The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#511

Post by MarkN » 06 Oct 2019, 17:32

Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
They did and they did.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
Manstein states on p 174 of Verlorene Siege that one should have always envisaged the possibility of doing it in 2 campaigns.
The Soviet Union is not going to become easier to defeat if the Heer adopted a 2 campaign effort from the outset.

It was the Heer who came up with the plan to get to the Volga in a single campaign before winter came.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#512

Post by Aida1 » 06 Oct 2019, 20:09

MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 17:32
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
They did and they did.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
Manstein states on p 174 of Verlorene Siege that one should have always envisaged the possibility of doing it in 2 campaigns.
The Soviet Union is not going to become easier to defeat if the Heer adopted a 2 campaign effort from the outset.

It was the Heer who came up with the plan to get to the Volga in a single campaign before winter came.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?
These men were not incompetent.They had proven that.The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.


MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#513

Post by MarkN » 06 Oct 2019, 23:20

Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 20:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
What documentary evidence are you using and comparing to reach this opinion?

Max Payload
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#514

Post by Max Payload » 07 Oct 2019, 00:20

MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 17:26
From your own reading of Weisung 32, do you believe that it relates to the Heer getting to the Volga (der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk as written in Weisung 21) or some other line? If other, which line?
My opinions of the nuances of meaning in Directive 32 are irrelevant to the fact that the statement;
MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 16:58
Weisung 32 ... clearly identifies a Soviet State east of the Volga which they will remain at war with, ... and ... Weisung 32 reconfirms to the Volga and no further.
is, notwithstanding your insights into the Directive’s consequential meaning, literally incorrect.


MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 17:26
Which word(s) are troubling you so much? Weisung 21 notes, in two places, Luftwaffe bombing of the non-captured entity east of the Volga. Does that imply there is a threat? Does that imply the war that they started in June is to continue - albeit at much reduced intensity? Are two sentences too few or too many to be considered almost nothing? Are those two sentences not clear enough to be considered clear?
The two sentences you refer to carry no greater meaning than ‘in case of necessity’ German retention of an ability to destroy by air the ‘last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals’, and consideration of air attacks against the industrial areas of Urals ‘after the conclusion of the mobile operations’. What they do not do is imply what you suggest and most certainly do not justify your statement that,
MarkN wrote:
05 Oct 2019, 12:19
The BARBAROSSA plan/weisung ... clearly state[s] that after a successful BARBAROSSA the Soviet Union will continue to exist east of the Volga and still be at war with the Reich.
which is also literally incorrect.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#515

Post by MarkN » 07 Oct 2019, 03:06

Max Payload wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 00:20
My opinions of the nuances of meaning in Directive 32 are irrelevant to the fact that the statement;
...
which is also literally incorrect.
:roll:

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#516

Post by Aida1 » 07 Oct 2019, 07:51

Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 20:09
MarkN wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 17:32
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
They did and they did.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019, 16:43
Manstein states on p 174 of Verlorene Siege that one should have always envisaged the possibility of doing it in 2 campaigns.
The Soviet Union is not going to become easier to defeat if the Heer adopted a 2 campaign effort from the outset.

It was the Heer who came up with the plan to get to the Volga in a single campaign before winter came.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?
These men were not incompetent.They had proven that.The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
This information is easily found by doing a search on Marcks plan.Strange question anyway as this is not an obscure detail of military history.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#517

Post by MarkN » 07 Oct 2019, 13:09

Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
This information is easily found by doing a search on Marcks plan.
It would be most foolish to base this opinion "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated." on Marcks Entwurf.

One requires at least four pieces of information/data sets to draw any conclusion on the matter. Marcks offers nothing on three and only offers data on one which is almost 12 months out of date.
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
Strange question anyway as this is not an obscure detail of military history.
I see. So you haven't done any research on the matter at all. You've just bought into other peoples stories.

:roll:

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#518

Post by Aida1 » 07 Oct 2019, 18:14

MarkN wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 13:09
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
This information is easily found by doing a search on Marcks plan.
It would be most foolish to base this opinion "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated." on Marcks Entwurf.

One requires at least four pieces of information/data sets to draw any conclusion on the matter. Marcks offers nothing on three and only offers data on one which is almost 12 months out of date.
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
Strange question anyway as this is not an obscure detail of military history.
I see. So you haven't done any research on the matter at all. You've just bought into other peoples stories.

:roll:
Historians do research and i read their books.
Fremde Heere Ost ,Magnus Pahl Ch .Links Verlag 2012 gives a detailed explanation of the underestimation of the USSR by Fremde Heere Ost on pp 64-84.
Come off your cloud where you are sitting on.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#519

Post by ljadw » 08 Oct 2019, 09:13

There was no underestimation by FHO ,besides what FHO was saying was irrelevant for the outcome of Barbarossa .FHO was even overestimating the strength of the Red Army west of Moscow.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#520

Post by Aida1 » 08 Oct 2019, 09:24

ljadw wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 09:13
There was no underestimation by FHO ,besides what FHO was saying was irrelevant for the outcome of Barbarossa .FHO was even overestimating the strength of the Red Army west of Moscow.
Wrong.And no source given.FHO had a pretty clear idea of what was in the West of the USSR but not of the Total strength and the ability to generate new divisions.The estimate of the enemy strength is of enormous importance when working out a plan for a campaign.

