The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#676

Post by AbollonPolweder » 20 Oct 2019, 15:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 04:02
...
OOO! OOO! OOO! I can answer that. :lol: Irrecoverable losses to 31 August 1941 were 2,129,677, wounded and sick were 687,626, for a total of 2,817,303. Assuming a standard distribution over time - for the sake of argument - then 37 days into the 70 days means about losses of about 1,489,145 to 8 August. So the scale of the German delusion was c. 2.69-to-1. Pretty bad accounting on the part of FHO.
1. Great, sir! Thank you for such a humorous post. Moreover, it is perhaps the most useful for solving the issue of FHO estimates. Of course, Soviet data could clarify a protracted debate. I would have taken in your place not 37 days (from the beginning of the war until August 8), but 48 days (9 - June, 31 - July and 8 - August).
2. I would clarify the term "defeated division." Does this mean that in order to defeat a division, it is necessary to kill all its soldiers and officers? Of course not. There are special criteria, most likely then, in different states they were different. For example, with a 30% loss, the division was considered incapable, and at 50% it was defeated.
3. If the document on losses is dated August 8, then the real losses reflected in it should be considered, say, on July 25. Those loss data were collected in more than one day. There was no Internet then, was it? That is, you need to make adjustments to your calculation. However, do not take all my words seriously. I just wanted to lower the "scale of the German delusion". Both my grandfathers and one uncle died at the front, and I am somehow sad to think that they were killed by morons with such a high coefficient of delusion. :(
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#677

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 17:29

AbollonPolweder wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 15:38
Richard Anderson wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 04:02
...
OOO! OOO! OOO! I can answer that. :lol: Irrecoverable losses to 31 August 1941 were 2,129,677, wounded and sick were 687,626, for a total of 2,817,303. Assuming a standard distribution over time - for the sake of argument - then 37 days into the 70 days means about losses of about 1,489,145 to 8 August. So the scale of the German delusion was c. 2.69-to-1. Pretty bad accounting on the part of FHO.
1. Great, sir! Thank you for such a humorous post. Moreover, it is perhaps the most useful for solving the issue of FHO estimates. Of course, Soviet data could clarify a protracted debate. I would have taken in your place not 37 days (from the beginning of the war until August 8), but 48 days (9 - June, 31 - July and 8 - August).
2. I would clarify the term "defeated division." Does this mean that in order to defeat a division, it is necessary to kill all its soldiers and officers? Of course not. There are special criteria, most likely then, in different states they were different. For example, with a 30% loss, the division was considered incapable, and at 50% it was defeated.
3. If the document on losses is dated August 8, then the real losses reflected in it should be considered, say, on July 25. Those loss data were collected in more than one day. There was no Internet then, was it? That is, you need to make adjustments to your calculation. However, do not take all my words seriously. I just wanted to lower the "scale of the German delusion". Both my grandfathers and one uncle died at the front, and I am somehow sad to think that they were killed by morons with such a high coefficient of delusion. :(
True. Combat strength and total strength are a different thing. A division losing most of it's infantry will have a very low combat strength but it's total strength is not down by that percentage.


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RE: The Logistics Of Barbarossa (Or Lack Of It)

#678

Post by Robert Rojas » 20 Oct 2019, 17:37

Greetings to both citizen Abollon Polweder and the community as a whole. Howdy Abollon! Well sir, in reference to your installment of Sunday - October 20, 2019 - 3:48am, histrionics and hyperbole notwithstanding, old yours truly will happily concur with your statement of "BUT, OF COURSE, NO ONE CAN FORBID YOU TO INTERPRET THE THOUGHTS OF HITLER AND OKH". Now, following this train of thought, I am starkly reminded of the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's slice of rhetorical braggadocio prior HIS assault upon the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. " YOU ONLY HAVE TO KICK IN THE DOOR AND THE WHOLE ROTTEN STRUCTURE WILL COME CRASHING DOWN". Given the veracity of that statement, one could easily conclude that Der Führer was anticipating the internal collapse of First Secretary Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili's regime along with the entire apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union once the Wehrmacht and its disparate allies merely crossed the frontier on June 22, 1941. As for Colonel General Franz Halder and Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, given the Herculean task ahead of them, did these two professional soldiers simply cave in to the ideological machinations of their political master? I also wonder where or even if Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel fits into the overall scheme of things. There is always much to ponder. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this continuing exercise into GRAND STRATEGY as dictated by MEIN KAMPF - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the Motherland. Das Vedanya.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :) :wink: 8-) :thumbsup:
Last edited by Robert Rojas on 20 Oct 2019, 17:43, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#679

