The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#856

Post by ljadw » 02 Nov 2019, 13:26

All this has nothing to do with the OP = Logistics of Barbarossa .

Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#857

Post by Hanny » 02 Nov 2019, 13:47

Boby wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:07
Kampfwert is a precise military term.

60-65 rifle/motorized plus 10 panzer equivalent means the total strength of the front at full manpower divisions. FHO calculated 260 rifle and motorized, 50 panzer and 20 cavalry, thus

60-65 * 270 = 22-24% average strength
10 * 50 = 20%
Ok, so a German ID with a basic combat load of munitions has a firepower of 6.2 tons of munitions.
Its wargamed out to face a SU Rifle Div 9/39 with 4.9 t, but ends up facing a 5.41 ID with 4.3 t, by 7/41 its facing a ID with 1.7T. Hence Halder knows by August the SU has ID of a far lower level of combat power/Kampfwert and is commenting on it.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#858

Post by MarkN » 02 Nov 2019, 14:00

Art wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:20
MarkN wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 19:46
If poster Art's suggestion that the 500,000 March call ups were principally for 45 days and no more, they'll have already returned home by the end of May. Not so?
First, it's literal meaning of relevant documents not my suggestion. Second, there was no"March call". On 8 March 1941 the Politburo approved the plan of reservists call-up during the year, which was to start later, principally beginning from the second half of May and on. Only several weeks after that the Red Army's General Staff sent relevant directives to military districts which detailed the schedule of reservists' call-up (units, starting day, duration). This schedule was revised later, according the the revised schedule in most divisions call of reservists was to begin in late May - early June.
So they were not in much of a hurry then.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#859

Post by MarkN » 02 Nov 2019, 14:14

Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:38
You have no clue.
:lol:
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:38
If you affected estimated losses on the total strength of the enemy, you would end up overstating what is left as most of the losses are sustained by the combat element, particularly by the infantry. So you do not need to inflict 100 % losses on a unit to render it combat ineffective. It will rarely happen you will destroy 100% of the total strength of a division .Even in encirclements part of the support units could have escaped. And you can mostly reconstitute them .Even 6 th Army was reconstituted after Stalingrad.
What was mostly underestimated was the ability of the red army to refit existing divisions and set up new ones and underestimating war production was an important aspect in that as FHO admitted itself. That the USSR had large human reserves was not unknown but you need to be able equip them.
A wall of words to deflect away from historical evidence showing that the OKH/Heer wrote off Red Army divisions in a way that significantly overstated their true combat success.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#860

Post by MarkN » 02 Nov 2019, 14:20

Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:27
MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 02:14
Aida1 wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 23:15
MarkN wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 22:33
Aida1 wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 21:48
You are misrepresenting here. On p 276 Thomas states: "Taking as the basis of computation approximately 200 rifle divisions and other units FHO assumes the following strength figures : field army 4 million , rear services ca 0,6 million ,internal troops 1,6 million. ."
You have added the 1,6 million internal troops to the field army to blow the numbers of the field army up. Dividing 5,6 million by 200 to get the strength of a socalled notional division is therefore nonsense . Notional divisions do not exist. Only real ones do. And a field army consists of more than divisions. There are levels above that. And we do see the 200 number here.
Anybody taking the time to read the evidence and wanting to understand the numbers will recognise you posting complete drivvel.

Why are you so determined to deny historical reality?
You are the one that manipulates numbers to suit your theory. I clearly proved that. Coming up with the idea of notional divisions is the real drivel.
You proved nothing. You posted whatever came into your head to deny the numbers of historical reality.

The FHO did exactly the same calculation using 'notional divisions' in another briefing. Instead of 200, they used 191. So, tell me, according to your "proof", what is the answer that comes out? Does the number for field army come down from 4 million, the number for internal troops come down from 1,6 million or the number for rear services come down from 0,6 million?
The 4 million is not only the combat divisions; it is also includes the levels above it and what depends from that, . So the 4 million is not only the strength of the 200 divisions as such.
Correct. The 'notional division' used a a strategic planning tool is a number approximating to a field division and an allowance for all the non-divisional assets alongside it.
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:27
In addition , you added up the 1,6 million internal troops to the 4 million to make the field army look bigger.
The two are added together because the two make up the 200 'notional divisions' total.

