Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

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CannonFodder95
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Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#1

Post by CannonFodder95 » 15 May 2018, 16:37

What if Japan attacks the USSR during Operation Barbarossa, say about a month after it begins, where it looks like Germany might actually win and Japan attacks due to wanting more land in the north.

Due to this they delay attacking the US until around late summer to early fall of 42

The biggest difference I could think of is that this would tie up Soviet troops, preventing them from pulling out troops from the area after they realized the Japanese weren't going to attack and putting them to the German front, these fresh troops played a big part during the battle of Stalingrad.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#2

Post by ljadw » 15 May 2018, 21:09

The result would be : big Japanese defeat .
The number of Soviet troops tied by this attack would be insignifiant, as only a few divisions were going west in 1941 and Uranus did not need any Far East units .


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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#3

Post by T. A. Gardner » 16 May 2018, 04:03

A massive Japanese defeat. The Soviets left several dozen divisions, including several tank and mechanized corps in Siberia. While these units tended to have older tanks, they vastly outnumbered the IJA's tank force.
Soviet practice was to stand up a new division for each one drawn from Asian military districts. So, the number of units available didn't fall much during the war.

Delaying an attack on the US, Dutch, and British into say mid 1942 would be disastrous too. The US in the Philippines would now have about 5 to 8 Philippine Army divisions fully equipped, manned, and at least basically trained. The US Philippine Division would be a full triangular one with about double the strength of the one that was there at the end of 1941. Additionally, the Japanese landing sites would have anywhere from 1 to 3 battalions of 155mm or 8" coast defense guns now covering them.
The USAAC would have about triple to quadruple the aircraft and might have had better planes like the P-43, and P-39 available along with two bombardment groups of A-24 (Army SBD dive bombers), more B-17's, etc. The air defenses would include new 90mm AA guns that could hit Japanese planes at 20,000 feet.
Even worse would be if the US reinforced the Asiatic Fleet more. Even just a few more cruisers and a couple more squadrons of 4 piper destroyers would have made a significant impact on Japanese operations.
They wait unit late 1942 and it's even worse. The Philippines has a second US infantry division. There are 10 Philippine Army divisions. The USAAC is massively larger and likely include at least a few P-38 now. There is a battalion of M3 medium tanks and corps level 155mm guns along with a mechanized cavalry regiment, and lots of engineers.


The Dutch in the DEI would have more Catalina's for maritime surveillance. There'd be hundreds of Marmon Herrington light tanks delivered. The P-40 would be replacing the Buffalo and the Dutch air forces would have about half again as many aircraft as they did historically. Their land forces would be larger too. By late 1942, the Dutch would have over 1,000 AFV of various sorts in the DEI. Their army would be close to a quarter million men. Their air force would have B-25 bombers and P-40 fighters.

The same goes for Britain in Malaysia. There'd be Hurricane fighters at a minimum in some quantity. Many of the obsolescent aircraft being used would be replaced.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#4

Post by thaddeus_c » 17 May 2018, 13:50

a couple of things are certain, the Japanese could seize the rest of Sakhalin (where the coal and oil were/are) and blockade Vladivostok, so THAT Lend Lease route closed off.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#5

Post by uhu » 17 May 2018, 14:57

Japan would have ran out of oil quite a few months before '42 had they have waited that long.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#6

Post by History Learner » 26 Oct 2019, 23:23

It'd be the knockout blow for the Soviets, although I concur it would've also left the Japanese in quite the pickle long term due to oil shortages.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#7

Post by OpanaPointer » 26 Oct 2019, 23:36

uhu wrote:
17 May 2018, 14:57
Japan would have ran out of oil quite a few months before '42 had they have waited that long.
Yep.
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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#8

Post by wm » 27 Oct 2019, 00:15

thaddeus_c wrote:
17 May 2018, 13:50
a couple of things are certain, the Japanese could seize the rest of Sakhalin (where the coal and oil were/are) and blockade Vladivostok, so THAT Lend Lease route closed off.
Then the American fleet would have to respond, and the eagerly awaited by Japanese decisive battle could have really happened and fast.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#9

Post by OpanaPointer » 27 Oct 2019, 00:53

If the US wasn't at war with Japan I doubt they would have sortied to raise the the blockade.