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 17:38

MarkN wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 23:35
Aida1 wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 21:57
So now they miscounted the dead and the prisoners. Haha.
Yes. Hahaha is exactly what your post is. Absolute comedy. Nothing to do with history.

On 8 August FHO are indicating, based on Heer formation combat claims, that 300+ Red Army divisions have been destroyed.

A Red Army rifle division has a wartime establishment of almost 14,500. 300 such divisions would mean a body count - dead or alive - circa 4 million.

The only thing you have done is give a pointer to the scale of the delusion. :lol: :lol: :lol:

What was the Red Army body count on 8 August? Dead and alive? Was it 4 million? 3 million? 2 million? 1 million? How big was the error? How big was the delusion?

This is not a slight error excused away by a trickle of Soviets escaping eastwards. This is the Heer collectively not understanding how badly they are failing, why they are failing and making up numbers to convince themselves of their deluded superority.
Aida1 wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 21:57
As long as you do not need to admit red army regenerative capacity was underestimated.
Why would l want to admit to the historical falsehood that you are peddling?
Aida1 wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 21:57
Looking at the detail of the battles one could get the impression the red army was not doing really well and that is an understatement. And the 60-65 divisions is the combat strength of 65 divisions. Divisions were supposed to be far depleted.
The 60-65 divisions is the product of a calculation based upon falsehoods and delusion. The delusion of the Heer collectively that they have been so good as to have already destroyed 300+ Red Army divisions. The body count should have been the first indicator if this gross overstatement. But, they couldn't see the wood for the trees.
You are confusing the combat strength of a division with it's total strength. So a division being down to 25 percent combat strength does not mean the total strength is down to that percentage. Most losses are always incurred by the infantry. A division down to an almost zero combat strength could still have half of it's total strength left. For the combat worth of a division you have to look at how many soldiers are left in the combat part.
So you make a totally wrong calculation. The FHO is speaking about combat strength.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#680

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 17:46

AbollonPolweder wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 13:48
MarkN wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 15:01
...
Aida1 wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 14:34
You are making destroying the red army in one bound so dogmatic that you would give up surprise in order to supposedly have the whole red army near the border and annihilate it. A dumb idea.
Not my dogma at all. It was the OKH/Heer's dogma to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound. It was the Panzerwaffe clique dogma that made that impossible.
...
Even without reading the text of Barbarossa or, for example, the OKH document “Aufmarschanweisung” of 31.1.41, we can confidently assume that there was no talk of one decisive battle near the border because of the huge theater of operations and the large number of the Red Army’s divisions.
Fast Feldzug is not at all the same as one Entscheidungsschlacht. But, оf course, no one can forbid you to interpret the thoughts of Hitler and OKH.
Exactly.It could never be one battle. The theatre of operations is too big for that.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#681

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 17:51

Richard Anderson wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 04:02
MarkN wrote:
19 Oct 2019, 23:35
Yes. Hahaha is exactly what your post is. Absolute comedy. Nothing to do with history.

On 8 August FHO are indicating, based on Heer formation combat claims, that 300+ Red Army divisions have been destroyed.

A Red Army rifle division has a wartime establishment of almost 14,500. 300 such divisions would mean a body count - dead or alive - circa 4 million.