When FHO did the same calculation for 191 divisions, was the size of the field army lower, the rear services or the home forces?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#861

Post by MarkN » 02 Nov 2019, 14:49

Hanny wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 10:49
Its when you called up and for what purpose, ie in 1940 to invade the Baltics in an offensive war, after which your demobilised.
I appreciate there is an ongoing debate as to which Russian history is the true Russian history and what scale of victimhood can they rightfully claim. I know it is also used by Nazi apologizers trying to argue the pre-emptive strike nonsense. Personally, l am not the slightest bit interested in those discussions.

Zhukov and many others point to approx 800,000 reservists being added to the standing Red Army just before 22 June 1941. In the Zakharov annexes that Art pointed me to l noticed a number of about 950,000 mentionned.

What interests me is not whether those reservists were called under false pretences, but where they were. Had all 800,000 (or 950,000) reached their units or not? Art is now suggesting these reservists only started to leave home in late May or later. Just how many of them were able to incorporated into their planned formations and how many got scooped up into 'new' build divisions?

What l'm trying to get at is what scale of reservists called up for border formations never arrived - and were thus to be found in other formations at a later point. If the Heer is writing down an entire division of - in their eyes 14,5k or 18,8k - at the border, but the actual division only had 9k manpower, the Heer is fooling itself. Especially when the 'missing' element shows up with a gun at the next roadblock.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#862

Post by Aida1 » 02 Nov 2019, 15:19

MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 14:14
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:38
You have no clue.
:lol:
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:38
If you affected estimated losses on the total strength of the enemy, you would end up overstating what is left as most of the losses are sustained by the combat element, particularly by the infantry. So you do not need to inflict 100 % losses on a unit to render it combat ineffective. It will rarely happen you will destroy 100% of the total strength of a division .Even in encirclements part of the support units could have escaped. And you can mostly reconstitute them .Even 6 th Army was reconstituted after Stalingrad.
What was mostly underestimated was the ability of the red army to refit existing divisions and set up new ones and underestimating war production was an important aspect in that as FHO admitted itself. That the USSR had large human reserves was not unknown but you need to be able equip them.
A wall of words to deflect away from historical evidence showing that the OKH/Heer wrote off Red Army divisions in a way that significantly overstated their true combat success.
No. It is you that has no clue what it means to render a unit combat ineffective. It means less than you pretend.
You do not understand what combat power means.
Last edited by Aida1 on 02 Nov 2019, 15:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#863

Post by Aida1 » 02 Nov 2019, 15:25

MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 14:20
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:27
MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 02:14
Aida1 wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 23:15
MarkN wrote:
01 Nov 2019, 22:33
Anybody taking the time to read the evidence and wanting to understand the numbers will recognise you posting complete drivvel.

Why are you so determined to deny historical reality?
You are the one that manipulates numbers to suit your theory. I clearly proved that. Coming up with the idea of notional divisions is the real drivel.
You proved nothing. You posted whatever came into your head to deny the numbers of historical reality.

The FHO did exactly the same calculation using 'notional divisions' in another briefing. Instead of 200, they used 191. So, tell me, according to your "proof", what is the answer that comes out? Does the number for field army come down from 4 million, the number for internal troops come down from 1,6 million or the number for rear services come down from 0,6 million?
The 4 million is not only the combat divisions; it is also includes the levels above it and what depends from that, . So the 4 million is not only the strength of the 200 divisions as such.
Correct. The 'notional division' used a a strategic planning tool is a number approximating to a field division and an allowance for all the non-divisional assets alongside it.
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 11:27
In addition , you added up the 1,6 million internal troops to the 4 million to make the field army look bigger.
The two are added together because the two make up the 200 'notional divisions' total.

When FHO did the same calculation for 191 divisions, was the size of the field army lower, the rear services or the home forces?
You have no clue. The internal troops are not part of the field army. There are only real divisions with specific strengths and at the levels above it you have other specific assets. There is not such a thing as a notional division. You are using that notion to try to make look German estimates of losses inflicted higher than they were. Losses are mostly inflicted on the combat strength of real divisions.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#864

Post by MarkN » 02 Nov 2019, 15:40

Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 15:25
The internal troops are not part of the field army.
Correct. And that is why Feldheer and Heimatstruppen were listed separately in FHO calculations.
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 15:25
There are only real divisions with specific strengths and at the levels above it you have other specific assets. There is not such a thing as a notional division. You are using that notion to try to make look German estimates of losses inflicted higher than they were. Losses are mostly inflicted on the combat strength of real divisions.
So, when FHO did the same calculation for 191 divisions, was the size of the field army lower, the rear services or the home forces? Did FHO reduce the size of the Feldheer by 9 divisions, the rear services by 9 divisions or the Heimatstruppen by 9 divisions?