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#521

Post by Yuri » 08 Oct 2019, 12:12

Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 18:14
Historians do research and i read their books.
Fremde Heere Ost ,Magnus Pahl Ch .Links Verlag 2012 gives a detailed explanation of the underestimation of the USSR by Fremde Heere Ost on pp 64-84.
Come off your cloud where you are sitting on.
4. April 2017. Dominik: In meinen Augen kein großer Wurf.
Es gibt - wie auch der Autor in der Einleitung feststellt - kein Standardwerk zur Geschichte des "Geheimdienstes" in Deutschland und ganz speziell nicht über das Amt Ausland/Abwehr, dem im 3. Reich unter Admiral Wilhelm Canaris die Nachrichtenbeschaffung oblag.
Daher habe ich mir mit Vorfreude das vorliegende Buch von Magnus Pahl besorgt, welches sich nun zumindest der Abteilung "Fremde Heere Ost" annimmt, welcher im 3. Reich als Teil des Generalstabs zumindest die Nachrichtenauswertung oblag.
Da das Buch schon vergriffen ist, musste ich es mir für "teuer Geld" gebraucht besorgen - und bereue es inzwischen sehr. Im Gegensatz zu meinen Mit-Rezensenten halte ich den Schreibstil des Autors für alles andere als spannend - und ich habe etliche militärwissenschaftliche Werke gelesen. Selbstredend könnte man darüber hinwegsehen, wenn es denn zumindest inhaltlich umfassend wäre. Davon kann aber zumindest in meinen Augen kaum die Rede sein. So wird etwa die Zusammenarbeit mit "Fremde Heere West" und dem "Amt Ausland/Abwehr" nur sporadisch behandelt, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris taucht gerade mal auf 9 Seiten auf, Alexis von Roenne sogar nur auf 6 Seiten.
Die Katastrophen von Stalingrad (1942/43), Kursk (1943) und Weißrussland (1944) werden nicht wirklich intensiv behandelt, was verwundern muss, gingen doch allen drei Ereignissen kapitale "Böcke" bei der Nachrichtenbeschaffung, -auswertung und -interpretation voran.
Natürlich führt der Autor zu Recht an, dass die Quellenlage nicht eben üppig ist und außerdem ist es immerhin das erste Werk zu diesem Thema. Trotzdem fühle ich mich nach der Lektüre nicht wirklich erhellt.
Das Buch enthält einige Skizzen und Bilder, trotzdem hätte ich mir - gerade auch auf Grund der "trockenen" Präsentation des Erarbeiteten - etliches mehr an Illustrierung gewünscht.
Fazit: Auf ein Standardwerk zum deutschen Geheimdienstkomplex wird man weiterhin warten und bis dahin zu den reichlich alten Werken von Heinz Höhne greifen müssen:
- Der Krieg im Dunkeln. Die deutsche und russische Spionage
- Canaris - Patriot im Zwielicht

8. Januar 2018. F., Gerry: Enttäuschend.
Schon der stolze Ausgabepreis von fast 50 € verringert den Kreis der Eingeweihten, die in den Genuss des Buches kommen sollten. War das vom Verlag so beabsichtigt?
Der Anhang nimmt fast 1/3 des Inhalts weg, die Bebilderung eher spärlich. Auf trockene Weise erfahren wir zuerst über die Aufbau und Struktur von FHO. Nun, in dem zweiten Teil des Buches gibt es nicht viel Neues zu entnehmen.
Spektakuläre Aktionen hinter der Front, Spionage oder Werwolf bei Kriegsende werden hier gar nicht betrachtet.
Das Buch bleibt eine Dissertation - und nichts mehr.


8. Oktober 2019 Yuri: Please accept my sincere condolences for the voluntary loss of your €50.
I confess frankly that reading your laudatory reviews about this work, I was ready to part with €51. However, now I will not give any 49 euro cents or even 49 kopecks.

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#522

Post by MarkN » 08 Oct 2019, 13:32

Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 18:14
MarkN wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 13:09
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
This information is easily found by doing a search on Marcks plan.
It would be most foolish to base this opinion "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated." on Marcks Entwurf.

One requires at least four pieces of information/data sets to draw any conclusion on the matter. Marcks offers nothing on three and only offers data on one which is almost 12 months out of date.
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
Strange question anyway as this is not an obscure detail of military history.
I see. So you haven't done any research on the matter at all. You've just bought into other peoples stories.
Historians do research and i read their books.
Fremde Heere Ost ,Magnus Pahl Ch .Links Verlag 2012 gives a detailed explanation of the underestimation of the USSR by Fremde Heere Ost on pp 64-84.
Pahl does indeed write: Insgesamt hatte der Feindnachrichtendienst an der Ostfront die sowjetische Seite in militarischer und rustungswirtschaftlicher Hinsicht erheblich unterschatzt. (p.80)

However, he offers no supporting data or even commentary on the scale of this underestimation and no analysis of how it supposedly affected the actual performance and results of the Heer.