The only thing you have done is give a pointer to the scale of the delusion. :lol: :lol: :lol:

What was the Red Army body count on 8 August? Dead and alive? Was it 4 million? 3 million? 2 million? 1 million? How big was the error? How big was the delusion?
OOO! OOO! OOO! I can answer that. :lol: Irrecoverable losses to 31 August 1941 were 2,129,677, wounded and sick were 687,626, for a total of 2,817,303. Assuming a standard distribution over time - for the sake of argument - then 37 days into the 70 days means about losses of about 1,489,145 to 8 August. So the scale of the German delusion was c. 2.69-to-1. Pretty bad accounting on the part of FHO.
Nope. You are doing the bad accounting as FHO is talking about combat strength. The combat strength of a division being down by a certain percentage does not mean the total strength is down by the same percentage, actually much less.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#682

Post by MarkN » 20 Oct 2019, 18:08

Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 17:38
You are confusing the combat strength of a division with it's total strength. So a division being down to 25 percent combat strength does not mean the total strength is down to that percentage. Most losses are always incurred by the infantry. A division down to an almost zero combat strength could still have half of it's total strength left. For the combat worth of a division you have to look at how many soldiers are left in the combat part.
So you make a totally wrong calculation. The FHO is speaking about combat strength.
I have analysed the FHO calculation. If there is any confusion it is the Heer's confusion. But more likely it is your abysmal attempt to peddle your falsehoods.

Let's look at the calculation the FHO did on 8 August.

Estimated total number of Red Army divisions minus number of divisions we have already destroyed equals how many Red Army divisions left in front of us.

Now, pick combat strength or total strength and insert into formula. But insert the same one to each side of the equation. No mixing the insertion to spin your falsehoods.

If you want to say that 60-65 divisions left is the combat strength not the total strength, then 300 destroyed is 300 combat strength. Are you now suggesting the Heer thought they had destroyed, say, 900 divisions total strength?

:lol:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#683

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 22:16

MarkN wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 18:08
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 17:38
You are confusing the combat strength of a division with it's total strength. So a division being down to 25 percent combat strength does not mean the total strength is down to that percentage. Most losses are always incurred by the infantry. A division down to an almost zero combat strength could still have half of it's total strength left. For the combat worth of a division you have to look at how many soldiers are left in the combat part.
So you make a totally wrong calculation. The FHO is speaking about combat strength.
I have analysed the FHO calculation. If there is any confusion it is the Heer's confusion. But more likely it is your abysmal attempt to peddle your falsehoods.

Let's look at the calculation the FHO did on 8 August.

Estimated total number of Red Army divisions minus number of divisions we have already destroyed equals how many Red Army divisions left in front of us.

Now, pick combat strength or total strength and insert into formula. But insert the same one to each side of the equation. No mixing the insertion to spin your falsehoods.

If you want to say that 60-65 divisions left is the combat strength not the total strength, then 300 destroyed is 300 combat strength. Are you now suggesting the Heer thought they had destroyed, say, 900 divisions total strength?

:lol:
You clearly do not understand. It says that the combat strength of the divisions facing the Germans is that of 65 divisions. It does not say 300 divsions were destroyed. If 360 divisions lose on average 80 percent of their combat strength then their total combat strength is that of 72 divisions at full combat strength. So the FHO is saying that on average red army divisions have lost over 80 percent of their combat strength. That is not the same as 80 percent of their total strength. A division down to 50 percent of it's total strength can be considered combat ineffective if it's combat strength was 50 percent and is down to zero. So one is to be very aware of what the proportion of real fighting men is in a division and that the losses are mostly sustained by the infantry.
Different notions were used like infantry strength which includes everybody in the infantry regiments or trench strength where you only. count those in the trenches and close supporting weapons.
Last edited by Aida1 on 20 Oct 2019, 22:52, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#684

Post by MarkN » 20 Oct 2019, 22:43

Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 22:16
You clearly do not understand. It says that the combat strength of the divisions facing the Germans is that of 65 divisions. It does not say 300 divsions were destroyed. If 360 divisions lose on average 80 percent of their combat strength then their total combat strength is that of 72 divisions at full combat strength. So the FHO is saying that on average red army divisions have lost over 80 percent of their combat strength. That is not the same as 80 percent of their total strength. A division down to 50 percent of it's total strength can be considered combat ineffective if it's combat strength was 50 percent and is down to zero.
I know that you think you know what you are talking about, but you don't.

The FHO briefed in January 1941 that the Red Army was 11-12 million after general mobilization - you can find that in Thomas's text that YOU introduced as evidencing your falsehoods. The FHO is still working to that number on 8 August 1941.