It is a simple question that you seem too scared to answer in case it shows all your posts for what they are: history denying garbage.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#865

Post by Aida1 » 02 Nov 2019, 19:54

MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 15:40
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 15:25
The internal troops are not part of the field army.
Correct. And that is why Feldheer and Heimatstruppen were listed separately in FHO calculations.
Aida1 wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 15:25
There are only real divisions with specific strengths and at the levels above it you have other specific assets. There is not such a thing as a notional division. You are using that notion to try to make look German estimates of losses inflicted higher than they were. Losses are mostly inflicted on the combat strength of real divisions.
So, when FHO did the same calculation for 191 divisions, was the size of the field army lower, the rear services or the home forces? Did FHO reduce the size of the Feldheer by 9 divisions, the rear services by 9 divisions or the Heimatstruppen by 9 divisions?

It is a simple question that you seem too scared to answer in case it shows all your posts for what they are: history denying garbage.
Only the field army is somewhat lower in strength. You should be a bit more modest after all the garbage you spewed out when you deducted an 80 % combat power löss from your “ notional divisions” in order to make the OKH look dumb and instead looking not very smart yourself.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#866

Post by AbollonPolweder » 03 Nov 2019, 18:35

MarkN wrote:
02 Nov 2019, 14:49
...
Zhukov and many others point to approx 800,000 reservists being added to the standing Red Army just before 22 June 1941. In the Zakharov annexes that Art pointed me to l noticed a number of about 950,000 mentionned.
...
What l'm trying to get at is what scale of reservists called up for border formations never arrived - and were thus to be found in other formations at a later point. If the Heer is writing down an entire division of - in their eyes 14,5k or 18,8k - at the border, but the actual division only had 9k manpower, the Heer is fooling itself. Especially when the 'missing' element shows up with a gun at the next roadblock.
How interesting! Zhukov and Vasilevsky name the same number of called-up reservists. But! Vasilevsky, like Zakharov, speaks of "the end of May and beginning of June," and Zhukov speaks of "the eve of war." Understand how you want! Military people do not write like that. In addition, all three of them were at different times the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. They had every opportunity to give the exact number of reservists for any date. They did not do this, because they could not do it, because the then Laws on the Preservation of State and Military Secret did not allow the publication of such data. Information from all three marshals up to the publication of original documents can be considered a fake story.
ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б)

N: 28
8 марта 1941 г.

155. О проведении учебных сборов военнообязанных запаса в 1941 году и привлечении на сборы из народного хозяйства лошадей и автотранспорта.

Утвердить следующий проект постановления СНК СССР: "Совет Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР постановляет:

1. Разрешить НКО призвать на учебные сборы в 1941 году военнообязанных запаса в количестве 975.870 человек, из них:

сроком на 90 дней 192.869 человек
на 60 дней – 25.000 человек
на 45 дней – 754.896 человек
на 30 дней – 3.105 человек

2. Разрешить НКО привлечь на учебные сборы из народного хозяйства сроком на 45 дней 57.500 лошадей и 1.680 автомашин, с распределением по республикам, краям и областям согласно приложению.

3. Сборы провести:

а) в резервных стрелковых дивизиях тремя очередями:

первая очередь – с 15 мая по 1 июля
вторая очередь – с 10 июля по 25 августа
третья очередь – с 5 сентября по 20 октября;

б) в стрелковых дивизиях шеститысячного состава в период – с 15 мая по 1 июля;
в) в стрелковых дивизиях трехтысячного состава в период – с 15 августа по 1 октября;
г) прочие сборы проводить очередями на протяжении всего 1941 года.
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in fact the highest, but unconstitutional authority (you can call it “Red Cosa Nostra”) planned everything. The total number of reservists for call up in 1941- 975,870, the time period - from May 15 to October 20.
First, from May 15 to July 1, divisions of 6,000 people were to be replenished, then divisions of 3,000 people.
The first line of reservists for reserve rifle divisions and divisions in 6000 men takes place at the same time from May 15 to July 1. These are the same divisions. These divisions receive another 6000 people each.
See document:
https://slyfox78rus.livejournal.com/41521.html
As a result, we have two documents: previously laid out document No. 272, signed by Zhukov and document No. 825ss
16. 6. 1941, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Baltic Special District, Lieutenant General Klenov. Serious documents. Aren’t they? According to these documents, border divisions have already long been brought up to 75-80% war-time TOEs, and 6,000 people are added to each reserve divisions. Reserve divisions have a time lag of several days. They do not meet the first blow of the enemy. When and how they took their first battles are different stories for different divisions.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#867

Post by MarkN » 04 Nov 2019, 00:43

AbollonPolweder wrote:
03 Nov 2019, 18:35
ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б)

N: 28
8 марта 1941 г.

