The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Art
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Art » 30 Oct 2019 19:19

Hanny wrote:
30 Oct 2019 14:11
Try reading the books and links i posted.
Ok, so what was the name of the TO&E with 12000 men which you found in these links and books?
Try reading the links, you will learn that the training centres existed and what function they served
That can solved very simply. Just give me any example of this alleged "training center" in existence from 1 April to 21 June 41 - how it was called, where it was located etc, and I admit that I was wrong.
Your not even going to try and explain why everyone went home after 45 days, leaving 00s of newly raised Divisons empty of personne
Because they were no empty of personnel. Again, there were two tables of peace-time organization with 10300 and 5900 men. This peace-time strength was provided by regular military personnel. Reservists that came to divisions for a training period were a surplus to this peace-time strength. After their release the actual number of men would simply return to a level prescribed by peace-time TO&Es (10300 or 5900 again). I just don't see which part of this explanation can be a problem to understand.
means every data point on existing formations we have is wrong then
Yep, I was sort of hinting at that in one of my previous messages.
Your quite right about STAVKA, its "The Main directorate of Formation and Staffing of the Red Army" that did that in 41.(Glavuprafrom)
Which didn't exist before July 41 either.
Fact free.
No, that's a fact, and more than that - a common knowledge in relatively modern literature. See, for example, "Stalin's missed chance" by M. Meltyukhov (*). By the start of 1941 almost no reservists were left in the Red Army and it was almost entirely composed of recruits serving regular term, and carrier officers and NCOs.
(*) I would recommend this book to those interested in the organization history of the RA in 1939-41 on a serious level.
Your own post of 25 million excluding those already in service, means your last post was a rather large error in maths.
Eh, what kind of error?
There is no such thing as a reservists temporarily inducted for training.
The Soviet law on military service of 1939 said a completely opposite thing:
From Article 33: Reservists who have completed military service are called for a two-months training up to six times while they stay below 35 years old. Reservists who are trained as NCOs are called for training up to three months long. Reserve NCO are called for a three-months training up to six time while they stay 35 below years old. etc etc
....
Article 46: All reservists called for training in the Army or Navy are provided with material supplies form the state.
Article 48: Workers and employees called for training retain their jobs and positions for a duration of a call-up and receive a half of their average wages from their employers....
Article 49. Reserve officers for a duration of a call-up receive wages from their units in accordance with the regulation on wages for Army and Navy personnel.
And so on ans so forth.

The same law draws a clear distinction between regular military personnel (военнослужащие) and reservists called for training with the military (военнообазанные, призванные на учебный сбор). They are even called with different terms, as you can see.

Generally, speaking call-up of reservists for training is a usual thing in military forces of the modern time. One can easily find recent examples:
https://www.baltictimes.com/estonian_go ... eservists/

So, returning to the original question, what type of personnel your numbers are supposed to mean exactly? What do you think?
The books and links already given refer to vpolzanie v voinu, and the authors understand
Good for them. However, what the Soviet military understood by mobilization was a different and specific thing. Namely, a transition from peace-time to wartime organization and TO&Es. No transition - no mobilization.

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 30 Oct 2019 19:35

Is it incorrect to request the esteemed Forum Members posting non-English quotes to also provide a translation ("official", or published, or theirs)?

Art's post above provides an excellent example how this can (should?) be done.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 30 Oct 2019 19:59

MarkN wrote:
30 Oct 2019 18:49
Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019 17:59
When an army you think was almost destroyed ,turns out to be alive and kicking, you got it wrong somewhere.
There most certainly were mistakes made by FHO and the wider Heer. There can be no doubt about that. And we are fortunate in having many years of hindsight and open archives to analyse exactly where the mistakes were made, their scale and their impact on events. It is foolish just to believe the words of the Heer generals who failed and tried to shift blame for their own failures in post war memoirs and narratives.

We are unable to verify your unsubstantiated handwave because it us just a quote of another handwave which is itself a quote of yet another handwave.