So, according to your understanding of the FHO 8 August 1941 briefing, the Red Army has lost 80% of a combat strength from that 11-12 million!!!!!!

In otherwords, your understanding is that the equivalent of about 9 million Soviet troops, combat effictiveness wise, have been nullified since 22 June 1941.

If that is what the FHO is saying, how could nobody in the Heer have not spotted this gross inaccuracy?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#685

Post by Aida1 » 20 Oct 2019, 23:12

MarkN wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 22:43
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 22:16
You clearly do not understand. It says that the combat strength of the divisions facing the Germans is that of 65 divisions. It does not say 300 divsions were destroyed. If 360 divisions lose on average 80 percent of their combat strength then their total combat strength is that of 72 divisions at full combat strength. So the FHO is saying that on average red army divisions have lost over 80 percent of their combat strength. That is not the same as 80 percent of their total strength. A division down to 50 percent of it's total strength can be considered combat ineffective if it's combat strength was 50 percent and is down to zero.
I know that you think you know what you are talking about, but you don't.

The FHO briefed in January 1941 that the Red Army was 11-12 million after general mobilization - you can find that in Thomas's text that YOU introduced as evidencing your falsehoods. The FHO is still working to that number on 8 August 1941.

So, according to your understanding of the FHO 8 August 1941 briefing, the Red Army has lost 80% of a combat strength from that 11-12 million!!!!!!

In otherwords, your understanding is that the equivalent of about 9 million Soviet troops, combat effictiveness wise, have been nullified since 22 June 1941.

If that is what the FHO is saying, how could nobody in the Heer have not spotted this gross inaccuracy?
You clearly do not understand. I know very well what i am talking about. The divisions the Germans are facing according to FHO do not have 11 million men in them An army is much more than just the divisions in the line. And even within a division there is a large support part too.The FHO is implicitly saying that the combat strength of the divisions is down to less than twenty percent. That is all it says. What that means in number of men depends on how you define combat strength but it is massively less than you state.
You will need to do some serious reading on the ratio between combat units and support within a division and above it. If you take the whole strength of an army you will find that combat strength is relatively small in modern armies which have a large tail.
Means a unit can be very low in combat strength while actually still having a lot of men in it. If a unit with a 50 percent combat strength loses 80 percent of that, it still has 60 percent of it's total strength left. The bigger the tail , the lesser the percentage of losses that is needed to render a unit combat ineffective.
Last edited by Aida1 on 20 Oct 2019, 23:24, edited 4 times in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#686

Post by Boby » 20 Oct 2019, 23:16

FHO study of January is available here
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... rid/zoom/1

see pp. 15-16

Boby,

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#687

Post by MarkN » 20 Oct 2019, 23:32

Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
You clearly do not understand.
No. You clearly do not understand the workings of the FHO.
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
The divisions the Germans are facing according to FHO do not have 11 million men in them An army is much more than just the divisions in the line. And even within a division there is a large support part too.
Yes, that is all very true. But it has nothing to do with the calculations presented by the FHO.

If you have read Thomas, analysed what he has written and understood it, ypu woyld know this.

However, l suspect you probably didn't even bother to read Thomas completely and certainly didn't do any analysis or understanding.

Just like Halder and the Heer, you extracted the odd words that suited your preconceptions and ignored the rest. Do you all come from the same gene pool?
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
The FHO is implicitly saying that the combat strength of the divisions is down to less than twenty percent. That is all it says.
Absolute nonsense.
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
What that means in number of men depends on how you define combat strength but it is massively less than you state.
Once again a handwave without any substance.

Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
You will need to do some serious reading on the ratio between combat units and support within a division and above it.
When it comes to FHO briefings, it us completely unnecessary.
If you had read, analysed and understood what Thomas wrote - and just to make sure done some reasearch, reading, analysis and undestanding of source FHO documents c you would know that. But you don't, do you?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#688

Post by MarkN » 20 Oct 2019, 23:35

Boby wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:16
FHO study of January is available here
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... rid/zoom/1

see pp. 15-16
Yep. Been there all the time. Free of charge. Don't have to move a milimeter from your current position.

But you cannot force people to engage with evidence that they are overtly trying to deny.