155. О проведении учебных сборов военнообязанных запаса в 1941 году и привлечении на сборы из народного хозяйства лошадей и автотранспорта.

Утвердить следующий проект постановления СНК СССР: "Совет Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР постановляет:

1. Разрешить НКО призвать на учебные сборы в 1941 году военнообязанных запаса в количестве 975.870 человек, из них:

сроком на 90 дней 192.869 человек
на 60 дней – 25.000 человек
на 45 дней – 754.896 человек
на 30 дней – 3.105 человек

2. Разрешить НКО привлечь на учебные сборы из народного хозяйства сроком на 45 дней 57.500 лошадей и 1.680 автомашин, с распределением по республикам, краям и областям согласно приложению.

3. Сборы провести:

а) в резервных стрелковых дивизиях тремя очередями:

первая очередь – с 15 мая по 1 июля
вторая очередь – с 10 июля по 25 августа
третья очередь – с 5 сентября по 20 октября;

б) в стрелковых дивизиях шеститысячного состава в период – с 15 мая по 1 июля;
в) в стрелковых дивизиях трехтысячного состава в период – с 15 августа по 1 октября;
г) прочие сборы проводить очередями на протяжении всего 1941 года.
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in fact the highest, but unconstitutional authority (you can call it “Red Cosa Nostra”) planned everything. The total number of reservists for call up in 1941- 975,870, the time period - from May 15 to October 20.
First, from May 15 to July 1, divisions of 6,000 people were to be replenished, then divisions of 3,000 people.
The first line of reservists for reserve rifle divisions and divisions in 6000 men takes place at the same time from May 15 to July 1. These are the same divisions. These divisions receive another 6000 people each.
See document:
https://slyfox78rus.livejournal.com/41521.html
As a result, we have two documents: previously laid out document No. 272, signed by Zhukov and document No. 825ss
16. 6. 1941, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Baltic Special District, Lieutenant General Klenov. Serious documents. Aren’t they? According to these documents, border divisions have already long been brought up to 75-80% war-time TOEs, and 6,000 people are added to each reserve divisions. Reserve divisions have a time lag of several days. They do not meet the first blow of the enemy. When and how they took their first battles are different stories for different divisions.
Russian is not my first language. Perhaps that is the problem. But l cannot find in any of these documents where it says "... border divisions have already long been brought up to 75-80% war-time TOEs".

As l wrote earlier, l am trying to research and analyse what numbers were where and when. All of these documents are orders defining what higher commands want to happen. They are not reports of what units and formations actually have. To what extent should we accept that these orders were carried out as per instructions?

From the document №306. ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б) №28 8 марта 1941 г. you posted above, 975,870 total to be called up during the year at different stages. Therefore, according to this document not all would be active at the same time. And, from the dates, we can see the majority would probably not be with their units on 22 June 1941. If this document is fact and Zhukov et all are fake stories, then those fake stories were over estimates of actual numbers mobilized by 22 June.

The final documents you link to are six orders sent out to divisions to collect their allocation of 6,000 reservists on 24 June 1941. On that date, two of the divisions had already been overrun by elements of 3.Pz.Grp. So, what happened to those 12,000 reservists? Did they never get sent for collection, get overrun waiting for divisional transport that never came or get scooped up by some other formation?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#868

Post by AbollonPolweder » 04 Nov 2019, 21:14

MarkN wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 00:43
...
Russian is not my first language. Perhaps that is the problem. But l cannot find in any of these documents where it says "... border divisions have already long been brought up to 75-80% war-time TOEs".

As l wrote earlier, l am trying to research and analyse what numbers were where and when. All of these documents are orders defining what higher commands want to happen. They are not reports of what units and formations actually have. To what extent should we accept that these orders were carried out as per instructions?

From the document №306. ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б) №28 8 марта 1941 г. you posted above, 975,870 total to be called up during the year at different stages. Therefore, according to this document not all would be active at the same time. And, from the dates, we can see the majority would probably not be with their units on 22 June 1941. If this document is fact and Zhukov et all are fake stories, then those fake stories were over estimates of actual numbers mobilized by 22 June.

