The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#781

Post by Aida1 » 29 Oct 2019, 19:25

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 18:37
Aida1 wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 17:34
If you read Thomas and Pahl , you know very well what the deficiencies were so do not play dumb. i read for example on p. 264 -265 of Foreign Armies east :” For a decade preceding the invasion of Russia,the Abwehr exerted great efforts to gather intelligence on Russia-without success. The material submitted by Amt/Ausland before june 1941 contained in FHO files is of poor quality. The planning of Barbarossa revealed that the Abwehr knew almost nothing about Sovjet Russia A German general staff Sovjet analyst described the contribution of the Abwehr thus :” Die Masse des Nachrichtenmaterials dass wir erhielten war Mist”.
I read on page 275:” Initially, FHO was forced to base its assessments of the Red army in 1939 and 1940 on five main sources of intelligence, all of which was inadequate : long-range and short-range radio;(ii) reports of Abwehr agents and immigrants from the Baltic states’ (iii) German military’s attaché reports ;(iv) information from allied intelligence services;(v) Soviet Army deserters. The overall assessment of the red army by FHO between juli 1940 and june 1941 must be described as incomplete and inadequate. After aerial reconnaissance, radio reconnaissance furnished the most reliable information about the strengt and deployment of the Red Army and the red air force ,but only for the portion of the Soviet Union accessible to German radio reconnaissance .However, radio reconnaissance provided almost no hard intelligence about Soviet reserve formations in the interior, Soviet active-duty units not stationed in European Russia , and the operation of the Red army conscription system.”
I read on p.278 : “ The invasion of Russia and the subsequent campaign from june to december 1941 exposed serious weaknesses in FHO evaluation of the Red Army and Soviet military strategy. (The campaign also revealed the general inadequacy of Abwehr I clandestine collection operations against the Soviet target). Within days, every Wehrmacht army group headquarters discovered that the intelligence furnished by FHO about the deployment , resistance, and strength of opposing Soviet forces was inaccurate and otherwise inadequate for operational planning in the field.”
That's a lot of words to say you don't have any data to show there actually was an underestimation by the Heer, the FHO or whoever.

It's a lot of words to say you are just sharing another person's opinion.
These are the conclusions from somebody who did serious research on the subject. I only need to give a source. You do not like his conclusions . The article gives a clear description of the lack of intelligence data.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#782

Post by Aida1 » 29 Oct 2019, 19:35

Hanny wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 18:43

Aida1 wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 17:34

. i read for example on p. 264 -265 of Foreign Armies east :
Indeed but your not posting the numbers, asked for by Mark, and have avoided giving the numbers the FHO provided.


Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45
https://www.jstor.org/stable/260933?rea ... b_contents

Page 276 FHO advised first 159 Divison of all types, increasing to 200 enemy Divisions, before its last advise on 2oth.
Field Army 4 million
Rear services 0.6 million
Internal Troops 1.6 million

total 6.2 million.
11/12 million men available for mobilisation into the Field army. Page 275.


FHO was advising therefore 17/18.2 million enemy combatants. It was out by roughly 100%.

Numbers went up and the last ones were given on 20 June 1941, FHO assessed the total Red Army strength at 179 rifle divisions, 33 cavalry divisions, 10 armoured divisions, 42 armoured or motorized-mechanized Brigades, and 7 to 8 paratroop brigades, giving SU AFV strength as 10,000 (being out by 10000 or so).

July it advised "The number of new formations has reached its maximum strength and virtually no new formations need to be counted."

Halder disagreed in his diary with the oft used comment "At the beginning of the war we believed that the enemy had about 200 divisions. Now we are counting 360. These forces are not always well armed and equipped, and they are often poorly led. But they are there. When a dozen have been smashed, another dozen replace them."
Hè read the article so i was not going to play along. You conveniently left out the mention on p 276 that the FHO doubted the 11 million men could be mobilised due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiël.