And, of course, the One Great All Out Battle was supposed to happen close to the Home Islands. (Consider the operational radius of the Japanese DDs.)
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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#10

Post by T. A. Gardner » 27 Oct 2019, 01:21

CannonFodder95 wrote:
15 May 2018, 16:37
What if Japan attacks the USSR during Operation Barbarossa, say about a month after it begins, where it looks like Germany might actually win and Japan attacks due to wanting more land in the north.

Due to this they delay attacking the US until around late summer to early fall of 42

The biggest difference I could think of is that this would tie up Soviet troops, preventing them from pulling out troops from the area after they realized the Japanese weren't going to attack and putting them to the German front, these fresh troops played a big part during the battle of Stalingrad.
Historically, the Soviets stood up a new division in Siberia and Asia every time they pulled one out to go fight the Germans. Usually these units left their equipment behind and were issued new equipment once they reached European Russia. Thus, the Japanese were always facing a very numerically superior Red Army in Siberia and Asia, even if the equipment was often older material. But, versus what the IJA was fielding it was equal to or better than Japanese issue in most cases.
That the Soviets denuded their Siberian and Asian theaters to supply troops to fight Germany is an utter and complete myth. The Kwantung Army would have had it's collective @$$ handed to it had it entered a war against the Soviets.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#11

Post by OpanaPointer » 27 Oct 2019, 01:49

...instead of having Japan's collective ass being handed to it in 1945.
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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#12

Post by wm » 27 Oct 2019, 01:51

OpanaPointer wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 00:53
If the US wasn't at war with Japan I doubt they would have sortied to raise the the blockade.

And, of course, the One Great All Out Battle was supposed to happen close to the Home Islands. (Consider the operational radius of the Japanese DDs.)
A single American ship arrested by the Japanese would change that.
Roosevelt was very keen to help Stalin anyway, the tricks he employed against the Germans would work very well against the Japanese who really had a very short fuse.

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#13

Post by History Learner » 27 Oct 2019, 02:19

T. A. Gardner wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 01:21
CannonFodder95 wrote:
15 May 2018, 16:37
What if Japan attacks the USSR during Operation Barbarossa, say about a month after it begins, where it looks like Germany might actually win and Japan attacks due to wanting more land in the north.

Due to this they delay attacking the US until around late summer to early fall of 42

The biggest difference I could think of is that this would tie up Soviet troops, preventing them from pulling out troops from the area after they realized the Japanese weren't going to attack and putting them to the German front, these fresh troops played a big part during the battle of Stalingrad.
Historically, the Soviets stood up a new division in Siberia and Asia every time they pulled one out to go fight the Germans. Usually these units left their equipment behind and were issued new equipment once they reached European Russia. Thus, the Japanese were always facing a very numerically superior Red Army in Siberia and Asia, even if the equipment was often older material. But, versus what the IJA was fielding it was equal to or better than Japanese issue in most cases.
That the Soviets denuded their Siberian and Asian theaters to supply troops to fight Germany is an utter and complete myth. The Kwantung Army would have had it's collective @$$ handed to it had it entered a war against the Soviets.
Not at all. I'd highly recommend reading the Kantokuen article on Wikipedia; I know the dude who wrote it is associated with the HyperWar website:
The Soviets, on the other hand, operated under the shadow of the raging war with Germany. Although the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts had access to a formidable array of weaponry, the demands of the fighting in Europe meant that strength was siphoned away by the week. Moreover, the state of those vehicles that remained was often mixed: prior to the beginning of transfers westward in 1941 some 660 tanks[130] and 347 aircraft[131] were inoperable due to repair needs or other causes. Because the Soviets only possessed a limited offensive capability on the Primorye and Trans-Baikal directions, they could never hope to achieve a decisive victory over the Kwantung Army, even if they succeeded in slowing or stopping them.[132] Furthermore, attacking into the teeth of a prepared enemy, especially one with his own fortified regions and heavy concentrations of troops immediately opposite the border, was "the hardest kind of offensive," requiring "overwhelming numbers and massive means of assault" to succeed,[133] neither of which the Soviets possessed.[134]