The final documents you link to are six orders sent out to divisions to collect their allocation of 6,000 reservists on 24 June 1941. On that date, two of the divisions had already been overrun by elements of 3.Pz.Grp. So, what happened to those 12,000 reservists? Did they never get sent for collection, get overrun waiting for divisional transport that never came or get scooped up by some other formation?
"But l cannot find ..." It is here in document № 272:
Document No. 272
Note by the NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) - I.V. Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - V.M. Molotov with the outline of the mobilization deployment of the Red Army

no later than 12/02/1941 no/number


Порядок проведения мобилизации
Мобилизационным планом 1941 года предусматривается проведение мобилизации по двум вариантам:
а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».

По литеру «Б» поднимаемые части только усиливались на 75–80 % до штата военного времени.
Ввиду того, что вариант по литеру «Б» предусматривался в основном только для частей и соединений, прикрывающих границу, и поскольку по мобилизационному плану 1941 года пограничные части по мирному времени в настоящее время содержатся в усиленном составе, считаю разрабатывать вариант литер «Б»
нецелесообразным.

(According to the letter “B”, the units being raised only have been increased by 75–80% of war-time TOEs.In view of the fact that the option for letter “B” was provided mainly only for units and formations covering the border, and since, according to the 1941 mobilization plan, the border units in peacetime are currently being reinforced, I consider it unreasonable to develop an option for letter “B” .)
...
Народный комиссар обороны Союза ССР

Маршал Советского Союза С. Тимошенко

Начальник Генерального штаба Красной Армии

генерал армии Жуков
ЦА МО РФ. Ф. 16. Оп. 2154. Д. 4. Лл. 199–250. Заверенная копия.
"From the document №306. ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б) №28 8 марта 1941 г. you posted above, 975,870 total to be called up during the year at different stages. Therefore, according to this document not all would be active at the same time. "
Right! But here Vasilevsky and Zakharov will help to figure it out. If at the end of May - beginning of June, that is, about 800 thousand were called up in 2-3 weeks .. and the Politburo approved the number 975870, then 175870 remained to be called up. And until June 22 there were a couple more weeks during which it could be transferred to the West a minimum of 500 thousand, given the speed of the previous 800 thousand. Right?
"On that date, two of the divisions had already been overrun by elements of 3.Pz.Grp. So, what happened to those 12,000 reservists? Did they never get sent for collection, get overrun waiting for divisional transport that never came or get scooped up by some other formation?"
Good question! That is why I asked you to call on a specific division when you put forward your version of 50% of the forces of divisions on the western border of the USSR.
Now when we know that the border divisions, as Zhukov claims (doc. No. 272), were reinforced already in the winter of 1941 to 75-80% of the war-time TOE, and even reserve divisions (doc. No. 825 cc) were being strengthened, your version is , at least, doubtful. Isn't it?
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MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#869

Post by MarkN » 04 Nov 2019, 22:42

AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 21:14
"But l cannot find ..." It is here in document № 272:
Ahhh! Thank you. I only looked in the 'newv documents you linked to.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 21:14
Порядок проведения мобилизации

Мобилизационным планом 1941 года предусматривается проведение мобилизации по двум вариантам:

а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».

В этом случае призыв военнообязанных запаса, а также поставка приписанного к частям автотранспорта и конского состава производится персональными повестками, без объявления приказов НКО.

б) второй вариант предусматривает проведение общей мобилизации всех Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР или отдельных военных округов открытым порядком, т.е. когда мобилизация объявляется Указом Президиума Верховного Совета СССР (статья 49, пункт «Л» Конституции СССР). В данном случае призыв военнообязанных производится приказами народного комиссара обороны, расклеиваемыми для общего сведения (в порядке ст. 72–73 Закона о всеобщей воинской обязанности).

По мобилизационному плану 1938–1939 гг. проведение «Больших учебных сборов» (скрытой мобилизации) предусматривалось также по двум вариантам, т.е. по литеру «А» и «Б».

По литеру «А» поднимались части по штатам военного времени, имеющие срок готовности только до М-10.

По литеру «Б» поднимаемые части только усиливались на 75–80 % до штата военного времени.

Ввиду того, что вариант по литеру «Б» предусматривался в основном только для частей и соединений, прикрывающих границу, и поскольку по мобилизационному плану 1941 года пограничные части по мирному времени в настоящее время содержатся в усиленном составе, считаю разрабатывать вариант литер «Б» нецелесообразным.