It is just a bland statement whose only worth is to provide cover for your own bland and historically worthless statement.

If you take the time to analyse the data yourself, you'll come to a very different understanding if you have an open mind.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#523

Post by Aida1 » 08 Oct 2019, 14:18

MarkN wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 13:32
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 18:14
MarkN wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 13:09
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
This information is easily found by doing a search on Marcks plan.
It would be most foolish to base this opinion "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated." on Marcks Entwurf.

One requires at least four pieces of information/data sets to draw any conclusion on the matter. Marcks offers nothing on three and only offers data on one which is almost 12 months out of date.
Aida1 wrote:
07 Oct 2019, 07:51
Strange question anyway as this is not an obscure detail of military history.
I see. So you haven't done any research on the matter at all. You've just bought into other peoples stories.
Historians do research and i read their books.
Fremde Heere Ost ,Magnus Pahl Ch .Links Verlag 2012 gives a detailed explanation of the underestimation of the USSR by Fremde Heere Ost on pp 64-84.
Pahl does indeed write: Insgesamt hatte der Feindnachrichtendienst an der Ostfront die sowjetische Seite in militarischer und rustungswirtschaftlicher Hinsicht erheblich unterschatzt. (p.80)

However, he offers no supporting data or even commentary on the scale of this underestimation and no analysis of how it supposedly affected the actual performance and results of the Heer.

It is just a bland statement whose only worth is to provide cover for your own bland and historically worthless statement.

If you take the time to analyse the data yourself, you'll come to a very different understanding if you have an open mind.
Pahl writes a history of the FHO so does not need to do what you state.It was interesting to read what were the causes of the underestimation. You cannot be unaware of the actual strength of the red army so you are playing silly games.
One does not need to be a military genius to be aware that a correct estimate of the enemy strength is very important before and during a campaign.
Ironic that you would accuse German commanders of hybris given that your way of expressing yourself could lead one to think you are suffering of this yourself..

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#524

Post by MarkN » 08 Oct 2019, 15:59

Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 14:18
Pahl writes a history of the FHO so does not need to do what you state.
No, he doesn't.

However, you chose to use Pahl as your evidence that "The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated." Pahl does not do that any more than make a bland statement.
Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 14:18
It was interesting to read what were the causes of the underestimation.
You have still not evidenced the FHO far underestimation that you claim. It is still just your opinion. You have merely linked to somebody else opining the same.
Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 14:18
You cannot be unaware of the actual strength of the red army so you are playing silly games.
I am aware. Now, when you compare that to what the FMO briefed, where is the far underestimation?
Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 14:18
One does not need to be a military genius to be aware that a correct estimate of the enemy strength is very important before and during a campaign.
So, comparing what the Heer actually faced before Moscow, before the winter, where is the far underestimation in the FHO briefings?

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#525

Post by ljadw » 08 Oct 2019, 16:51

Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 09:24
ljadw wrote:
08 Oct 2019, 09:13
There was no underestimation by FHO ,besides what FHO was saying was irrelevant for the outcome of Barbarossa .FHO was even overestimating the strength of the Red Army west of Moscow.
Wrong.And no source given.FHO had a pretty clear idea of what was in the West of the USSR but not of the Total strength and the ability to generate new divisions.The estimate of the enemy strength is of enormous importance when working out a plan for a campaign.
FHO was giving the numbers of Soviet divisions west of Moscow,which were impressive, but FHO failed to inform the OKH of the situation of these forces, situation which was catastrophic : most tank divisions had too many tanks,some had no tanks, shortage of fuel,ammunition,spare parts, drivers, officers,NCOs,etc,etc. FHO had no pretty clear idea of what was in the west of the USSR.
A lot of these divisions collapsed when going to the border,without having fired one shot, before they saw one German .
The decision to attack the SU was taken without any contact with FHO.
What FHO was saying had no influence on the elaboration of the Barbarossa plan .
If the German political leadership had more informations about the Soviet POSSIBLE ability to generate new divisions, they still would attack the SU with the same plan .
3 things were needed for a successful Barbarossa. If ONE lacked, Barbarossa would fail .
1 The Red Army would go to the border . This was a guess, but a correct one .
2 The WM would defeat these forces : this was a conviction, but a correct one .
3 The Soviet leadership would not be able to generate new divisions : this was an unlikely shot in the dark,but as it was needed for the success of Barbarossa, everyone accepted this .Attenuating circumstance was that no one could know that the Soviet leadership would be able to generate new divisions . Even the Kremlin did not know it .
And that the informations from FHO determined the war plan is nonsense : Japan would still have attacked PH if its spy organisations had warned them that US would have defeated them . And if Japan had known that the US aircraft carriers were not at PH, it still would attack PH .
The influence of FHO is only a myth, invented by Halder to have a scapegoat to blame if everything went wrong . German public opinion would not accept that the defeat was caused by the Soviets, it would ask for a scapegoat . And Halder decided that it would not be him .
Germany started with the principle that it had to win,thus that it would win, thus that the conditions needed to win would be executed .

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