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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#783

Post by AbollonPolweder » 29 Oct 2019, 20:02

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 11:33
...
So what are you trying to say?
A) Zhukov is wrong and the 500,000 hadn't reached the border by 1 June?
C) Zhukov is correct, the 500,000 had reached the border, and the 12,000 is based upon another later order/plan which had nothing to do with the 500,000 called up in March?
In addition to Zhukov, many wrote about this including Vasilevsky and Zakharov.
Всего на «учебные сборы» до объявления войны было призвано свыше 802 тыс. человек, что составляло 24% приписного личного состава по мобплану МП-41. Эти мероприятия позволили усилить половину всех стрелковых дивизий (99 из 198), предназначенных в основном для действий на Западе. "1941 год — уроки и выводы" — М.:Воениздат, 1992.
В мае-начале июня было призвано из запаса около 800 тыс. военнообязанных. Это позволило повысить укомплектованность личным составом почти 100 стрелковых дивизий, ряда укрепрайонов, частей ВВС и других войск" "История второй мировой войны 1939–1945 гг. Том 3. Начало войны. Подготовка агрессии против СССР" — М.:Воениздат, 1974, с.439-440.
в конце мая — начале июня проводится призыв 793,5 тыс. военнообязанных запаса, что позволило укомплектовать до полного штата военного времени 21 дивизию приграничных округов,
Это Захаров В.В. Генеральный штаб в годы войны. Глава 6.
And they all lied. However, it is difficult to accuse Zhukov of lying, for it is known that he did not write his book. Therefore it is difficult to convict him of a lie. The lie, of course, was not in numbers. All these marshals lied about the gathering of reservists (BUS). In fact, in the spring and summer of 1941 there was a hidden mobilization. You can read about it in this document:
Документ № 272
Записка НКО СССР и Генштаба Красной Армии в Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) — И.В. Сталину и СНК СССР — В.М. Молотову с изложением схемы мобилизационного развертывания Красной Армии

[не позже 12.02.1941]

б/н


Мобилизационный план Красной Армии был утвержден Комитетом обороны 29 ноября 1937 года на 1938–1939 гг. По этому плану была проведена частичная мобилизация семи округов в сентябре 1939 года. По схеме развертывания этого же плана были развернуты войска действующей армии во время войны с финской белогвардейщиной.
В настоящее время в связи с реорганизацией стрелковых, танковых войск, ПВО и военно-воздушных сил, а также с перемещением значительного количества войск, является необходимым рассмотреть и утвердить новую схему мобилизационного развертывания1.
В основу новой схемы развертывания Красной Армии положены:
а) новая организация стрелковых, танковых войск, артиллерии, ПВО и военно-воздушных сил;
б) измененная дислокация войск;
в) возможность отмобилизования войск по очередям и каждого округа в отдельности, в зависимости от обстановки.
В этих целях представляется на утверждение нижеследующий мобилизационный план развертывания Красной Армии:
Document No. 272
Note by the NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) - I.V. Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - V.M. Molotov with the outline of the mobilization deployment of the Red Army