При скрытой мобилизации полагал бы необходимым оставить только один вариант в порядке «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)» на все части, независимо от их сроков готовности. Это мероприятие позволит отмобилизовать при необходимости отдельно каждую часть.

Прошу утвердить:

а) количество формирований и общую численность Красной Армии, развертываемой по мобилизационному плану 1941 г. в составе:
военнослужащих — 8 682 827 чел.
вольнонаемных — 187 880 чел.

б) общую численность формирований гражданскими наркоматами в составе:
военнослужащих — 242 126 чел.
вольнонаемных — 83 605 чел.

в) количество частей и численность формирования первого года войны в составе:
военнослужащих — 219 000 чел.
вольнонаемных — 225 000 чел.

г) количество призываемых при мобилизации возрастов военнообязанных запаса;

д) лимит поставки из народного хозяйства в период мобилизации автотранспорта, тракторов и конского поголовья.

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ: Ведомости за №№ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 на 17 лст. и проект постановления СНК Союза ССР на« » лст.
(According to the letter “B”, the units being raised only have been increased by 75–80% of war-time TOEs.In view of the fact that the option for letter “B” was provided mainly only for units and formations covering the border, and since, according to the 1941 mobilization plan, the border units in peacetime are currently being reinforced, I consider it unreasonable to develop an option for letter “B” .)
Hmmmm!

This is a proposal for a new (1941) mobilization plan. I read these particular part to be as follows:-

The 1938-39 mobilization plan defines two possible ways to mobilize via "big war games" call ups:
Option A: a full, mobilization to take formations up to a full war establishment
Option B: a partial, mobilization to take formations up to betwen 75-80% and full wartime establishment.
Since Option B was designed principally to augment border formations only, and the proposed 1941 Plan defines separately for border units to be brought up in strength, there is no need for an Option B in the new plan.

In otherwords, l do not believe this in any way represents a statement that border units are already at 75-80%. If so, it means they have been like that since 1938 - which is nonsense. But, since Russian is not my first language......
AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 21:14
"From the document №306. ВЫПИСКА ИЗ ПРОТОКОЛА РЕШЕНИЯ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ВКП(б) №28 8 марта 1941 г. you posted above, 975,870 total to be called up during the year at different stages. Therefore, according to this document not all would be active at the same time. "
Right! But here Vasilevsky and Zakharov will help to figure it out. If at the end of May - beginning of June, that is, about 800 thousand were called up in 2-3 weeks .. and the Politburo approved the number 975870, then 175870 remained to be called up. And until June 22 there were a couple more weeks during which it could be transferred to the West a minimum of 500 thousand, given the speed of the previous 800 thousand. Right?
Right? I don't think so. In your last post, you encouraged me to see Zhukov et al writings as false stories. Now you want to use the very words you considered "false" to evidence large numbers already at the front. That makes no sense to me at all.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 21:14
"On that date, two of the divisions had already been overrun by elements of 3.Pz.Grp. So, what happened to those 12,000 reservists? Did they never get sent for collection, get overrun waiting for divisional transport that never came or get scooped up by some other formation?"
Good question! That is why I asked you to call on a specific division when you put forward your version of 50% of the forces of divisions on the western border of the USSR.
I used 50% to illustrate a concept: the Heer writing down troops that were not even there played a large part in their later problems.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Nov 2019, 21:14
Now when we know that the border divisions, as Zhukov claims (doc. No. 272), were reinforced already in the winter of 1941 to 75-80% of the war-time TOE, and even reserve divisions (doc. No. 825 cc) were being strengthened, your version is , at least, doubtful. Isn't it?
No, l don't think it is/does. Option B was from the 1938-39 mobilization plan that Zhukov is proposing be dropped from the 1941 plan.

Russian is not my language, but your belief that border formations were at 75-85% of wartime establishment before February 1941 makes no sense to me defies the current histograph in a big way.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#870

Post by BDV » 04 Nov 2019, 23:27

ljadw wrote:All this has nothing to do with the OP = Logistics of Barbarossa .
Well, it has something - in that it could offer a fig leaf for the "TriumVirate" (GROFAZ+deskjockeys+panzerjockeys) decision to continue with (and actually move up the schedule for) the attack on Leningrad.

Which ended up as the endless pit that consumed the meager Barbarossa logistical resources.
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