MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
Now since l'm stupid, l'll post this in babysteps which l hope you will confirm which are right or wrong to help me find the exact scale of my stupidity.
Several times Zhukov went to Stalin to ask for permission to call up reserves to stengthen formations against the probable German attack. Right or wrong?
Depends who you ask. Stalin did it when he allied with Yugoslavia in May to be on the safe side.
Zhukov did propose a pre-emptive strike on 15 May 1941, Stalin did not approve this plan. The next day Zhukov ordered a defensive deployment, which remained largely unchanged until 22 June. See
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40110360?s ... b_contents
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
In May 1941, Stalin twice gave his permission. Once for approx. 500,000 and once for approx. 300,000. Right or wrong?
Wrong. see post 748. See Glantz When titans clashed page 26. Stalin ordered the partial mobilisation (400k) in April to defend with, due to a"threatening period of war", this was increased in May by another 800k. see
https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300077920
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
Zhukov says the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 8,000 level. You claimed the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?
Wrong. I noted C Sharp in June has 500k ( post 750) of the 1.2 million reservist called up in April and May ( post 748) assigned to Rifle Div to bring them up to 12000 strength by June 1. Rifle Div strength increase to planned 8k ( May)and then 12k (june) from the two intakes. Also round a hundred new formations were established from the remaining reservists.
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
You have also posted that the 1 June numbers posted by "Chuck" were subsequently increased in an attempt to get to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?
Wrong.
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
I'm going through this process to understand where the 500,000 were on 22 June 1941 and how many, when and where, others were called up.
Good luck with that, but i have made no claims for 22 June and i dont recall ever reading any author who has made such a study. Art will tell you they are all back at home having completed there 45 day visit.
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
If Zhukov is right, and "Chuck's" numbers are right, then those from the 500,000 allocated to the border formations have already reached their units. It doesn't seem too much of a stretch to assume those from the 500,000 allocated to non-border formations have also reached their units. Not so?
Depends, formations were raised from a region, travial distance from that region, or training centre, to where the formation was stationed on the border, could mean a lengthy train trip on a military train. one example would be the 28 Rifle Divisions tasked 13th May to move from the interior to the frontier, and complete the move by 10 July.
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
If Zhukov is right, then any subsequent increases in manpower after 1 June must have come from further call ups of reservists which have not been well documented in English language narratives? Not so? Isaev, for example identifies the manpower strength of each of the rifle divisions along the border in KOVO and the average looks to be nearer 10,000 than 8,000. So, how many more reservists were called up and when?
Glantz has this in most of his works.
For instance, trying to expand army divisions from their normal peacetime complement of 6,000 men to their full complement of 12,000 meant, in Glantz's analysis, that unit cohesion troughed right at the time of the German attack. With perfect hindsight, preexisting divisions might have done better in June 1941 at their peacetime levels without having to integrate reinforcements, though the author does not assert this.[5] And the horrors awaiting the brand-new divisions that would make up the reinforcing strategic echelons in 1941 are hinted at by reference to the new 251st Rifle division, formed from thousands of raw recruits, around a cadre of 400 NKVD (secret police) men. Especially with no material or rear support, life looked especially nasty, brutish and short for such a unit (p.220).
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EBl ... on&f=false
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019, 16:31
If you are right about the 500,000 being to take divisions up to the 12,000 level, and that that was occuring during June not earlier, then Isaev's numbers are explained - from 8,000 on the way to 12,000. However, the implication of this is that a significant chunk of the 500,000 are still not yet with their units and still lurking somewhere else. Not so? Where are they? Did they ever make it to their units or where they regrouped into 'new' units elsewhere?
Try Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4669
Or if your not a book person try here: as it has a lot of usfull stuff
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/de28/8 ... f23f6e.pdf
By the summer of 1940 a wartime mobilization plan existed and the strength of the active army continued to grow. In May 1940 there were 161 rifle divisions, 23 cavalry division, and 38 tank brigades.26 Of these, 34 divisions were in the Far East and 17 divisions were on the Turkish border.27 Most of the 161 rifle divisions were below strength. There were eight tables of organization for infantry divisions and three for cavalry, as follows:
14,000 man division 3 12,550 man division 15 12,000 man division 80 Motorized rifle division (12,000 men) 3 Motorized division (12,000 men) 4 9,000 man division 3 Mountain division (9,000) 10 6,000 man division 43 Total rifle divisions 161
The Soviet Union was divided into military districts, which were administrative organizations charged with inducting and training men, forming new units, and other duties, similar to the German Wehrkreis. In the mobilization plan the number of divisions allocated to each district was proportionate to the population of the district. In the 18 months before the war, each district created a number of divisions almost equal to those existing before 1940.
The restructuring of the Soviet rifle division had begun in earnest in 1938. The territorial divisions were eliminated. The plan approved by the General Staff in March 1938 called for the creation of 96 rifle divisions of four types: two levels of divisions on the borders, one level for the interior, and the mountain division. The reorganization was to be completed by the end of the year. 6 The two levels on the borders were the wartime with a shtat (table of organization and equipment) of 14,483 men and the "12,000" with a shtat of 10,291 men. The interior divisions, the "6,000, " had a shtat of 5,864 men and the mountain divisions had a shtat of 8,829 men. 7 The four tables of organization were retained until June 1941.
The wartime division shtat included three rifle regiments, two artillery regiments, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion, a transport battalion, and a medical battalion. The equipment included 10,420 rifles, 1,204 machine pistols, 558 machine guns, 12 152mm howitzers, 20 122mm howitzers, 16 76mm guns, 66 mortars, 16 light tanks, 13 armored cars, 558 motor vehicles, 99 tractors, and 3,000 horses. 8 In January 1939, divisions on the borders averaged 6,959 men, while those in the interior had 5,220 men. 9 The shtat of the "12,000" and "6,000" divisions had fewer rifles, trucks, and horses, but had most of the weapons of the wartime division in 1939. 10
Few if any divisions were at wartime strength when the Germans attacked in June 1941. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the average Russian rifle division had from 8,000 to 12,000 men and 80 to 90% of authorized
-78-
weapons. By July 1941 the official strength of the division decreased to 10,859 men, 171 machine pistols, 270 machine guns, 54 76mm and 45mm guns, and 203 motor vehicles. 11 By mid-July 1941, the average was down to 6,000.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.