Soviet forces in the Far East were dispersed over a vast arc from Mongolia to Vladivostok. Without the ability to capitalize on this deployment by striking deep into Manchuria from multiple axes, their strength would be fatally diluted and prone to piecemeal destruction at the hands of the Japanese, who could maneuver freely on their interior lines, concentrating their power at will while the immobile Red Army was fixed in place.[135] The only saving grace for the Soviets was that the remoteness of the Far East from European Russia meant that Japan alone could never hope to deal a mortal blow to the USSR, for which the former would be reliant on Germany.[136]

Organizationally, although Soviet forces in the Far East on paper amounted to some 32 division-equivalents by December 1941,[137] they were regarded as only barely sufficient for defensive operations. Compared to a typical Japanese division, pre-war Red Army units possessed slightly less manpower, but had greater access to long-range, higher caliber artillery. After the German invasion, however, the Red Army was reorganized so that each division had scarcely half the manpower and a fraction of the firepower of either its German or Japanese counterpart. Hence, to achieve superiority on the battlefield the Soviets would have to concentrate several divisions to counter each of the opponent's.[138]

Lastly, the quality of both personnel and equipment in the respective armies cannot be ignored. As the Soviets drained their best, most well-trained divisions to fight in the west, the overall standard of the forces in the east correspondingly diminished, forcing the STAVKA to rely more heavily on its fortified regions in defensive operations.[149] Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army opposite them then constituted "the cream of the entire Japanese armed forces,"[150] and was receiving reinforcements by the day. A large proportion of its units were elite Type A divisions,[r] many of which had seen extensive service in China. The quality of the Japanese officer corps was also very high, as many figures who would go on to have notable careers in the Pacific War including Tomoyuki Yamashita (head of the Kwantung Defense Command and later First Area Army), Isamu Yokoyama (1st Division, later 4th Army), Mitsuru Ushijima (11th Division),[152] and Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1st Cavalry Brigade, Mongolia Garrison Army)[153] held commands there. While both sides primarily relied on bolt-action rifles and light automatic weapons as the backbone of the infantry, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged by the heavy Soviet guns at Khalkhin Gol, to the point where the IJA felt compelled to move their 15 cm howitzers closer to the front in order to bring them to bear, even at the expense of cover.[154] Even though the Japanese managed to disable a considerable number of Soviet guns through counterbattery fire,[155] their lack of range at extreme distances and shortage of ammunition left them at a distinct disadvantage against the Red Army.[156]

Tanks presented a mixed picture as well: although the most modern machine available to the Kwantung Army in 1941, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, had thicker armor (up to 33 mm)[157] compared to the Soviet BT and T-26, its low-velocity 57 mm gun common to medium tanks of the era was outmatched by the long-barreled 45 mm weapons mounted on its opposite numbers, while the 37 mm gun used on the Ha-Go and Te-Ke had an effective range of less than a kilometer.[158] In general, while the "handcrafted, beautifully polished" Japanese tanks were more survivable thanks to their diesel engines (the gasoline powerplants used by the Russians were especially fireprone[159]), their lesser numbers meant that each loss was more damaging to the IJA than each destroyed "crudely finished," "expendable" BT or T-26 was to the Red Army.[160] During the only pitched armored engagement at Khalkhin Gol (the Yasuoka Group's attack in July), the Japanese saw 42 out of their 73 tanks[161] disabled whereas the Soviet-Mongol side lost over 77 tanks and 45 armored cars out of the more than 133 and 59 committed, respectively.[162][s] The balance in the air would have been strongly in favor of the Japanese. Although the most modern fighter in the Soviet Air Force arsenal available in the Far East, the Polikarpov I-16, was a firm opponent of the Nakajima Ki-27,[163][t] the majority of planes in-theater were considerably older. Furthermore, the Soviets had no answer to either the Mitsubishi A6M, which had been fighting in China since 1940,[164] or the high-speed Ki-21 bomber, which could fly faster and farther than its contemporary, the SB-2.[165][166] Japanese pilots were also highly experienced, with IJNAS airmen averaging roughly 700 hours of flight time by late 1941, and IJAAF aviators averaging 500. Many of these fliers had already tasted combat against China or the VVS in previous battles.[167] In comparison, German pilots received about 230 hours of flying time and Soviet pilots even less.[168]
"If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler's side... our cause is hopeless."

