that, “The strength of the security forces required in Russia can only be forecast with certainty at a later date. In all probability, however, about sixty divisions and one Air Fleet will be sufficient ...”
Nor does the Directive state that these forces will necessarily be required for use against a belligerent Russian state. It refers to,”the despatch of a motorised expeditionary force from Transcaucasia against Iraq” and the, “possibility of exerting strong pressure on Turkey and Iran ... which will be created by the victorious conclusion of the campaign in the East”.
The supplementary Directive 32b refers to, “the overthrow of Russia”.
And having taken your advice and read the document myself, I could find no reference to the Volga in Directive 32. Perhaps you could direct me to the relevant paragraph.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#505

Post by MarkN » 06 Oct 2019, 02:26

My advice was, and is, to read the original texts yourself and make up your own mind. Don't rely on what others write. And that includes me.
Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 00:01
Implying they will still be a threat is substantially different to your earlier claim that
So what?

Apply common sense.
BARBAROSSA was not an operation to capture all of the Soviet Union. So some Russian entity was going to remain in the non-captured part. Not so?
Was that entity going to be like Britain or like Vichy France. No doubt the Germans would prefer and were hoping for the latter, but...
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Russland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Russland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden.
...and...
Erst nach dem Abschluss der Bewegungsoperationen kommen derartige Angriffe, in erster Linie gegen das Uralgebiet, in Frage.
The reality is Weisung 21 offers almost nothing as to what happens after BARBAROSSA. All we can be certain of is that the Heer has only got to the Volga and no further. What was going to be to the east of the Volga? The Germans were preparing to have to bomb the place to keep whatever was there down. War? Peace? Threat?
Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 00:01
Directive 32 only states that, “After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces ... [no] serious threat to Europe by land will then remain.” And that, “The strength of the security forces required in Russia can only be forecast with certainty at a later date. In all probability, however, about sixty divisions and one Air Fleet will be sufficient ...”
Nor does the Directive state that these forces will necessarily be required for use against a belligerent Russian state. It refers to,”the despatch of a motorised expeditionary force from Transcaucasia against Iraq” and the, “possibility of exerting strong pressure on Turkey and Iran ... which will be created by the victorious conclusion of the campaign in the East”.
The supplementary Directive 32b refers to, “the overthrow of Russia”.
And having taken your advice and read the document myself, I could find no reference to the Volga in Directive 32. Perhaps you could direct me to the relevant paragraph.
60 German divisions (ie not including forces from allies) and an airfleet are required for what? Internal occupation and border security? How much to each? Perhaps consider the scale of forces in other newly occupied countries.

So what if it doesn't use the word Volga. Weisung 32 are the directions as to what happens after BARBAROSSA (Vorbereitungen für die Zeit nach Barbarossa). BARBAROSSA was a campaign to go to the Volga and no further and nothing in Weisung 32 says they will go further east after BARBAROSSA.

Now, what about this part...
Wenn der Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion die Voraussetzung dafür geschaffen hat, ist ferner der Ansatz eines motorisierten Expeditionskorps aus Transkaukasien heraus gegen den Irak ....
...in conjunction with the earlier unknown of what forces would be required to occupy, garrison and secure the newly conquored land. They don't know how many will be needed, nor whether they will gave sufficient spare for this operation. Why don't they know how many will be needed?

For us amateurs 80 years later, the words are not precise enough through the documents to state definitively what level of hope v expectation flowed through the predictions. I am sure they were hoping for a Soviet capitulation similar to the French one with a friendly collaborator government installed somewhere east of the Urals. Realistic expectation or pipe dream? Nevertheless, there are indications in the texts to suggest they were prepared and preparing for an entity offering a similar threat as Britain and requiring similar remedy.