no later than 12/02/1941 no/number
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/ ... oc/1011413
The document is large in volume, so I give excerpts from it.
Порядок проведения мобилизации
Мобилизационным планом 1941 года предусматривается проведение мобилизации по двум вариантам:
а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».
В этом случае призыв военнообязанных запаса, а также поставка приписанного к частям автотранспорта и конского состава производится персональными повестками, без объявления приказов НКО.
б) второй вариант предусматривает проведение общей мобилизации всех Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР или отдельных военных округов открытым порядком, т.е. когда мобилизация объявляется Указом Президиума Верховного Совета СССР (статья 49, пункт «Л» Конституции СССР). В данном случае призыв военнообязанных производится приказами народного комиссара обороны, расклеиваемыми для общего сведения (в порядке ст. 72–73 Закона о всеобщей воинской обязанности).
По мобилизационному плану 1938–1939 гг. проведение «Больших учебных сборов» (скрытой мобилизации) предусматривалось также по двум вариантам, т.е. по литеру «А» и «Б».
По литеру «А» поднимались части по штатам военного времени, имеющие срок готовности только до М-10.
По литеру «Б» поднимаемые части только усиливались на 75–80 % до штата военного времени.
Ввиду того, что вариант по литеру «Б» предусматривался в основном только для частей и соединений, прикрывающих границу, и поскольку по мобилизационному плану 1941 года пограничные части по мирному времени в настоящее время содержатся в усиленном составе, считаю разрабатывать вариант литер «Б» нецелесообразным.
При скрытой мобилизации полагал бы необходимым оставить только один вариант в порядке «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)» на все части, независимо от их сроков готовности. Это мероприятие позволит отмобилизовать при необходимости отдельно каждую часть.
The procedure for mobilization
The 1941 mobilization plan provides for mobilization in two ways:
a) the first option provides for the mobilization of individual military districts, separate units and formations established by a special decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - in a hidden manner, in the order of the so-called "Big training camps (BTC)
In case of covert mobilization, I would consider it necessary to leave only one option in the order of "Big Training Camps (BTC)" to all formations, regardless of their combat readiness. This event will allow to mobilize each formation separately if necessary.

As can be seen from the document - BUS is a hidden mobilization.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#784

Post by MarkN » 29 Oct 2019, 21:02

AbollonPolweder wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 20:02
In addition to Zhukov, many wrote about this including Vasilevsky and Zakharov.
....
And they all lied. However, it is difficult to accuse Zhukov of lying, for it is known that he did not write his book. Therefore it is difficult to convict him of a lie. The lie, of course, was not in numbers. All these marshals lied about the gathering of reservists (BUS). In fact, in the spring and summer of 1941 there was a hidden mobilization. You can read about it in this document:
Документ № 272
As can be seen from the document - BUS is a hidden mobilization.
Dokument 272 is a great document for comparing actual Red Army mobilization planning (February 1941 planning) to FHO and Heer estimates. How many divisions, what type and number of personnel. Underestimate or overestimate by the FHO?

The two systems for mobilization is also described by Zakharov and Isaev that l know of. I'm sure others too.

But Dokument 272 tells us nothing about how many were actually mobilized, where and for what purpose. So it does nothing to suggest anybody lied about the 500,000 in March nor that there were any other call-ups other than what is written by Zhukov et al.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#785

Post by Art » 29 Oct 2019, 21:32

Hanny wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 12:36
So now you realise its your error in using wartime TOE when the formations were creeping up to wartime mobilisation levels, being at 12000 on June 1.
I don't have errors here. Again, as of June 41 there was single wartime TO&E (14500 men) which was the same for all 177 divisions in existence. And two peace-time TO&Es (10300 and 5900). Ok, with some minor sub-variants. Now, look at your starting message and see the difference:
viewtopic.php?p=2230831#p2230831
There was no 12000 mobilization level or a peace-time division organization with 12 000 men. Entry of reservists for training period didn't affect authorized organization - they were just a temporary surplus to a peace-time TO&Es.
Training of reservist was a min of 4 months
Well, Politburo's decree of 8 March 1941 said that training of reservist in rifle divisions should last 45 days:
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/ ... oc/1011498
The Red Army General Staff also ordered a training call-up lasting 45 days:
Sbory.png
The conclusion is pretty obvious. Again, entry of reservist for training was just temporary and didn't affect permanent organization.
Its the actual average strength of Russian Rifle Div, on June 1 in each of the 5 districts.