Major General A. K. Kazakovtsev, Operations Chief of the Far Eastern Front in 1941

"We dreaded and we feared the specter of the Kwantung Army. We pleaded with the Russians, since the very day of Pearl Harbor, to pin down the Kwantung Army, relieve pressure upon our hardpressed forces in the Philippines, and thereby “save the Pacific” from the Japanese, as General MacArthur put it. At the same time we (and the Soviets) worried lest the Japanese assault the USSR first, like the jackal Mussolini had jumped the reeling French in 1940. . . . When, for example, the American Military Mission proposed to the Russians, in December 1943, that a U. S.-supplied logistical base be set up east of Lake Baikal in Siberia, the Soviet Army authorities were shocked by the idea and “literally turned white.”

ALVIN D. COOX, “The Myth of the Kwantung Army,” 1958

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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#14

Post by paulrward » 27 Oct 2019, 03:22

Hello All :

Allow me to make a few corrections to some misunderstandings and miss-statements by a few of the posters on this thread;

First, in 1941, Stalin and his government were desperately worried that the Japanese might join in with the Germans on Barbarossa. In fact, this concern was so deep and so pervasive that they pushed 'Richard Sorge and his spy ring into taking a number of riskes that ultimately led to their exposure and executions. Sorge's group had contacts inside the Japanese Imperial Cabinet, which, in the summer of 1941, told them that the Japanese had, after much deliberation, and despite the urging of the Army Faction, decided NOT to attack the USSR, but insteat to attack the United States, which they believed might be an easier target.

Upon receiving this information, Stalin began the systematic process of denuding his Far Eastern Forces. A total of 28 Divisions ( 18 Infantry Divisions of some 115,000 men , 3 Tank Divisions and 3 Mechanized Infantry Divisions of appx 74,000 men, and 1 Mountain Infantry Division and 3 Mountain Cavalry Divisions of appx 16,000 men ) comprising some 205,000 men, were transferred to the West, some to the Southern Frontal Areas, others to the Moscow Front. (It must be noted, the strength of Soviet Divisions varied widely, for example, of the 28 18 infantry divisions listed above, 4 Divisions had 7,000 men each, 6 Divisions had 5,500 men each, and 2 Divisions had only 3,000 men )

Now, Mr. Gardner is correct, some of the Soviet equipment was left behind in the East, but some, such as rifles, MGs, light weapons, etc, was carried West. And, it must be noted, that Germans had captured or destroyed so much of the Soviet Army's equipment in the first four months of Barbarossa that there were extreme shortages of such items as tanks on the Moscow Front. We know this because the Soviets were desperate for British tanks from the convoys, and, in one case, had put a number of Matilda's into service less than two weeks after they had arrived. So, the Soviet Army, by the late fall / early winter of 1941 was, as my Grandfather used to say, ' sucking hind tit ' when it came to equipment and weapons.

So, from this we can see that, had the Japanese attacked the USSR in concert with Barbarossa, as the IJA Faction wanted, they probably could have created enough confusion to;

1) Prevent the Transfer of all or part of those 28 Divisions that so crucially held the line for the Soviets, and

2) Close the Vladivostock Lend Lease Route, either by naval air attack on the Dockyards and Railroad marshalling facilities, or by the series of raids to destroy the Trans Siberian Railway, which would prevent the movement of troops to the West no matter what Stalin wanted.

3) Impose an informal blockade on Vladivostock, in the same way the Germans were using U-boats to blockade Britain.

It should be remembered by everyone on this forum that the U.S. was shipping supplies to the Soviet Union on Civilian cargo ships, and these cargo ships generally do NOT have insurance policies that cover War losses. In effect, the U.S. might not be able to ship supplies to the USSR due to lack of any shipping company willing to take the financial risks, no matter what Roosevelt wanted...