But make up your own mind.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#506

Post by ljadw » 06 Oct 2019, 12:33

Barbarossa had no territorial aim and that some ''Russian '' entity was going to remain in the non captured part is questionable and irrelevant .
Barbarossa was not a campaign to go to the Volga : it was a campaign to destroy the Soviet state by destroying the Soviet army, followed by an advance to the Volga, but this advance was not the aim of Barbarossa .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#507

Post by ljadw » 06 Oct 2019, 12:48

MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung and subsequent weisung clearly state that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.
The Barbarossa Weisung does not say this, neither is saying this Weisung 32; the content of Weisung 32 is the continuation of the war against Britain,if Britain continued the war after the SU had ceased to exist .
If the Germans were at the Volga, there would be no longer a SU .
The territories east of the Volga would become independent,or would become Japanese satellites .
That the Germans would go not farther than the Volga does not mean that the Volga was the aim .
They would not go farther than the Volga because it would be not possible and because it would be not necessary .
The collaps of the Soviet state would make an advance to the Volga possible, but not an advance farther than the Volga .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#508

Post by Max Payload » 06 Oct 2019, 14:11

MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 02:26
Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 00:01
Implying they will still be a threat is substantially different to your earlier claim that
So what?
So perhaps it is simply worth noting that your statement, “The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung ... clearly state[s] that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will still be at war with the Reich,” is incorrect and is incompatible with your subsequent statement that, “The reality is Weisung 21 offers almost nothing as to what happens after BARBAROSSA”.

MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 02:26
So what if it [Directive 32] doesn't use the word Volga.
So it was misleading to state that it did.


MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 02:26
I am sure they were hoping for a Soviet capitulation similar to the French one with a friendly collaborator government installed somewhere east of the Urals. Realistic expectation or pipe dream? Nevertheless, there are indications in the texts to suggest they were prepared and preparing for an entity offering a similar threat as Britain and requiring similar remedy.
This seems to be a reasonable summary of what was probably a spectrum of end-state anticipation within the higher echelons of the Third Reich.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#509

Post by Aida1 » 06 Oct 2019, 16:43

ljadw wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 11:35
Aida1 wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 11:00
MarkN wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 22:53
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Hateful retoric does not make much of an impression. Moscow had to be taken before winter so weather was an important consideration in starting early enough.Moscow was not an obsession.Going for Moscow was a means of fighting a decisive battle with the main forces of the red army.
And quotes where already posted concerning the why of going on after the first phase of Taifun instead of going on the defensive which,in hindsight,would seem the sensible thing to do..Also the reason why the operation was started in the first place as late as october.A quote was already posted also about the awareness of the impending bad weather and Taifun being a gamble and a race against time.
:lol: :lol: :lol:
Aida1 wrote:
04 Oct 2019, 20:31
Decisiomaking would have been different if there had not been the conviction that one needed to finish off the USSR in 1941.
This is probably the only useful sentence you have posted in several days. It brings us full circle back to the question of hubris, delusion, stupidity or incompetence.
Once Hitler had decided to attack the USSR it had to be defeated in 1941 for strategic reasons already mentioned.The conviction that that could be done was based on the faulty intelligence picture concerning the USSR.Realistically speaking one could not have done better as it is difficult to get intelligence on a closed society like the USSR.
The conviction that that could be done was not based on faulty intelligence picture, but on the correct assumption that the SU could not be defeated in a war of attritiuoin, thus that the only remaining option was a short ''blitzkrieg '',who would be won by a decisive battle .
Blaming FHO is the same as blaming Hitler, general mud and general winter .
What FHO was saying did not influence/changing the Barbarossa planning .
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.Manstein states on p 174 of Verlorene Siege that one should have always envisaged the possibility of doing it in 2 campaigns.I do not pretend that the incorrect intelligence picture is the result of mistakes made by FHO.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#510

Post by MarkN » 06 Oct 2019, 17:26

Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 14:11
So it was misleading to state that it did.
From your own reading of Weisung 32, do you believe that it relates to the Heer getting to the Volga (der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk as written in Weisung 21) or some other line? If other, which line?
Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 14:11
So perhaps it is simply worth noting that your statement, “The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung ... clearly state[s] that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will still be at war with the Reich,” is incorrect and is incompatible with your subsequent statement that, “The reality is Weisung 21 offers almost nothing as to what happens after BARBAROSSA”.
Which word(s) are troubling you so much? Weisung 21 notes, in two places, Luftwaffe bombing of the non-captured entity east of the Volga. Does that imply there is a threat? Does that imply the war that they started in June is to continue - albeit at much reduced intensity? Are two sentences too few or too many to be considered almost nothing? Are those two sentences not clear enough to be considered clear?

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