In the absence of any numbers/data, it is impossible to verify whether the FHO handwave is true and accurate or simply a handwave to deflect attention away from a more serious error that they are trying to cover up and hide.
The truth is you have a pet theory and are in denial of everything that contradicts that. You are even starting to see conspiracies, judging by your last phrase.
FHO guessed wrong because it lacked data and then revised its assessment. If the FHO had guessed right ,the red army would-have been destroyed. It was not so the guess was wrong . I need no numbers to accept that.
I love the phrase about the generals and their narratives. One of these often repeated generalities which is supported by nothing.
And FHO is not on trial here.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 30 Oct 2019 20:06

BDV wrote:
30 Oct 2019 18:26
Aida1 wrote: Oh really. What is silly is putting into doubt the more realistic assessment of the red army by FHO in december 1941 based on reality .So, i do accept the statement about being surprised by the amount of equipment the red army had . When an army you think was almost destroyed ,turns out to be alive and kicking, you got it wrong somewhere.
FHO: 500 RKKA divisionen x 18000 mann = 9 millionen

STAVKA: total mobilizable strength of RKKA is 9 million.

So where is the mistake?!?
I already gave a quote about the doubts the FHO had about the ability to really mobilise the number of men that could theoretically be mobilised. Had to do with labour shortages, lack of officers and material.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 30 Oct 2019 21:00

BDV wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:35
Is it incorrect to request the esteemed Forum Members posting non-English quotes to also provide a translation ("official", or published, or theirs)?

Art's post above provides an excellent example how this can (should?) be done.
If l have the original text, l post the original text in whatever language it is. Readers then have EXACTLY the same words as l do. They do not suffer my translation of the text. I do not have to suffer complaints about the quality of the translation. That's my approach. Perhaps it does not suit you, but in this day and age getting a translation is just a simple cut&paste away. If that's too much effort for you.....

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 30 Oct 2019 21:04

Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:59
I love the phrase about the generals and their narratives. One of these often repeated generalities which is supported by nothing.
I knew you would like it. That's why l put it in. For giggles.

I didn't expect you to respond like that. But BINGO!

...supported by nothing. That's the perfect description of your handwaves.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 30 Oct 2019 21:14

MarkN wrote:
30 Oct 2019 21:04
Aida1 wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:59
I love the phrase about the generals and their narratives. One of these often repeated generalities which is supported by nothing.
I knew you would like it. That's why l put it in. For giggles.

I didn't expect you to respond like that. But BINGO!

...supported by nothing. That's the perfect description of your handwaves.
At least i gave two sources that support what i stated. You only have an unrealistic nonsensical pet theory about which you are clearly obsesessed given the way you express yourself.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 30 Oct 2019 23:40

Aida1 wrote: At least i gave two sources that support what i stated.
Can you repeat the sources, and what the sources actually say. Please.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 31 Oct 2019 08:48

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19

Ok, so what was the name of the TO&E with 12000 men which you found in these links and books?
Try reading the books and links i posted. I answered this already several times.

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19
That can solved very simply. Just give me any example of this alleged "training center" in existence from 1 April to 21 June 41 - how it was called, where it was located etc, and I admit that I was wrong.
Try reading the books and links i posted. I answered this already several times.
Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19
Because they were no empty of personnel. Again, there were two tables of peace-time organization with 10300 and 5900 men. This peace-time strength was provided by regular military personnel. Reservists that came to divisions for a training period were a surplus to this peace-time strength. After their release the actual number of men would simply return to a level prescribed by peace-time TO&Es (10300 or 5900 again). I just don't see which part of this explanation can be a problem to understand.
Try reading the books and links i posted. I answered this already several times.

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19
Yep, I was sort of hinting at that in one of my previous messages.
Ok, so every author is wrong, all archival data is wrong, but you on your own with no one else to support you are right.
Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19
Which didn't exist before July 41 either.
The Main directorate of Formation and Staffing of the Red Army, who raised new formations, and provided increases in personnel to existing formations, along with the The Main directorate of Military Training, who turned civilians into reservists, and the The Main directorate of the rear who organised the movement of reservist to the Fronts.


Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 19:19
Eh, what kind of error?
Two statements of maths, if one is correct the other cannot be.

At which point its best i leave you to have the last word as im more interested in history than revisionism.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 31 Oct 2019 09:20

BDV wrote:
30 Oct 2019 23:40
Aida1 wrote: At least i gave two sources that support what i stated.
Can you repeat the sources, and what the sources actually say. Please.
Google on Pahl Fremde Heere Ost and you will find the book by Pahl. Google on David Thomas foreign armies east and you will find his article.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 31 Oct 2019 13:16

Aida1 wrote:
BDV:
FHO: 500 RKKA divisionen x 18000 mann = 9 millionen

STAVKA: total mobilizable strength of RKKA is 9 million.

So where is the mistake?!?