Here we come to a point that a great many of the Non-U.S. Citizen members and some of the younger members of this forum fail to grasp: The United States of America is a Republic with a Democratically elected Representative Government. It is NOT, and in 1941, WAS NOT, a dictatorship. Freewheelin' Franklin couldn't just send the Fleet to fight the Japanese because he was feeling frisky. He would need a Declaration of War from the Congress. And, in the summer of 1941, that wasn't likely to happen. A Gallup Poll taken in late 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, showed that 45 % of the American public was AGAINST the U.S. getting involved in the war. If Roosevelt had tried to get a declaration of war against Japan without the Cassus Belli of Pearl Harbor, the bill would have been filibustered on the floor of the Senate, and might just have died there.

An American writer of that period, in a letter to his editor, a close friend, discussing the outbreak of Barbarossa, wrote, " Well, the Nazis are killing the Commies.... What ? Me Worry ? " This attitude summed up the viewpoint of a large segment of the U.S. population. Many people felt that the U.S. had been sucked into the previous war to pull Great Britain's chestnuts out of the fire, and didn't want a repeat of that same mistake. Others were conservatives on the political right, and no matter how unpopular Hitler is today, Stalin wasn't any more popular with the average American Citizen back in 1941. After all, we had fought AGAINST the Soviet Union until 1921, and hadn't recognized their government until 1933. The Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, and their attacks on Poland and Finland hadn't made the USSR any more popular.


With all of this in mind, it seems obvious that the Japanese could have waged a VERY limited war against the USSR with no fear of U.S. involvment. This type of war would be fought just to keep the Soviets occupied, the Japanese acting carefully to take no major military risks, minimizing their casualties, and relying on their air superiority to keep the larger, more powerful Soviet forces from crushing them. Such a war would have been, to quote Shakespeare, " " Much Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing " , much like the Germans had waged in the Phony War to keep the French from interfering with their dismemberment of Poland. But, this war would have keep those 200,000 Soviet Soldiers pinned down, and, with any luck, closed the Vladivostock Lend Lease Route and knocked out the Trans Siberian Railway.


All right, so Japan agrees to carry water for Hitler. Now, a number of posters have taken the short sighted view that, had this happened, by the middle of 1942, Japan would have been without oil and would have been prostrate. This shows a lack of geo-political thinking, and an inablity to read a map.

In September of 1940, Japan occupied French IndoChina. The response of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR was , " Yeah.... Whatever... " This gave Japan access to rice, rubber, tin, and tungsten, as well as some supplies of iron and timber.

What if, in return for Japan's participation in Barbarossa, Hitler agrees to turn over the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. In the Spring of 1941, the Puppet Government in the Netherlands informs the East Indies Colonial Government that an agreement has been signed with Japan, making the East Indies a Protectorate of Japan. Japanese administrators begin arriving by plane, quietly and peacefully taking over the machinery of government, and all of the management of the major resource producing companies are told that, if they cooperate, they will have new, large markets with the Japanese government. If they don't cooperate, new managers will be found who WILL cooperate. At one stroke, Japan peacefully gets all of the oil of Indonesia, along with timber, and other metals such as gold and bauxite.

Because the occupation is essentially peaceful, the US has no cause to interfere, and, with no fighting, the Oil Fields and Refineries of Borneo, Sumatra, and Java are left intact and run uninteruptedly to provide the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere with the fuel it needs to keep the lights on and the battleships up and steaming.


When the winter of 1941-1942 hits, Japan hits Malaya. This time there is no subterfuge. It is nothing bot raw military power and force. All of the troops that historically were used in Malaya and the Philippines, along with a the IJN fleet, run the British into Singapore, and then bomb it into submission. Again, the Japanese are careful NOT to attack the US Possessions in the Philippines, US shipping is left un-molested, and the Roosevelt Administration is left grinding it's teeth in frustration, without a means to go to war to prevent it.


In effect, by the end of 1942, Russia is gone, the Axis are riding high, Britain is on it's uppers, and in the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is still trying to find a way to get the U.S. into the war to help SOMEBODY !