What kind of personnel?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#786

Post by Art » 29 Oct 2019, 21:39

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:12
Zhukov explains how many more were called up, when and where they went.
Ok, Zhukov memoir is a mixture of accurate information with inaccurate information with a total nonsense. You are better to forget about it as a fully credible source. Building various hypothesis based on this memoir is just a waste of you time which doesn't lead anywhere. If you want to read something more reliable - learn Russian. Sorry, it only works that way.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#787

Post by Art » 29 Oct 2019, 21:52

AbollonPolweder wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 20:02
As can be seen from the document - BUS is a hidden mobilization.
Fine, but neither Zhukov nor Zakharov referred to this abbreviation. The document quoted above doesn't say that any training call-up means mobilization.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#788

Post by MarkN » 29 Oct 2019, 22:14

Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:39
Ok, Zhukov memoir is a mixture of accurate information with inaccurate information with a total nonsense. You are better to forget about it as a fully credible source. Building various hypothesis based on this memoir is just a waste of you time which doesn't lead anywhere. If you want to read something more reliable - learn Russian. Sorry, it only works that way.
All memoirs, diaries and postwar narratives by the participants have to be treated with caution. 95% of historical works need to be treated with caution.

I'm not hypothesizing anything from Zhukov. I pointed out the contradiction between what poster Hanny wrote and Zhukov and the contradiction within the evidence presented by poster Hanny.

How many reservists were actually called up, by whom, when and where they ended up (formation and/or location) is not found in Zhukov and won't be found by handwave guesses.

Isaev does a decent job of detailing some of the numbers regarding KOVO, but doesn't answer everything. Zakharov has a bit about OdVO and KhVO.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#789

Post by Art » 29 Oct 2019, 22:42

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 22:14
How many reservists were actually called up, by whom, when and where they ended up (formation and/or location) is not found in Zhukov and won't be found by handwave guesses.
Pages 469-478 here:
http://militera.lib.ru/h/0/djvu/zaharov_mv02.djvu

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#790

Post by Hanny » 30 Oct 2019, 09:32

Aida1 wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:35

Hè read the article so i was not going to play along. You conveniently left out the mention on p 276 that the FHO doubted the 11 million men could be mobilised due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiël.
You assumed he knew ( having read the FHO report already) you had lied you mean, and then asked you for data he already knew about that you had lied about.

Its highly likely he did this to see if you would continue to lie by not posting the data, so you played along and continued to be dishonest in your posting.

The FHO predicted the Field Army and reservists amounted to c 18 million, this was 4 million more than the SU had.

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:12

Zhukov explains how many more were called up, when and where they went. I posted that yesterday.
You did, in post 753 to counter June 1 Rifle Div mobilisation strength returns, planned target of 12000*, you referred to March called up numbers with planned target of 8000, and complained 12000 is not 8000, Problem was all your end in not understanding different Dates with mobilised strengths ( March Rifle Div increase to 8000, By June 12000) bringing different TOE numbers up on existing units and creating new formations.

You then later posted:
MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:12
How many reservists were actually called up, by whom, when and where they ended up (formation and/or location) is not found in Zhukov and won't be found by handwave guesses..
Problems all your end, including being the one hand waving.

* example of 4 divisons reaching the 12000 TOE here https://www.jstor.org/stable/260824?rea ... b_contents

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:12
As l originally understood it, the 500,000 called up in March were designed to bring some rifle divisions up to about 8,000. Not 12,000 as you posted. Having gone around the houses, you are no saying the same thing with a different combination of words.
Indeed the problem is all your end with a lack of understanding of the subject of how the SU mobilisation plan worked, to increase the number of existing formations, and to increase the TOE of existing ones towards full wartime strength, by creeping to wartime TOE is stages for existing formations, and raising of new formations.

MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:12
12,000 may well have been an intermediate target that somebody had once defined, but it was not one being actively pursued. Probably due to Stalin's determination not to provoke the Germans or to be seen as the guilty party.
12000 was authorised in the mobilisation plan, planned to be in effect in June, 8000 was authorised in the mobilisation plan, planned to be in effect in May, both done by order of stalin, in accordance with the SU mobilisation plan, in addition over 00 new Divs were also formed, and existing ones moved forward for use to be replaced by newly mobilised ones.
Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:32
I don't have errors here. Again, as of June 41 there was single wartime TO&E (14500 men) which was the same for all 177 divisions in existence. And two peace-time TO&Es (10300 and 5900). Ok, with some minor sub-variants. Now, look at your starting message and see the difference:
You do.
Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:32
There was no 12000 mobilization level or a peace-time division organization with 12 000 men. Entry of reservists for training period didn't affect authorized organization - they were just a temporary surplus to a peace-time TO&Es.
There was , its a fact you unaware of to be sure. Reservists when called up spent 45 days at training centres, then STAVKA decided where the formation, in accordance with the mobilisation plan went afterwards.

In May the reservists increased existing formations upto at least 8000, and increased the number of active formations, these new Division began their training for use in the mobilisation plan.


Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:32
Well, Politburo's decree of 8 March 1941 said that training of reservist in rifle divisions should last 45 days:
Thats for the newly raised formations, to be assembled and trained at their local training centres, after which they became active and filter into the mobilisation plan.
Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:32
The conclusion is pretty obvious. Again, entry of reservist for training was just temporary and didn't affect permanent organization.
Ignores rather obvious reality that reservist called up in new formations, in May spent c45 days in local training centres, ( already given you this in book cites btw) and then the formation became active, and were still active when war came, and that existing formations, increased their manpower levels in May and 1 June, and still had them when war came.

In Sept 39 there were 96 rifle Divs, ( Army strength 1.5 million)By Dec 39 170, ( Army strength 2.3 million, by June 1 1941 there were 196,( Army strength 5 million) all the increases came from reservist being called up for c 45 days training.

The conclusion is pretty obvious, your in error.

Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 21:32
What kind of personnel?
Average personnel, 144 Divs in the 8k range 19 in the 5/6k range.

In addittion to Glantz, Hill, Sharp, hell, any author you like who writes about creeping mobilisation you can try the following link, by now you should accept the errors are all yours.
Soviet military thought.
Author: United States. Air Force.
.https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ixN ... 40&f=false
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#791

Post by Aida1 » 30 Oct 2019, 12:35

Hanny wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 09:32
Aida1 wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:35

Hè read the article so i was not going to play along. You conveniently left out the mention on p 276 that the FHO doubted the 11 million men could be mobilised due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiël.
You assumed he knew ( having read the FHO report already) you had lied you mean, and then asked you for data he already knew about that you had lied about.

Its highly likely he did this to see if you would continue to lie by not posting the data, so you played along and continued to be dishonest in your posting.

The FHO predicted the Field Army and reservists amounted to c 18 million, this was 4 million more than the SU had.


Nonense. Hè had already mentioned the numbers before. Hè had read the article. There was no doubt about that. And the author did thorough research on the FHO and came to very damning conclusions concerning the lack of intelligence data on the USSR. So i have 2 perfectly good sources to support what i stated. You are again ignoring that FHO doubted the USSR could mobilise the 11 million men it mentioned.You cannot get away from the fact that FHO got it completetely wrong because of a lack of data on a lot of aspects like war production and admitted that itself.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#792