Have you noticed how poster Aida1 is refusing to engage with any evidence in the document (Thomas) that he presented which hexshe is trying to deny?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#689

Post by Aida1 » 21 Oct 2019, 11:20

MarkN wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:32
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
You clearly do not understand.
No. You clearly do not understand the workings of the FHO.
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
The divisions the Germans are facing according to FHO do not have 11 million men in them An army is much more than just the divisions in the line. And even within a division there is a large support part too.
Yes, that is all very true. But it has nothing to do with the calculations presented by the FHO.

If you have read Thomas, analysed what he has written and understood it, ypu woyld know this.

However, l suspect you probably didn't even bother to read Thomas completely and certainly didn't do any analysis or understanding.

Just like Halder and the Heer, you extracted the odd words that suited your preconceptions and ignored the rest. Do you all come from the same gene pool?
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
The FHO is implicitly saying that the combat strength of the divisions is down to less than twenty percent. That is all it says.
Absolute nonsense.
Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
What that means in number of men depends on how you define combat strength but it is massively less than you state.
Once again a handwave without any substance.

Aida1 wrote:
20 Oct 2019, 23:12
You will need to do some serious reading on the ratio between combat units and support within a division and above it.
When it comes to FHO briefings, it us completely unnecessary.
If you had read, analysed and understood what Thomas wrote - and just to make sure done some reasearch, reading, analysis and undestanding of source FHO documents c you would know that. But you don't, do you?
You are evading here as i talked about the Lagebericht of august 1941 and i made clear to you that implicitly the FHO was saying that the combatstrength of the divisions in line is down by 80 % on average. You tried to make that sound more than it was by coming up with the total mobilisable strength and applying the 80 % on that. The reason for this is that you have been trying to make out that the OKH overestimated losses inflicted on the red army and that is why you try to make the Lagebericht sound more than it was in actual losses inflicted. 80% percent loss of the combat strength of a division is not 80 % loss of it total strength .
A simplified example. If a force with 10 10 000 men divisions of which 50 percent is combat strength loses 80 % of its combatstrength , that is a loss of 40.000 men which leaves 60.000 with a combatstrength of 10.000 which is the combatstrength of two divisions. The FHO did not say 300 divisions were totally destroyed. It stated that that the force facing the german army had the combatstrength of 65 divisions which is not the same.The article by Thomas has nothing to do with this as it does not go into that.
Where the estimate of the number of combat divisions is concerned that can be set up from a certain mobilisable strength, the FHO had to work with a rough guess as it did not have sufficient data. That implies guessing how many men will be available for the combat divisions , also taking into account how many you can actually equip given the war production capacity (which was underestimated). Not easy as you cannot know for certain to which extent men mobilised will be used to set up new divisions or used to replace losses in existing ones. If you do the first, you will have an impressive OOB but the combat strength will be low as existing divisions will remain depleted.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#690

Post by MarkN » 21 Oct 2019, 15:59

Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019, 11:20
Yadda yadda yadda.

I'm posting all this yadda to deflect attention away from historical evidence that l am trying to deny the existance of.

Yadda yadda yadda.
The FHO briefing on 8 August shows how they estimated very broadly the likely military strength of a foe. Namely, for every 1 million population, 2 'notional divisions' can be assumed. Now, in this document the FHO uses the term 'kriegstarke Division' which is an error or unforunately misleading term to use and thus may well have caused them problems later.

The FHO, using a Soviet population of 190 million sets the potential post-mobilization strength at 370 'notional divisions' for the 11-12 million that they believe can be put in uniform from the 190 million population pool.

The 'notional division' is not a rifle, pantser or cavalry division, it is a notional strategic planning unit which embodies a number including a division of whatever flavour AND a slice of all the non-divisional assets that would also need to be formed. It is purely a planning number to give a broad idea of an opposition. It has no tactical value whatsoever. From the information given in the FHO comprehensive briefing of January 1941 (numbers repeated in Thomas), we can deduct that the 'notional division' constitutes 28,000 troops. The 370 'notional divisions' represents a field army over 10,000,000 million strong.

In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops.

That briefing was distributed down to corps level headquarters. How many Heer staff officers read it and grasped the significance?

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