So, as Mr. Thaddeus and Mr. HIstoryLearner have concluded, a Japanese attack would have been a Knock Out blow to the Soviet Union, closed the lend lease route on the Pacific, and, with a little diplomatic help from Germany, would have made Japan secure in the Pacific, allowing the Japanese to polish off China at their leisure, and, when the U.S. pulls out of the Philppines in 1946, quietly move in to add the Philippines as the last big piece of the GEACPS.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

#15

Post by pugsville » 27 Oct 2019, 05:55

paulrward wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 03:22
Hello All :

Allow me to make a few corrections to some misunderstandings and miss-statements by a few of the posters on this thread;

First, in 1941, Stalin and his government were desperately worried that the Japanese might join in with the Germans on Barbarossa. In fact, this concern was so deep and so pervasive that they pushed 'Richard Sorge and his spy ring into taking a number of riskes that ultimately led to their exposure and executions. Sorge's group had contacts inside the Japanese Imperial Cabinet, which, in the summer of 1941, told them that the Japanese had, after much deliberation, and despite the urging of the Army Faction, decided NOT to attack the USSR, but insteat to attack the United States, which they believed might be an easier target.

Upon receiving this information, Stalin began the systematic process of denuding his Far Eastern Forces. A total of 28 Divisions ( 18 Infantry Divisions of some 115,000 men , 3 Tank Divisions and 3 Mechanized Infantry Divisions of appx 74,000 men, and 1 Mountain Infantry Division and 3 Mountain Cavalry Divisions of appx 16,000 men ) comprising some 205,000 men, were transferred to the West, some to the Southern Frontal Areas, others to the Moscow Front. (It must be noted, the strength of Soviet Divisions varied widely, for example, of the 28 18 infantry divisions listed above, 4 Divisions had 7,000 men each, 6 Divisions had 5,500 men each, and 2 Divisions had only 3,000 men )

Now, Mr. Gardner is correct, some of the Soviet equipment was left behind in the East, but some, such as rifles, MGs, light weapons, etc, was carried West. And, it must be noted, that Germans had captured or destroyed so much of the Soviet Army's equipment in the first four months of Barbarossa that there were extreme shortages of such items as tanks on the Moscow Front. We know this because the Soviets were desperate for British tanks from the convoys, and, in one case, had put a number of Matilda's into service less than two weeks after they had arrived. So, the Soviet Army, by the late fall / early winter of 1941 was, as my Grandfather used to say, ' sucking hind tit ' when it came to equipment and weapons.

So, from this we can see that, had the Japanese attacked the USSR in concert with Barbarossa, as the IJA Faction wanted, they probably could have created enough confusion to;

1) Prevent the Transfer of all or part of those 28 Divisions that so crucially held the line for the Soviets, and

2) Close the Vladivostock Lend Lease Route, either by naval air attack on the Dockyards and Railroad marshalling facilities, or by the series of raids to destroy the Trans Siberian Railway, which would prevent the movement of troops to the West no matter what Stalin wanted.

3) Impose an informal blockade on Vladivostock, in the same way the Germans were using U-boats to blockade Britain.

It should be remembered by everyone on this forum that the U.S. was shipping supplies to the Soviet Union on Civilian cargo ships, and these cargo ships generally do NOT have insurance policies that cover War losses. In effect, the U.S. might not be able to ship supplies to the USSR due to lack of any shipping company willing to take the financial risks, no matter what Roosevelt wanted...



Here we come to a point that a great many of the Non-U.S. Citizen members and some of the younger members of this forum fail to grasp: The United States of America is a Republic with a Democratically elected Representative Government. It is NOT, and in 1941, WAS NOT, a dictatorship. Freewheelin' Franklin couldn't just send the Fleet to fight the Japanese because he was feeling frisky. He would need a Declaration of War from the Congress. And, in the summer of 1941, that wasn't likely to happen. A Gallup Poll taken in late 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, showed that 45 % of the American public was AGAINST the U.S. getting involved in the war. If Roosevelt had tried to get a declaration of war against Japan without the Cassus Belli of Pearl Harbor, the bill would have been filibustered on the floor of the Senate, and might just have died there.