Post by Art » 30 Oct 2019, 14:10

Hanny wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 09:32
There was , its a fact you unaware of to be sure.
As I told you there were TO&Es 4/100 and 4/120 with 10300 and 5900 personnel respectively. What was the number of this alleged TO&E?
Reservists when called up spent 45 days at training centres, then STAVKA decided where the formation, in accordance with the mobilisation plan went afterwards.
First, Stavka couldn't decide anything because it didn't exist prior to 22.6.41
Second, these alleged training centers didn't exist either.
Finally, both the Politburo decree and the General Staff directive from March 1941 posted above told about reservist going to rifle divisions for a period of 45 days in the most unequivocal manner. Some other categories could be called for 60 or 90 days. Again, I repeat if for the third time, call-up of reservists was planned as only temporary and didn't affect standing organization.
Again both Politburo and the General Staff told about reservists called to divisions for period of 45 days.
In Sept 39 there were 96 rifle Divs, ( Army strength 1.5 million)By Dec 39 170, ( Army strength 2.3 million, by June 1 1941 there were 196,( Army strength 5 million) all the increases came from reservist being called up for c 45 days training.
Nope, by early 1941 the Red Army had practically no reservists left in its ranks. All the augmentation came from annual drafts of young classes and smaller part from recruitment of officers.
Average personnel, 144 Divs in the 8k range 19 in the 5/6k range.
What kind of personnel? There were permanent personnel and there were reservists temporarily inducted for training? So what kind?
In addittion to Glantz, Hill, Sharp, hell, any author you like who writes about creeping mobilisation you can try the following link, by now you should accept the errors are all yours.
The problem is that you understand the term "mobilization" in a different way than the Red Army understood it. RA understood mobilization as planned and timely transition of every unit, staff, headquarter and the entire Red Army from organization and TO&Es of the peace time to organization and TO&Es of the wartime. In that sense there was no Soviet mobilization in 1941 prior to 22 June, since organization and TO&E still remained those of the peace-time type. Temporary induction of reservists for summer training didn't change organization and TO&Es.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#793

Post by Hanny » 30 Oct 2019, 14:29

Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 12:35

Nonense. Hè had already mentioned the numbers before. Hè had read the article.
Ergo he was seeing if you were going to continue to be dishonest after being caught being dishonest.
Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 12:35
There was no doubt about that.
I have no doubt when you were caught by Mark and others, being dishonest, Mark then gave you an opportunity to be honest or not going forwards.
Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 12:35
And the author did thorough research on the FHO and came to very damning conclusions concerning the lack of intelligence data on the USSR.
Er, no, his opinion on the data contained in the archives is not the point, its what data is in the FHO archives, and that he is comparing to post glasnost su archival data that the FHO had no knowledge of. Pahl is critical with hindsight based knowledge of post glasnost data that the FHO had no means to be aware of. Any idiot can be critical with hindsight. AH saw the same data and simply said it did not matter as the campaign will be over before any of that long term stuff becomes an issue to be concerned with. Hubris and arrogance but not ignorance of the facts, just a refusal to let them bother him.
Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 12:35
So i have 2 perfectly good sources to support what i stated. You are again ignoring that FHO doubted the USSR could mobilise the 11 million men it mentioned.You cannot get away from the fact that FHO got it completetely wrong because of a lack of data on a lot of aspects like war production and admitted that itself.
Nope there is only the FHO archive, ( which rather accurately has the SU start strength in Divs and manpower despite your instance to the opposite, gives 11/12 million able to be mobolised and 6 million in the field so roughly 17/18 million participation ) its a single source from which Pahl and Thomposon then use alongside the more recent soviet archive material, and form hind sighted opinions of data accuracy. Basically Pahl comment on production is that the FHO were fools not to be able to predict the massive SU industrial military output in wartime, the idiots based their projections of past outputs, the fools should have known the SU was going to move decimal places on military output indexes, more MG in 12 months than the last 10 years is one example.

FHO Intel data on military production was based on past production data sets, sadly FHO lacked a time machine to see what would happen in the future production of the SU wartime economy.

It rather accurately gave the SU Div numbers, Appendix A https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EBl ... on&f=false
Last edited by Hanny on 30 Oct 2019, 15:25, edited 1 time in total.
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Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#794

Post by Hanny » 30 Oct 2019, 15:11

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10

As I told you there were TO&Es 4/100 and 4/120 with 10300 and 5900 personnel respectively. What was the number of this alleged TO&E?
Try reading the books and links i posted.


Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10
First, Stavka couldn't decide anything because it didn't exist prior to 22.6.41
Second, these alleged training centers didn't exist either.
Finally, both the Politburo decree and the General Staff directive from March 1941 posted above told about reservist going to rifle divisions for a period of 45 days in the most unequivocal manner. Some other categories could be called for 60 or 90 days. Again, I repeat if for the third time, call-up of reservists was planned as only temporary and didn't affect standing organization.Again both Politburo and the General Staff told about reservists called to divisions for period of 45 days.
Being in error three times on the same thing is kinda cool. Try reading the links, you will learn that the training centres existed and what function they served, and what happened to them after the formation was inducted and moved on. Your not even going to try and explain why everyone went home after 45 days, leaving 00s of newly raised Divisons empty of personnel, means every data point on existing formations we have is wrong then eh?.

Your quite right about STAVKA, its "The Main directorate of Formation and Staffing of the Red Army" that did that in 41.(Glavuprafrom) but it was Stalin who gave the order to do it.

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10
Nope, by early 1941 the Red Army had practically no reservists left in its ranks. All the augmentation came from annual drafts of young classes and smaller part from recruitment of officers.
Fact free.
Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10
The number of registered reservists by the start of 1941 was approaching 25 million. Not counting men already on active service in military.
Your own post of 25 million excluding those already in service, means your last post was a rather large error in maths.
Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10
What kind of personnel? There were permanent personnel and there were reservists temporarily inducted for training? So what kind?
Your seeking an answer that the data does not have, because your not understanding that the Data is a % of TOE. There is no such thing as a reservists temporarily inducted for training.
Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 14:10
The problem is that you understand the term "mobilization" in a different way than the Red Army understood it. RA understood mobilization as planned and timely transition of every unit, staff, headquarter and the entire Red Army from organization and TO&Es of the peace time to organization and TO&Es of the wartime. In that sense there was no Soviet mobilization in 1941 prior to 22 June, since organization and TO&E still remained those of the peace-time type. Temporary induction of reservists for summer training didn't change organization and TO&Es.
The books and links already given refer to vpolzanie v voinu, and the authors understand it and give the changes in manpower levels at each transition point when reservist are mobilised for increasing existing formations and raising new ones, and you simply ignore them.
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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#795

Post by ljadw » 30 Oct 2019, 15:27

Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 12:35
Hanny wrote:
30 Oct 2019, 09:32
Aida1 wrote:
29 Oct 2019, 19:35

Hè read the article so i was not going to play along. You conveniently left out the mention on p 276 that the FHO doubted the 11 million men could be mobilised due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiël.
You assumed he knew ( having read the FHO report already) you had lied you mean, and then asked you for data he already knew about that you had lied about.

Its highly likely he did this to see if you would continue to lie by not posting the data, so you played along and continued to be dishonest in your posting.

The FHO predicted the Field Army and reservists amounted to c 18 million, this was 4 million more than the SU had.


Nonense. Hè had already mentioned the numbers before. Hè had read the article. There was no doubt about that. And the author did thorough research on the FHO and came to very damning conclusions concerning the lack of intelligence data on the USSR. So i have 2 perfectly good sources to support what i stated. You are again ignoring that FHO doubted the USSR could mobilise the 11 million men it mentioned.You cannot get away from the fact that FHO got it completetely wrong because of a lack of data on a lot of aspects like war production and admitted that itself.
Since time immemorial you are searching for scape-goats to be blamed for the German failure to defeat the Soviets .
It was Hitler, general mud, general winter, now it is FHO, tomorrow it will be the Reichsbahn, a day later,it will be the Ruhrbarone,but you will never admit that the ''culprits ''were the Russian Untermenschen, because that would admit that the German generals were not the superhuman heros who were bathing in a sea of admiration from US and British copycats,as they claimed and as their followers are still claiming .
But outside the usual suspects, you will not convince many people .
The German generals lost in WWI, blaming their dead colleagues,they lost in WWII ,blamimg their dead boss ,but immediately they claimed the new NATO top jobs with as excuse that they were the experts in fighting the Soviets .
They were the experts into losing from the Soviets .
A little modesty would not be out of place for these Herren.

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