I already gave a quote about the doubts the FHO had about the ability to really mobilise the number of men that could theoretically be mobilised. Had to do with labour shortages, lack of officers and material.
Those doubts were significantly reduced by August, and gone by November. It was GROFAZ with his coterie of deskjockeys and field commanders (although field commanders were first to come to their senses due to developments in front of their noses) that saw fit to ignore those data, in July, August, and November.

And the logistical issues of Barbarossa were due EXACTLY to that triumvirate ignoring FHO warnings.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 31 Oct 2019 13:24

Art wrote:
29 Oct 2019 21:42
MarkN wrote:
29 Oct 2019 21:14
How many reservists were actually called up, by whom, when and where they ended up (formation and/or location) is not found in Zhukov and won't be found by handwave guesses.
Pages 469-478 here:
http://militera.lib.ru/h/0/djvu/zaharov_mv02.djvu
Thank you. I am currently plodding through the first edition of that very book. I'll get to the annexes soon. :)
Hanny wrote:
30 Oct 2019 17:06
Or if your not a book person try here: as it has a lot of usfull stuff https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/de28/8 ... f23f6e.pdf
I don't have a problem with books. I have a healthy disrespect for authors. ;)

Thanks for info and links you posted. I won't respond to them now as l fear you may not appreciate me highlighting some of the contradictions, flaws and presumptions made within.

However, as a note of concilliation between the two of you, it seems obvious to me that you are talking through each other more determined to assert your selfimposed intellectual superiority and in doing so demonstrating the complete opposite.

Art is quite right regarding the toe/shtat. There were only 3 extant for rifle divisions when the Germans attacked. At the same time, Hanny is correct that those same rifle divisions were having their manpower increased to certain levels: 6,000, 8,000, 12,000 etc. The two are not contradictory. It is doubtful a single rifle division conformed exactly to any of the shtat or transitional manpower targets.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 31 Oct 2019 14:47

BDV wrote:
31 Oct 2019 13:16
Aida1 wrote:
BDV:
FHO: 500 RKKA divisionen x 18000 mann = 9 millionen

STAVKA: total mobilizable strength of RKKA is 9 million.

So where is the mistake?!?

I already gave a quote about the doubts the FHO had about the ability to really mobilise the number of men that could theoretically be mobilised. Had to do with labour shortages, lack of officers and material.
Those doubts were significantly reduced by August, and gone by November. It was GROFAZ with his coterie of deskjockeys and field commanders (although field commanders were first to come to their senses due to developments in front of their noses) that saw fit to ignore those data, in July, August, and November.

And the logistical issues of Barbarossa were due EXACTLY to that triumvirate ignoring FHO warnings.
Hardly as it was FHO who consistently underestimated the red army and even Halder started to have doubts in august.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 31 Oct 2019 16:55

Aida1 wrote:
31 Oct 2019 14:47
Hardly as it was FHO who consistently underestimated the red army and even Halder started to have doubts in august.
Halder's doubts in August were well founded.

The evidence coming from the front line was clear: the plan that he was responsible for had failed. That he only started to have doubts at this point is an indicator of hubris and delusion. Or is is it a sign of incompetence or stupidity? Take your pick.

More worryingly, instead of make an effort to understand why his plan was failing and doing something about it, he sought scapegoats to pass the blame onto - the FHO - and buried his head in the sand to the real problem and changed nothing.

The FHO hadn't underestimated, Halder hadn't bothered to listen and just worked from an imaginary Red Army strength existing only in his head!

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or plain stupidity. Take your pick.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 31 Oct 2019 18:07

Art wrote:
30 Oct 2019 18:26
AbollonPolweder wrote:
30 Oct 2019 17:39
Not so fine as it seems to you! Learn Russian language and logic. :)
Who is the author of this document? Zhukov!
I've talked about Zhukov's memoir. In his memoir Zhukov didn't said that the call-up of reservists of 1941 was BUS. Neither Zakharoiv said that etc.
Were BUSes announced until June 22? Yes!
Where they were announced and by whom?
Do you want me to give an example of using this very abbreviation "BUS" in official documents? 8O
The phrase "large training camps" was used in 1939 documents before the attack on Poland. Do you want this abbreviation “BUS” to appear in the summer of 1941 as a harbinger of yet another campaign to the West? You are inattentively reading documents, I specifically highlighted:
а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».
The so-called, alas, the so-called. After the start of the war, such a phrase can be found in the documents of 1941, when it came to hidden mobilization.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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