An American writer of that period, in a letter to his editor, a close friend, discussing the outbreak of Barbarossa, wrote, " Well, the Nazis are killing the Commies.... What ? Me Worry ? " This attitude summed up the viewpoint of a large segment of the U.S. population. Many people felt that the U.S. had been sucked into the previous war to pull Great Britain's chestnuts out of the fire, and didn't want a repeat of that same mistake. Others were conservatives on the political right, and no matter how unpopular Hitler is today, Stalin wasn't any more popular with the average American Citizen back in 1941. After all, we had fought AGAINST the Soviet Union until 1921, and hadn't recognized their government until 1933. The Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, and their attacks on Poland and Finland hadn't made the USSR any more popular.


With all of this in mind, it seems obvious that the Japanese could have waged a VERY limited war against the USSR with no fear of U.S. involvment. This type of war would be fought just to keep the Soviets occupied, the Japanese acting carefully to take no major military risks, minimizing their casualties, and relying on their air superiority to keep the larger, more powerful Soviet forces from crushing them. Such a war would have been, to quote Shakespeare, " " Much Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing " , much like the Germans had waged in the Phony War to keep the French from interfering with their dismemberment of Poland. But, this war would have keep those 200,000 Soviet Soldiers pinned down, and, with any luck, closed the Vladivostock Lend Lease Route and knocked out the Trans Siberian Railway.


All right, so Japan agrees to carry water for Hitler. Now, a number of posters have taken the short sighted view that, had this happened, by the middle of 1942, Japan would have been without oil and would have been prostrate. This shows a lack of geo-political thinking, and an inablity to read a map.

In September of 1940, Japan occupied French IndoChina. The response of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR was , " Yeah.... Whatever... " This gave Japan access to rice, rubber, tin, and tungsten, as well as some supplies of iron and timber.

What if, in return for Japan's participation in Barbarossa, Hitler agrees to turn over the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. In the Spring of 1941, the Puppet Government in the Netherlands informs the East Indies Colonial Government that an agreement has been signed with Japan, making the East Indies a Protectorate of Japan. Japanese administrators begin arriving by plane, quietly and peacefully taking over the machinery of government, and all of the management of the major resource producing companies are told that, if they cooperate, they will have new, large markets with the Japanese government. If they don't cooperate, new managers will be found who WILL cooperate. At one stroke, Japan peacefully gets all of the oil of Indonesia, along with timber, and other metals such as gold and bauxite.

Because the occupation is essentially peaceful, the US has no cause to interfere, and, with no fighting, the Oil Fields and Refineries of Borneo, Sumatra, and Java are left intact and run uninteruptedly to provide the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere with the fuel it needs to keep the lights on and the battleships up and steaming.


When the winter of 1941-1942 hits, Japan hits Malaya. This time there is no subterfuge. It is nothing bot raw military power and force. All of the troops that historically were used in Malaya and the Philippines, along with a the IJN fleet, run the British into Singapore, and then bomb it into submission. Again, the Japanese are careful NOT to attack the US Possessions in the Philippines, US shipping is left un-molested, and the Roosevelt Administration is left grinding it's teeth in frustration, without a means to go to war to prevent it.


In effect, by the end of 1942, Russia is gone, the Axis are riding high, Britain is on it's uppers, and in the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is still trying to find a way to get the U.S. into the war to help SOMEBODY !


So, as Mr. Thaddeus and Mr. HIstoryLearner have concluded, a Japanese attack would have been a Knock Out blow to the Soviet Union, closed the lend lease route on the Pacific, and, with a little diplomatic help from Germany, would have made Japan secure in the Pacific, allowing the Japanese to polish off China at their leisure, and, when the U.S. pulls out of the Philppines in 1946, quietly move in to add the Philippines as the last big piece of the GEACPS.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
The Dutch Government in Exile was officially recognized, the Dutch puppet Government in the Netherlands was Not. A different situation from the Vichy regime. The French Government sought an armistice in 1940 and there was some legitimacy to the Vichy french regime, and had official recognition thus some things could be done. No such arrangement existed in the Netherlands. The Puppet government was unrecognized and the Government in Exile in England was.

No agreement signed by the Puppet Government was worth anything. Any Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies would have to be an invasion.


There was no much co-operation between Japan and Germany. The Japanese asked the Germans to asistance in their negotiations with Vichy France, the Germans did not.

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